REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT.

(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

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Chairman: Mr. Ismail FAHMY
(United Arab Republic).

AGENDA ITEM 28
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1. The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the first speaker on my list, I should like to consult the Committee on the proper time to close the list of speakers in the general debate. If there is no objection, my intention is to close the list next Monday at 1 p.m.

It was so decided.

2. Mr. BARNES (Liberia): Mr. Chairman, it is gratifying to see you occupy the high office of Chairman of this Committee at the time when the important question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is being considered.

3. We have every reason to be reassured that this Committee will continue to benefit from your wise and efficient guidance and leadership and that at the end of our labours not only shall we find ourselves on the right road to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons but also there will be a proliferation of goodwill and understanding among us here who represent the international community.

4. The death of the permanent representative of Botswana has brought grief to all of us. We extend to the people and Government of Botswana and the relatives of the deceased our heartfelt sympathy.

5. The position of the Government of Liberia on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been known since this burning question was first discussed in this house under the title "The wider dissemination of nuclear weapons".

6. As far back as the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, Liberia was one of the co-sponsors of resolution 1664 (XVI), adopted by 58 votes to 10 with 23 abstentions, which called upon the Secretary-General to make an inquiry into "the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive, in the future, nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of any other country".

7. That resolution followed closely on the heels of General Assembly resolution 1380 (XVI) of which Ireland was the author and which expressed concern about the spread of nuclear weapons through dissemination and proposed that the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, as it then was:

"...should consider appropriate means whereby this danger may be averted, including the feasibility of an international agreement, subject to inspection and control, whereby the Powers producing nuclear weapons would refrain from handing over the control of such weapons to any nation not possessing them and whereby the Powers not possessing such weapons would refrain from manufacturing them."

8. Two more General Assembly resolutions, 1576 (XV) and 1665 (XVI), were later adopted, both designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons by calling upon nuclear Powers not to relinquish control of those weapons to non-nuclear States and upon non-nuclear States not to manufacture or otherwise acquire them. What is quite significant about the four Assembly resolutions to which I have referred is that they are peculiarly silent in respect of the de-escalation of the nuclear armament of nuclear States, that is to say, the vertical non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. All that they call for is the non-transfer by nuclear Powers to non-nuclear Powers of nuclear weapons and information concerning their manufacture, and the renunciation by non-nuclear States of the acquisition of such weapons, which we have now learned to call horizontal non-proliferation.

9. Though General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) enunciated five principles in the elaboration of a non-proliferation treaty, it is to be observed that the draft treaty before us conforms more closely to the previous four resolutions than to resolution 2028 (XX). This led me to state in another forum about two weeks ago that what we are confronted with is a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear States, rather than a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

10. Be that as it may, my delegation is not unaware of the labours and compromises that went into the elaboration of this draft treaty. Like some delicate tapestry, each thread...
had to be woven into the fabric with patience and infinite care. It is also evident that tremendous difficulties confronted the parties in negotiating the draft treaty; hence my delegation does not take issue with the view that the efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States—the two super-Powers—in reaching agreement, though of a limited scope, on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be commended and applauded. We even join in this commendation of those two Powers.

11. Time and again the delegation of Liberia has stated in this house that the fundamental common concern and interest of the international community in the elimination of the threat of total destruction posed by the continued manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons and the moral responsibility of the nuclear Powers for the fate and destiny of mankind make it urgently imperative to pursue unremittingly and unrelentingly, in a climate of goodwill and compromise, the goal we have set for ourselves, which is a disarmed world—a world more secure, happier and ethically sounder for human existence.

12. However, it cannot be overemphasized that the hopes for lasting peace and international understanding which permeated the thoughts of the world community after the Second World War are far from being realized. World tensions mount from year to year, and even where some action seems to be possible to reduce such tensions, there is, for political or economic reasons, a lack of fortitude or courage to take that action on the part of those States which possess the ability to do so.

13. None of us here can so easily forget the unfortunate results of the use of the atomic bomb and the destruction of life and property as a result of the last world war. It is true that we dread even the thought of a nuclear war, knowing full well that the peoples of the developing nations and territories would be among the first to receive the cruel effects therefrom.

14. But it is precisely for those reasons that the non-nuclear States must conscientiously examine the responsibilities and obligations of both the nuclear and non-nuclear States under the provisions of the treaty which we are now called upon to endorse. If General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) is to constitute the guideline in the elaboration of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, then it is clear for all to see that this draft treaty is an inadequate specimen of what is required. A number of previous speakers have quoted verbatim the five principles enunciated in resolution 2028 (XX), and I therefore need not burden the record by a repetition.

15. A careful reading of the first and third principles makes it crystal-clear that the treaty should be of such a character as to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form—I repeat: in any form—and that it should be a step towards general and complete disarmament. In the light of these two principles, one would have hoped to see provision in the draft treaty for the de-escalation of the nuclear armament of the nuclear Powers. At least the nuclear Powers should have agreed to the discontinuation of underground nuclear tests, thus bringing to an end nuclear testing in all environments. Nothing, however, in the draft treaty prevents the nuclear Powers from increasing their nuclear weapons, thus adding to their already overstocked arsenals capable of decimating the human race many times over. In this connexion I must recall what my delegation said on this question in the debate at the twentieth session:

"... it is far-fetched to suggest that certain Powers should be permitted to possess nuclear weapons eternally and that others should be denied their use. As a matter of fact, it is morally untenable that this should be so."

16. The danger to human existence will remain so long as any Power on earth continues to possess these horrible purveyors of death. The late President Kennedy spoke of the nuclear bomb as the sword of Damocles hanging by a slender thread. But, as we know, the sword of Damocles threatened only Damocles. The nuclear weapon, on the other hand, threatens all of mankind.

17. There has been disturbing and distressing news of bombers with atomic weapons criss-crossing the skies, deploying these deadly weapons from city to city and from continent to continent. There have been alarming incidents of some of these carriers of mass destruction crashing on the territories of other States. Only through the grace and mercies of Divine Providence have we not yet witnessed the explosion of those atomic bombs, with the consequent disaster to humanity from blast, fire and radio-active fall-out. We are told we should not expect the worst, because these weapons are foolproof. But has man yet reached the stage of perfection where the works of his hands are foolproof? Or are we challenging the inexorable laws of God and thus attempting to put His patience to the test?

18. I believe my delegation has the right to ask whether, until a broad and comprehensive treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is achieved, the world will have to be exposed to the resurrection of such overflights.

19. Recourse to the Group of Consultant Experts appointed by the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 2162 (XXI) is very revealing in regard to the fact

"... that the nuclear armouries which are in being already contain large megaton weapons every one of which has a destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosive that has ever been used in warfare since the day gunpowder was discovered" [A/6838 and Corr. 1, para. 1].

20. In its conclusion, the report states that the solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them.

21. It is noted that article VI of the draft treaty states that each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. If this article

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2 This statement was made at the 1359th meeting of the First Committee, the official record of which is published in summary form.

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3 For the text of this draft treaty, see A/6838 and Corr. 1.
is to be strictly interpreted and construed, would it not mean that only after the treaty has come into force can such negotiations be undertaken, since the treaty does not become operable, nor do a party's obligations under it become binding and enforceable, until it has entered into force? Does this, then, mean that, should it take three, four or five years for the treaty to be ratified by the number of Member States envisaged in paragraph 3 of article IX, it will not be imperative to undertake such negotiations for the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament and that the Nuclear Powers will continue to be free to pursue this deadly game which is sapping the genius and wealth of our age? These are questions which agitate our thinking and cause great apprehension on our part.

22. It is argued, and with truth perhaps, that the incentive which motivates a State to acquire nuclear weapons is security. Concomitantly, it is equally argued that, for a non-nuclear State to forswear the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons, a guarantee that the nuclear Power will not use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against it is a prerequisite.

23. At the twentieth session of the General Assembly, a number of non-nuclear States, including Liberia, insisted that an indispensable element in any non-proliferation treaty would be a firm undertaking with adequate guarantees by a nuclear Power not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States under any circumstances.

24. It is disappointing to note that the draft treaty does not contain that specific guarantee. On the other hand, however, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom have indicated their intention of co-sponsoring a draft resolution in the Security Council by which they will undertake to

"... provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty ... that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used." 3

25. As the situation stands, there are five nuclear Powers, two of which did not participate in the formulation of the draft treaty and may not even become signatories to it. It might, then, be easy to conclude that the guarantee to "provide or support immediate assistance" will be given if a non-nuclear Power is attacked or an attack is threatened by a nuclear Power not signatory to the treaty. In that connexion, is it implicit in this undertaking to "provide or support immediate assistance" that the three remaining nuclear Powers eschew the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear State? I pose the question because it appears to me ironical that a nuclear Power would "provide or support immediate assistance" to a non-nuclear State when that very nuclear Power has made up its mind to erase the non-nuclear State from the face of the earth.

26. What my country as a non-nuclear Power wants is not retaliation but prevention. We are a small country. The population of our capital city is about 100,000 souls. If, as reported by the consultant experts, a single megaton nuclear weapon burst at ground level would kill by blast and fire 270,000 persons, kill by radioactive fall-out 90,000 persons and injure 90,000 persons, all the retaliation against the nuclear Power causing that havoc would not avail us very much. That is why we, like other non-nuclear States, have insisted on iron-clad guarantees that nuclear States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against us. My delegation, nevertheless, does not minimize the significance of the guarantee which the three nuclear Powers intend to make, as this surely means that their own cities will be opened to retaliatory nuclear attacks by the aggressor State which is being punished for victimizing a non-nuclear State.

27. My delegation recognizes that this draft treaty, with its limited scope, its shortcomings and its other imperfections, is but a first step on the path to a broader and comprehensive treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In these troubled times, made more troubled by man's search for more efficient instruments of mass slaughter, it would be foolish not to exert every effort to bridle this Frankenstein's monster that man's genius has created, even if the choice in doing so may appear to be a Hobson's choice. If, by endorsing this draft treaty, my delegation will have made a contribution to the long and rugged quest for peace—a quest that may perhaps be continued for many more years to come—then we shall not be failing our obligations and responsibility to mankind.

28. In closing this brief statement I must observe that, at the very time when science and technology have advanced to a position where each human being can enrich his life by this revolutionary technological progress which has brought us to the age where prosperity is within our easy reach, it has been the madness of man to prefer to devote this progress to destructive application. In that connexion one may recall that in Bernard Shaw's Man and Superman the Devil notes that man's heart is in his weapons. In the arts of life he invents nothing, but in the arts of death he outdoes nature itself. It is time we proved the Devil to be wrong.

29. Mr. GOLDBERG (United States of America): I think it is only appropriate at this stage of our debate that I should express the appreciation of my delegation—universally shared, I am sure, by all members of this Committee—of the fair and objective manner in which you, Mr. Chairman, are conducting the important business of this Committee. Such action on your part is no more than we have learned to expect of you from your conduct in other important offices of the General Assembly. I should like also to compliment all delegations participating in our work on the highly responsible and serious manner in which this debate is being carried on.

30. In my statement of 26 April [15556th meeting], at the very outset of our discussions, when I touched upon the important question of security assurances, I said my delegation would further detail the position of the United States on this matter later in our debate, after we had had the opportunity to hear the views of various delegations. I should like to make that presentation now and at the same time to comment on several other questions which have been raised as we have listened carefully to the statements of our colleagues in this Committee. First I shall deal with the matter of security assurances.

The United States will further declare that any State which commits aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons, or which threatens such aggression, must be aware that its actions are to be countered effectively by measures to be taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter to suppress the aggression or remove the threat of aggression. We will affirm the intention of the Government of the United States, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance in accordance with the Charter to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty that is a victim of an act of aggression, or the object of a threat of aggression, in which nuclear weapons are used.

The United States will reaffirm, in particular, the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack, including a nuclear attack, occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

In voting for this draft resolution, the United States will indicate that its vote and its statement of the way in which it intends to act in accordance with the Charter are based on the fact that the draft resolution is also supported by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the other permanent members of the Security Council which are nuclear-weapon States and are proposing to sign the non-proliferation treaty. We will further state that our vote for this draft resolution is based on the fact that the States have made statements similar to that of the United States as to how they intend to act in accordance with the Charter.

If the full significance of this proposed Security Council action is to be grasped, it must be seen in the light of the present world situation. It reflects the determination of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, to have assistance in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to any party to the treaty which is a victim of an act of aggression or the object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

I note that questions have been raised by several delegations as to how the machinery of the Security Council and the provisions of the Charter would function in the event of aggression, or of the threat of aggression, with nuclear weapons. These are legitimate questions and deserve a serious answer. In attempting to answer them I would make several points.

My first point is that with the joint support of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, there is a firm foundation for an effective response by the Security Council to any challenge requiring immediate action.

Secondly, I would emphasize a point of the very greatest political significance: namely, the identity of the three nuclear-weapon Powers which have joined in supporting the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and in agreeing to present this Security Council draft resolution. It is no secret that these Powers command the overwhelming preponder-
ance of nuclear-weapon power in the world today. That these major nuclear Powers, whatever their respective views on other matters, have now united in this proposal is a political fact of the first order. It means that they consider that their respective vital national interests demand that there shall be no nuclear aggression, and no threat of nuclear aggression, from any quarter; and that those countries that forgo nuclear weapons by adhering to the non-proliferation treaty should not thereby feel any loss of security.

43. Thus, the sponsorship of this Security Council draft resolution by these three nuclear-weapon Powers introduces a powerful element of deterrence against nuclear aggression or the threat of such aggression. It also is a fact of history, as we who represent our countries in the United Nations well know that where the three nuclear nations which have developed this Security Council draft resolution have joined in support of proposed action by the Council, such action has usually been forthcoming and effective.

44. Furthermore, as we have already pointed out, Article 51 of the Charter recognizes the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence. This right is reaffirmed in the Security Council draft resolution which the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom would submit and is also reaffirmed in the declaration which my Government would make accompanying this resolution and which the other Governments would likewise make.

45. I urge all members to consider thoughtfully the value to them, from the standpoint of their own national interests, of these proposed security assurances sponsored by the principal nuclear-weapon Powers. And I suggest that, in so considering them, each State should ask itself not "Will this treaty, combined with the security assurances, give my country perfect security?"—because there is, of course, no perfect security in this world—but should rather ask itself "Will this treaty, combined with the security assurances, give my country more security than it would otherwise enjoy?" And, as I said in my opening statement, the United States is confident that a careful appraisal, in the light of this pertinent question, will result in an overwhelmingly affirmative answer in support of the treaty before us.

46. Finally, the treaty itself, independent of any other consideration, will enhance the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

47. What will the world be like if, due to failure on the part of the Assembly to endorse the treaty on time—which I trust and hope will not happen—further proliferation should take place? In July 1963, upon the initialling of the limited test-ban Treaty, the late President Kennedy noted that within a few years a small but significant number of nations would possess the resources to produce both nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. President Kennedy went on to say:

"In time, it is estimated, many other nations will have either this capacity or other ways of obtaining nuclear warheads, even as missiles can be commercially purchased today."

48. President Kennedy continued as follows:

"I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small . . . scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts."

This treaty will prevent such a nightmare world of the future. By halting the spread of nuclear weapons, the treaty itself will lessen the danger of nuclear war, reduce tensions, and improve the prospects for nuclear disarmament and for general disarmament.

49. Having dealt with the matter of security assurances, I should now like to refer to views that have been expressed in this debate concerning other aspects of the question before us.

50. The view has been expressed that, despite the urgency and importance of prompt action on the treaty, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament did not have sufficient opportunity for a detailed consideration of all proposals submitted by the members of that Committee and other countries prior to the transmission of its report to the General Assembly on 15 March, and consequently it has been suggested that we should now consider ab initio all aspects of the treaty.

51. It should not be supposed, however, that the treaty text before us, when it was submitted in Geneva on 11 March last, was a brand new text. Rather, it was the culmination of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament's four years of consideration of this treaty project. It contains formulations reflecting a broad area of agreement, evolved over a long period of negotiations during which many members and non-members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament made extensive and detailed contributions to it.

52. It is a matter of record that I should now like to recall that negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty began in the Geneva Committee in 1964. Extensive debate, in which all participants took part, went on virtually continuously, with only intermittent recesses, throughout the ensuing four years. Many proposals were made and discussed, emanating both from members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and from non-members. As is usual in international negotiations, as we well know, along with public debate intensive private negotiations took place. It is an open secret that many of these private negotiations took place during recesses of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, as well as during sessions of that body.

53. Then, on 24 August 1967, in light of these discussions and negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union, in discharge of their responsibilities as co-Chairmen, submitted a draft treaty text. Following the submission of this text, all members of the Committee participated in intensified negotiations, in the course of which major

5 Ibid., annex IV, sects. 6 and 8.
suggestions and counter-proposals were submitted by various members. Thereafter, on 18 January 1968, a revised and complete treaty draft was submitted, incorporating many of these suggestions and proposals. There then followed nearly two months of even more intensified negotiations, pursuant to the mandate of the General Assembly in resolution 2346 (XXII) which called upon the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament “urgently to continue its work”. The result was the final draft of 11 March 1968, incorporating further substantive changes suggested by various Governments.

54. It is, of course, a matter of record that, three days after this final text was submitted, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament adjourned. However, we should recall that the 15 March date for submitting the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was set by the General Assembly after intensive consultations between the nuclear-weapon States participants and non-nuclear-weapon States, which culminated in resolution 2346 (XXII) of 19 December 1967. I hope it is not amiss for me, as co-Chairman, to observe that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is to be commended for having met the date set by the General Assembly.

55. This record demonstrates that the draft treaty that lies before us is the result of four years of detailed negotiations in which the views of many Governments, nuclear and non-nuclear, are reflected. This is not to say that every specific proposal or amendment that was put forward by one or more Governments was, or could be, adopted. Some of these proposed amendments cancelled out others. Some aroused no interest or support from other Governments. Often, several related proposals aimed at reaching the same general goal by somewhat different means.

56. Thus, there were large areas of overlapping or congruent interest. The obvious and necessary course, indispensable in negotiating an agreement, was to reconcile divergent interests and to fix those elements which were most likely to make the treaty as widely acceptable as possible. That task was performed by the co-Chairmen in consultation with members of the Committee and with other Governments which had displayed a keen interest in its work. No other procedure was or is possible.

57. By way of illustration, I believe that it would be useful if I were to list the changes made in the successive texts on the basis of the suggestions and proposals offered at Geneva and elsewhere. Incorporated into the present text are a number of important and vital amendments which were not part of the initial text of 24 August 1967.

58. Article IV—an extremely vital part of this draft treaty—was subsequently strengthened, to meet the requests of many Governments for strong and positive provisions protecting and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

59. Article V was added in order to remove concern that non-nuclear parties might be dependent merely on the goodwill of the nuclear Powers for the performance of nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes. It assures that such services will be available under appropriate international procedures and that the charge for the device used will be at low cost—in fact, below the cost of perfecting those devices by the nuclear Powers.

60. Article VI was added, and subsequently strengthened, to give further effect to the principle that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of obligations. It binds the parties to seek to end the nuclear arms race at an early date and to seek effective nuclear disarmament.

61. A new preambular paragraph concerning a comprehensive test ban was added for the same purpose.

62. Article VII was added to amplify the importance of the principle that nothing in this draft treaty affects the rights of the parties to establish nuclear-free zones, and thus to accord appropriate recognition of the first such zone established by the Treaty concluded by the Latin American countries.

63. The provisions in article VIII for amending the treaty were changed to meet the concern expressed by several Governments that parties might later find themselves unwillingly bound by unforeseen amendments ratified by a majority of the parties.

64. The provisions in article X regarding the treaty’s duration were changed in order to meet the concern expressed about the treaty’s having no limit in time.

65. Finally, article VIII was amended, in response to proposals put forward by a number of nations within and outside the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, to provide for review conferences every five years, and to provide further that, in reviewing the operation of the treaty, periodic review conferences should examine the purposes of the preamble as well as the provisions of the treaty.

66. Six of the nine major changes which I have listed were incorporated in the draft of 18 January 1968. They were made after consideration of some twenty written proposals, plus innumerable oral comments. Specifically, there were six written proposals on article IV, four on article V, four on article VI, two on article VII, and two each on amending the treaty and on its duration. The further changes incorporated in the text of 11 March were derived from three new written proposals concerning article VI and four concerning article VIII, as well as several less formal suggestions.

67. In the history of international diplomacy it is hard to recall a treaty more painstakingly negotiated, in due recognition of the interests of so many Governments and of its world-wide impact and importance.

68. It is nevertheless true, as I have said, that not every suggested alteration was incorporated in the draft treaty. During this debate we have heard arguments in favour of a number of the suggestions and proposals which were put forward by certain delegations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament but were not adopted.
69. However, it is the impression of my delegation, after listening carefully to and reviewing these arguments, that the adoption of all the suggested amendments would not cure the more fundamental difficulty that seems to be troubling some of those who now argue in favour of them. It has been stated, for instance, that the desire to emulate the example of those which have become nuclear-weapon Powers can be eliminated only if we do away with the special status of superiority associated with the power and prestige conferred on those Powers which possess nuclear weapons. The logical and inescapable conclusion to be drawn from this is that the world should do nothing about the proliferation of nuclear weapons until all of us here, and communist China as well, are able to do far more in the direction of nuclear disarmament than most of us believe can be done practically in the immediate future.

70. In this, as in other courses of international action open to Governments, we are not faced with a choice between good and evil, or between what is possible and what would be ideal. Rather, the choice is between what is helpful and possible and what, although ideal, could only lead to inaction, disagreement and frustration. In Geneva that choice was made in favour of what is possible, practicable and helpful. I submit that this was the wise choice and that we in the Assembly should reaffirm it. And I strongly hope that those delegations which may still remain in doubt on this question will decide, after careful consideration of all that has been said and will be said here, that this draft treaty deserves their full support. It is a cliché, but it deserves repeating, that the perfect should never be the enemy of the good.

71. I now turn to a particular provision of the draft treaty on which there has been considerable discussion in this debate: the prohibition against the development by non-nuclear State powers of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. In my initial intervention of 26 April [1556th meeting] I dealt with the reasons for this prohibition, and other speakers have also addressed themselves to this point.

72. But I should like now to deal with one particular assertion, an important one, namely, that this prohibition would retard the scientific and technological development of the non-nuclear parties to the treaty. This is not the case. This treaty will in no way limit the freedom or capacity of its signatories to develop peaceful applications of nuclear energy—apart from nuclear explosive devices, the technology of which is essentially indistinguishable from nuclear weapons. Indeed, the treaty binds those parties in a position to do so to co-operate with developing countries in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy; and it further obligates the nuclear Powers—and I wish to emphasize this once again—to make available to treaty signatories nuclear explosions for peaceful uses on a non-discriminatory basis and at a cost for the devices used which excludes any charge for research and development, which is the major charge of any nuclear Power that has experimented in this area.

73. While this treaty was still in the process of negotiation, the President of the United States, President Johnson, gave the following instructions to the United States negotiators, and I should like to share them with the members of this Committee:

"I have instructed our negotiators to exercise the greatest care that the treaty not hinder the non-nuclear Powers in their development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We believe in sharing the benefits of scientific progress and we will continue to act accordingly. Through IAEA, through EURATOM, and through other international channels, we have shared—and will continue to share—the knowledge we have gained about nuclear energy. There will be no barrier to effective co-operation among the signatory nations."

74. The United States negotiators followed that directive faithfully. I emphasized in my last statement the importance which we attach to article IV in furthering international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy. In pursuance of our obligation under this treaty, the United States will appropriately and equitably share its technological knowledge and experience, acquired at great cost, with the parties to the treaty, and particularly the non-nuclear parties, in the important areas of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This treaty does not ask any country to accept a status of technological dependency or to be deprived of developments in nuclear research. On the contrary, this treaty opens the way for greater knowledge and greater opportunity for the non-nuclear Powers to share information and move forward in the field of knowledge related to nuclear development.

75. Thus, under this treaty, the great, wide and varied field of research and development in nuclear science and technology for peaceful uses will not only remain open, but will be opened wider to all parties that wish to engage fully their talents and capabilities in this field. I could not hope to set forth in this presentation all the facets of this modern science—that would take many volumes and would be beyond my capacity. As examples, however, and to remind us all of the depth and breadth of this science and technology, let me mention just a few of these areas of nuclear science.

76. The whole field of nuclear science associated with electric power production is accessible now, and will become more accessible under the treaty, to all who seek to exploit it. This includes not only the present generation of nuclear power reactors, but also that advanced technology, which is still developing, of fast breeder power reactors, which, in producing energy, also produce more fissionable material than they consume.

77. Many nations are now engaged in research in an even more advanced field of science, that of controlled thermonuclear fusion. The future developments of this science and technology may well lead to the nuclear reactor of the future, in which the fissile process of uranium or plutonium is replaced by the fusion reactions of hydrogen isotopes as the source of energy. Controlled thermonuclear fusion technology will not be affected by the treaty, but, on the contrary, will be accelerated by it.

78. The same will be true of the development and use of research reactors for specialized application in science and engineering; the development, for example, of reactors for desalting sea water; and the very important uses of
radioisotopes in agriculture, medicine and the physical sciences.

79. This list could be elaborated at great length. The point is that there is no basis for any concern that this treaty would impose prohibitions or restrictions on the opportunity for non-nuclear-weapon States to develop their capabilities in nuclear science and technology. On the contrary, under the express provisions of the treaty they stand to gain greater assistance through an expanded exchange of information in these areas.

80. In this context some further comments are in order on the subject of peaceful nuclear explosions. The specialized technology involved in the production of nuclear explosive devices is not such a crucial element in other aspects of nuclear science that its absence would retard progress in their peaceful application. In any case, the limited amount of "spin-off" for such peaceful applications from the development of nuclear explosive devices has long since been made available by the United States to all countries that might wish to use it.

81. It should also be realized that the treaty does not forbid anyone to engage in research and development in the conventional engineering for peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. It is only the production or acquisition of the explosive device itself that is precluded; and it is precluded for the reason I have stated, that the device is indistinguishable from a nuclear weapon. There exist hundreds of reports, available to all, for those who wish to begin now to study peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.

82. In conclusion, I wish to emphasize again that several years of arduous negotiations have gone into achieving the treaty text that is before this Committee. This complete and carefully balanced text embodies the widest area of agreement that we believe, and have found from the experience of the last four years, is possible. We are convinced that the treaty will be effective and will accomplish its purpose—if we act in time. But if we continue merely to support non-proliferation in principle, while delaying the achievement of a treaty to accomplish it in practice—if we lose precious time in prolonging the quest for a broader or more perfect text—I express the gravest concern lest we find that we acted too late and that our efforts were futile and wasted.

83. My Government strongly believes that the moment has arrived for decisive action on this treaty. The time is now. The place is here. History will have every reason to judge us harshly if we miss this opportunity to create a more stable, secure and peaceful world order.

84. Mr. ZOLLNER (Dahomey) (translated from French):
In speaking on such an extremely important question as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the delegation of Dahomey is fully aware of the many problems involved. We realize the complex factors which go to determine the attitudes of the various great Powers. As we are fully aware of our own status as a small developing country whose prospect of becoming a nuclear State is not even a remote dream, we venture to voice an opinion on this matter with the utmost modesty.

85. With regard to general disarmament, we have in the past left speech-making and initiatives to the main military Powers which play a predominant role in this matter. However, the creation of nuclear weapons, while further widening the gap between great and small nations, has simulta­neously and paradoxically caused the large nations to lose their monopoly on concern in this area, whereas in the recent past it was possible to let the Great Powers settle their military problems as they saw fit, either by disarm­ment or by periodic confrontations from which the small Powers could always remain aloof, the mastering of nuclear energy and its utilization for military uses completely upset the classical factors in this area. The existence and use of nuclear weapons no longer constitutes a threat only to the parties to a conflict. No one, from now on, whether civilian or military, belligerent or neutral, large, medium-sized or small, is safe from the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear conflict. Since the very survival of mankind is at stake, the most humble voice now speaks with as much authority as the most powerful.

86. Furthermore, the great Powers, as is natural, are wrapped up in their many interests, in their world responsibilities, in the complex nature of the political, technological, juridical and psychological factors they must take into account and which sometimes conceal the importance of what is at stake. Indeed, it sometimes happens that, as the saying goes, we can not see the wood for the trees. That is why the comments made by representatives of small States, comments which may be ingenuous and frank, may contribute to a more sober appraisal of the situation.

87. Ever since the accession to independence of a large number of African States, our continent has been deeply preoccupied with the nuclear threat and the means of eliminating it.

88. Thus, as far back as 1961, at the sixteenth session of the General Assembly, the African representatives brought to a vote resolution 1652 (XVI), the first of its kind, which called upon Member States "to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a demilitarized zone".

89. Later on, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its first regular session in July 1964, adopted and issued a solemn Declaration on the demilitarization of our continent.9 The African Heads of State and Government further stated that they were prepared, in an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, to undertake not to manufacture or have control of nuclear weapons. Lastly they called upon the peace-loving nations of the world to make a similar commitment. This appeal was heeded, since shortly afterwards, in a statement published on 10 October 1964, the second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries supported the July declaration.10

90. The year after the declaration by the African Heads of State and Government, the General Assembly, at its


10. See document A/5763 (mimeographed).
twentieth session, adopted on the initiative of the African representatives resolution 2033 (XX) which, among other provisions, reiterated the request made to all States to respect the African continent as a denuclearized zone, supported the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa and called upon all States to respect it and abide by it.

91. I have briefly gone over the past record in order to show how African countries, my own among them, have always attached the greatest importance to the problem of denuclearization. We have in particular taken an active part in General Assembly decisions on the non-dissemination and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

92. At the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Dahomey stated:

"We have always and everywhere stated that we are opposed to the dissemination of atomic weapons because it increases the danger of war and because radio-active fall-out poisons the atmosphere and damages human health.

"The Republic of Dahomey has always, consistently, and on many occasions, taken a stand in favour of the denuclearization of Africa and of the other continents. The bomb, an arm of military dissuasion for some and of political persuasion for others, is for us an object of horror and a source of terror." [1290th plenary meeting, paras. 94 and 95.]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs went on to say:

"The Republic of Dahomey also thinks that the suggestion for the convening of a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons is deserving of consideration. If the United Nations took the initiative in convening such a conference, the result would be a new step forward in the direction of peace through collective security.

"The threat of an apocalyptic end which is overhanging mankind must be ended once and for all." [Ibid., paras. 98 and 99.]

93. Thus Dahomey has always linked the question of non-dissemination with that of the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.

94. Failing the conference we had hoped for, the following year, 1965, we welcomed resolution 2028 (XX), in which the General Assembly decided to conclude a treaty designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and defined the principles on which such a treaty should be based. Rather than entrust the task to as universal a conference as possible, the Assembly entrusted the preparation of the treaty to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, but requested it to report to the General Assembly. Moreover, the aim was no longer, as it had been at the sixteenth session—in resolution 166.5—to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, but a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The nuance is of some importance, and we shall revert to it later, for we must now consider the report submitted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee and see whether the Committee has carried out the work the Assembly entrusted to it in resolution 2028 (XX).

95. I must first of all pay a deserved tribute to the members of the Committee, whose task was not an easy one, and especially to the Committee's two Chairmen, the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, for on two occasions they took the happy initiative of submitting to the Committee a draft treaty on which they had reached a. or agreement, and it is to them that we owe the major part of the text which is now before us.

96. We are fully aware of the effort the Committee has made, and we know the difficulties its members have had to face. However, it is our task to decide, as conscientiously as we can, whether the end result complied with the norms and principles laid down by the General Assembly.

97. In operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 2028 (XX), the resolution which was the direct cause of the treaty, the General Assembly:

"Urges all States to take all steps necessary for the early conclusion of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

"Calls upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, to reconvene as early as possible with a view to negotiating an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons ... ."

The purpose of the request made by the General Assembly to all States, on the one hand, and to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on the other, was therefore to bring about the conclusion of a treaty for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

98. If the aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we should naturally first of all consider how such proliferation occurs. As has already been said, there can at the present time be proliferation of nuclear weapons in two ways only: first, by an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons—commonly known as "dissemination", or "spread", or "horizontal" proliferation; and second, by an increase in the number of nuclear weapons in the possession of the States that are already nuclear States—the so-called "vertical" proliferation.

99. If the General Assembly, which had hitherto adopted appropriate resolutions aimed at preventing only the spread of nuclear weapons, decided at its twentieth session that a treaty should be concluded to prevent not only mere dissemination, but the general proliferation of nuclear weapons, this was obviously because the Assembly wished to put an end both to the dissemination of such weapons and to their proliferation.

100. What has happened to that goal in the draft treaty before us? In articles I and II, the draft treaty very clearly provides for the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, or horizontal non-proliferation. These articles prevent any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the treaty from becoming a nuclear State. Furthermore, the various provisions of article III are aimed at preventing possible proliferation by nuclear States. Thus, in this specific area the treaty complies with the first principle laid down in paragraph 2 of resolution 2028 (XX), which states:

"The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to pro-
101. However, we can search through the entire text of the treaty without finding one single article or provision to prevent the other type of proliferation of nuclear weapons: proliferation carried out by the existing nuclear Powers. The effective prevention of this kind of proliferation is not only neglected, it is completely ignored in the treaty, which is none the less supposed to be "designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons". This glaring loop-hole remains, whereas the first provision of resolution 2028 (XX) intended, as we have just seen, that the treaty should be void of loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate nuclear weapons.

102. Thus, even if all nuclear and non-nuclear States, without exception, were to ratify or adhere to this treaty, nuclear weapons would nevertheless continue to proliferate legally in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers, and these Powers would in no way be acting contrary to the provisions of the treaty. Can we, in those circumstances, maintain that this is a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons?

103. We are of course aware of the fact that a treaty which was really intended to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons would require much time and effort. It is understandable that we should be realistic by being satisfied for the time being with a preliminary step. In that case, however, we must know exactly what we are doing. We must accept responsibility for our actions. Having felled the first tree, we must not think we have cut down the forest. In a word, we must not think that by restricting the number of nuclear States, we have stopped the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

104. That is why the delegation of Dahomey formally moves that this text should be entitled "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon States", for this is what the treaty in fact is. We feel that this is more than merely a matter of terminology. We consider that the treaty by its real name we will avoid giving world public opinion a false impression as to the precise nature of the work accomplished. Above all, we believe that the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the General Assembly itself will thereby bear in mind that the task is only half accomplished and that the goal set forth in resolution 2028 (XX) has not yet been achieved.

105. The most important task still lies ahead, for the current danger, greater than that of future nuclear States, is the present and certain existence of nuclear stockpiles capable of destroying our planet. The current danger lies in the continual increase of those nuclear weapon reserves by the super-Powers, whose economic capacity is such that this increase can continue to a practically unlimited extent, while the small or medium-sized Powers, even if they should become nuclearized, would inevitably be limited in their building of a nuclear arsenal by their economic capabilities. The current danger is the improvement—not only continual but I would even say constantly accelerated—of these mass destruction devices and their delivery vehicles by the super-Powers, who are devoting an important percentage of their vast resources and technology to that end.

106. In speaking thus we are not trying to minimize the risks that would result from an indefinite increase in the number of nuclear Powers. These risks were very well described by the Secretary-General in the excellent study he submitted last year. However, that study also stated:

"The mounting concern about the spread and development of nuclear weapons is a clear manifestation of the fear which now besets the world." [A/6858, para. 82.]

107. We are saying that it would be misleading and dangerous for us to allow our entire attention to be turned to a future and hypothetical danger—the possible increase in the number of nuclear countries—while nothing or hardly anything is being done to avert or even merely to diminish the real, tangible and immediate threat hanging over all mankind because of existing nuclear arsenals, the increase in such arsenals and their constant improvement. We are saying that it is time the super-Powers agreed not only on the commitments the non-nuclear countries should make, but above all on what they themselves should do to eradicate the standing threat their terrifying nuclear weapon poses to mankind.

108. Those of us who six years ago here in the United Nations lived through the anxious days of October 1962, when the main nuclear Powers were on the brink of a catastrophic confrontation, know that the danger of which I speak is neither imaginary nor distant, but that it is constantly hanging over our heads, whether the number of nuclear States increases or not.

109. Moreover, the increase in the number of secondary nuclear Powers represents a serious threat to mankind only to the extent that a conflict to which those States might be parties could in some way act as a fuse to set off the super-Powers' enormous stockpile of nuclear weapons.

110. No matter how we look at this problem, we can see that in the final analysis the real danger in fact stems from the vast economic potential of the nuclear super-Powers.

111. That is why the Government of Dahomey feels that if this treaty is really to be, as General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) intends, "a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament", it must include more precise provisions to achieve this than the vague joint commitment contained in the present article VI "to pursue negotiations in good faith". We consider that part of this article at least should consist of a specific and concrete commitment on the part of the nuclear Powers, which are mainly responsible for the nuclear peril to which the world is being subjected today.

112. The delegation of Dahomey strongly supports the inclusion in the treaty of the text of article VI put forward at Geneva by Romania, which reads:

"1. Nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty undertake to adopt specific measures to bring about as soon as possible the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.

"2. If, five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, such measures shall not have been taken, the
113. That is the minimal commitment the nuclear States ought to make in this connexion to set off the firm commitment not to possess nuclear weapons made by the non-nuclear States, especially those of them which are now or will in the near future be able to produce nuclear weapons. It would have been legitimate for these States to ask, in return, for the definition and inclusion in the treaty itself of measures to ensure the denuclearization of the nuclear countries, as in the case of the non-nuclear States. By confining themselves to asking the nuclear Powers to make a simple commitment to adopt specific measures—which are left to their own discretion entirely—to bring about denuclearization, the non-nuclear countries are displaying a considerable sense of reality and compromise.

114. However, it is unreasonable for the nuclear Powers which, as I have shown at length, are the real and present nuclear threat, to promise to the non-nuclear countries, in return for an immediate and absolute commitment to renounce the acquisition of any nuclear weapon, mere negotiations which could be interminable, even if carried out "in good faith". After all, "good faith" in international matters is so subjective a concept today that we are somewhat surprised to see it mentioned in a serious treaty.

115. What we need is not a promise of negotiations, but of results. We need positive acts, effective measures for nuclear disarmament which will be based not on the good faith of the nuclear Powers, but on their political determination to achieve it. In addition to constituting a guarantee for the survival of mankind, such measures would ensure the freeing of the vast resources which are now being sunk into the nuclear arms race. Rather than serving to prepare for the annihilation of the human race, these immense resources could be used, at least in part, to promote peace by contributing to the economic development of the developing countries.

116. We therefore support the initiative taken by Brazil, in its amendments to the draft treaty proposed the following text:

"Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes the obligation to channel, through a special United Nations fund for the benefit of the economic development of developing countries, in particular for their scientific and technological progress, a substantial part of the resources freed by the measures of nuclear disarmament."12

A similar text could serve as the final paragraph of a new article VI, as suggested by Brazil, or be added as a separate article.

117. We have spoken with some emphasis about nuclear disarmament because we are convinced that that is the true and valid goal. We have dwelt on the fact that the treaty should express the clear determination to bring about nuclear disarmament. However, we are aware that the process itself will be a difficult one, and that it will call for great effort and perseverance.

118. Pending that achievement, the non-nuclear countries which are being called upon to renounce forthwith the use of nuclear weapons, will remain exposed to the possible use of those weapons against them. It is hardly conceivable that the non-nuclear countries, especially those with an existing or future nuclear capability—in other words, those which we are most anxious to see ratified, a non-proliferation treaty—would agree to have their hands tied without the provision of solemn security guarantees.

119. Can the draft resolution13 annexed to the text of the treaty be regarded as a solemn security guarantee? We feel that it has three main drawbacks.

120. Our first objection has to do with the form in which these guarantees are given. We feel that security guarantees play a part in establishing the “acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers” which resolution 2028 (XX) requires of the treaty. The provisions dealing with security guarantees should therefore appear in the body of the treaty, and should constitute multilateral obligations having the same force as those assumed by the non-nuclear States under the treaty. We see no reason why these guarantees should take the form of simple resolutions or unilateral declarations. Of course, we are happy to note the excellent intentions which the nuclear Powers propose to express in their various declarations, some of which are very important and significant. However, if such declarations can suffice, why should we not be satisfied with similar statements and mere declarations from the non-nuclear countries and why would a treaty be necessary at all?

121. Our second objection is to the connexion made between security guarantees and the concept of “aggression”. It is true that this term is used many times in the United Nations Charter and that it is the term which justified the establishment of machinery for the restoration and maintenance of peace. But if in 1945 the authors of the Charter could still in good faith harbour illusions as to the practical application of the term “aggression”, the same does not hold true today. For well over a decade, our Organization has been unsuccessfully trying to arrive at an objective definition of aggression acceptable to the international community. How many times have we ourselves noted the inability of the United Nations to determine whether or not an act of aggression had been committed, and by whom. In these circumstances, to link security guarantees with aggression rather than with the simple use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons is tantamount to no guarantee whatsoever. Our concern is that the non-nuclear States parties to the treaty, which thereby undertake not to become nuclear States, should be effectively protected against any use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons against them.

122. The question of the effectiveness of protection brings me to our third major objection to what is now being

12 Ibid., annex IV, sect. 17.
13 Ibid., annex II.
offered us as security guarantee. The main provision of the draft resolution, operative paragraph 1, reads as follows:

"Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter."

In other words, if there is nuclear aggression or the threat of nuclear aggression against a non-nuclear State, the Security Council and its permanent members will act immediately, as in fact the Charter calls upon them to do.

123. I have already stated our opinion of aggression as a condition for security guarantees. Let us now examine the machinery which is proposed. Whereas we are asking for specific guarantees to offset specific commitments, we are offered the implementation of the Charter, which would be implemented in any event, with its oft-revealed imperfections.

124. We are well aware that any move to act by the Security Council can be blocked by a single veto issued by any one of its permanent members. We know that the veto power is not merely a formality, and that it has been employed on many occasions in the past in far less serious circumstances; we know that there have been even more occasions when the mere certainty that one or other of the permanent members would use it has nipped in the bud many proposals and desires for action which were none the less necessary. If the first paragraph of the resolution is not a useless repetition of the Charter, what is its meaning? Does it mean that in specific cases such as this the nuclear Powers that are permanent members of the Council might begin to consider some curbs on their veto power, which is primarily responsible for the impotence of the Security Council? We would be most happy to learn that, but in the meanwhile we feel there is room for reasonable doubt.

125. What would happen in the case of nuclear attack or threat of nuclear attack against a non-nuclear State party to the treaty? We know that the nuclear Powers, with one exception, are also permanent members of the Security Council having the power of veto. Should the threat come from the one exception I have mentioned, we would hope that the Council would act as it always has, with the uncertainty inherent in the existence and always possible use of the veto. We would hope that the nuclear Powers permanent members of the Security Council would ultimately come to the defence of the non-nuclear country by activating the Council.

126. But who will defend the non-nuclear countries against their defenders? In any case other than the one I have just noted, the country resorting to nuclear threat would be one of the countries with veto powers in the Security Council. Can we for one minute intelligently conceive that that country would wait for the Security Council to take forceful steps against it and not block any attempt at action by availing itself of its prerogative under the Charter. In any circumstance other than that of a nuclear threat, we might have some limited trust in the Security Council as it now operates. However, the nuclear sphere is the very one in which, as I have shown, we can be practically certain in advance that the Council will be unable to act. In those circumstances is it not absurd to offer Security Council action as a security guarantee?

127. The idea that a nuclear country which is a permanent member of the Security Council might one day constitute a nuclear threat to a non-nuclear country is not so ridiculous as it might seem at first glance. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Dahomey stated during the twentieth session of the General Assembly:

"... the possession of atomic weapons gives rise to a constant temptation to use them." [1340th plenary meeting, para. 73.]

128. Without recalling events in the distant past, we all witnessed a short while ago a heated debate in the Press of a great country on the possibility of using nuclear weapons in a current conflict. We are of course convinced that such rumours were completely unfounded. However, what we find noteworthy is the very fact that such rumours were able to spread, that such a debate was able to take place, that important persons who spoke out vigorously against such a likelihood—not to mention those who were in favour of it—felt that it was possible. Circumstances we can scarcely conceive of at present in which the temptation might be strong, can arise in the future for any one of the existing nuclear States.

129. For all these reasons, we cannot give serious consideration to the proposal made in the Security Council draft resolution, or to any similar proposal. For all these reasons, we insist on a real security guarantee.

130. The delegation of Dahomey earnestly desires a two-fold guarantee which would consist, first, of a formal commitment by the nuclear States not to use their nuclear weapons or to threaten to use them against non-nuclear-weapons States that undertake not to manufacture and not to acquire nuclear weapons. We would give our full support to a text based on the new article VI-A put forward at Geneva by Romania. The second part of the guarantee would take up, in a form which would extend its scope, the proposal made by Nigeria at the beginning of the working paper submitted in March 1968.14 We hope that the States parties, and in particular the nuclear States, will, if called upon, undertake to come to the aid of any non-nuclear-weapons State party to the treaty which is attacked or threatened with attack by nuclear weapons. Such guarantees, incorporated in the body of the treaty in what could be a new article III, would represent, with regard to security, an appropriate counterpart to the commitment required of the non-nuclear countries in article II.

131. My delegation has one last comment to make on the contents of the treaty. It concerns article VIII, paragraph 2, with regard to amendments, which reads as follows:

"Any amendment to the Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of

14 Ibid., annex IV, sect. 37.
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment."

132. In other words, any nuclear country or member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency will be able to veto any amendment to the treaty. This speaks volumes on the future possibilities for amendment. Thus, even in the case where all other parties to the treaty might agree to introduce later on an amendment deemed sound by a near unanimity of the parties, it would take only one vote to prevent the passage of the amendment were that vote cast by a nuclear country or by a country that was a member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

133. A nuclear veto is hard to understand here, particularly if we consider the actual contents of the treaty. This privilege, which would be justifiable in a treaty exclusively or mainly concerned with the nuclear Powers, such as the treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests or a nuclear disarmament treaty, is scarcely justifiable in this case, in a treaty which primarily commits the non-nuclear countries. Nor is such a privilege justified for the countries members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. If there must be a veto power in this treaty, which we hope will not be the case, it is the non-nuclear countries parties to the treaty that should have it. The delegation of Dahomey therefore proposes the deletion of the sentences dealing with this veto power.

134. In short, the delegation of Dahomey considers that this treaty does indeed represent progress along the road to nuclear disarmament, in so far as the non-nuclear States which will be parties to the treaty undertake not to possess nuclear weapons in the future.

135. However, we feel the treaty is clearly inadequate, even at the present stage. Its hasty adoption could lead to consequences which would be more harmful than useful. We believe that in order to be acceptable, it must incorporate certain specific improvements which I have described at some length and which are as follows:

136. First: the treaty—which, as we have seen, is not really a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—should be given a different title reflecting its true contents, and be called "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear-Weapon States".

137. Secondly: failing the immediate inclusion of the provisions which the treaty should have contained to prevent the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons as it does their horizontal proliferation, the treaty should at least have in it a firm and precise commitment that the nuclear Powers will take swift and effective steps to forestall vertical proliferation and to achieve total nuclear disarmament in successive and concrete stages. These provisions could be backed up by a commitment to devote a part of the resources thus made available to the economic, scientific and technological development of developing countries.

138. Thirdly: a security guarantee should be explicitly provided for and its implementation should be laid down in the body of the treaty. This guarantee would include the nuclear States' commitment not to use or threaten to use their nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear State which, under the treaty, undertakes not to become a nuclear State; it would also include an undertaking by all Parties to the treaty, especially the nuclear States, to come, if requested, to the assistance of a non-nuclear State party to the treaty which is being attacked or being threatened with attack by nuclear weapons.

139. Fourthly: the right of veto should not apply to future amendments even if the majority needed to adopt amendments and bring them into operation had to be raised as a result.

140. We consider it necessary to make the improvements I have mentioned because we truly want this treaty to be an effective one. Of course, a final consideration of the wishes of the international community on this subject may delay the treaty's formal adoption by a few months. However, let us not forget that this highly important treaty was submitted to our various Governments only a few weeks ago.

141. We feel it would be sound procedure to allow this text, drawn up by a small committee, to be discussed in depth by all Members of our Organization and to be amended, if need be, at this stage. The treaty's future would be seriously prejudiced if the international community, being apprised for the first time of the final text drawn up by the nuclear Powers on the Eighteen-Nation Committee, should, after the inclusion of some selected proposals, be frustrated in a last, serious attempt to improve it.

142. It would be preferable for the final adoption of the treaty to take place after the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, to be held from August to September this year. All the nuclear countries involved in the treaty have been able to agree amongst themselves, as the present text already shows. This, however, is not the case with the non-nuclear countries, which are nevertheless the ones which the treaty mainly concerns. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States might give the final text of the treaty massive support if agreement was reached on a minimum number of improvements.

143. If a final vote were to be insisted upon at the resumed twenty-second session, it is obvious that it would not correctly reflect the wishes of the great majority of the international community, since many of those who would vote for the present text, and even some of the sponsors of the resolution for its adoption [A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1 to 3] have stated in effect that they would like to see improvements such as those which have been suggested. They are, in fact, succumbing to pessimism.
144. We, for our part, are convinced that if we take the trouble to make certain changes the treaty will meet with nearly unanimous support, which will, we hope, include all the non-nuclear countries with a possible nuclear capability. For this treaty, even if it is adopted here by a certain majority and put into effect, will not be worth a great deal if this group of States does not subscribe to it en masse and unreservedly.

145. Everyone would profit from a last attempt at improvement. We feel that the choice lies not between the present text of the treaty and no treaty at all, but between a rather unsatisfactory treaty and a better one; between a treaty hastily adopted today by a shaky majority and a treaty which can receive the nearly unanimous support of the Members of our Organization at the General Assembly's twenty-third session.

146. I reserve the right to speak again on draft resolutions which have been or will be submitted and, ultimately, on proposals we ourselves may put forward.

147. Mr. BANZAR (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): For the space of ten years, working through the United Nations, mankind has been endeavouring to find a generally acceptable constructive solution to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons—one of the most important aspects of the entire intricate problem of disarmament.

148. Alarmed at the steadily growing threat of thermonuclear war, the peoples of the world demand that a way should be found to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons over the globe.

149. As early as 1959, at its fourteenth session, the General Assembly adopted an important resolution [resolution 1380 (XIV)], the draft of which had been submitted by the Italian delegation. It contained a recommendation to the nuclear Powers to refrain for a specified period from delivering nuclear weapons to States not having such weapons, and to States not manufacturing nuclear weapons to refrain from manufacturing such weapons during the same period.

150. In 1961, the States Members of the United Nations responded favourably to the appeal of the non-nuclear countries that they should reach agreement on preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. Sweden, then a non-nuclear country, also proposed that the non-nuclear States should renounce nuclear weapons and form a "non-nuclear club".

151. It will be remembered that two years ago the Italian delegation submitted a draft unilateral declaration on non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. 15

152. Thus, the non-nuclear countries were the first to press for measures which would not be conducive to the spread of nuclear weapons.

153. As may be seen from the debate on this question at the last three sessions of the General Assembly, nearly 100 non-nuclear States voted on every single occasion for the earliest positive solution to the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

154. We thus see that the overwhelming majority of countries have been vigorously advocating prompt conclusion of an international agreement which would constitute a reliable obstacle in the way of any further spread of nuclear weapons.

155. However, in the course of the stubborn struggle which developed in the United Nations on the proposals for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the General Assembly resolutions, which constitute recommendations, proved to be inadequate. It thus became necessary to sanction the principle of prohibiting proliferation of nuclear weapons in any manner in the form of a treaty having binding force. As noted by preceding speakers, the basic principles of such a treaty are to be found in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session.

156. A constructive solution of this important question of our day is, of course, fully in accord with the wishes of world opinion and the purposes and decisions of the United Nations. That is very convincingly stated in the Secretary-General's report on the injurious effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and their proliferation [A/6858] submitted to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly. This extremely interesting and useful document, drawn up by the scientists of twelve countries Members of the United Nations, proves once again how urgently necessary it is to conclude a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

157. In this report, the most distinguished scientists of the Soviet Union, Poland, Mexico, France, India and other countries, after carefully studying the possible effects of the use of nuclear weapons, have unanimously concluded that the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war by accident would increase in a geometric proportion with a simple arithmetic increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons. They appeal to all States to come rapidly to an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in order to avert the "threat of immeasurable disaster which could befall mankind were nuclear war ever to erupt, whether by miscalculation or by mad intent." Incidentally, the world has been witnessing quite a few accidents—crashes of bombers carrying nuclear bombs. 16

158. Although my country is not a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, it has been attentively following the Committee's work and studying the generally available documentation. I am therefore in a position to state the considered opinion of my Government on the question before us—the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

159. Now, at this resumed session of the General Assembly, the world's peoples are pressing for the constructive solution of one of the most topical problems of contemporary international politics, which they all take to heart—the problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The security of all States without exception, small and great, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, depends on the earliest solution of this problem.

160. The people and Government of Mongolia can visualize clearly the new dangers to general peace and security...
that would arise unless a solid barrier is erected to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty is particularly urgent today, when a good many countries have reached or are reaching the scientific, technical and industrial development level at which they could produce nuclear weapons. According to authoritative experts in various countries, no less than ten more States now have the scientific and technical resources and industrial potential for that purpose. It is worth mentioning that these States include some which are either openly committing international aggression or have committed such aggression in the recent past.

161. Logic tells us that if some countries begin to manufacture nuclear weapons, this may cause a chain reaction, a circumstance which would not promote peaceful settlement of existing disputes.

162. Such a development would undoubtedly heighten not only regional but world tension and thereby increase the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. Peace-loving peoples do not want to become the victims of a devastating thermonuclear war and demand insistently that the forces of revanchism, racism and reaction should be denied access to nuclear weapons.

163. Despite great difficulties, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has successfully completed its appointed task. It has prepared and submitted to the General Assembly, by 15 March of this year as stipulated, a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

164. In the view of the Mongolian delegation, this draft treaty contains many new and valuable ideas as against the draft considered in previous years. Included in it are additions and amendments which take into account the wishes of the non-nuclear countries.

165. Under articles I and II of the draft treaty, the nuclear Powers undertake not to transfer to other countries, and the non-nuclear-weapon States, in their turn, undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons or explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

166. Thus, the draft treaty completely prohibits the further spread of nuclear weapons in any form, leaving no loop-holes; that is its main importance. In addition, the treaty, when concluded, will not only be binding on all the Parties to it, but will impose a moral and political responsibility on all those States which for any reason fail to accede to it.

167. The Mongolian delegation supports the revised article of the draft treaty which deals with the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The draft clearly defines the question of co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The draft treaty before us, far from reducing the possibility of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, lays down the groundwork for broad international co-operation in this field. Under article V, the nuclear Powers in future will carry out for non-nuclear States nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Consequently, the nuclear Powers undertake to make available to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the treaty the potential benefits from any peaceful application of nuclear explosions on favourable terms.

168. We therefore believe that the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons offers the non-nuclear States the prospect of making use of the latest achievements of atomic technology for peaceful purposes and for a successful solution of their pressing economic problems.

169. This important document contains an agreed text of article III, dealing with control—an article which repeatedly caused the Geneva negotiations to bog down. My delegation notes with satisfaction that there is at last an agreed decision on the setting up of international control by the International Atomic Energy Agency. As regards safeguards for non-nuclear countries, we are deeply convinced that the treaty in itself will constitute a trustworthy safeguard of the security of all States, and more particularly, the small States.

170. Moreover, the draft resolution for the Security Council on security assurances to non-nuclear States, formulated jointly by the delegations of three nuclear powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom—deserves the appreciation and support of all.

171. Under this resolution, these nuclear Powers permanent members of the Security Council solemnly undertake to act immediately in accordance with the United Nations Charter to repel aggression or avert the threat of aggression.

172. In my delegation's view, this is a very serious warning to aggressors that they will not go unpunished if they commit nuclear aggression against non-nuclear-weapon States party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

173. My delegation fully appreciates the arguments advanced by other delegations to the effect that the absence of such a treaty would do irreparable harm to the national interests of the non-nuclear countries, and, primarily, the small States.

174. We believe that for new countries to acquire their own nuclear weapons would result in great expenditure rather than in greater security. On the other hand, we feel that, because of its enormously devastating effects, the use of nuclear weapons in any local conflict is inconceivable and not to be tolerated.

175. Bearing this in mind, I would like to associate the Mongolian people with the broad range of States which have spoken in favour of concluding such a treaty. We support the treaty in the belief that all other non-nuclear States will also renounce the acquisition of so dreadful a weapon of mass destruction.

176. Mankind is struggling to achieve disarmament, and, first and foremost, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the destruction of such weapons. Naturally, we would be happier if we could prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons here and now. But we must approach the
question realistically. The experience of many years shows that in the tense international situation prevailing today it is a much more complicated matter than some suppose to achieve effective disarmament measures. It therefore seems to us that to relate the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to the final solution of all aspects of nuclear disarmament would mean that for the time being we would achieve neither the one nor the other.

177. At the same time, the Mongolian People's Republic has never considered the conclusion of such a treaty to be an end in itself and has always felt that other and more effective measures of nuclear disarmament must follow. In this regard, the draft treaty gives us hope and strengthens our conviction. Under article VI of the treaty, the parties will undertake to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the arms race and to nuclear disarmament and also on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

178. My delegation accordingly holds that it is the urgent task of the present session to approve the draft treaty; such action would provide an impetus to further negotiations on disarmament, in particular on the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.

179. In this connexion, my delegation also notes with satisfaction that the successful work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in preparing the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons proves that it is possible with equal success to solve other international problems, such as the problem of disarmament, by means of negotiations.

180. For it is true that in its struggle to avert the danger of nuclear war mankind has achieved considerable success in recent years. By way of example, it should suffice to cite the Moscow Treaty of 1963 on the banning of nuclear tests in three media with a view to arresting contamination of the air, the earth's surface, and the waters of seas and oceans by radio-active substances lethal to man and to all living things. Another purpose of that treaty is to some extent to limit the technical possibilities of further development of nuclear weapons.

181. As everyone knows, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in Outer Space, i.e., on not placing in orbit objects with nuclear warheads (resolution 2222 (XXII)) was concluded in January 1967. The Treaty prevents nuclear weapons from being placed in orbit around the earth or in outer space, or on celestial bodies, including the moon.

182. We are able to state with satisfaction that the above-mentioned treaties, to which the Mongolian People's Republic was one of the first to accede, have been working for the benefit of peoples, and never against their interests.

183. My delegation expresses the hope that 1968 will be the year of the constructive solution of another important nuclear weapon problem—the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

184. Like the delegations of other countries, my delegation holds that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should promptly resume negotiations on effective measures for cessation of the arms race in the nearest future and ensuring nuclear disarmament, and also on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

185. As we know, the Eighteen-Nation Committee and other United Nations organs have before them for consideration a number of constructive proposals on specific measures for nuclear disarmament. These include, in particular, important proposals by the Soviet Union on a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the complete prohibition of testing and the reduction and elimination of stockpiles of these weapons, and destruction of the means of delivery.

186. Consequently, any postponement of the conclusion of a treaty which is to limit the number of States possessing nuclear weapons will not, in my delegation's opinion, accelerate the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee. That Committee must move forward if it is to carry out its mandate—prepare and submit to the General Assembly new recommendations on other equally important and urgent disarmament questions. In this connexion, my delegation expresses the hope that the forthcoming conference of non-nuclear States, for the convening of which we voted, will facilitate the constructive solution of urgent disarmament problems and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It must make its due contribution to the cause of application of atomic energy for peaceful, creative purposes.

187. Guided by the vital interests of the entire Mongolian people and the principles of its Government's foreign policy, which aims at international peace and security, my delegation strongly favours the immediate conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

188. My delegation, as a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.421/Rev.1 and Add.1-3, urges the delegations of other countries to approve the draft treaty so that the ideas it contains can be translated into reality.

189. We think the time has come to show a maximum of goodwill; the time has come to bear out words by deeds.

190. The General Assembly has an excellent basis for final discussion and approval of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It must now fulfil the hopes of all peace-loving forces sincerely concerned with eradicating a strong barrier to arrest the proliferation of the deadliest weapon known to man.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.