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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

References to the Yearbook of the International Law Commission are abbreviated to Yearbook ..., followed by the year (for example, Yearbook ... 2011).

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Volume I: summary records of the meetings of the session;

Volume II (Part One): reports of special rapporteurs and other documents considered during the session;

Volume II (Part Two): report of the Commission to the General Assembly.

All references to these works and quotations from them relate to the final printed texts of the volumes of the Yearbook issued as United Nations publications.

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The reports of the special rapporteurs and other documents considered by the Commission during its sixty-fourth session, which were originally issued in mimeographed form, are reproduced in the present volume, incorporating the corrigenda issued by the Secretariat and the editorial changes required for the presentation of the final text.
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ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU African Union
EC European Community
EU European Union
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
OAS Organization of American States
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research

ICJ Reports ICJ, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders

NOTE CONCERNING QUOTATIONS

In quotations, words or passages in italics followed by an asterisk were not italicized in the original text.

Unless otherwise indicated, quotations from works in languages other than English have been translated by the Secretariat.

The Internet address of the International Law Commission is http://legal.un.org/ilc.
EXPULSION OF ALIENS

[Agenda item 2]

DOCUMENT A/CN.4/651

Eighth report on the expulsion of aliens, by Mr. Maurice Kamto, Special Rapporteur

[Original: French]

[22 March 2012]

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Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome)
(Rome, 25 March 1957)

United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 298, No. 4300, p. 3. See also Official

Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union,
the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition
of checks at their common borders (Schengen, 14 June 1985)


Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing
the European Communities and certain related acts (Amsterdam, 2 October 1997)


Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing
the European Community (Lisbon, 13 December 2007)


Introduction

1. In introducing his seventh report1 at the sixty-third session of the International Law Commission, in 2011, the Special Rapporteur on the expulsion of aliens indicated that it was his last report before the entire set of draft articles on the topic was submitted for consideration and, he hoped, adoption by the Commission.

2. However, during the discussion in the Sixth Committee at the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, the representatives of several States who spoke on the topic raised

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concerns about some matters and made comments and suggestions on others. Most of them reiterated well-known positions in the understandable belief that the Special Rapporteur had not taken their remarks into account. Others criticized the Special Rapporteur for failing to take fully into account the provisions of their domestic law or, in the case of the European Union in particular, the specificity of Community law on the expulsion of aliens who were not citizens of member States.

3. In the Special Rapporteur’s view, most of these comments are a consequence of the discrepancy between the Commission’s progress on the topic of the expulsion of aliens and the related information submitted to the Sixth Committee during its consideration of the Commission’s annual report to the General Assembly on its work. This report will seek to dispel the misunderstandings created by the aforementioned discrepancy, respond to the comments that were doubtless prompted by insufficient clarification of the methodology followed in the treatment of the topic, and consider to what extent some of the suggestions that have not already been incorporated following the discussion in the Committee could be taken into account.

4. To that end, the report will consider first the comments made by States (chap. I) and then those of the European Union (chap. II), followed by a few final observations (chap. III).

CHAPTER I

Comments by States

5. The representatives of several States spoke on the topic of the expulsion of aliens during the Sixth Committee’s discussion of the report of the Commission. Most of the comments concerned the draft articles proposed by the Special Rapporteur in his sixth report. Some statements, however, concerned the recurring issues of the feasibility of the topic, the methodology followed by the Special Rapporteur and the final form of the Commission’s work on the topic.

6. In the interests of consistency, the specific comments on the draft articles will be considered first; the general comments will be addressed in the section on the final observations of the Special Rapporteur.

7. Concerning the incorporation of the non-refoulement rule into various provisions of the draft articles, the representative of the United States had already said that he was "troubled" by the Special Rapporteur’s incorporation of the rule into "numerous provisions", including draft articles 14 and 15. The Special Rapporteur replied to this concern, which had been expressed more than once, in the document "Draft articles on protection of the human rights of persons who have been or are being expelled, as restructured by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Maurice Kamto, in the light of the plenary debate during the first part of the sixty-first session", submitted as a supplement to his fifth report, in footnote 8 under draft article 14 and footnote 9 under draft article 15. In the light of current international human rights law, he has nothing to add to these clarifications.

8. Concerning the return to the receiving State of the alien being expelled (draft article D1), the representative of Malaysia considered that "codification of the duty or extent of the obligation imposed on States to encourage the voluntary departure of an alien being expelled was unnecessary, in that the expulsion decision concerned would have legal force"; the alien would therefore be obliged to comply with it. This is doubtless a misunderstanding since the purpose of encouraging voluntary compliance is not to give aliens a choice as to whether to leave, but to allow them to do so on their own, calmly as it were, on the understanding that they will otherwise be forced to do so by the competent authorities of the expelling State. On the other hand, several States, while recognizing the value of the idea of a voluntary return, pointed out that the word "encourage" in draft article D1, paragraph 1, was vague and could pose problems of implementation in the absence of guidance as to the means of encouragement to be employed. For this reason, some States, including Hungary, Portugal and Greece, suggested that rather than "encouraging" voluntary compliance with an expulsion order, the expelling State should "facilitate" or "promote" it. The Commission ultimately came to the same conclusion in its discussion of draft article D1, paragraph 1. Thailand also suggested that the specific reference to the rules of air travel should be deleted from paragraph 2 of this draft article since sea or land transport could also be used to expel an alien. This comment has already been made in the Commission and taken into due account.

9. Concerning the State of destination of expelled aliens (draft article E1), Malaysia—in terms that were doubtless exaggerated—said that it found the current wording of paragraph 2 “unacceptable” because, under Malaysian law, where the State of nationality of the alien being expelled had not been identified, the alien could be returned only to his or her place of embarkation or country of birth or citizenship. This is merely a variation on the

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5 Ibid., document A/CN.4/611.
7 Including Greece, the Russian Federation, Hungary and Portugal; ibid., paras. 17, 33, 56 and 62, respectively.
8 See Greece (ibid., para. 17), Hungary (ibid., para. 56) and Portugal (ibid., para. 62). In addition, Malaysia said that it considered the wording of draft article D1, para. 1, “broad” (ibid., para. 103) and that its practice was to allow “a reasonable time frame” for execution of an expulsion order (ibid., para. 104).
9 Ibid., para. 84.
10 Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), para. 236.
list of options contained in paragraph 2; in the Special Rapporteur’s view, nothing in it appears “unacceptable”. It has also been suggested that consideration should be given to the question of what would happen in the event that no State was willing to admit an expelled alien. In the Special Rapporteur’s view, the decision in such cases should be left to the discretion of the expelling State; at present, there is no rule of international law that obliges that State to allow the alien in question to remain in its territory, and it can only expel such an alien under the conditions established in these draft articles and in other rules of international law. The most that could be done is to address this issue briefly in the commentaries. Similar treatment should be given to the question of readmission agreements, since they fall within the extremely broad scope of international cooperation, in which States exercise their sovereignty in the light of variable considerations that in no way lend themselves to normative standardization through codification. As for the difference between a State that has not consented to admit an expelled alien to its territory and a State that refuses to do so, that issue has also been raised within the Commission and will doubtless be settled by choosing one or the other of those expressions.

10. Most of the States that expressed their views on protecting the human rights of aliens subject to expulsion in the transit State (draft article F1) referred either to the bilateral agreements that they conclude with the transit State or, in a few cases, to their domestic law in addition to bilateral cooperation agreements with the transit State. The Special Rapporteur considers that neither these bilateral agreements nor domestic law can contradict the relevant rules of international human rights law, from which aliens subject to expulsion must also benefit. But, as some members of the Commission rightly noted during the discussion of draft article F1, and as the representative of Malaysia also noted in the Sixth Committee, the transit State “should be obliged only to observe and implement its own domestic laws and other international rules governing the human rights of aliens arising from instruments to which it was a party”. The Special Rapporteur endorses this view but considers it appropriate to expand the scope of the transit State’s obligations to include all the rules of international human rights law to which it is subject, not merely those contained in instruments to which it is a party. The Special Rapporteur considers that draft article F1 might therefore be reworded.

11. On protecting the property of aliens facing expulsion (draft article G1), Greece stated that “the elaboration of a specific or privileged regime governing the property of expelled aliens was unnecessary in that such property was subject to protection under the general rules of international law, applicable international treaties and national legislation”. While that argument was relevant, it would apply not only to the entire set of draft articles on the expulsion of aliens but to most, if not all, of the topics under consideration by the Commission. This is because the legal sources on which the Commission typically draws for purposes of codification and progressive development are the general rules of international law, the applicable treaties and State practice. In this case, the obligation to protect the property of aliens facing expulsion does, of course, arise from general rules, but these are supported by a large body of jurisprudence that justifies formulating it, clarifying it and applying it to the specific issue of the expulsion of aliens. The 2010 judgment on the merits of the International Court of Justice in the Diaa case supports this statement. The commentary to the draft article should, however, clarify the scope of application of this rule, including by stating both that it applies without prejudice to the right of any State to expropriation or nationalization and that confiscation may be remedied by compensation where restitution is no longer possible.

12. In any event, the Russian Federation, unlike Greece, considered that the rule contained in draft article G1, paragraph 1, “was a well-founded notion that deserved support”. Thailand suggested that, in order to overcome the problem of how to assess objectively the intention of the expelling State, the word “unlawfully” should be added to paragraph 1, which would then read: “The expulsion of an alien for the sole purpose of unlawfully confiscating his or her assets is prohibited.” The Special Rapporteur is not opposed to this suggestion.

13. Concerning draft article G1, paragraph 2, some States suggested that the bracketed words “to the extent possible” should be deleted. This view had already been expressed by some members of the Commission.

14. On the right of return to the expelling State (draft article H1), the Special Rapporteur showed, in his sixth report, that several States—including Belarus, Germany, Malaysia, Malta and the Netherlands—recognized the right of an unlawfully expelled alien to return to the expelling State. However, these countries’ laws on this matter vary: some of them place restrictions on the right of return, others make it contingent on the prior possession of a residence permit that would be revoked by the expulsion order, and still others require that the expulsion order be annulled owing to a particularly grave or clear error. In the comments and observations received from Governments in 2010, the United States replied with extreme caution on this issue, suggesting that, under its domestic law, this was an option available to the competent immigration authorities rather than a right arising automatically from revocation of an unlawful expulsion order. Similarly, although more briefly,
Malta stated that expelled persons could submit a request for re-entry to the Principal Immigration Officer.26

15. During the discussion in the Sixth Committee, Malaysia reiterated its position, which was similar: “an expelled alien should be allowed to return to the expelling State, subject to its immigration laws”.27 In the opinion of Greece, the provisions of draft article H1 were “too broad”. Greece considered that the draft article introduced no differentiation on the basis of whether the alien being expelled was lawfully present in the expelling State, whereas the annulment of an expulsion decision could not confer a right to entry or residence in a State on an alien whose situation had been irregular before implementation of the decision. Moreover, a potential right to return to the expelling State could be envisaged only in cases where an expulsion decision was annulled because it was contrary to a substantive rule of international law.28

This is also the implied meaning of the aforementioned statement by Malaysia.

16. The position that a right of return to the expelling State can be envisaged only in cases where the expulsion order has been annulled owing to violation of a substantive rule of international law is shared by other States, including the Russian Federation29 and Hungary.30

17. Also noteworthy is the preference of some States31 for the term “right to re-entry” rather than “right of return”, which might be confused with the recognized right of internally or externally displaced persons to return to their own country.

18. The Special Rapporteur agrees with the preceding suggestions. In fact, he proposes that, in future, the term “readmission of an alien in cases of illegal expulsion” should be used in order to avoid any disagreement as to whether this is, in all cases, a right or whether the expelling State retains its power to grant or deny admission to its territory to an alien. In the light of the other suggestion—that a distinction should be made between aliens who were lawfully and those who were unlawfully present in the territory of a State prior to the issuance of an expulsion order, the Special Rapporteur suggests that an alien who was unlawfully expelled but was lawfully present in the territory of the expelling State should have a right to readmission and that readmission should be based on the order annulling the unlawful expulsion order; the competent authorities of the expelling State should be required to carry out the readmission procedures. The readmission of aliens who were unlawfully expelled but were unlawfully present in the territory of the expelling State would be subject to the expelling State’s entry and residence procedures. In either case, readmission could be denied for reasons of public policy or public safety.

19. Lastly, several States objected to the words “mistaken grounds”, in paragraph 2 of this draft article, because they did not qualify as legal terminology.32 That objection had also been made within the Commission,33 and the notion of “erroneous grounds” had then been proposed.

20. Concerning the responsibility of States in cases of unlawful expulsion (draft article H1) and diplomatic protection (draft article J1), the views expressed by States differed. Hungary did not comment on draft article H1; however, it said that consideration should be given to omitting draft article J1 on diplomatic protection because “not only did it address a controversial issue, but it was not closely related to the subject matter of the draft articles”.34 Portugal considered that the issues addressed in draft articles H1 and J1 “should be approached with caution, bearing in mind that States had domestic mechanisms available to aliens subject to expulsion that would enable them to appeal against a wrongful or unlawful expulsion decision or hold the expelling State responsible for such a decision”.35 Greece said that it “attached great importance to the issue of effective remedies in the case of expulsion decisions”.36

21. As to whether there is a relationship between, on the one hand, the expulsion of aliens and the question of the responsibility of the expelling State in cases of unlawful expulsion and, on the other hand, diplomatic protection, suffice it to recall, without insisting (since the issue was addressed in the seventh report37) that the aforementioned 2010 judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Diallo case marks the culmination of a tradition of an abundant arbitral jurisprudence dating from the nineteenth century, which clearly shows that these two questions have always been at the heart of international law on the expulsion of aliens. It is interesting to note the statement by Chile that it:

supported the inclusion of both draft article H1 (The responsibility of States in cases of unlawful expulsion) and draft article J1 (Diplomatic protection), which concerned the exercise of diplomatic protection by the expelled alien’s State of nationality, particularly in order to guarantee the protection of human rights in the case of unlawful expulsions.38

As for the emphasis placed by some States on the fact that internal mechanisms were available to aliens in cases of unlawful expulsion, it goes without saying that the exercise of diplomatic protection is subject to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. As the regime on the responsibility of States in cases of unlawful expulsion and the regime on diplomatic protection are quite well established in international law, the Special Rapporteur did not deem it appropriate to focus on them specifically.

22. As the Special Rapporteur wrote in his seventh report,39 the two draft articles on, respectively, the respon-

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26 Ibid.
28 Ibid., para. 21.
29 Ibid., para. 35.
30 Ibid., para. 57.
31 See, in this connection, Thailand (ibid., para. 87).
32 See Chile (ibid., para. 6) and Hungary (ibid., para. 57).
33 Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), para. 248.
35 Ibid., para. 64. In addition, Malaysia said that “a more cautious approach should be adopted” (ibid., para. 109).
36 Ibid., para. 23.
sibility of States in cases of unlawful expulsion and diplomatic protection are therefore quite appropriate for inclusion in the draft articles on the expulsion of aliens.

23. Concerning expulsion in connection with extradition (revised draft article 8), the Russian Federation fully supported the Special Rapporteur: “The draft article 8 embodied a new approach meriting support, which was that the existence of an extradition request did not in itself constitute a circumstance that prevented expulsion”. But it should be noted that this is one of the rare examples of such clear support for the draft article. Chile said that “it had particular concerns stemming from the connection between the two related but different institutions of expulsion and extradition, each of which had its own regulations”. Chile nevertheless suggested that the issue should be studied “with a view to harmonizing the institutions of expulsion with that of extradition”. According to Malaysia, “the decision as to whether to exercise deportation or extradition must remain the sole prerogative of a sovereign State”. The wording of revised draft article 8 “should … be re-evaluated with the aim of ensuring a clear distinction between disguised extradition and a genuine act of deportation”.

24. On the other hand, the United States has always been opposed to the inclusion of such a draft article in the draft articles on the expulsion of aliens, whatever the wording proposed. Similarly, Portugal said that it was not certain whether revised draft article 8 “had a rightful place in the draft articles”. Thailand took a similar position on the matter. Canada stated bluntly that “the draft article should be deleted on the ground of prematurity” since, in its view, “there was insufficient practice to support the conclusion on which revised draft article 8 … was based”.

25. In the light of the differences of opinion on this issue and of the significant support for deletion of the current wording of revised draft article 8, the Special Rapporteur considers the suggestion from Thailand—that the draft article should be replaced by a “without prejudice” clause concerning the international legal obligations regarding extradition among the States concerned—to be useful.

26. Very few States replied to the question concerning appeals against an expulsion decision. In its reply to the question put to States on this issue, Sweden stated that “an expulsion order may not be enforced until it has become final”. During the discussion of the report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixty-third session in the Sixth Committee, Canada stated that “State practice did not yet appear to warrant the formulation of a provision” on the suspensive effect of such an appeal. In its written reply to the questions raised by the Commission in chapter III of the report on the work of its sixty-third session, in 2011, communicated to the secretariat of the Commission in February 2012, Germany expounded at length on its legislation in that area. It stated that section 80 (1) of its Code of Administrative Court Procedure stipulated as a general rule that “objections and rescissory actions” had a suspensive effect. However, paragraph 2 of that article and various provisions of the Residence Act set out exceptions to that rule.

27. For example, under article 84 (1) of the Residence Act, an objection or legal action against the refusal of an application for a residence title (issuance or extension) does not have a suspensive effect. Section 52 (1) (4) of the Residence Act, in conjunction with section 75 (2) of the Asylum Procedure Act, stipulates that no suspensive effect is attached to revocation of an alien’s residence title. Section 80 (2) (4) of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure also states that there is no suspensive effect in cases in which the authority that issues the administrative act separately orders immediate execution in the public interest.

28. Even in cases where suspensive effect is granted, the Residence Act stipulates that the operative effect of an expulsion or an administrative act that terminates the lawfulness of the residence is not affected by any objection or legal action (sect. 84 (2)). Under the Code of Administrative Court Procedure, the competent administrative court can, however, grant suspensive effect by way of a court order in those cases where suspensive effect would not otherwise apply pursuant to section 80 (2).

29. As to the question of whether suspensive effect depends on the lawfulness of the alien’s residence, Germany replied that it did not. In fact, the expulsion decision makes the alien’s residence unlawful and obliges him or her to leave German territory.

30. On the question of whether States that have such a practice (suspending effect) consider it to be required by international law, Germany replied that on such matters, it was mainly influenced and directed by German constitutional law.

40 Ibid., para. 224 and its footnote.
42 Ibid., para. 7.
43 Ibid., para. 111.
46 Ibid., para. 88.
47 Ibid., para. 77.
48 See footnote 46 above.
51 Yearbook … 2011, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 40–42.
31. The practice in Germany in these matters is proof of the extreme complexity of the issue. Not only is there insufficient consistency in State practice, as noted first by the Special Rapporteur in his sixth report\(^5\) and then by Canada (see above), but it would be quite risky to propose a general rule for a question to which national legal systems provide a variety of responses, depending on the circumstances envisaged. The Special Rapporteur therefore remains uncertain as to whether there is sufficient legal basis to propose a draft article on the issue.

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32. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related Acts, member States transferred competence over a broad field of “aliens law” to the European Commission. This transfer took effect in 1999 and led to the inclusion in the Treaty establishing the European Community of a separate title dealing with visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to freedom of movement of persons (Title IV). The European Community has since taken various initiatives towards a common return and readmission policy for non-nationals of its member States and has adopted several relevant directives\(^5\) and concluded international agreements under Title IV of the Treaty of Amsterdam. That title was replaced by Title V of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, which came into effect on 1 December 2009 and replaced the European Community by the European Union. Title V of the Treaty of Lisbon deals with the “area of freedom, security and justice”\(^5\).

33. In European Union law, the term “aliens”, as used by the Commission in its work on the expulsion of aliens, corresponds to “third-country nationals”, defined in article 2 \((a)\) of Council Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third-country nationals\(^5\) as “anyone who is not a national of any of the member States”. European Union legislation uses a variety of terms to designate the concept of “expulsion”, including “ending of stay”, “removal” and “return”.

34. The Return Directive, which sets out common standards and procedures in member States for the return of illegally staying third-country nationals, uses the same terminology but also refers to “voluntary return”. It defines the term “return” as the process of a third-country national going back—whether in voluntary compliance with an obligation to return, or enforced—to \((a)\) his or her country of origin; \((b)\) a country of transit in accordance with Community or bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements; or \((c)\) another third country, to which the third-country national concerned voluntarily decides to return and in which he or she will be accepted.\(^5\)

35. These provisions reflect the Special Rapporteur’s comments on the issue of relations between the expelling State and the transit and receiving States in his sixth report\(^5\), which led to the formulation of draft article E1 (State of destination of expelled aliens),\(^5\) and draft article F1 (Protecting the human rights of aliens subject to expulsion in the transit State).\(^5\) It is true that the Special Rapporteur said nothing about readmission agreements; he acknowledged their existence but felt that they did not require codification or even progressive development insofar as they fall within the scope of international cooperation, since States are free to conclude any agreements that they deem necessary in this area.

36. With regard to the specific issues on which States were requested to submit information about their practice, the European Union provided the explanations set out in the following paragraphs.

37. Concerning the grounds for expulsion provided for in national legislation, the principles of European Union law require member State authorities to adopt an individualized approach to expulsion, including for public policy or security considerations. This approach must take into account the likely danger emanating from the person concerned, the severity and type of offence committed, the duration of stay in member States, the age of the person concerned, the consequences of expulsion for that person and for his or her family members, the links with the country of residence and/or the absence of links with

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\(^5\) Ibid., para. 518.

\(^5\) Ibid., para. 520.
the country of origin. There is therefore no fixed list of concrete grounds for expulsion for public policy or security considerations.⁶⁰

38. With regard to the conditions and duration of “detention for the purpose of removal”, the 2008 Return Directive contains detailed provisions setting out minimum standards for the duration of detention (art. 15), general conditions of detention (art. 16) and specific provisions for detention of minors (art. 17).

39. With respect to detention, article 15, paragraph 1, provides that an alien who is “the subject of return procedures” may only be kept in detention when (a) “there is a risk of absconding”, or (b) the alien concerned “avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process”. In any event, “any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence”.

40. With regard to “conditions of detention”, article 16, paragraph 1, provides that “detention shall take place as a rule in specialized detention facilities”. Where detention takes place in a prison, the alien concerned must be kept separated from ordinary prisoners. The alien must be allowed—on request—to establish “in due time” contact with legal representatives, family members and competent consular authorities (para. 2). Paragraph 3 of the article establishes the obligation to pay “particular attention” to the situation of vulnerable persons and to provide “emergency health care and essential treatment of illness”. Paragraph 4 states that relevant and competent national, international and non-governmental organizations and bodies shall have the possibility to visit detention facilities and that such visits may be subject to authorization. Paragraph 5 provides that aliens kept in detention shall be “systematically provided with information which explains the rules applied in the facility and sets out their rights and obligations”.

41. Article 17, paragraph 1, provides that minors and families shall only be detained “as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time”. The article then sets out various rights enjoyed by these groups and other protective measures to which they are entitled: the right to separate accommodation guaranteeing adequate privacy; the possibility for minors to engage in leisure activities; and the provision, as far as possible, of accommodation in institutions with appropriate personnel and facilities. Lastly, “the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration in the context of the detention of minors pending removal” (para. 5).

42. The issues covered by articles 15 to 17 of the 2008 Return Directive were addressed by the Special Rapporteur in his sixth report.⁶¹ It should be acknowledged, however, that the Directive contains extremely progressive provisions on such matters that are far more advanced than the norms found in other regions of the world. Although these provisions are applicable in some 27 States, it appears difficult to establish them as universal norms, particularly since some States⁶² have not hesitated to criticize the Special Rapporteur for codifying European Union law, and even the jurisprudence of the human rights treaty bodies. At a minimum, it should be noted that the principal norms contained in these provisions are generally accepted in the practice of most States and are, moreover, universal in nature in that they are found, inter alia, in General Assembly resolution 43/173 of 9 December 1988, which the Special Rapporteur highlighted in paragraph 245 of his sixth report. The discussions within the Commission showed that there was no consensus on, for example, the conditions for detaining an alien who is the subject of expulsion, covered by article 15.

43. One issue of terminology is worth addressing. The French text of the Return Directive refers to rétention (art. 15), while both the Special Rapporteur and the Commission use the term détention. While it might be tempting to adopt the Directive’s terminology, it does not seem necessary to do so. First, the term détention is all-encompassing. In this connection, the French title of the aforementioned resolution 43/173 is significant: “... la protection de toutes les personnes soumises à une quelconque forme de détention ou d’emprisonnement” (“... Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment”). Second, since article 15, paragraph 2, of the Directive provides that “detention shall be ordered by administrative or judicial authorities”, it does not seem relevant to distinguish between detentions ordered by the same administrative or judicial authorities for offences that, while they may be different, produce the same consequences in terms of deprivation of liberty.

44. On the other hand, it may be necessary to amend draft article B, paragraph 3 (b),⁶³ which provides that “the extension of the duration of the detention may be decided upon only by a court or a person authorized to exercise judicial power” along the lines of article 15, paragraph 2, of the Directive. This provision of the draft article, which is based on jurisprudence, gives the administrative authorities no power to extend the duration of detention, even though they have the power to order the detention itself. Apart from being illogical, such an approach could create practical difficulties for States, since, in certain emergency situations, it is impossible to await the conclusion of judicial proceedings, which are generally slower in such cases than administrative proceedings.

45. The Return Directive does not deal directly with the right of an unlawfully expelled alien to return to the expelling State. It might be inferred from article 11, paragraph 1, of the Directive (Entry ban) that the right of return to the expelling State may be set aside in certain cases, for example, where the expulsion order is accompanied by an entry ban if no period for voluntary departure has been granted, or if the obligation to return has not been complied with. Member States are, however, allowed to refrain from issuing an entry ban for humanitarian reasons, including where victims of human trafficking, asylum seekers or persons who are in need of international protection are involved.

⁶⁰ See letter from the Director-General of the European Commission’s Legal Service (footnote 54 above).

⁶¹ Yearbook ... 2010, vol. II (Part One), document A/CN.4/625 and Add.1–2, pp. 183–200, paras. 211–276 and draft article B.


⁶³ See footnote 61 above.
46. It should also be noted that article 13 of the Directive provides for the right to appeal against an expulsion order, including for cases in which an entry ban has been imposed. The consequences of a successful appeal are to be determined in each individual case by the appeals body. In short, European Union law has no specific, explicit rule concerning the return of an expelled person to the expelling State.

47. This observation on the common practice of 27 European States confirms to the Special Rapporteur that there is no general rule or uniform practice on the topic and that the rule set out in draft article H1, contained in his sixth report, is indeed part of the progressive development of international law and is relevant since it is a rule a contrario, a logical rule formulated as a legally necessary consequence of violation of a rule of international law.

48. The European Union directives do not deal explicitly with the nature of relations between the expelling State and the transit State, although this issue is addressed in a number of readmission agreements concluded between the European Union and non-member States. However, this is an area of bilateral cooperation, where States are free to exercise their sovereign right to agree on the rules that they intend to apply in their mutual relations, provided that those rules do not violate the objective norms of international law or erga omnes obligations. For this reason, the Special Rapporteur feels that consideration of this issue should be limited to established practice in general international law, which is what draft article F1, proposed in his sixth report and amended during the Commission’s plenary debates thereon, attempts to do.


66 Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), para. 219 and its footnote.

CHAPTER III

Final observations of the Special Rapporteur

49. In these final observations, the Special Rapporteur will first make some remarks concerning States’ comments on specific draft articles. He will then focus on some aspects of his working methodology, on progress in the Commission’s work on the topic of the expulsion of aliens, and on the final form of that work.

A. Specific comments on various draft articles

50. The Special Rapporteur welcomed the comments and suggestions made by States in relation to specific draft articles. As indicated above, he believes that the Commission might adopt some proposals when it finalizes the draft articles on first reading. Where applicable, he will endeavour to formulate such proposals.

B. Specific comments on several methodological questions

51. Some States have made sometimes-contradictory comments on the approach followed by the Special Rapporteur with a view to the formulation of the draft articles. The United States, for instance, has criticized him for codifying the jurisprudence of regional human rights courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights, and for codifying the jurisprudence of regional human rights bodies. In short, European Union law has no specific, explicit rule concerning the return of an expelled person to the expelling State.

52. Without repeating in detail his replies on these matters during the discussion in the Sixth Committee in November 2011, the Special Rapporteur will simply recall a strong statement on the question made by one member of the Commission during the plenary debate on the sixth report on the expulsion of aliens. That member commended the Special Rapporteur on his attempt to assemble the widest possible range of sources from all regions of the world and on the manner in which he used those sources, comparing them and putting them in historical context, as seen from the various reports on the expulsion of aliens. It is possible that, in the case of a particular country, the presentation of certain events may have given the erroneous impression that the Special Rapporteur was dwelling on the past. However, this should simply be seen as his attempt to use as many historical examples as possible in order to establish a more solid foundation for his proposed draft articles without passing judgment on the events themselves or on the circumstances surrounding them. At no time did the Special Rapporteur intend to harm any State or pass judgment on its history or its recent practice.

53. It was in that spirit that he discussed, in his seventh report, the amendment to the Swiss Constitution concerning the expulsion of foreign criminals, adopted by the people and cantons of Switzerland in November 2010. The report noted that, as was its practice, the Swiss Government would adapt the amendment through the adoption of implementing legislation. In the same vein, he discussed, again in the seventh report, the 2011 French draft legislation on immigration, integration and nationality, which concerned the expulsion of aliens indirectly.

65 Ibid., p. 244, paras. 519 and 520.

66 Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), para. 219 and its footnote.
as it provided for deprivation of nationality followed by expulsion. The Special Rapporteur notes that the aspects of that draft legislation that were relevant to the question of the expulsion of aliens were deleted from the final draft that was adopted by the French parliament.

54. Lastly, consideration of the topic by the Sixth Committee suffered from the discrepancy between the Commission’s progress on the topic and the information contained in the reports submitted for consideration by States in the Sixth Committee on the basis of the Special Rapporteur’s original reports. The Commission’s work on the expulsion of aliens was always ahead of the reports on the topic that were submitted to the General Assembly. The draft articles that were first discussed in plenary within the Commission and then transmitted to and considered by the Drafting Committee, often after the Special Rapporteur had submitted new drafting proposals, were not immediately relayed to the Sixth Committee because the Drafting Committee had decided not to take a decision on a few initial draft articles concerning, inter alia, the scope of the draft articles and certain key definitions before seeing the rest of the draft articles. This resulted in a discrepancy between the actual progress in the Commission’s work on the topic and the documents submitted to States within the Sixth Committee, and made dialogue between the two bodies somewhat difficult since they did not have the same amount of information on progress in the work on the topic. It is hoped that submission of all the draft articles adopted by the Commission, with the commentaries thereto, will bring this situation to an end.

C. Specific comments on the final form of the Commission’s work on the topic

55. Some States have felt that the topic of the expulsion of aliens was not suitable for codification or that the final outcome of the Commission’s work on the topic should, at most, take the form of “fundamental guiding principles, standards and guidelines” or “guidelines or guiding principles” rather than “draft articles”. Some States expressed similar views during the discussion in

56. At this juncture, the Special Rapporteur will simply recall briefly his replies on the question at the sixty-third session of the Commission and in November 2011, during the discussion in the Sixth Committee. Apart from the topic of State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts and, to a certain extent, that of diplomatic protection, on which, moreover, the codification work drew extensively on international jurisprudence on the expulsion of aliens, no other topic on the Commission’s agenda for the past three quinquenniums has had a richer and more solid foundation for codification than the expulsion of aliens: a considerable body of international legal instruments, international jurisprudence from a wide variety of sources, an abundance of national legislation and jurisprudence, and well-developed doctrine. Several of the topics that have been considered by the Commission and have resulted in draft articles rather than directives, guidelines or principles were not based on such abundant legal material.

57. It is doubtless premature to decide on the final form of the Commission’s work on the topic of the expulsion of aliens. However, since this topic appears to be a source of concern for some States, the Special Rapporteur is convinced that, once the drafting of the draft articles and the commentaries thereto is completed, the consistency and soundness of the work will become more evident than at present and some of the concerns regarding the topic will be allevied. He therefore hopes that at the appropriate time, the Commission will elect to transmit the outcome of its work to the General Assembly as draft articles so that the Assembly can take an informed decision on their final form.


See also the position expressed by Greece in the name of the Nordic countries, ibid., Sixty-second Session, Sixth Committee, 19th meeting (A/C.6/62/SR.19), para. 9; and Portugal, ibid., Sixty-third Session, Sixth Committee, 20th meeting (A/C.6/63/SR.20), para. 2.


Ibid., para. 258.

PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN THE EVENT OF DISASTERS

[Agenda item 4]

DOCUMENT A/CN.4/652

Fifth report on the protection of persons in the event of disasters,
by Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Special Rapporteur

[Original: English] [9 April 2012]

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HOLLAND, Anthony, Christine

Institute of International Law

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Introduction

1. The International Law Commission, at its fifty-ninth session, in 2007, decided to include the topic “Protection of persons in the event of disasters” in its programme of work and appointed Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina as Special Rapporteur.

2. At its sixtieth session, in 2008, the Commission had before it the preliminary report of the Special Rapporteur, tracing the evolution of the protection of persons in the event of disasters, identifying the sources of the law on the topic, as well as previous efforts towards codification and development of the law in the area. It also presented in broad outline the various aspects of the general scope with a view to identifying the main legal questions to be covered and advancing tentative conclusions without prejudice to the outcome of the discussion that the report aimed to trigger in the Commission. The Commission also had before it a memorandum it had requested from the Secretariat, focusing primarily on natural disasters and providing an overview of existing legal instruments and texts applicable to a variety of aspects of disaster prevention and relief assistance, as well as of the protection of persons in the event of disasters.

3. The Commission considered, at its sixty-first session, in 2009, the second report of the Special Rapporteur analysing the scope of the topic ratione materiae, ratione personae and ratione temporis, and issues relating to the definition of “disaster” for purposes of the topic, as well as undertaking a consideration of the basic duty to cooperate. The report contained proposals for draft articles 1 (Scope), 2 (Definition of disaster) and 3 (Duty to cooperate). The Commission also had before it written replies submitted by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to the questions addressed to them by the Commission in 2008.

4. At the sixty-second session of the Commission, in 2010, the Special Rapporteur submitted his third report on the topic, in which he provided an overview of the comments of States and IFRC made in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly on the work undertaken by the Commission up to that time. He then examined the principles that inspired the protection of persons in the event of disasters, in its aspect related to persons in need of protection, and the question of the responsibility of the affected State. The report contained proposals for three further draft articles: 6 (Humanitarian principles in disaster response), 7 (Human dignity) and 8 (Primary responsibility of the affected State).

5. At its sixty-third session, in 2011, the Commission had before it the fourth report of the Special Rapporteur, providing an overview of the views of States and IFRC expressed in the Sixth Committee on the work accomplished by the Commission thus far, a consideration of the responsibility of the affected State to seek assistance where its national response capacity is exceeded, the duty of the affected State not to arbitrarily withhold its consent to external assistance as well as the right to offer assistance in the international community. Proposals for the following three further draft articles were made in the report: draft articles 10 (Duty of the affected State to seek assistance), 11 (Duty of the affected State not to arbitrarily withhold its consent) and 12 (Right to offer assistance).

6. At its sixty-first session, in 2009, the Commission, on 31 July 2009, took note of draft articles 1 to 5, as

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2 A/CN.4/590 and Add.1–3 (available from the Commission’s website, documents of the sixtieth session; the final text will be published as an addendum to Yearbook ... 2008, vol. II (Part One)).

provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee. The Commission, on 20 July 2010, took note of draft articles 6 to 9, as provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee.7

7. At its sixty-second session, in 2010, the Commission, on 4 June 2010, adopted the report of the Drafting Committee on draft articles 1 to 5, which had been considered at the Commission’s previous session.8 Commentaries to draft articles 1 to 5 were likewise adopted by the Commission, on 2 August 2010.9 The text of draft articles 1 to 5, with commentaries, was reproduced in the report of the Commission on the work of its sixty-second session.10

8. The Commission, at its sixty-third session, in 2011, adopted, on 11 July 2011, the report of the Drafting Committee on draft articles 6 to 9, which had been considered at the Commission’s previous session.11 The Commission further adopted the report of the Drafting Committee on draft articles 10 and 11, on 2 August 2011.12 On 9 August 2011, the Commission adopted commentaries to draft articles 6 to 11.13 The text of draft articles 6 to 11, with commentaries, was reproduced in the report of the Commission on the work of its sixty-third session.14

9. Also at its sixty-third session, the Commission, on 18 July 2011, referred to the Drafting Committee draft article 12, together with draft articles 10 and 11, proposed by the Special Rapporteur in his fourth report.15 However, owing to the lack of time, the Drafting Committee could not provisionally adopt draft article 12 at that session.

Chapter I

Comments made in the Sixth Committee by States and organizations

10. In 2011, the Sixth Committee considered,16 under agenda item 81, the report of the Commission on the work of its sixty-third session, chapter IX of which concerned the topic “Protection of persons in the event of disasters”.17 The interventions of States concentrated on the text of draft articles 5 to 11 and commentaries thereto already adopted by the Commission,18 as well as on the content of draft article 12 as proposed by the Special Rapporteur in his fourth report.19 Representatives also referred to the points related to the present topic included in the chapter of the Commission’s report entitled “Specific issues on which comments would be of particular interest to the Commission”.20

11. In its report,21 the Commission reiterated that it would welcome any information concerning the practice of States under the present topic, including examples of domestic legislation, in particular information and comments on specific legal and institutional problems encountered in dealing with or responding to disasters. In this respect Austria,22 Hungary23 and Indonesia4 made reference to their national legislation dealing with disaster relief. The European Union25 elaborated on its instruments in the field of humanitarian assistance and civil protection, while IFRC26 highlighted some of the most recent developments in its activities related to International Disaster Response Law.

A. General comments

12. As in previous years, the debate in the Sixth Committee evidenced the great interest of States and organizations in the topic. States in general welcomed the progress achieved by the Commission in a short time, emphasizing the importance and timeliness of the topic in the light of the rising number of losses produced by natural disasters.27 They recognized that the Commission’s work of codification and progressive development would greatly contribute to the development of disaster response law and commended its efforts in clarifying the specific legal framework pertaining to access in disaster situations, the inclusion of the fundamental principles governing disaster relief and the recognition of several duties on the part of affected States.28 Several States acknowledged that such undertakings would help to improve the efficiency and quality of humanitarian assistance and mitigate the

6 Yearbook ... 2009, vol. I, 3029th meeting; see also document A/CN.4/L.758 (mimeographed).
7 Yearbook ... 2010, vol. I, 3067th meeting; see also document A/CN.4/L.776 (mimeographed).
8 Yearbook ... 2010, vol. I, 3057th meeting.
9 Ibid., 3072nd meeting.
10 Ibid., vol. II (Part Two), pp. 185–190, para. 331.
11 Yearbook ... 2011, vol. I, 3102nd meeting.
12 Ibid., 3116th meeting.
13 Ibid., 3122nd meeting.
15 Ibid., vol. I, 3107th meeting.
20 Ibid., vol. II (Part Two), p. 20, paras. 43–44.
21 Ibid., para. 43.
23 Ibid., 24th meeting (A/C.6/66/SR.24), para. 58.
24 Ibid., para. 71.
consequences of disasters. One delegation, for example, noted that “the Commission had chosen to focus on matters of great current significance and had shown itself to be in tune with existing trends in international practice”.

13. As a general remark and a point of departure for the debate on specific draft articles, several States praised the Commission for striking the proper balance between the need to protect the persons affected by disasters and respect for the principles of State sovereignty and non-interference. Some delegations underlined that response to disasters, and consequently the draft articles prepared by the Commission, should always be based on full respect for the sovereignty of the affected State and should not allow humanitarian assistance to be politicized or be made an excuse for interfering in the internal affairs of the affected State. The importance of international solidarity in the event of disasters was also emphasized.

14. While the Commission’s recognition of the role of international organizations and other humanitarian actors in the protection of persons in the event of disasters was welcomed, it was deemed unclear whether the respective draft articles also included regional integration organizations, such as the European Union.

15. It was suggested that the proposed scope of the draft articles was too narrow with respect to the events to be covered and therefore should be extended to a wider range of pre-disaster activities relating to risk reduction, prevention, preparedness and mitigation. It was also felt that the draft articles themselves should focus on operational matters. In addition, it was stressed that non-binding guidelines or a framework of principles for States and other parties engaged in disaster relief would be more practical and more likely to enjoy wide support.

16. States endorsed the Commission’s view based on the position of the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the concept of “responsibility to protect” fell outside the scope of the topic and applied only to four specific crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. For the Secretary-General, extending the concept of “responsibility to protect” to include the response to natural disasters would stretch it beyond recognition or operational utility. Nevertheless, one delegation maintained that since “responsibility to protect” was among the most dynamically developing and innovative concepts in international relations, further careful consideration should be given to the appropriateness of extending it to natural disasters.

B. Draft articles 5–8

17. Regarding draft article 5 (Duty to cooperate), States emphasized its importance since cooperation was essential to successful disaster relief and protection of persons in need. Nevertheless, a call for further clarification of draft article 5 was made, in order to enable States to understand the extent of their obligations.

18. With respect to draft article 6 (Humanitarian principles in disaster response), the Special Rapporteur was commended for recognizing the core role played by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and non-discrimination in the coordination and implementation of disaster relief. Support was expressed for the Commission’s view in the commentary that it was not necessary to determine whether the three humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality in the draft article were general principles of international law. The suggestion was made to clarify the term “the particularly vulnerable” concerning the application of humanitarian principles in disaster response.


20. Two delegations proposed that draft articles 7 and 8, as they addressed key principles, should be better placed at the beginning of the text of the future instrument or in its preamble.

21. Draft article 7 (Human dignity) was deemed especially significant, since it was the first time that...
it had appeared as an autonomous provision in the body of a future international instrument and it stood as a reminder that the protection of human beings lay at the heart of the topic. It was pointed out that, as recognized in the corresponding commentary, the duty to “respect and protect” was very broad, encompassing both a negative obligation to refrain from injuring the dignity of the human person and a positive obligation to maintain that dignity. The State, given its primary role in disaster response, also had the primary role in fulfilling that duty.  

22. With regard to draft article 8 (Human rights), it was said that in comparison to draft article 7, its wording was too general and vague and raised questions regarding its scope and interpretation. The view was also expressed that the commentary should elaborate further on the meaning of human rights by referring to the protection of rights relating to the provision of food, health, shelter and education, housing, land and property, livelihoods and secondary and higher education; and documentation, movement, re-establishment of family ties, expression and opinion, and elections.  

C. Draft article 9

23. Draft article 9 (Role of the affected State), premised on the core principle of State sovereignty and establishing a duty of the affected State to ensure the protection of persons and the provision of relief and assistance on its territory, met with general approval of States in the Sixth Committee.  

Although the affected State was best placed to assess its needs in that regard, its responsibility should not remain exclusive. Additional consideration should be given to the affected State’s duty towards the international community as a whole, since inaction could affect not only its own territory but also that of its neighbours. The use of the term “duty” in draft article 9 was welcomed for various reasons, especially in order to avoid any confusion with the concept of “responsibility” and as the appropriate means of reconciling the two desiderata of preserving State sovereignty and protecting the affected population. It was also said that the text would benefit from a specific reference to persons with disabilities.  

D. Draft article 10

24. Concerning draft article 10 (Duty of the affected State to seek assistance), many delegations welcomed establishing as legal, and not as moral or political, the duty of the affected State to seek assistance. They agreed that the duty established therein derived from the affected State’s obligations under international human rights instruments and customary international law, and that the protection of various human rights directly implicated in the context of disasters, such as the right to life, food, health and medical care, was essential. In this connection, it was recommended that among the human rights listed in the commentary a reference to the right to access to fresh water should be added.  

25. Since the affected State did not have unlimited discretion regarding its consent to external assistance, which it was obliged to seek if the disaster exceeded its response capacity, a suggestion was made that situations in which the affected State might be unwilling to provide assistance and protection should also be addressed.  

26. Attention was drawn to the preamble of the Council of the European Union Regulation No. 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid, which stated that “people in distress, victims of natural disasters, wars and outbreaks of fighting, or other comparable exceptional circumstances have a right to international humanitarian assistance where their own authorities prove unable to provide effective relief”.  

27. It was suggested that the fact that the Government of an affected State was in the best position to determine the severity of a disaster and the limits of its own response capacity be reflected in the text of draft article 10.  

28. On the other hand, a number of States opposed the idea that the affected State was placed under a legal obligation to seek external assistance in cases where a disaster exceeded its national response capacity. In their view, the imposition of such a duty constituted infringement of the sovereignty of States as well as of international cooperation and solidarity, and had no basis in existing international law, customary law or State practice. It was preferable that the provision of draft article 10 be reworded in hortatory terms, namely, to use

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49 Thailand, ibid., 24th meeting (A/C.6/66/SR.24), para. 89.  
51 characterized draft article 9 as the most essential provision of the draft articles implying the preference given to domestic law.  
53 Colombia, ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/66/SR.22), para. 27.  
instead of the mandatory phrase “duty to seek assistance” the formulation “should seek assistance”.

29. As stated by one delegation, the relationship between the affected State and the international community in disaster situations should not be defined in terms of rights and duties, but rather be considered from the perspective of international cooperation, not only in draft article 10 but also in draft articles 11, paragraph 2, and 12.

30. Some delegations drew attention to the importance of the last part of draft article 10, namely, that the affected State was free to choose among the various enumerated external actors offering assistance, as indicated by the phrase “as appropriate”. In that connection, the view was expressed that inclusion of the words “as appropriate” in the draft article contributed to strengthening the affected State’s discretion in determining and choosing the best assistance provider, since an affected State was in the best position to determine the gravity of an emergency situation on its territory and to frame appropriate responses. Conversely, a suggestion was made to exclude those words so as to emphasize the discretionary power of the affected State.

31. The opinion was expressed that the clause “to the extent that a disaster exceeds its national response capacity” raised questions as to the manner in which the national response capacity was assessed, and therefore it should be further elaborated. In that connection, support was voiced for reverting to the wording originally proposed by the Special Rapporteur in his fourth report: “If the disaster exceeds its national response capacity”.

32. There were some additional suggestions in respect of draft article 10. One State proposed that the draft article should be reworded so as to make it clear that States were free to request assistance from any of the enumerated actors or from others not mentioned in the draft article in the light of general human rights law. For some delegations, it would be useful to provide incentives for the affected State to seek assistance at an even earlier stage in order to avoid delays in the provision of assistance.

It was also suggested that a distinction should be made between States and international organizations on the one hand and relevant non-governmental organizations on the other, since it was not incumbent on the affected State to seek assistance from the latter.

E. Draft article 11

33. It was suggested that the words “without prejudice to article 10” be added at the beginning of draft article 11 (Consent of the affected State to external assistance) for the sake of harmony.

34. General agreement was expressed with paragraph 1 of draft article 11, which reflected the core principle, fundamental to international law, that implementation of international relief assistance was contingent upon the consent of the affected State, which was fully in line with the principle of State sovereignty. However, concern was manifested at imposing such a legal obligation, which could undermine the current practice of international cooperation and solidarity.

35. The opinion was expressed that although the requirement to obtain the consent of the affected State was reasonable, it could cause delay in cases where rapid reaction was needed. It was also stated that draft article 11 should categorically refuse to allow consent to be implied or dispensed completely in situations where a lack of consent would not bar the provision of assistance. The situation where there was no functioning Government to provide consent might be acceptable from a humanitarian standpoint but raised questions as to who should decide whether a Government, functioning or otherwise, existed.

36. A number of States welcomed paragraph 2 of draft article 11, which stipulates that the consent to external assistance by the affected State should not be withheld arbitrarily, underlyening that the affected State had both a right and a duty to assist its own population.

37. In the opinion of one State, an additional study on the relationship between international cooperation and international principles would be helpful in establishing
possible derogations to those of sovereignty and non-intervention. A State should bear the responsibility for its refusal to accept assistance, since such a refusal could give rise to an internationally wrongful act if it undermined the rights of the affected persons under international law. It was explained by another State that the duties to cooperate, to seek assistance and to refrain from arbitrarily withholding consent imposed an obligation of conduct or means, not of result, on the affected State, which was obliged to give good faith consideration to the possibility of accepting assistance from another State or from an international actor and could not withhold its consent arbitrarily. Another delegation concurred with this provision of draft article 11 but warned that under existing international law other States would not be able to act without the consent of the affected State, even if the latter incurred international responsibility by refusing assistance.

38. Some States insisted that, based on the principle of sovereignty, the affected State had a right to decide whether to request or accept humanitarian assistance and that no customary international law or State practice provided for the obligation on the part of an affected State to accept outside assistance. One delegation preferred that the draft articles, rather than imposing a strictly legal obligation that would entail international legal consequences in the event of noncompliance, should determine that the affected State had simply a moral and political duty to seek assistance and not to withhold arbitrarily its consent to external assistance.

39. A number of States considered that the term “arbitrarily” in paragraph 2 of the draft article could give rise to difficulties of interpretation, including the questions on how arbitrary refusal would be determined, who was to make such an assessment, or what its consequences would be, among others, and therefore it should be clarified in both the text and the commentary.

40. Some States made concrete suggestions of a textual nature. Thus, it was felt worth considering whether the term “unreasonably” should be substituted for “arbitrarily.” In addition, it was suggested that an explanation should be added to the text as follows: “[Withholding of] consent is considered to be arbitrary, in particular when in contravention of article 8.” In the opinion of one State, no refusal was arbitrary, for instance, if the affected State had previously accepted appropriate assistance from another source. In the State’s view, the necessary guarantees should be provided—including by underlining the relevant principles of the Charter of the United Nations—to ensure that the cause of humanitarian assistance was not abused with a view to undermining the sovereign rights of the affected State and interfering in its internal affairs. It was thus suggested that paragraph 2 should be amended to read: “Consent to external assistance offered in good faith and exclusively intended to provide humanitarian assistance shall not be withheld arbitrarily and unjustifiably.”

41. With reference to paragraph 3 of article 11, some States argued that the expression “whenever possible” could raise difficulties in communicating the decision regarding the acceptance of assistance, adversely affecting populations in urgent need of such assistance. The affected State’s discretion in communicating such a decision should be narrowed in order to cover cases where a decision proved impossible. It would help to clarify who was expected to make a formal offer of assistance to the affected State.

42. One State proposed to divide paragraph 3 in order to express two distinct ideas: first, that the State had a duty to communicate its response to an offer of assistance in a timely manner; and, second, that in extreme situations States might, for good cause, not be able to respond immediately, or indeed at all, to an offer of assistance. It was explained that neither the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement nor foreign non-governmental organizations tend to make formal offers of assistance to States. It was also stated that it was unclear in draft article 11 whether there was an implied temporal deadline for responding to offers of assistance.

43. The suggestion was made that the order of draft articles 11 and 12 should be reversed, with the right of third States and other entities to offer assistance being stated first.

F. The right to offer assistance (proposed draft article 12)

44. A number of delegations addressed the inclusion of a further draft article on the right of assisting actors to offer assistance to the affected State, as proposed by the Special Rapporteur in his fourth report (proposed draft article 12). As already explained, a proposed article 12 has been considered by the Commission in plenary, which referred it to the Drafting Committee. Many States expressed agreement with such a proposal, maintaining that it acknowledged the interest of the international community in the protection of persons in the event of...
a disaster, which should be viewed as complementary to the primary responsibility of the affected State and as an expression of solidarity and cooperation, and not as interference in its internal affairs. It was stressed that this right of assisting actors was merely to “offer”, not to “provide”, assistance and the affected State remained, in line with the principle of sovereignty and notwithstanding draft articles 10 and 11, free to accept in whole or in part any offers of assistance from States and non-State actors, whether made unilaterally or in answer to an appeal. A suggestion was made that the proposed draft article should be reformulated so as to extend the right to offer assistance to all persons, both natural and legal.

45. One State added that offers of assistance should not be considered as interference in the internal affairs of the affected State, provided that the assistance offered did not affect the latter’s sovereignty or its primary role in the direction, control, coordination and supervision of such assistance. A suggestion was made to formulate this provision as a positive duty of the international community, this being a part of international cooperation. In that connection, it was stressed that draft article 5 already established a duty of cooperation on the part of all actors; therefore, draft articles 5 and 12, taken together, would put States and other actors under some pressure to offer assistance, which was only to be welcomed.

46. Some States, however, agreed only with the general premise articulated in the draft article and urged to limit its applicable scope and conditions, without undermining the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the affected State. In that connection, it was suggested that the scope should be reduced to the “offer of assistance”. A number of States considered that the role of the international community in offering assistance to affected States should not be defined as an assertion of rights, and therefore should be reformulated on the basis of the principles of international cooperation and solidarity.

Some also emphasized that the focus should be on the duty of the affected State to give consideration to offers of assistance, rather than as a legal right. It was also stated that the right to offer assistance set out in draft article 12 had no evident independent value but simply recognized the reality in disaster situations.

48. Moreover, in the view of some of States, it was appropriate to consider whether all of the actors mentioned in the text should be placed on the same footing, since only subjects of international law were entitled to exercise the right to offer assistance. In that connection, it was noted that those three groups of actors had been placed in the same category in draft article 7 on human dignity.

49. It was also pointed out that IFRC and its national societies did not fall within the categories mentioned in draft article 12. In addition, as already mentioned, it was felt necessary to consider whether the term “competent intergovernmental organizations” extended to regional integration organizations, such as the European Union.

50. For some delegations the provision was superfluous, since States already had a sovereign right to make such offers in practice. One delegation suggested that, owing to the diverging views, the Commission should avoid a definitive pronouncement on those issues in the interest of facilitating the development of a product that would be of the most practical use to the international community.

G. Duty to provide assistance (question posed by the Commission in its 2011 annual report)

51. The Commission, on 11 August 2011, and in the absence of the Special Rapporteur, agreed to the proposal of one member also to include in chapter III


104 Chile, ibid., 24th meeting (A/C.6/66/SR.24), para. 10.


106 Austria, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/66/SR.23), para. 25.


109 United States, ibid., 21st meeting (A/C.6/66/SR.21), para. 69; Singapore, ibid., para. 75; El Salvador, ibid., 22nd meeting (A/C.6/66/SR.22), para. 19; Germany, ibid., 23rd meeting (A/C.6/66/SR.23), para. 28; Israel, ibid., para. 33; United Kingdom, ibid., para. 45; Netherlands, ibid., para. 48; Russian Federation, ibid., 24th meeting...
of its report on the session, entitled “Specific issues on which comments would be of particular interest to the Commission”, the following question addressed to States: “The Commission has taken the view that States have a duty to cooperate with the affected State in disaster relief matters. Does this duty to cooperate include a duty on States to provide assistance when requested by the affected State?”

52. No written replies to the question above had been received from States by the date of the present report. However, in the Sixth Committee, the many States that spoke on the point responded in the negative to the question posed, mainly arguing that such a duty had no basis in existing international law, customary law or practice, and that the creation of such a new duty would not only be controversial but would give rise to numerous legal and practical problems.

53. The view was expressed that the duty to cooperate should in this context be understood as simply a duty to consider requests for assistance made by the affected State, and was conditional upon a decision by the affected State that it required assistance and also upon the capacity of the assisting State to provide the assistance requested. Some suggestions were advanced to formulate the provision in a way to encourage or strongly recommend to non-affected actors cooperation and assistance on the basis of the principles of cooperation and international solidarity, or to only oblige States to “respond promptly” to a request made by the affected State. In the latter respect, reference was made to article 4 of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (hereinafter the “ASEAN Agreement”). It was also underlined that the question posed would have an impact on the practical operation of draft articles 10 and 11, since the duty to seek assistance in the event of disasters would need to be mutually supported by a corresponding duty to assist. Nevertheless, a binding obligation on States to provide assistance upon request could be deemed unacceptable interference in a State’s sovereign decision-making.

54. Support was expressed for the Special Rapporteur’s earlier understanding of the duty to cooperate.

55. It falls now to the Special Rapporteur to address the Commission’s question in the light of relevant State practice and the comments made by States in response to this inquiry. As a starting point, it must be recalled that draft articles 5 and 10, provisionally adopted, enshrine the duty to cooperate and the duty of affected States to seek assistance, respectively. The issue singled out by the Commission involves the interrelationship between the legal duties established in both draft articles.

56. In this respect, international practice as evidenced in international treaties shows that, although underpinned by the principles of solidarity and cooperation, the provision of assistance from one State to another upon the latter’s request is premised on the voluntary character of the action of the assisting State. In this sense, article 4, paragraph 3, of the Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations provides that:

Each State Party to which a request for telecommunication assistance is directed, either directly or through the operational coordinator, shall promptly determine and notify the requesting State Party whether it will render the assistance requested, directly or otherwise, and the scope of; and terms, conditions, restrictions and cost, if any, applicable to such assistance.

57. In more explicit terms, the ASEAN Agreement establishes, in article 9, paragraph 1, that:

On a voluntary basis, each Party shall earmark assets and capacities, which may be available for the regional standby arrangements for disaster relief and emergency response, such as:

(a) Emergency response/search and rescue directory;
(b) Military and civilian assets;
(c) Emergency stockpiles of disaster relief items; and
(d) Disaster management expertise and technologies.

58. In the above-mentioned instruments, it is made clear that the provision of assistance from one State to another must be made voluntarily, and thus no positive obligation to assist exists for the parties thereto. This practice is recognized by the Institute of International Law in article V of its 2003 resolution on humanitarian assistance, according to which:

Protection of persons in the event of disasters

Duties in respect of humanitarian assistance

1. All States should to the maximum extent possible offer humanitarian assistance to the victims in States affected by disasters, except when such assistance would result in seriously jeopardizing their own economic, social or political conditions. Special attention should be paid to disasters affecting neighbouring States.

2. Intergovernmental organizations shall offer humanitarian assistance to the victims of disasters in accordance with their own mandates and statutory mandates.

59. In this formulation, the hortatory term “should” regarding the provision of assistance by States stands in marked contrast with the mandatory formulation “shall” used when referring to intergovernmental organizations. Such differentiation implies that, although a duty to provide assistance may exist for intergovernmental organizations when their mandates so provide, no such duty exists for States. In this respect, States remain free to decide whether or not to provide assistance, even if requested to do so by an affected State.

60. Furthermore, the statement by the Institute of International Law that States should offer humanitarian assistance “except when such assistance would result in seriously jeopardizing their own economic, social or political conditions” indicates that the limits of a State’s capabilities are a pivotal criterion for the provision of humanitarian assistance. An obligation to provide assistance formulated in the abstract might represent in practice an excessive burden for those States that may not be in a position to adequately and effectively discharge their primary obligation towards their own populations, much less a duty towards those of third States. Solidarity and cooperation are of course central to the protection of persons in the event of disasters, which, as has been noted by the Special Rapporteur in his fourth report,118 is a project of the international community as a whole. However, they cannot be understood in such a way as to impair the capacity of States to comply, by virtue of their sovereignty, with their primary obligation towards their own people.

61. The limitation premised on the restricted capabilities of States finds confirmation in several international instruments. Among them is the Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency, which stipulates in article 2, paragraph 4, that States Parties shall, within the limits of their capabilities, identify and notify the Agency of experts, equipment and materials which could be made available for the provision of assistance to other States Parties in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency as well as the terms, especially financial, under which such assistance could be provided.

62. In turn, the aforementioned ASEAN Agreement embodies, in article 3, paragraph 3, the guiding principle that the Parties shall, in the spirit of solidarity and partnership and in accordance with their respective needs, capabilities and situations, strengthen cooperation and coordination to achieve the objectives of this Agreement.

63. And further, article 11, paragraph 6, provides that the Parties shall, within the limits of their capabilities, identify and notify the AHA Centre of military and civilian personnel, experts, equipment, facilities and materials which could be made available for the provision of assistance to other Parties in the event of a disaster emergency as well as the terms, especially financial, under which such assistance could be provided.

64. The limitation is also recognized by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which states in its General Comment No. 14 (2000),119 regarding the right to the highest attainable standard of health (art. 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), that States parties have a joint and individual responsibility, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and of the World Health Assembly, to cooperate in providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergency, including assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons. Each State should contribute to this task to the maximum of its capacities.

65. Similarly, the Committee, in General Comment No. 12 (1999),120 referring to the right to adequate food (art. 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), stated that States have a joint and individual responsibility, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to cooperate in providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergency, including assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons. Each State should contribute to this task in accordance with its ability.

66. Moreover, the same principle is also found, albeit implicitly, in the aforementioned Tampere Convention, which provides, in article 4, paragraph 2, that A State Party requesting telecommunication assistance shall specify the scope and type of assistance required and those measures taken pursuant to Articles 5 and 9 of this Convention, and, when practicable, provide the State Party to which the request is directed and/or the operational coordinator with any other information necessary to determine the extent to which such State Party is able to meet the request.

67. In this respect, in the Sixth Committee, among the many States denying that a duty to provide assistance upon request by an affected State does currently exist in the realm of international law, some explicitly held that view, invoking as reasons for the denial considerations based on the limits to the national capacity of States to provide assistance.

68. In the light of the preceding considerations, the Special Rapporteur cannot but reaffirm the conclusion he had already arrived at when preparing his fourth report: that the duty to cooperate in relief matters does not currently include a legal duty for States to provide assistance when requested by an affected State. This conclusion is confirmed by the overwhelming majority of States that submitted comments in the Sixth Committee in response to the Commission’s inquiry, with Mexico,121 Slovenia,122 E/C.12/2000/4, para. 40.
119 E/C.12/1999/5, para. 38.
Singapore, Italy, Switzerland, Colombia, Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Spain, Hungary, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Ireland clearly manifesting their firm belief that no such duty exists under general international law. While other delegations—Poland, Thailand, Pakistan and Sri Lanka—expressed somewhat more nuanced views on the subject, it must be pointed out that, in doing so, they were not admitting the existence of a duty of States to “provide” assistance upon request, but were rather addressing the quite distinct issue of the possible existence of a duty to “offer” assistance.

69. The foregoing notwithstanding, it must also be noted that by means of mutual arrangements, States may accept the imposition of such a duty as between the Parties thereto. Indeed, this possibility is implicitly recognized in the aforementioned article V of the 2003 resolution of the Institute of International Law. By affirming that States “should” offer assistance while intergovernmental organizations “shall” do so in accordance with their own mandates, the Institute admits that States may agree to impose on intergovernmental organizations of which they are members the positive obligation to provide assistance upon request.

70. Such a possibility is also recognized in the Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency, which, in article 1, paragraph 2, after formulating a general duty to cooperate to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency, disposes that

To facilitate such cooperation States Parties may agree on bilateral or multilateral arrangements or, where appropriate, a combination of these, for preventing or minimizing injury and damage which may result in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.

71. Inter-State agreements have been concluded establishing a duty to provide assistance on request as between the Parties thereto. Among them, mention may be made of the Agreement establishing the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency of the Caribbean Community, article 13 of which reflects the obligation undertaken by the participating States to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.

72. Another example may be found in the consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, whose article 222, paragraph 2, provides that

Should a [m]ember State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, the other [m]ember States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the [m]ember States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council.

73. Finally, the Special Rapporteur wishes to address the issue raised in the Sixth Committee by some States that endorsed the view that, although there is no duty to provide assistance upon request, there may exist a duty to give due consideration to requests for assistance from an affected State. There is some evidence in practice to found that position.

74. Thus, the Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency provides, in article 2, paragraph 3, that

Each State Party to which a request for such assistance is directed shall promptly decide and notify the requesting State Party, directly or through the Agency, whether it is in a position to render the assistance requested, and the scope and terms of the assistance that might be rendered.

75. In the same sense, article 4, paragraph 3, of the Tampere Convention provides that each party to which a request for assistance is directed “shall promptly determine and notify the requesting State Party whether it will render the assistance requested, directly or otherwise”.

76. More recently, the ASEAN Agreement incorporated a similar provision, establishing, in article 4 (c), that in pursuing the objectives of the Agreement, the Parties shall “promptly respond to a request for assistance from an affected Party”.

77. And further, article 11, paragraph 4, disposes that

Each Party to which a request for assistance is directed shall promptly decide and notify the Requesting Party, directly or through the AHA Centre, whether it is in a position to render the assistance requested, and of the scope and terms of such assistance.

78. Pending the conclusion of the Commission’s consideration of the Special Rapporteur’s proposal for draft article 12, it does not appear necessary to him to indicate at the present stage a definitive position on the last issue discussed above. At any rate, the actions of an assisting State are, as much as those of an affected State, subject to the fulfillment of the principle of good faith, to which reference has been made in paragraph (9) of the commentary to draft article 10.

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Footnotes:

125 Ibid., 21st meeting (A/C.6/66/SR.21), para. 76.
126 Ibid., para. 91.
128 Ibid., para. 28.
130 Ibid., para. 28.
131 Ibid., para. 45.
132 Ibid., para. 48.
133 Ibid., para. 50.
135 Ibid., para. 82.
136 Ibid., paras. 114 and 120–121.
138 Ibid., 21st meeting (A/C.6/66/SR.21), para. 86.
142 Ibid., footnote 117 above.
144 Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), para. 289.
Elaboration on the duty to cooperate

79. In response to comments made in the Sixth Committee, as summarized above, the Special Rapporteur will now proceed to a further elaboration on the duty to cooperate, enshrined in draft article 5.

80. As discussed in the previous reports of the Special Rapporteur, cooperation plays a central role in the context of disaster relief and is an imperative for the effective and timely response to disaster situations. Such an essential role lends itself to further elaboration of the functional requirements of the duty to cooperate outlined in draft article 5 and the kind of coordination required by affected States and assisting actors.

81. The present analysis, therefore, an attempt to identify the contours of the duty of cooperation in draft article 5. Admittedly, the nature of cooperation has to be shaped by its purpose, which in the present context is to provide disaster relief assistance. Seen from the larger perspective of public international law, to be legally and practically effective, the States’ duty to cooperate in the provision of disaster relief must strike a balance between three important aspects. First, such a duty cannot intrude into the sovereignty of the affected State. Second, the duty has to be imposed on assisting States as a legal obligation of conduct. Third, the duty has to be relevant and limited to disaster relief assistance, by encompassing the various specific elements that normally make up cooperation on this matter.

A. The nature of cooperation and respect for the affected State’s sovereignty

82. By its very nature, cooperation is likely to appear in conflict with the sovereign prerogatives of the recipient State. For example, food access to domestic populations or the use of foreign search and rescue teams might both be regarded as offensive to the traditional notion of State sovereignty. The legitimate concern to give its nature of cooperation to the affected State’s sovereign has been examined extensively in the Special Rapporteur’s previous reports and the earlier discussions in the Commission. Therefore, while reaffirming that, as such, this remains a central consideration regarding the nature of cooperation, the present section needs to touch on it rather briefly.

83. Any attempt to provide disaster relief must take cognizance of the principle of sovereignty. In order to respect and safeguard the sovereignty of the affected State, article 5 dispose cooperation will be implemented “in accordance with the present draft articles”. Consequently, cooperation will have to be extended in conformity with draft article 9, which places the affected State, “by virtue of its sovereignty”, at the forefront of all disaster relief assistance, limiting other interested actors to a complementary role.

84. The attempt to provide for assistance while respecting the sovereignty of the affected State is not a novel concept in international law. As indicated in paragraph (1) of the commentary to draft article 5, the Charter of the United Nations balances both concepts of sovereignty (Art. 2, para. 1), and international cooperation (Art. 1, para. 3; Arts. 13, 55 and 56). Similar balancing is achieved in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Likewise, such balance is reflected in General Assembly resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations and in the Tampere Convention.

B. The duty to cooperate, an obligation of conduct

85. The duty to cooperate is also embodied in article 17 of the final draft articles on the Law of transboundary aquifers, adopted by the Commission at its sixtieth session, in 2008. Paragraph 4 of the article reads:

States shall provide scientific, technical, logistical and other cooperation to other States experiencing an emergency. Cooperation may include coordination of international emergency actions and communications, making available emergency response personnel, emergency response equipment and supplies, scientific and technical expertise and humanitarian assistance.

86. The article calls for States to provide “scientific, technical, logistical and other cooperation” to other States experiencing an emergency, in order to ensure the protection of an aquifer. It expands upon the general obligation to cooperate in draft article 7 by describing the cooperation necessary between affected States and assisting actors in emergency situations. The commentary to article 17 indicates that the Commission established an obligation “of conduct and not result”. The commentary further states that the assistance required would relate to coordination of emergency actions and communication, providing trained emergency response personnel, response equipment and supplies, extending scientific and technical expertise and humanitarian assistance.

87. The ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters of 1976 contains similar language and provides that

The Member Countries shall, within their respective capabilities, cooperate in the

(a) improvement of communication channels among themselves as regards disaster warning;

(b) exchange of experts and trainees;

(c) exchange of information and documents; and

(d) dissemination of medical supplies, services and relief assistance.

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145 See, in particular, paragraphs 17, 28–29, 37, 45, 47 and 53 above.
88. The establishment of an obligation of conduct rather than one of result appears in various United Nations instruments. The General Assembly, in paragraph 12 of the annex to resolution 46/182, called for the United Nations to adopt a coordinating role in the provision of emergency aid, but not for specific attainments as a result of that coordination. The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order focuses on conduct in its call for “the strengthening, through individual and collective actions, of mutual economic, trade, financial and technical cooperation among the developing countries”.150

89. The Economic and Social Council, in resolution 2008/36 of 25 July 2008 dealing with emergency humanitarian assistance, also called for specific conduct without envisaging any specific outcome, when it encourages Member States to create and strengthen an enabling environment for the capacity-building of their national and local authorities, national societies of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, and national and local non-governmental and community-based organizations in providing timely humanitarian assistance, and also encourages the international community, the relevant entities of the United Nations system and other relevant institutions and organizations to support national authorities in their capacity-building programmes, including through technical cooperation and long-term partnerships based on recognition of their important role in providing humanitarian assistance.151

90. Several multilateral instruments prioritize the establishment of an obligation of conduct. The States parties to the Tampere Convention, for example, agree, in article 3, paragraph 2 (c), to “the provision of prompt telecommunication assistance to mitigate the impact of a disaster”, but not to the functioning of a given type of telecommunications network. For its part, the ASEAN Agreement, which has detailed provisions on the methods of technical and scientific cooperation, does not turn any of those provisions into obligations. Instead of, for example, agreeing to standardize their reporting methods by a certain date, the members of ASEAN agree, in article 18, paragraph 1 (b), of the ASEAN Agreement, to “promote the standardization of the reporting format of data and information”. Similarly, obligations of conduct and not result are found in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.

91. Outside the realm of international disaster relief law proper, the obligation to cooperate as an obligation of conduct and not one of result is also embodied in bilateral treaties. Among the many examples, suffice it to mention the United States–Mexico Treaty on Agriculture, which commits both States to cooperation on fumigation of pests, but not to the eradication of the Oriental Moth.152 The Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on precursors and chemical substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances calls for “technical cooperation … in particular, training and exchange programmes for the officials concerned”, but not in requiring that those officials pass a certain predetermined knowledge test.153

92. In line with other relevant international legal obligations, by its very nature, cooperation regarding the protection of persons in the event of disasters implies an obligation of conduct and not one of result.

C. Categories of cooperation

93. In the context of the present topic, the duty to cooperate has a well-defined goal, i.e. to protect persons in the event of disasters. To meet this goal in practice, the duty to cooperate most often covers activities such as “medical care, food, agricultural training, disaster relief, shelter, education, clothing, water, professional exchanges, institutional reform, technical assistance, and support of human rights and civil liberties”.154 The duty to cooperate must be understood as encompassing a great variety of coordinating, technical, scientific and logistical activities. Guidance as to the extent of such activities under draft article 5 can be found in other related international legal rules that specify the nature of the cooperation involved.

94. Cooperation has been addressed in specific terms in various United Nations instruments. The General Assembly, in resolution 46/182, explained how the United Nations should adopt a coordinating role and—as an indicative list—should establish a central register of all specialized personnel and teams of technical specialists, as well as relief supplies, equipment and services available within the United Nations system and from Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, that can be called upon at short notice by the United Nations.155

The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order calls, in turn, for, inter alia, the strengthening of “technical cooperation”. Such cooperation was also called for by the Economic and Social Council in its aforementioned resolution 2008/36, which focused on humanitarian assistance. The last two instruments, however, do not elaborate on the meaning of “technical cooperation”.

95. Some multilateral instruments refer to specific categories of cooperation without accompanying them by indicative or exhaustive lists. For example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights refers to economic and technical cooperation (art. 2) and to the creation of specific programmes on the problem of hunger (art. 11). A series of environmental instruments also call for coordination on the basis of such general categories. The 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (“Stockholm Declaration”) provides for “accelerated development

150 General Assembly resolution 3201 (S-VI), para. 4 (s).
152 United States, State Department No. 02-50, 2002 WL 1517444 (Treaty), Memorandum of understanding between the United States Department of Agriculture and the Office of the United States Trade Representative, and the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food and the Secretariat of Economy of the United Mexican States regarding areas of food and agricultural trade, signed at Washington, D.C. and Mexico City on 29 March, and 1 and 3 April 2002.
155 Annex, para. 27.
through financial and technological assistance”, which “includes scientific information and expertise relevant to mitigating environmental degradation”. The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer calls for information-sharing among all Parties to that Convention of scientific, technical, socioeconomic, commercial and legal information relevant to that Convention (art. 4, para. 1). Finally, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer appeals to developed nations to provide financial assistance and technology to less-developed nations (arts. 5 and 10).

96. Other multilateral treaties provide more detailed examples that help to clarify the general categories of cooperation that they identify. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities indicates, in article 32, paragraph 1 (d), that “technical and economic assistance” includes “facilitating access to and sharing of accessible and assistive technologies, and through the transfer of technologies”. Similarly, the Tampere Convention, in article 3, paragraph 2 (c), calls for “the provision of prompt telecommunication assistance to mitigate the impact of a disaster”, to be accomplished by means such as “the installation and operation of reliable, flexible telecommunication resources to be used by humanitarian relief and assistance organizations” (art. 3, para. 2 (d)).

97. In an even more detailed fashion, article 18 of the ASEAN Agreement holds the following:

Technical Cooperation

1. In order to increase preparedness and to mitigate disasters, the Parties shall undertake technical co-operation, including the following:

(a) facilitate mobilisation of appropriate resources both within and outside the Parties;

(b) promote the standardisation of the reporting format of data and information;

(c) promote the exchange of relevant information, expertise, technology, techniques and know-how;

(d) provide or make arrangements for relevant training, public awareness and education, in particular, relating to disaster prevention and mitigation;

(e) develop and undertake training programmes for policy makers, disaster managers and disaster responders at local, national and regional levels; and

(f) strengthen and enhance the technical capacity of the Parties to implement this Agreement.

2. The AHA Centre shall facilitate activities for technical cooperation as identified in paragraph 1 above.

98. The Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency provides general headings for the type of cooperation it envisages and a detailed list of actions under each heading. For example, it allows the International Atomic Energy Agency to

(b) Assist a State [p]arty or a [m]ember State when requested in any of the following or other appropriate matters:

(i) preparing both emergency plans in the case of nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies and the appropriate legislation;

(ii) developing appropriate training programmes for personnel to deal with nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies;

(iii) transmitting requests for assistance and relevant information in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency;

(iv) developing appropriate radiation monitoring programmes, procedures and standards;

(v) conducting investigations into the feasibility of establishing appropriate radiation monitoring systems.

While not exhaustive, the foregoing list gives a clear indication of many forms of cooperation allowing, by analogy, an evaluation of other possible forms.

99. In other fields, most bilateral agreements that call for some form of technical cooperation provide a list with the types of assistance that such cooperation encompasses. For example, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia concluded agreements with domestic jurisdictions to provide technical assistance and evidence for domestic trials. Those agreements mentioned the type of technical assistance involved. Additionally, the United States–Mexico memorandum of understanding on agriculture enumerated specific types of activities such as fumigation, while the United States–Republic of Korea memorandum of understanding on science and technology explained that cooperation included “research, exchanges of scientific information, scientific visits, individual exchanges, joint seminars and workshops, and other forms of activities as are mutually agreed upon”.

100. As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, instruments in the field of disaster response refer, broadly speaking, to scientific, technical and logistical cooperation. That includes the coordination of communication and the sharing of information; the provision of personnel, response equipment and supplies; and the extension of scientific and technical expertise to strengthen the response capacity of the affected State. Owing to the nature of many of the requirements of disaster relief efforts, regulatory barriers to the entry of personnel, equipment and supplies pose a particular challenge and are thus treated by a variety of international, regional and bilateral agreements. Additionally, a significant number of more recent agreements have focused on ex ante cooperation emphasizing disaster prevention and preparedness, including search and rescue arrangements, standby capacity requirements, early warning systems, exchange of information pertaining to risk identification, and contingency planning.

1. Communication and exchange of information

101. One aspect of cooperation that is frequently mentioned in disaster relief instruments is communication. The coordination of communication and exchange of information is essential to effective disaster response. Accordingly, many of the instruments that deal with

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157 See footnote 152 above.

158 Memorandum of understanding between the National Science Foundation of the United States of America and the Korea Science and Engineering Foundation of the Republic of Korea concerning Cooperation in Science and Technology, signed at Arlington on 21 September 2000.
disaster relief also touch on the topic of information exchange.\textsuperscript{159} For example, the preamble of the Tampere Convention notes “the vital role of broadcasting in disseminating accurate disaster information to at-risk populations”,\textsuperscript{160} and the Framework Convention on civil defence assistance requires the affected State to “provide all necessary information available relating to the situation, so as to ensure smooth implementation of assistance” (art. 4 (a) (1)). The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 also emphasizes the central role of information exchange, dialogue and cooperation in the context of disasters.\textsuperscript{161}

102. The approach taken by various instruments with regard to communications varies, as some provisions refer generally to the desirability of effective disaster relief communications or a general obligation of the affected State to facilitate communications, while others contain more specific direction pertaining to the facilitation of disaster relief communications. For example, the International Law Association model bilateral agreement provides that

in the zone of operations … the organization shall have the right to communicate by radio, telegraph, or by any other means and to establish the necessary means for the maintenance of said communications in the interior of its facilities or between these facilities and its service units.\textsuperscript{162}

Likewise, the Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines) state that “the Affected State should provide to the international disaster community timely and accurate information on the nature and magnitude of the disaster, in order to enhance the effectiveness of external assistance”.\textsuperscript{163}

103. In the vein of substantive measures to facilitate communications, the Agreement establishing the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency provides, in article 11 (c), for the creation and maintenance of an emergency operations system to handle emergency telecommunications. The most comprehensive instrument in this area is the Tampere Convention, which provides a regulatory framework for cooperation with respect to the utilization of telecommunications and information technology in disasters.

2. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

104. Another often-mentioned modality of cooperation is the provision of scientific, technical or technological assistance and expertise. Different classes of disasters may call for specific technologies or expertise that are either not readily available in the affected country or that are not available in sufficient degree or quantity. Consequently, a number of instruments refer specifically to the provision of scientific and technical assistance, such as the ASEAN Agreement, which, in article 18, entitled “Technical cooperation”, calls for Parties to “promote the exchange of relevant information, expertise, technology, techniques and know-how”.\textsuperscript{164} The Framework Convention on civil defence assistance also refers, in article 2 (a), to cooperation with regard to the exchange of expertise. Moreover, a number of bilateral agreements provide for mutual assistance in scientific and technical matters as well.\textsuperscript{165}

105. Technology can also enhance communication, as the utilization of telecommunications and information technology can substantially improve information exchange and increase the overall efficacy and efficiency of disaster relief efforts. The Tampere Convention deals with the provision of telecommunications assistance, including equipment, materials, information, training, radio-frequency spectrum, network or transmission capacity or other resources necessary to telecommunications. Another agreement that refers to a specific class of technological cooperation is the Charter on Cooperation to Achieve the Coordinated Use of Space Facilities in the Event of Natural or Technological Disasters (also known as the International Charter on Space and Major Disasters), which relates to coordination of satellite technology in the disaster relief context.\textsuperscript{166}

3. RELIEF PERSONNEL

106. Effective disaster relief also necessitates coordination with regard to the provision of emergency response personnel to strengthen the response capacity of the affected State, including medical teams, search and rescue teams, and technical specialists. A number of instruments

\textsuperscript{159} See, for example, the Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden on cooperation across State frontiers to prevent or limit damage to persons or property or to the environment in the case of accidents, 1989, art. 6 (1). (“The Contracting States shall provide each other with information of importance for this agreement.”) See also Agreement among the Governments of the Participating States of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) on collaboration in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to natural and man-made Disasters (“Black Sea Agreement”), art. 4 (4).

\textsuperscript{160} See also article 3 (2), which calls for “the deployment of terrestrial and satellite telecommunication equipment to predict, monitor and provide information concerning natural hazards, health hazards and disasters”, and “the sharing of information about natural hazards, health hazards and disasters among the States Parties and with other States, non-State entities and intergovernmental organizations, and the dissemination of such information to the public, particularly to at-risk communities”.


\textsuperscript{162} Draft Model Agreement on International Medical and Humanitarian Law, art. 6. Report of the Fifty-ninth Conference of the International Law Association, Belgrade, 17–23 August 1980, p. 523. See also Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines on Cooperation in the Event of Natural Disaster or Major Emergencies, 6 December 2001, art. 8 (2) (“the competent authorities of the requesting State shall undertake … to facilitate the use by the aid units of existing telecommunication systems or the use of special frequencies, or both, or the establishment by the aid units of an emergency telecommunication system”).

\textsuperscript{163} OCHA, Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (also known as the Oslo Guidelines) of 2006, as revised 1 November 2007, para. 54.

\textsuperscript{164} Art. 18 (c). See paragraph 97 above.

\textsuperscript{165} See, for example, Convention on mutual assistance in combating disasters and accidents (Netherlands–Belgium) (The Hague, 14 November 1984), art. 13 (stating that the Parties should exchange all useful information of a scientific and technical nature) (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1526, No. 26466, p. 27, at p. 47); see also Protocol on technical cooperation and mutual assistance in the field of civil defence (Spain–Portugal) (Evora, 9 March 1992), art. 1 (2) (ibid., vol. 1730, No. 30218, p. 191); and Agreement on cooperation on disaster preparedness and prevention, and mutual assistance in the event of disasters (Spain–Argentina) (Madrid, 3 June 1988), art. IV (ibid., vol. 1689, No. 29123, p. 23).

\textsuperscript{166} Available from www.disasterscharter.org.
call upon States to coordinate efforts and facilitate the expedited entry of relief personnel. These include General Assembly resolutions 46/182 of 19 December 1991 and 57/150 of 16 December 2002, as well as the Measures to expedite international relief, adopted by the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the Economic and Social Council in 1977 and endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 32/56 of 8 December 1977.

107. In addition to the entry of personnel, instruments also deal with the coordination, facilitation and supervision of the provision of assistance within the affected State. Common issues are freedom of movement, transport of personnel, access to facilities, and coordination with the affected State, including the provision of support, relevant information, guidance, and translation and interpretation services. The General Assembly, in its resolution 46/182, referred broadly to “facilitating” the work of relief teams. The Tampere Convention provides, in article 10, that “the States Parties shall, when possible, and in conformity with their national law, reduce or remove … regulations restricting the movement of personnel who operate telecommunication equipment or who are essential to its effective use”, and the Oslo Guidelines call, in paragraph 60, for “free access to disaster zones” for relief teams. The Agreement establishing the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency provides, in articles 16 and 22, for the cooperation of the affected State in making available local facilities and services and facilitating the in-country transit of relief personnel.

108. A number of instruments, including the Framework Convention on civil defence assistance, the Tampere Convention (art. 5, para. 3), the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, and the Oslo Guidelines deal with the identification and protection of relief personnel. The General Assembly, in paragraph 4 of its resolution 57/150, urged “all States to undertake measures to ensure the safety and security of international urban search and rescue teams operating in their territory”.

4. RELIEF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

109. Disaster relief efforts also require a variety of goods and equipment. Victims of disaster need food, clothing, medicine and other items to support their basic needs. Relief teams require equipment such as telephones, radios, computers, vehicles and construction equipment in order to operate effectively. While some goods and equipment necessary in the aftermath of a disaster may be found locally, there may be a need to import items in the event of a shortage of goods and equipment in the affected State. Owing to the nature of disasters, the rapid attainment of relief supplies is critical. Moreover, many of those items, such as food and medicine, could spoil or expire if not transported and delivered in a timely manner. Cooperation in the area of provision and facilitation of entry of relief supplies and equipment is particularly crucial because many of the necessary items are highly regulated by domestic law. Those items include foods, medicines, machines, telecommunications equipment, vehicles and rescue dogs.

110. As such, many agreements and guidelines deal with the facilitation of rapid access to disaster relief equipment and supplies. Some instruments specify those items and treat them in detail, while others make general provisions for “relief supplies and equipment”, which encompass a variety of items. The General Assembly, in its resolution 46/182, called generally for coordination to facilitate expeditious access to relief supplies and suggested that “disaster-prone countries should develop special emergency procedures to expedite the rapid procurement and deployment of equipment and relief supplies”. The Measures to expedite international relief also focus on coordination to avoid delay because of regulatory barriers.

111. Some instruments highlight equipment and supplies with specificity. The ASEAN Agreement, for example, mentions, in article 14(a), telecommunications equipment and vehicles specifically. General Assembly resolution 46/182 and the International Convention on the simplification and harmonization of Customs procedures ("Kyoto Convention") call on affected States to assist in the entry of medicines. The Kyoto Convention also expressly refers to “specially trained animals” among the types of relief consignments that should be prioritized for expedited processing. Several bilateral agreements, such as the Agreement between Sweden and Norway concerning the improvement of rescue services in frontier areas, and the Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines on Cooperation in the Event of Natural Disaster or Major Emergencies of 2001, also deal with the entry process for specially trained rescue dogs.

112. Agreements also provide for the re-export of goods to ensure that relief supplies and equipment can be efficiently redirected to where they are most needed. The ASEAN Agreement calls, in article 14(b), for the facilitation of “the entry into, stay in, and departure from* its territory of personnel and of equipment, facilities, and materials involved or used in the assistance”. Similarly, the Tampere Convention, in article 9, paragraph 2(d), calls for reduction of “regulations restricting the transit of telecommunication resources into, out of, and through the territory of a State party”.

113. Cooperation involves both accommodation by the affected State to expedite and facilitate the provision of relief assistance and coordination and planning by assisting actors to reduce the complications of providing relief. If assisting actors are informed of and prepare adequately for the requirements of the affected State, the process can be made more efficient. The Measures

167 Paras. 27 and 28.
168 Para. 3.
170 See also Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, art. VII; and League of Arab States Decision No. 39 (Arab Cooperation Agreement on Regulating and Facilitating Relief Operations), art. 3.
171 Annex, para. 30.
172 Handbook of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (footnote 169 above), Recommendation D.
to expedite international relief call on “donors to restrict their relief contributions to those high-priority relief needs identified by appropriate relief authorities and agencies.” 174 Many instruments provide for a degree of specificity to the requests of affected States, and for assisting actors to comply with those requests. The Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, for example, states in article II (b) that

[u]pon the occurrence of a disaster the assisting State shall consult with the assisted State to receive from the latter information on the kind of assistance considered most appropriate to provide to the populations stricken by the disaster.

Communication as to the requirements, capacities and expectations of concerned parties can facilitate the relief process significantly and reduce the difficulty caused by regulation.

5. COOPERATION IN DISASTER PREPAREDNESS, PREVENTION AND MITIGATION

114. More recent conventions have shifted the focus from a primarily response-centric model to one focused largely on prevention and preparedness. Many instruments deal with not only cooperation as it pertains to relief assistance, but also with the prevention and mitigation of disasters: search and rescue arrangements, standby capacity requirements, early warning systems, exchange of information pertaining to risk assessment and identification, contingency planning and capacity-building.

115. The Hyogo Framework for Action puts a large degree of emphasis on prevention and preparedness, stating that one of the agreement’s primary objectives is “to share good practices and lessons learned to further disaster reduction within the context of attaining sustainable development, and to identify gaps and challenges”. 175 The General Assembly, in resolution 46/182, 176 called for cooperation in sharing scientific and technical information related to the assessment, prevention, mitigation and early warning of disasters as well as assistance to developing States to bolster their capacity in disaster prevention and mitigation, while in paragraph 7 of resolution 57/150 the Assembly more generally encouraged “the strengthening of cooperation among States at the regional and subregional levels in the field of disaster preparedness and response, with particular respect to capacity-building at all levels”. 177 Other instruments call for cooperation in regard to the training of experts, research, and studies to increase preparedness, such as the ASEAN Agreement, which states, in article 19, paragraph 1, that the Parties shall individually or jointly, including in cooperation with appropriate international organizations, promote and, whenever possible, support scientific and technical research programmes related to the causes and consequences of disasters and the means, methods, techniques and equipment for disaster risk reduction.

116. In the light of all of the above, the Special Rapporteur concludes that the inclusion is warranted in the set of draft articles on Protection of persons in the event of disasters of an additional draft article concerning the elaboration of the duty to cooperate. That additional draft article, whose number and placing in the set is to be decided at a later stage, can most economically and usefully be modelled on article 17, paragraph 4, of the draft articles on the Law of transboundary aquifers, cited earlier. 178 The proposed additional draft article would thus read as follows:

“Draft article A. Elaboration of the duty to cooperate

“States and other actors mentioned in draft article 5 shall provide to an affected State scientific, technical, logistical and other cooperation, as appropriate. Cooperation may include coordination of international relief actions and communications, making available relief personnel, relief equipment and supplies, scientific and technical expertise, and humanitarian assistance.”

174 Handbook... (footnote 169 above), Recommendation F.
175 A/CONF.206/6 and Corr.1, chap. 1, resolution 2, para. 10 (c).
176 Annex, paras. 5, 13 and 14.

CHAPTER IV

Conditions for the provision of assistance

117. The Commission has established in draft article 9 that an affected State, by virtue of its sovereignty, has the duty to ensure the protection of persons and to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance on its territory. It also has the primary role to direct, control, coordinate and supervise such assistance within its territory. The Special Rapporteur will now consider the conditions that an affected State may place on the provision of assistance.

118. In determining the extent of appropriate conditions, it is necessary to reiterate the core principles of State sovereignty and non-intervention. The Special Rapporteur, in his third report, noted that “the correlating principles of sovereignty and non-intervention presuppose a given domestic sphere, or a domaine réservé, over which a State may exercise its exclusive authority” 179. In formulating his proposal for draft article 9, the Special Rapporteur took particular note of the principles of State sovereignty and non-intervention, concluding that “it is clear that a State affected by a disaster has the freedom to adopt whatever measures it sees fit to ensure the protection of the persons found within its territory”. 180 As such, the affected State may impose conditions on the provision of assistance, including compliance with its national laws and fulfilling demonstrated needs.

177 See also Southern African Development Community Protocol on Health, art. 25 (b) (calling for Parties to “collaborate and facilitate regional efforts in developing awareness, risk reduction, preparedness and management plans for natural and man-made disasters”).
178 See paragraph 85 above.

180 Ibid., para. 74.
119. The core principles of State sovereignty and non-intervention should be considered in the light of the responsibilities undertaken by States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, to other States and to individuals within a State’s territory and control. As recognized in the judgment in the Corfu Channel case of the International Court of Justice, “sovereignty confers rights upon States and imposes obligations on them.”181 According to the commentary of the Commission, draft article 9 reflects those obligations and “affirms the primary role held by an affected State in the response to a disaster upon its territory”.182 Therefore, any condition imposed by the affected State must be reasonable and must not undermine the duty to ensure protection of persons on its territory. Furthermore, the affected State has a corresponding duty to facilitate the prompt and effective delivery of assistance, which includes the waiver of national laws as appropriate.

A. Compliance with national laws

120. An affected State may condition the provision of assistance on compliance with its national law. A requirement of compliance with national law follows naturally from the principles stated in draft article 9, by virtue of its sovereignty: the duty to ensure the protection of persons and to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance lies with the affected State, and it has the primary role in the direction, control, coordination and supervision of such assistance. Moreover, this principle is grounded in State practice.

121. Several multilateral treaties include a provision requiring compliance with national law. The Tampere Convention states, in article 4, paragraph 8, that “[n]othing in this Convention shall interfere with the right of a State Party, under its national law*, to direct, control, coordinate and supervise telecommunication assistance provided under this Convention within its territory”.

122. The ASEAN Agreement provides (art. 13, para. 2) that “members of the assistance operation shall respect and abide by all national laws and regulations”. Several other international agreements also require assisting actors to respect national laws183 or to act in accordance with the law of the affected State.184

123. The General Assembly also declared, in resolution 46/182, that “cooperation [to address emergency situations] should be provided in accordance with international law and national laws”.185 This is a clear statement that the affected State should be able to condition the provision of assistance on compliance with its national law.

124. Several non-binding and draft provisions on disaster assistance include a requirement that assisting actors respect, abide by or observe the affected State’s national law.186 Those international law instruments acknowledge the principle that assisting actors should comply with an affected State’s national law.

125. Conditioning the provision of assistance on compliance with national law creates obligations on the assisting actors. Furthermore, as an exception to the rule that the State may condition the provision of assistance on compliance with national law, the affected State must facilitate prompt and effective assistance.

1. Obligation of assisting actors to cooperate in compliance with national laws

126. In deference to the right of the affected State to condition the provision of assistance on compliance with national law, there is a corresponding obligation on assisting actors to provide assistance in compliance with the national law and authorities of the affected State. The obligation to respect the national law and authorities of the affected State arise out of respect for the sovereignty of the affected State and the principle of cooperation, reaffirmed in draft article 5.

127. Three obligations on assisting actors flow from the general principle that assistance be provided in compliance with the national laws and authorities of the affected State. First, there is an obligation on members of the relief operation to observe the national laws and standards of the affected State. Second, there is an obligation of the head of the relief operation to ensure the observance of the national laws and standards of the affected State. Finally, there is the obligation to cooperate with national authorities.187

128. First, there is an obligation on personnel of the relief operation to observe the national laws and standards of the affected State. An articulation of this general principle is found in annex X, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents: “The personnel involved in the assistance operation shall act in accordance with the relevant laws of the requesting Party.” The Inter-American Convention states, in article XI (d), that: assistance personnel have the obligation to respect the laws and regulations of the assisted State and of States they may cross en route. Assistance personnel shall abstain from political or other activities that are inconsistent with said laws or with the terms of this Convention.

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182 Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), p. 157, commentary to art. 9, para. (1).
183 See, for example, Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, art. VIII XI (d); and Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency, art. 8 (7).
184 Ibid.; Black Sea Agreement (footnote 159 above), arts. 5 and 9.
185 Annex, para. 5.
Similarly, the Agreement among the Governments of the Participating States of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) on collaboration in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to natural and man-made Disasters (hereinafter the “Black Sea Agreement”) states that the members of the assistance team are obliged to observe the State laws and rules of the Requesting Party.\(^{188}\)

129. Second, the head of the relief operation of the assisting State, international organization or other humanitarian actor has a duty to ensure the observance of the national laws and standards of the affected State. This duty was articulated in article 13, paragraph 2, of the ASEAN Agreement: “The Head of the assistance operation shall take all appropriate measures to ensure observance of national laws and regulations”. This obligation flows naturally from the general understanding that the head of the relief operation is generally responsible for the “immediate operational supervision of the personnel”.\(^{189}\)

130. Third, in order to comply with national laws and pursuant to obligations to cooperate under draft article 5, the assisting State has an obligation to cooperate with national authorities. The International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance Operations (“Max Planck Institute Guidelines”) provide that “at all times during humanitarian assistance operations the assisting personnel shall … cooperate with the designated competent authority of the receiving State”.\(^{190}\) Similarly, the IFRC Guidelines state that “assisting actors and their personnel should … coordinate with domestic authorities”.\(^{191}\) The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Model Rules for Disaster Relief Operations (1982) have elaborated on the purpose of such an obligation:

> Relief personnel shall cooperate at all times with the appropriate authorities of the receiving State to facilitate the proper administration of justice, secure the observance of police regulations and prevent the occurrence of any abuse in connection with the facilities granted.\(^{192}\)

2. EXCEPTION FOR THE AFFECTED STATE TO FACILITATE PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

131. As articulated in draft article 9, the affected State has the duty to ensure the protection of persons on its territory. As such, the right to condition the provision of assistance on compliance with national law is not absolute. The exception to this rule is that the affected State has the duty to facilitate the provision of prompt and effective assistance, under its sovereign obligations to its population. States have an obligation to assist in compliance with national law and an obligation to examine whether certain national laws must be waived in the event of a disaster.

132. First, States have an obligation to assist in compliance with national law. The obligation to ensure prompt and effective assistance includes an obligation to provide relevant information to assisting actors. Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Black Sea Agreement provides that “the Parties shall cooperate … in order to provide prompt relevant information and assistance in case of natural or man-made disasters”.\(^{193}\) This duty extends to an obligation of the assisting State to cooperate to ensure the observance of national law, as illustrated by article 13, paragraph 2, of the ASEAN Agreement: the “receiving Party shall cooperate to ensure that members of the assistance operation observe national laws and regulations”.

133. As part of the duty to cooperate to ensure the observance of national law, the affected State has an obligation to provide assisting actors with relevant laws, including those relating to privileges and immunities and regulatory barriers. This obligation extends only to laws that are relevant in the disaster context. As stated in the IFRC Guidelines:

> Affected States should make available to assisting actors adequate information about domestic laws and regulations of particular relevance to the entry and operation of disaster relief or initial recovery assistance.\(^{194}\)

134. Second, in certain circumstances, an affected State may be required to waive provisions of its law in order to facilitate the prompt and effective provision of assistance in order to fulfill its duty to ensure the protection of persons on its territory. As noted in the memorandum by the Secretariat, “national laws are, generally speaking, not well suited for the purpose of creating a ‘humanitarian space’ in the wake of a disaster since compliance can prove onerous and costly in terms of both resources and time lost.”\(^{195}\) A waiver of national law by the affected State of its national laws should promote access to and the timeliness of the delivery of assistance.\(^{196}\)

135. International instruments currently recognize several instances when national laws must be waived in order to facilitate prompt and effective assistance: privileges and immunities, visa and entry requirements, customs requirements and tariffs, and quality and freedom of movement. Waiver of national law in each of these fields should not be required in every circumstance, but rather should be reasonable when balancing the affected State’s duty to provide assistance and its obligation to protect its population from harm in the light of the particular circumstances.

136. The first instance when national laws must be amended or waived concerns the privileges and immunities of actors participating in disaster relief operations. The Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency requires an affected State requesting assistance to provide certain privileges and immunities to assisting actors, including immunity from arrest, detention and legal process (art. 8, para. 2 (a)). An agreement between Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany also requires the affected

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188 Art. 9 (3). See also IFRC Guidelines, guideline 4 (1); and Max Planck Institute Guidelines, para. 22 (d).

189 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, annex X (1).

190 Max Planck Institute Guidelines, para. 22 (b).

191 IFRC Guidelines, guideline 4 (1).


193 See also Max Planck Institute Guidelines, para. 19 (c).

194 Guideline 10 (3).

195 A/CN.4/590 and Add.1–3 (see footnote 2 above), para. 70.

196 Ibid., paras. 105 and 106.
State to extend “protection” to the emergency teams of assisting States.197 The Framework Convention on civil defence assistance also states, in article 4 (a) (5): “The Beneficiary State shall, within the framework of national law, grant all privileges, immunities, and facilities necessary for carrying out the assistance”.

137. The second instance when national laws must be amended or waived concerns visa and entry requirements. The League of Red Cross Societies has long noted that entry requirements and visas serve as a “time-consuming procedure which often delays the dispatch of such delegates and teams”,198 thus delaying the vital assistance the affected State has a duty to provide. The ASEAN Agreement, in article 14 (b), requires an affected State to “facilitate the entry into, stay in and departure from its territory of personnel and of equipment, facilities and materials involved or used in the assistance”. The Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency includes a similar provision (art. 8, para. 5). Specific bilateral agreements have also allowed entry to assisting actors without obtaining entry permits in the event of a disaster.199 In addition to those waivers of entry requirements, the Tampere Convention, in article 9, paragraphs 1 and 3 (d), also requires affected States to remove regulatory barriers, including recognizing foreign operating licences in the field of telecommunications. There are also numerous international agreements requiring unencumbered passage through transit States regardless of entry or visa requirements.200

138. Some agreements, such as the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, the Tampere Convention and the ASEAN Agreement, do not require a waiver of entry and visa requirements, but simply require States to use their existing national laws to allow entry.201 However, the better requirement may be to recognize that a waiver is required in order to promote the prompt and effective provision of assistance in the event of a natural disaster because of the concerns noted by the League of Red Cross Societies.

139. The third instance in which national law may be amended or waived concerns an affected State’s, and even transit States’, customs requirements and tariffs on assistance in the event of a natural disaster. That requirement reduces costs and delays with respect to transit States in the event of a natural disaster, promoting prompt and effective assistance.202 Some international instruments require facilitation of entry of goods and equipment relating to disaster relief. Other instruments additionally require that such goods and equipment not be taxed.203

140. With respect to facilitating the clearance of customs, Specific Annex I, Chapter 5, article 2, of the Kyoto Convention requires that “clearance of relief consignments for export, transit, temporary admission and import be carried out as a matter of priority”.204 The Tampere Convention and the ASEAN Agreement contain similar provisions.205 In addition, bilateral treaties and General Assembly resolution 57/150 of 16 December 2002 urge affected States to reduce formalities in order to facilitate entry of goods and equipment. With respect to waiving tariffs, duties or import taxes, the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance also includes a provision (art. V) that waives “taxes, fees, and other charges” for vehicles, equipment and supplies. The ASEAN Agreement and the Black Sea Agreement contain similar provisions.206

141. The fourth instance when national laws must be amended or waived concerns national laws and regulations related to quality of goods and equipment imported for disaster relief. As noted in the memorandum by the Secretariat, waiver of laws related to quality is for the purpose of “ensur[ing] that existing laws and regulations in place to assure quality in various settings do not have the effect of limiting effective disaster relief operations”.207 Some agreements exempt goods imported for the purpose of disaster relief from any national regulation entirely.208

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198 Resolution adopted by the League of Red Cross Societies Board of Governors at its 33rd session, Geneva, 28 October–1 November 1975. See, for example, Convention on mutual assistance in combating disasters and accidents (Netherlands–Belgium) (footnote 165 above), art. 6 (2) and (3). See also Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and the Government of the Republic of South Africa regarding the Coordination of Search and Rescue Services (Maputo, 10 May 2002), art. 2 (2) (for this agreement, see Patrick H. G. Vrancken, South Africa and the Law of the Sea, Leiden, Nijhoff, 2011, chap. 10.4.3); Agreement concerning mutual assistance in the event of disasters or serious accidents (Austria–France) (Paris, 3 February 1977) (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1214, No. 19561, p. 67), art. 4; Agreement on cooperation and mutual assistance in cases of accidents (Estonia–Finland) (Helsinki, 26 June 1995) (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1949, No. 33539, p. 125), art. 9; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of Namibia regarding the Coordination of Search and Rescue Services (8 September 2000), art. 7; and Agreement on cooperation for the prevention of and assistance in cases of natural disasters (Mexico–Guatemala) (Guatemala City, 10 April 1987), (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1509, No. 26053, art. V).

200 See, for example, Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency (footnote 199 above), art. 9; ASEAN Agreement, art. 16 (1); Oslo Guidelines, para. 63; and Agreement establishing the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency, art. 22.

201 See Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, art. VII (a); Tampere Convention, art. 9 (4); ASEAN Agreement, art. 14 (b).

202 See, for example, Agreement on mutual assistance in combating disasters and accidents (France–Germany) (Paris, April 1987), vol. 4, para. 3.

203 A/CN.4/590 and Add.1–3 (see footnote 2 above), para. 201.

204 Convention on temporary admission, art. 2.

205 Kyoto Convention, Specific Annex I, chap. 5, art. 2.

206 Tampere Convention, art. 9 (4); ASEAN Agreement, art. 14 (b). See also 1976 ASEAN Declaration, para. III (b).

207 See, for example, Agreement on cooperation and mutual assistance in cases of accidents (Estonia–Finland) (footnote 199 above), art. 9; and Convention on Mutual Assistance between French and Spanish Fire and Emergency Services, 14 July 1959, updated by the Protocol of 8 February 1973 (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 951, No. 13576, p. 135), art. II.

208 ASEAN Agreement, art. 14 (a); Black Sea Agreement, art. 10; Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden on cooperation across State frontiers to prevent or limit damage to persons or property or to the environment in the case of accidents (footnote 159 above), art. 3 (3). See also Oslo Guidelines, para 60.

209 A/CN.4/590 and Add.1–3 (see footnote 2 above), para. 201.

210 See, for example, Agreement on mutual assistance in the event of disasters or serious accidents (with exchange of notes), (Denmark–Federal Republic of Germany) (Tønder, 16 May 1985) (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1523, No. 26375, p. 95), art. 5 (5); IFRC Guidelines, guideline 17 (1) (b).
The Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning mutual assistance in the event of disasters or serious accidents,210 the Measures to expedite international relief of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and the UNITAR Model Rules211 suggest that affected States may have to waive import restrictions, such as for certain medical products. Some instruments require waiver for disaster areas.212

142. The final instance when national laws may be waived in the event of a natural disaster concern freedom of movement. Some international law instruments only require a State to remove internal obstacles to assisting actors entering the disaster area. The UNITAR Model Rules provide that an affected State must permit assisting “personnel freedom of access to, and freedom of movement within, disaster stricken areas that are necessary for the performance of their specifically agreed functions”213. The 2003 resolution on humanitarian assistance adopted by the Institute of International Law includes a similar provision.214

143. Although some national laws encourage opening disaster areas to assisting actors,215 other States continue to place restrictions on assisting actors in their national laws or regulations. Japanese law allows local officials to prohibit the entry of non-emergency personnel in the event of danger to personnel.216 The law of Nepal includes a provision allowing the Government to require assisting actors to receive permission before entering a disaster area.217

144. Some international instruments suggest that the affected State may have an obligation to facilitate entry into the disaster area. The General Assembly, in resolution 46/182, required the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator to facilitate “the access by the operational organizations to emergency areas for the rapid provision of emergency assistance by obtaining the consent of all parties concerned”.218 A small number of bilateral agreements require that the affected State permit and facilitate access to a disaster area, and even provide transportation to assisting actors.219

145. Although it is reasonable for the national laws described above to be waived in some circumstances, an absolute requirement that those laws be waived in every circumstance would prevent a State from exercising its sovereignty to protect its population and persons within its territory and control. For example, an absolute requirement of waiver of quality regulations might interfere with an affected State’s duty to protect its population from goods that the State in good faith believes to be harmful. The balance between the need to facilitate timely assistance while also preserving minimum standards concerning the quality of assistance is reflected in the Max Planck Institute Guidelines, which urge States to “waive any prohibitions, restrictions or regulations which would otherwise delay the importation of humanitarian assistance consignments, to the extent compatible with reasonable health and safety standards”.220 Therefore, rather than a strict and absolute requirement of waivers in a natural disaster, the affected State should consider the reasonableness of the waiver under the circumstances and balancing its obligations to provide prompt and effective assistance and to protect its population.

B. Identifiable needs and quality control

146. Affected States may condition the provision of assistance on the identifiable needs of the persons concerned and the quality of assistance, in furtherance of the purpose of the present draft articles “to facilitate an adequate and effective response to disasters that meets the essential needs of the persons concerned”.221 The Commission has emphasized the discretionary power of the affected State to choose the assistance “most appropriate to its specific needs” in the commentary to draft article 10.222 In exercising this discretionary power and in accordance with the principle that the affected State’s Government is “best placed to determine the gravity of an emergency situation and to frame appropriate response policies”, the affected State should undertake a needs assessment. The affected State may impose quality conditions for the provision of assistance to ensure that its identified needs are effectively met. In reference to draft article 2 explaining the purpose of the present draft articles, “the link between a high-quality (‘adequate and effective’) response and meeting the needs of the persons concerned” was underscored in the Commission.223 The affected State should facilitate the provision of high-quality, effective assistance by specifying the scope and type of assistance requested, in line with its duty to cooperate under draft article 5.224

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210 Art. 7 (5).
211 Annex A, rule 7.
212 See, for example, Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines on Cooperation in the Event of Natural Disaster or Major Emergencies, art. 8 (2) (footnote 162 above); Measures to expedite international relief (footnote 169 above), recommendation D; UNITAR Model Rules, annex A, rule 7.
213 Annex A, rule 16.
214 Art. VII, para. 3 (see footnote 117 above).
215 Order No. 48/1999 (XII.15) of the Minister of the Interior on the disaster protection tasks of organs subordinated to the Minister of the Interior (Hungary), secs. 15 (3) (c) and (d); Law on Disaster Protection (Mongolia), art. 30 (2).
216 Act to Provide for the Relief Work relating to the Natural Calamity, 1982 (Nepal), para. 4 (a).
217 Annex, para. 35 (d).
218 See, for example, Agreement concerning the United States relief assistance to the Chinese people (China–United States of America) (with exchange of notes) (Nanking, 27 October 1947), United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 12, No. 178, art. V (a) and (b).
219 Para. 21 (b).
221 Ibid., p. 160, commentary to art. 10, para. (10): “The phrase ‘as appropriate’ was adopted by the Commission to emphasize the discretionary power of an affected State to choose from among various States, the United Nations, competent intergovernmental organizations, and relevant non-governmental organizations the assistance that is most appropriate to its specific needs.”
222 Ibid., commentary to art. 9, para. (4): “The primacy of an affected State is also informed by the long-standing recognition in international law that the government of a State is best placed to determine the gravity of an emergency situation and to frame appropriate response policies.”
223 Statement by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Yearbook ... 2009, vol. I, 3029th meeting, para. 6.
1. IDENTIFIABLE NEEDS

147. The affected State’s right to condition the provision of assistance on identifiable needs enables the State to ensure the protection of persons on its territory. Thus, the ability to condition the provision of assistance on identifiable needs allows fulfilment of draft article 9, which recognizes the affected State’s primary role in directing, controlling and coordinating disaster relief on its territory.

The State’s ability to condition assistance on identifiable needs is also fully consistent with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality identified in draft article 6 and the duty to cooperate recognized in draft article 5.

148. According to the memorandum by the Secretariat, conditioning disaster relief assistance on identifiable needs is a valid constraint on the provision of such assistance. Multilateral instruments regulating the provision of relief assistance emphasize the importance of allocating assistance directly in proportion to needs. Article 72, paragraph 2, of the Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States and the European Community and its member States (Cotonou Agreement), for example, establishes a general requirement that humanitarian and emergency assistance be granted “exclusively according to the needs and interests of victims of disasters”. Similarly, the General Assembly, in paragraph 2 of resolution 54/233 of 22 December 1999, provided that humanitarian assistance for natural disasters “should be determined on the basis of the human dimension and needs arising out of the particular natural disaster”. In the particular context of food supplies, the Food Aid Convention, 1999, submits that food aid should be “consistent with the dietary habits and nutritional needs of recipients” (art. III (j)).

149. A number of model rules and draft guidelines reiterate the emphasis on allocation of assistance in proportion to needs. In explaining the rationale for inclusion of the phrase “as appropriate” in draft article 10 on the duty of the affected State to seek assistance, the Commission notes that it sought to emphasize the discretion of an affected State to choose “assistance that is most appropriate to its specific needs” from among different assisting entities. Under the IFRC Guidelines, assisting actors should calculate aid priorities “on the basis of need alone” (guideline 4 (2) (a)), disaster relief should be “adequate for the needs of affected persons” (guideline 4 (3) (b)) and assisting States and organizations should inspect all goods and equipment to ensure “appropriateness for the needs in the affected State” (guideline 17 (3)). The UNITAR Model Rules require that the assisting State consult with the affected State “with respect to the needs of the receiving State” (annex A, rule 2 (2)). The Mohonk Criteria state that assistance should be allocated in proportion to needs (sect. III (2) (a)). The Max Planck Institute Guidelines likewise stipulate that humanitarian assistance should be “suitable for meeting the assessed needs in every respect” (guideline 15).

150. Although numerous texts support the principle of needs-based allocation of disaster relief assistance, other factors have been mentioned in the Sixth Committee that might validly influence the distribution of relief assistance, including economic considerations relating to the capability to provide assistance and the importance of assessing proportionality of needs on a case-by-case basis. In addition, it has been noted that the General Assembly, in paragraph 2 of resolution 54/233, envisioned consideration of the “human dimension”, implying that allocation of humanitarian assistance is not limited to a strict proportional provisioning of resources based on need.

2. NEEDS ASSESSMENT

151. An affected State that conditions the provision of assistance on its linkage to identifiable needs must clearly identify such needs. It has been noted that an affected State may undertake a needs assessment on its own or jointly in cooperation with an assisting State. Cooperation between States in undertaking needs assessments reflects the duty to cooperate enshrined in draft article 5. The ASEAN Agreement, in article 11, paragraph 3, provides that the affected State shall either specify the assistance required to the assisting entity or, if this is not practicable, assess and decide upon the assistance required, jointly and in consultation with the assisting entity. The Food Aid Convention, in article VIII (b), also foresees an “evaluation of needs by the recipient and the members, within their own respective policies”, in order to determine the provision of food aid. That instrument further provides, in article VIII (g), that States parties should seek to develop a “common approach to needs analysis” by consulting with each other at the regional and recipient State level when food aid needs are identified. Likewise, the process described by the UNITAR Model Rules (annex A, rule 2 (2)) involves the assisting State consulting with the designated national authority of the receiving State.

152. A role is also envisioned for humanitarian agencies in needs assessments. The Economic and Social Council, in paragraph 8 of resolution 2002/32, encouraged humanitarian agencies to strengthen humanitarian information centres by “providing timely and accurate information on assessed needs, and the activities developed to respond to them”. Accordingly, the International Recovery Platform conducts post-disaster needs assessments, which harmonize the assessment, analysis and prioritization of needs by various stakeholders. The Balkan National Societies’ Recommended Rules and Practices suggest that States “ascertain the needs of the victims for humanitarian assistance and their number”.

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225 A/CN.4/590 and Add.1–3 (see footnote 2 above), para. 76.
226 Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two). See also IFRC Guidelines, guidelines 4 (2), 4 (3) and 17 (3); UNITAR Model Rules, annex A, rule 2 (2); and Ebersole, “The Mohonk Criteria for humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies: Task force on ethical and legal issues in humanitarian assistance”.
228 In explaining the rationale for inclusion of the phrase “as appropriate” in draft article 10 on the duty of the affected State to seek assistance, the Commission notes that it sought to emphasize the discretion of an affected State to choose “assistance that is most appropriate to its specific needs” from among different assisting entities. Under the IFRC Guidelines, assisting actors should calculate aid priorities “on the basis of need alone” (guideline 4 (2) (a)), disaster relief should be “adequate for the needs of affected persons” (guideline 4 (3) (b)) and assisting States and organizations should inspect all goods and equipment to ensure “appropriateness for the needs in the affected State” (guideline 17 (3)). The UNITAR Model Rules require that the assisting State consult with the affected State “with respect to the needs of the receiving State” (annex A, rule 2 (2)). The Mohonk Criteria state that assistance should be allocated in proportion to needs (sect. III (2) (a)). The Max Planck Institute Guidelines likewise stipulate that humanitarian assistance should be “suitable for meeting the assessed needs in every respect” (guideline 15).
230 A/CN.4/590 and Add.1–3 (see footnote 2 above), para. 80.
alongside “competent international relief agencies which offer their assistance”.

153. It should be noted that a needs assessment is not limited to the context where the affected State has conditioned provision of assistance on linkage to identified needs. It has been stated that a needs assessment is appropriate where an instrument requires the affected State to specify the scope and type of assistance requested. In such a case, the needs assessment forms the basis of the information provided regarding the scope and type of assistance.

3. QUALITY CONTROL

154. International instruments provide that the affected State may condition aid on quality including, inter alia, safety, nutrition and cultural appropriateness, encouraging members of the public to assist States in providing only those relief goods requested by the affected State and discouraging the provision of unnecessary or inappropriate goods. The ASEAN Agreement, for example, provides in article 12, paragraph 4, that “the relief goods and materials provided by the assisting entity should meet the quality and validity requirement of the Parties concerned for consumption and utilization”. Article III (j) of the Food Aid Convention declares that all products provided as food aid shall meet international quality standards, be consistent with the dietary habits and nutritional needs of recipients and, with the exception of seeds, shall be suitable for human consumption.

155. The memorandum by the Secretariat explained that certain provisions aim to assure that disaster relief assistance is of a sufficiently high quality as to provide a benefit, rather than a potential harm, to recipients. Under this general concept of quality, many different provisions exist, including those seeking to assure that disaster relief is geographically and culturally relevant, that it is timely, and that it is coordinated so as to assure non-redundancy of assistance.

156. The ability of an affected State to condition the provision of aid on quality is not limited to the quality of the goods themselves, but also applies to the quality of assistance workers deployed in the affected State. The General Assembly, in resolution 57/150, urged States to deploy search and rescue teams that complied with internationally developed standards including training, equipment and cultural awareness. The IFRC Guidelines expand on the notion of quality conditions to include quality of coordination efforts, consistent with draft article 5, and quality of personnel.

4. SCOPE AND TYPE

157. As a corollary to draft articles 5 and 9, the affected State should specify the scope and type of assistance it is seeking if the provision of assistance is conditioned on quality. As has been previously explained, certain bilateral treaties contain a provision to the effect that “the Party requesting assistance must specify the nature and scope of the assistance which it requires and must, to the extent possible, provide the other Party with the information which the other Party needs in order to determine the scope of the assistance”.

Providing assisting States with relevant information specifying the type and scope of the conditions on quality both helps to facilitate the affected State’s duty to protect its citizens and take the lead in relief efforts under draft article 9 and also to cooperate with assisting States, as provided by draft article 5.

158. In upholding the duty to protect victims of natural disasters and the duty to cooperate with assisting States, when requesting assistance the affected State shall specify the scope and type of assistance it is requesting. The Tampere Convention provides that “a State Party requesting telecommunication assistance shall specify the scope and type of assistance required.” The ASEAN Agreement (art. 11, para. 3) requires the affected State to “specify the scope and type of assistance required and, where practicable, provide the assisting entity with such information as may be necessary for that Party to determine the extent to which it is able to meet the request”. As noted previously in the discussion relating to needs assessment, the ASEAN Agreement also acknowledges, consistent with draft article 9, that in many instances the affected State may not be capable of specifying the scope and type of assistance required, and in such instances,

232 Recommended rules and practices, Balkan National Societies meeting on international disaster response law, Belgrade, 24–26 September 2004, sect. II (2).


234 A/CN.4/590 and Add.1–3 (see footnote 2 above), para. 80.

235 Ibid.

236 IFRC Guidelines, guideline 18 (3) (“assisting States and eligible assisting humanitarian organizations should take all reasonable steps to ensure the quality, appropriateness and safety of any such medications and equipment ...”).

237 Ibid., guideline 5 (2) (“All States should actively encourage members of the public interested in contributing to international disaster relief or initial recovery to make financial donations where possible or otherwise donate only those types of relief goods expressly requested by the affected State.”).

238 A/CN.4/590 and Add.1–3 (see footnote 2 above), para. 194.

239 General Assembly resolution 57/150 of 16 December 2002, para. 5 (“The General Assembly ... further urges all States that have the capacity to provide international urban search and rescue assistance to take the necessary measures to ensure that international urban search and rescue teams under their responsibility are deployed and operate in accordance with internationally developed standards as specified in the Guidelines of the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group, particularly concerning timely deployment, self-sufficiency, training, operating procedures and equipment, and cultural awareness...”).

240 Guideline 4 (3) (“To the greatest extent practicable, their disaster relief and initial recovery assistance should also be ... (b) adequate for the needs of affected persons and consistent with any applicable international standards of quality; (c) coordinated with other relevant domestic and assisting actors; (d) provided and conducted in a manner that is sensitive to cultural, social and religious customs and traditions ... (f) provided by competent and adequately trained personnel”).

241 A/CN.4/590 and Add.1–3 (see footnote 2 above), para. 199.

242 Tampere Convention, art. 4 (2). This reiterates the IFRC Guidelines, guideline 1 (3) (“While affirming the principal role of domestic authorities and actors, they recommend minimum legal facilities to be provided to assisting States and to assisting humanitarian organizations that are willing and able to comply with minimum standards of coordination, quality and accountability.”).
assisting States shall collaborate in the needs assessment as it relates to quality.\(^{245}\)

159. Other international instruments place the onus of consultation and coordination on the assisting, rather than the affected, State. The Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance provides that upon the occurrence of a disaster the assisting State shall consult with the assisted State to receive from the latter information on the kind of assistance considered most appropriate to provide to the populations stricken by the disaster.\(^{244}\)

Bilateral treaties also acknowledge, as explained above in paragraphs 151–153, concerning the discussion of linking aid to needs on a case-by-case basis rather than on a directly proportional basis, that a case-by-base analysis that does not include operational detail may also be appropriate.\(^{245}\)

\(^{245}\) ASEAN Agreement, art. 11 (3) (“In the event that it is not practicable for the requesting party to specify the scope and type of assistance required, the requesting party and assisting entity shall, in consultation, jointly assess and decide upon the scope and type of assistance required.”). See also Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency, art. 2 (2) (reiterating that “a State Party requesting assistance shall specify the scope and type of assistance required and, where practicable, provide the assisting party with such information as may be necessary for that party to determine the extent to which it is able to meet the request. In the event that it is not practicable for the requesting State Party to specify the scope and type of assistance required, the requesting State Party and the assisting party shall, in consultation, decide upon the scope and type of assistance required.”).

\(^{244}\) Art. II (b). This is in contrast to the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, art. 12 (1), for example, which places the onus of specifying the scope and type of aid on the affected State: “If a Party needs assistance in the event of an industrial accident, it may ask for assistance from other Parties, indicating the scope and type of assistance required.” See also Black Sea Agreement, art. 4 (2) (“The assistance shall be provided upon request, wherein the requesting party specifies: —place, time, character and scale of the disaster, and current state of the emergency in the affected area; —actions already carried out, specification of the required assistance, setting the priorities of the requested disaster relief.”); Agreement on cooperation and mutual assistance in cases of accidents (Estonia–Finland) (footnote 199 above), art. 6 (“The Party requesting assistance must specify the nature and scope of the assistance which it requires.”); Protocol on technical cooperation and mutual assistance in the field of civil defence (Spain–Portugal) (footnote 165 above), art. 3 (7) (“The overall management of operations shall, in all cases, be the responsibility of the authorities of the territory in which the disaster occurs. Nevertheless, the units of the donor country shall act through their own national leaders, whom the head of the expedition shall apprise of the objectives and missions to be accomplished.”).

\(^{245}\) See Agreement on reciprocal assistance in case of disasters or major accidents (France–Switzerland) (Bern, 14 January 1987) (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1541, No. 26745), art. 4 (“The nature, extent and procedures for the provision of assistance shall be determined by mutual agreement between the authorities mentioned in article 3, on a case-by-case basis.”); Agreement concerning mutual assistance in the event of disasters or serious accidents (Austria–Germany) (footnote 199 above), art. 4 (“The type and extent of assistance to be provided shall be agreed upon by the authorities referred to in article 3 case by case, without necessarily going into operational detail.”). See also Council of the European Union decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom, of 23 October 2001, art. 5 (3) (explaining that specific limitations and details of execution of assistance intervention shall only be provided by the affected State when necessary: “The requesting Member State shall be responsible for directing assistance interventions. The authorities of the requesting Member State shall lay down guidelines and, if necessary, define the limits of the tasks entrusted to the intervention teams, without giving details of their execution, which are to be left to the person in charge appointed by the Member State rendering assistance.”).

160. The IFRC Guidelines place a reciprocal duty on both assisting States and the affected State to specify the scope, type and needs of assistance that are available and offered or needed and sought. Guideline 10 (2) declares that [r]equests and offers for assistance should be as specific as possible as to the types and amounts of goods as well as the services and expertise available or required, respectively. Affected States may also wish to indicate particular types of goods and services likely to be offered that are not needed.

This reciprocal duty is most consistent with the importance of cooperation among States underlying draft article 5 and with the reality that the victims of natural disasters in the affected State may benefit from quality specification coming from assisting States, thus further enabling the affected State to fulfil its duty under draft article 9.

C. Limitations on conditions under international and national law

161. The right of the affected State to impose conditions for the delivery of assistance is qualified by an obligation that such conditions comply with international and national laws\(^{246}\) as well as treaty obligations.\(^{247}\) Although such provisions textually modify general requirements for the delivery of aid, they have a clear application to the conditions an affected State may impose on assisting States, because an affected State is not to require actions in contravention of obligations otherwise stated. Consequently, although an affected State may impose conditions, including the retention of control over the provision of assistance and requirements that any assistance comply with specific national laws, such conditions may not abrogate otherwise existing duties under national and international law.\(^{248}\) Further, such conditions may not contravene the provisions of any treaties, conventions or instruments to which the affected State is a party.\(^{249}\) Rather, where discrepancies between agreements to which either the affected or the assisting States are parties, conditions on the provision of assistance should conform with those provisions that “afford[ed] the greatest degree of assistance in the event of disaster and fav[o][ured] support and protection to personnel providing assistance” (Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, art. XV).

\(^{247}\) General Assembly resolution 46/182, para. 5. See also IFRC Guideline 4 (1) (“Assisting actors and their personnel shall abide by the laws of the affected State and applicable international law, coordinate with domestic authorities, and respect the human dignity of disaster-affected persons at all times.”); Max Planck Institute Guidelines, paras. 9 (“humanitarian assistance shall only be provided in accordance with the principles and rules of international law”) and 22 (d) (“assisting personnel [shall] respect and observe the laws and customs of the receiving State”).

\(^{249}\) See footnote 246 above.

\(^{248}\) ASEAN Agreement, art. 30. ("The provisions of this Agreement shall in no way affect the rights and obligations of any Party with regard to any existing treaty, convention or instrument to which they are Parties.") Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, art. XV ("If there is any discrepancy between this Convention and other international agreements on the subject to which the assisting and assisted states are parties, the provision that affords the greatest degree of assistance in the event of disaster and favours support and protection to personnel providing assistance shall take precedence.").
162. The Special Rapporteur noted in his third report that State sovereignty rights with respect to emergency assistance must be balanced against other obligations under international law principles, particularly the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality as embodied in the Commission in draft article 6 (humanitarian principles in disaster response), as well as human dignity (draft article 7) and human rights (draft article 8). Further, the Commission has found that such principles should not be construed in a limiting fashion, as only those explicitly enshrined in international agreements, but rather as "obligations applicable on a<br>48x626>fashion, as only those explicitly enshrined in international<br>48x648>law principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality should<br>48x659>be construed in a limiting way. Consequently, State obligations used in international law pertaining to, inter alia, the environment and sustainable development may also serve to circumscribe the conditions an affected State may impose for the provision of assistance. Where the national laws of an affected State provide protections in excess of international standards and the affected State has not agreed to waive such additional protections in order to facilitate the delivery of assistance, assisting States must comply with the national laws of the affected State. Applicable principles that may serve to balance the right of an affected State to impose conditions on the delivery of assistance are detailed below.

1. CORE HUMANITARIAN OBLIGATIONS

163. As stated in General Assembly resolution 46/182, "humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality". That formulation reflects the language of the Secretary-General in his 2009 report entitled "Strengthening the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations":

Respect for and adherence to the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence are therefore critical to ensuring the respect of humanitarian action from other activities, thereby preserving the space and integrity needed to deliver humanitarian assistance effectively to all people in need.

164. These humanitarian principles are discussed extensively in the Special Rapporteur’s third report. They are found in a number of documents, including the

Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross. The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampa Convention) provides that “States Parties shall uphold and ensure respect for the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence of humanitarian actors”. Conditions set by affected States on the acceptance of aid must not contravene those principles.

165. States may not impose conditions for the provision of assistance that do not comport with the principle of humanity. This principle initially developed in humanitarian law, but has since been recognized as applying in both war and peace. In the Corfu Channel case, the International Court of Justice found that the obligations incumbent on State authorities were based “on certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war”. The principle of humanity, therefore, requires that affected States, in imposing conditions for the provision of aid, do so only in ways that respect the human dignity of those affected.

167. Conditions imposed for the provision of aid by an affected State must adhere to the principle of neutrality. The principle of neutrality is described by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement as the notion that humanitarian assistance should be provided without "taking sides in hostilities or engaging at any time in conflict". The principle of neutrality is extended to the context of disaster relief by the Oslo Guidelines and the Mohonk Criteria, which affirm that “human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found". The dignity and rights of all victims must also be respected and protected. The Kampala Convention, in article 3, paragraph 1 (c), requires that States Parties “respect and ensure respect for the principles of humanity and human dignity of internally displaced persons”. Humanity is a fundamental principle of IFRC, and its guideline 4, paragraph 1, recommends that assisting actors and their personnel should abide by the law of the affected State and applicable international law, coordinate with domestic authorities, and respect the human dignity of disaster-affected persons at all times.

The principle of humanity, therefore, requires that affected States, in imposing conditions for the provision of aid, do so only in ways that respect the human dignity of those affected.

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251 See General Assembly resolution 46/182, annex, para. 2; IFRC Guidelines, art. 4 (2).
253 Statement by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Yearbook ... 2010, vol. I, 3067th meeting.
254 See, for example, General Assembly resolution 46/182, annex, para. 5 (see also para. 123 above); IFRC Guidelines, guideline 4 (1) (“Assisting actors and their personnel shall abide by the laws of the affected State.”); and Max Planck Institute Guidelines, para. 22 (d) (“assisting personnel shall respect and observe the laws and customs of the receiving State.”).
255 Annex, para. 2.
256 A/64/84-E/2009/87, para. 23.
260 Art. 5, para. 8.
261 See, for example, Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3 (1), para. (c); Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 to the Effect of Prohibiting the Use of Certain Projectiles in War; Hague Convention of 1899 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899, preamble.
262 Corfu Channel case (see footnote 181 above), p. 22.
controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature”. 266 This wording is echoed in the Mohonk Criteria. It is clear from this formulation that neutrality is relevant in disaster situations, and not merely in the context of conflict.267 In his third report, the Special Rapporteur noted that “the affected State must respect the humanitarian nature of the response activities and refrain from subjecting it to conditions that divest it of its material and ideological neutrality” 268 Therefore, conditions set by affected States on the acceptance of aid must be “neither partisan or political acts nor substitutes for them”.269

168. The incidence of a disaster does not absolve an affected State from its obligation to refrain from promulgating conditions for the provision of aid that violate the principle of impartiality. The principle of impartiality, which is commonly understood to include non-discrimination, refers to the doctrine that aid must be provided “without discriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions, race or religion. Relief of the suffering of individuals must be guided solely by their needs and priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress”.270 All human rights instruments take into account the principle of non-discrimination either explicitly or implicitly.271 For example, the Charter of the United Nations describes, in Article 1, paragraph 3, one of the purposes of the Organization as follows:

To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

169. Impartiality and non-discrimination are not per se violated, however, by conditions that funnel aid to those with the most urgent needs.272 Other agreements, such as the Convention and Statute establishing an International Relief Union, make explicit the applicability of the principle of non-discrimination in the context of disaster relief.273 Non-discrimination is addressed specifically in the context of emergency situations in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which allows suspension of certain obligations “provided that such measures … do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin”.274 It therefore follows that affected States are not free to derogate from the principle of impartiality in conditioning their acceptance of aid.

2. HUMAN RIGHTS

170. While States have broad latitude in specifying the kind and extent of assistance they need, they may not place restrictions on assistance that compromise their obligations under international law. Existing human rights obligations under human rights law do not cease in the wake of a disaster. As outlined by the Special Rapporteur in his fourth report, disasters implicate numerous human rights, such as the rights to food and water and the right to adequate housing.275 The affected State may not impose restrictions on assistance that will violate or infringe upon those rights.

171. Similarly, a State’s obligations to vulnerable or disadvantaged groups, such as women, children, people with disabilities and indigenous or minority cultural groups, continue to apply in a disaster situation.276 In fact, disaster situations may impose added duties on States to ensure the safety of vulnerable populations. For instance, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities requires, in article 11, that States take “all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including … the occurrence of natural disasters”.

172. The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 underscores the importance of human rights considerations in the disaster-planning process, urging States to adopt “a gender perspective” in disaster risk management and to take into account “cultural diversity, age, and vulnerable groups” in disaster risk reduction.277 To the extent that humanitarian assistance contributes to disaster planning and risk management, affected States must condition acceptance on the assurance that the aid will provide adequately for vulnerable groups.

3. RECONSTRUCTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

173. In its commentary to draft article 1 on Scope, the Commission indicated that the scope ratione temporis “is primarily focused on the immediate post-disaster response and recovery phase, including the post-disaster reconstruction phase”.278 To the extent that reconstruction is a continuation of relief efforts and starts almost immediately after a disaster occurs, sustainable development considerations might come into play early in the disaster.
response process and merit, therefore, some brief reference here. This is not to ignore that reconstruction remains different from relief work and that the rights and obligations of States in the two contexts may differ considerably. When assistance will contribute to reconstruction efforts, the affected State may be required to condition its acceptance on the assurance that reconstruction will ameliorate, not just restore, previous conditions. For instance, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights identifies, in article 11, paragraph 1, the universal right to “housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions”. Improving living conditions in the wake of a disaster that has destroyed settlements may require an affected State to ensure that new housing will be more resilient to future disasters and that future land use decisions will not perpetuate vulnerabilities.

174. Similarly, the international goal of sustainable development is highlighted in the wake of a disaster. As the Hyogo Framework for Action notes, in paragraph 13, “disaster risk reduction is a cross-cutting issue in the context of sustainable development and therefore an important element for the achievement of internationally agreed[-upon] development goals”. Those goals have been set in principle 4 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which provides that “in order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it”.

175. Agenda 21, adopted at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, echoes this principle, setting forth as a broad objective the promotion of “human settlement development through environmentally sound physical planning and land use”. Furthermore, in the disaster context, it recognizes the importance of post-disaster reconstruction in “mitigation[ing] the negative impact of natural and man-made disasters on human settlements, national economies and the environment”. Likewise, Agenda 21 views the international community “as a major partner in post-[disaster] reconstruction and rehabilitation” by providing funds and expertise to affected States to develop long-term disaster planning and mitigation policies.

176. The Millennium Declaration lists respect for nature as a “fundamental value” that is “essential to international relations”, and asserts that “prudence must be shown in the management of all living species and natural resources, in accordance with the precepts of sustainable development”. The Declaration identifies international cooperation “to reduce the number and effects of natural and man-made disasters” as a key means to protecting the environment.

177. The Hyogo Framework for Action also emphasizes the nexus between disaster risk reduction and sustainable development and the importance of cooperation among States and the international community in developing the “knowledge, capacities and motivation needed to build disaster-resilient nations and communities”. The Framework further specifies that post-disaster humanitarian assistance should be used “in such a way that risks and future vulnerabilities will be lessened as much as possible”. That language suggests that affected States should, to the extent possible, ensure that the assistance they receive will enable them to develop safely and sustainably.

4. Obligations under National Laws

178. In addition to complying with international law, conditions on the delivery of assistance must comply with national laws. An affected State may condition its acceptance of aid on compliance with its national laws. Affected States also have an obligation to follow their own national laws when they set conditions for the provision of aid. This obligation derives from the well-established duty to respect the rule of law. This obligation does not restrict the ability of affected States to modify or waive certain laws when necessary to facilitate the provision of aid.

179. International law requirements restricting conditions that may be imposed by affected States constitute a baseline for the obligations of affected States to their populations, and should not be considered exhaustive. Affected States may enact national laws that provide protections to their populations in excess of international standards and condition their acceptance of aid on compliance with such higher standards. This principle is well supported by the core duty of States to respect the rule of law, which is foundational in the history of international law.

180. Consequently, affected States have a duty to respect and follow their own laws when imposing conditions for the provision of aid. While an affected State may enter into agreements with other States to modify or harmonize its national laws in order to facilitate the provision of external assistance, such agreements may not abrogate national standards for other purposes. Where no such agreement exists, assisting States must comply with the national laws of the affected State, even where they impose higher standards than those existing under international law.

181. Bearing the foregoing considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the following draft article:

“Draft article 13. Conditions on the provision of assistance

“The affected State may impose conditions on the provision of assistance, which must comply with its national law and international law.”

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279 A/CONF.206/6, chap. I, resolution 2, para. 13 (k).
281 Ibid., annex II, para. 7.28.
282 Ibid., para. 7.58.
283 Ibid., para. 7.62.
284 General Assembly resolution 55/2 of 8 September 2000, para. 6.
285 Ibid., para. 23.
CHAPTER V

Termination of assistance

182. The draft articles adopted thus far provide a framework for the affected State to guide the provision of assistance to suit its needs. Draft article 9 ensures that the affected State maintains direction, control, coordination and supervision of any assistance provided. Draft article 11 gives the affected State the right to refuse an offer of assistance, but not arbitrarily. The foregoing suggests that when an affected State does accept an offer of assistance, it retains a measure of control over the duration for which that assistance will be provided, and assisting actors are correspondingly obliged to leave the territory of the affected State upon request. Both parties remain duty-bound to cooperate according to draft article 5, and the context of termination of the assistance is no exception. The instruments addressing this question echo this duty by routinely articulating a preference for a collaborative approach in which both parties reach an amicable agreement on when the period of assistance will come to an end and the assisting actor will leave the territory.

183. International instruments bearing on this topic have addressed termination of assistance in a number of ways. As the memorandum by the Secretariat has acknowledged, “termination provisions contain subtle differences in formulation which could have a significant impact in practice”. 291

184. Several instruments mark the end of the period of assistance with a notification from either party. Thus, the Tampere Convention provides, in article 6, paragraph 1, that

the requesting State Party or the assisting State Party may, at any time, terminate telecommunication assistance received or provided ... by providing notification in writing. Upon such notification, the States Parties involved shall consult with each other to provide for the proper and expeditious conclusion of the assistance.

The draft convention on expediting the delivery of emergency assistance provides that

the receiving State or an assisting State or organization may give notice of termination of assistance and where necessary the Parties to this Convention which are affected by such notice shall then arrange to bring the assistance to an orderly conclusion under the terms of this Convention.292

Similarly, IFRC Guidelines state that

When an affected State or an assisting actor wishes to terminate disaster relief or initial recovery assistance, it should provide appropriate notification. Upon such notification, the affected State and the assisting actor should consult with each other.293


185. A China–United States agreement of 1947 allowed the receiving State to terminate the agreement “whenever it deems that such relief assistance as is provided in this Agreement is no longer necessary”, but established a series of conditions necessary for the assisting State to terminate the assistance.296 The Nordic Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement in connection with radiation accidents297 provides that a receiving State may request termination of disaster relief assistance at “any time”, but that the assisting State may only terminate its assistance if, in its opinion, certain conditions are met.

186. Some instruments allow the affected State to request the termination of assistance, after which both parties shall consult with each other to that effect. For example, article 11 of the Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency provides that

the requesting State ... may at any time, after appropriate consultations [with the assisting actor] and by notification in writing, request the termination of assistance received ... under this Convention. Once such a request has been made, the parties involved shall consult with each other to make arrangements for the proper conclusion of the assistance.

The Agreement establishing the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (art. 20, paras. 2 and 3), the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents (annex X, para. 10) and the Max Planck Institute Guidelines298 include similar provisions.

187. Bearing the foregoing in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the following draft article:

“Draft article 14. Termination of assistance

“The affected State and assisting actors shall consult with each other to determine the duration of the external assistance.”

291 See Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and the Government of the Republic of South Africa regarding the Coordination of Search and Rescue Services (footnote 199 above), art. 12 (“This Agreement may be terminated by either Party giving written notice through the diplomatic channel to the other Party of its intention to terminate this Agreement”).

292 Agreement concerning the United States relief assistance to the Chinese people (China–United States) (footnote 218 above), art. IX.

293 Art. X (“1. The requesting State may at any time in writing request the termination of the assistance provided under this Agreement ... 3. Upon such request for, or notice of, termination the requesting State and the assisting party shall consult together with a view to concluding any operations in progress at the time of such termination and facilitating withdrawal of the assistance”).

294 Art. 13 (1): “The requesting party may cancel its request for assistance at any time. The requesting party shall inform the assisting party immediately about its decision.”
Chapter VI

Related developments

188. During the period between the Commission’s sixty-third session and the date of the present report, two related developments deserve to be singled out.

189. The third session of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction was held in Geneva from 8 to 13 May 2011. It built on the findings and recommendations of the Global Platform second session in 2009, as well as the results of the midterm review of the Hyogo Framework for Action and the 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. The Platform Chair’s Summary highlights consensus points and outlines critical steps to be taken.

190. The 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent was held in Geneva from 28 November to 1 December 2011. On the occasion of the Conference, IFRC made available a pilot version of a Model Act for the Facilitation and Regulation of International Relief and Recovery Assistance, consisting of 71 articles together with commentaries. It was intended that a final version be produced by the end of 2012. By its resolution 7, entitled “Strengthening disaster law”, the Conference, inter alia, welcomed the efforts to develop a model act “to assist States interested in incorporating the recommendations of the IDRL Guidelines into their legal frameworks” (para. 5) and invited “further consultation with States and other stakeholders on the use of the model act as a reference tool” (para. 6). As is known, the IFRC International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles (IDRL) Programme, launched in 2001, developed the Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international disaster relief and initial recovery assistance, adopted at the 30th International Conference in 2007. The IFRC has announced that its IDRL programme has become the IFRC Disaster Law Programme.


300 IFRC, OCHA and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Geneva, November 2011.
IMMUNITY OF STATE OFFICIALS FROM FOREIGN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

[Agenda item 5]

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Preliminary report on the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, by Ms. Concepción Escobar Hernández, Special Rapporteur

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Introduction

1. The topic “Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction” was included in the long-term programme of work of the International Law Commission at its fifty-eighth session, in 2006, on the basis of the proposal contained in annex I to the Commission’s report for that session.1 At its fifty-ninth session, in 2007, the Commission decided to include the topic in its current programme of work and appointed Mr. Roman A. Kolodkin as Special Rapporteur.2 At the same session, the Secretariat was requested to prepare a background study on the topic.3

2. The previous Special Rapporteur submitted three reports. In the preliminary report,4 the Special Rapporteur provided the history of the consideration of the question of immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction by the Commission and other learned institutions,5 outlined the preliminary range of aspects implicated by the topic6 and identified issues that the Special Rapporteur viewed as worthy of consideration in documents of the sixtieth session; the final text will be published as an addendum to Yearbook ... 2008, vol. II (Part One).

determining the overall scope of the topic. In the second report, the Special Rapporteur, following a review of developments that had taken place since the issuance of the preliminary report, provided a substantive overview and analysis of questions concerning the scope of immunity of a State official from criminal jurisdiction. In the third report, unlike the preliminary and second reports, which addressed the substantive aspects of the topic, the Special Rapporteur considered its procedural aspects while at the same time analysing the relationship between the invocation by a State of the immunity of its official and the responsibility of that State for a wrongful act that is the same as the one that gave rise to the question of immunity. For each of these three reports, the Special Rapporteur routinely presented a summary following a detailed analysis of the issues involved on the basis of a review of State practice, case law and the doctrine, thus providing elements of an overall picture of the issues addressed in a synthesized manner.  

3. The Commission considered the reports of the Special Rapporteur at its sixty and sixty-third sessions, held in 2008 and 2011, respectively. The Sixth Committee of the General Assembly dealt with the topic during its consideration of the Commission’s report, particularly in 2008 and 2011.

4. At its 3132nd meeting, on 22 May 2012, the Commission appointed Ms. Concepción Escobar Hernández as Special Rapporteur to replace Mr. Kolodkin, who was no longer with the Commission. The Special Rapporteur would like to express her appreciation to Mr. Kolodkin for his devotion to the study of the topic. The scholarly and outstanding contribution of Mr. Kolodkin will undoubtedly assist the Commission in its work.

5. The present report is a “transitional report”. It is preliminary in nature and must take into account the reports submitted by the previous Special Rapporteur and the progress of the debates held by the competent United Nations bodies (the Commission and the Sixth Committee) in order to continue the work that is already under way. Therefore, the primary purpose of the present report is to help clarify the terms of the debate up to this point and to identify the principal points of contention that remain and on which the Commission may wish to continue to work in the future. The Special Rapporteur also hopes that this preliminary report will lead to a structured debate that will make it possible to meet the international community’s expectations for the topic of the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction since 2007, when it was first included in the Commission’s programme of work. For that reason, this preliminary report will identify the basic elements of the programme of work that the Special Rapporteur considers necessary to pursue in the future in order to complete work on the topic during the current quinquennium, thereby complying with the General Assembly’s request that the Commission give priority to this topic in its programme of work.

6. To that end, it has been decided to divide the present report into four separate parts. The purpose of the first two parts will be to provide an overview of the Commission’s work to date (chap. I), followed by a summary of the current status of the debate on the topic in the competent United Nations bodies. Chapter II will study the major aspects of the topic that, in the Special Rapporteur’s view, require special handling or consideration by the Commission in the future. Lastly, the report will include an indicative programme of work, which the Special Rapporteur proposes to follow during the current quinquennium (chap. III).

Chapter I

Consideration of the topic during the quinquennium 2007–2011

7. As noted above, following the inclusion of the topic in the Commission’s programme of work and the appointment of the Special Rapporteur in 2007, Mr. Kolodkin submitted for the Commission’s consideration three reports that offer a broad, well-documented analysis of the question of the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction and that present his views on the primary issues raised in that connection. On the basis of these reports, the members of the Commission had the opportunity to formulate their opinions on various issues set out in the Special Rapporteur’s reports, as well as on general aspects of the topic. A number of States have also expressed their views on the previous Special Rapporteur’s reports and on the topic in general within the framework of the Sixth Committee.

8. At these three levels, there has been significant consideration of the topic, which, in the Special Rapporteur’s opinion, must be reflected in this preliminary report in order to clarify the current status of the work and of the debate on the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, these comments will be followed by three sections devoted, respectively, to the reports of Special Rapporteur Kolodkin, the debate in the Commission and the debate in the Sixth Committee.

A. An overview of work by the previous Special Rapporteur

9. According to the previous Special Rapporteur, the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal
The immunity of State officials is grounded in international law, including customary international law. The immunity of State officials is often justified on the basis of the functional and representative theories. Moreover, principles of international law concerning the sovereign equality of States and non-interference in internal affairs, as well as the need to ensure the stability of international relations and the independent performance of their activities by States, all have a justificatory bearing on immunity.

10. Although immunity and jurisdiction are related concepts, as the International Court of Justice noted in the case of Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), they are different. Absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction and jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity. Immunity remains opposable before the courts of a foreign State, even where such courts exercise such a jurisdiction on the basis of conventional rules.\(^\text{17}\) In the view of the previous Special Rapporteur, the consideration of immunity should be limited and should not consider the substance of the question of jurisdiction as such. It is nevertheless worth bearing in mind that the criminal jurisdiction of a State, like its entire jurisdiction over its territory, takes several forms. It may be legislative, executive or judicial, although doctrinally the executive and judicial aspects may be considered together under the rubric of executive jurisdiction. Although executive (or executive and judicial) criminal jurisdiction has features in common with civil jurisdiction, they are different in that many criminal procedure measures tend to be adopted at the pretrial phase of the juridical process. The question of immunity thus arises even at the pretrial phase of the criminal process.

11. The immunity of officials from foreign jurisdiction as a rule of international law means, in juridical terms, that the juridical right of the person enjoying immunity not to be subject to foreign jurisdiction reflects the juridical obligation of the foreign State not to exercise jurisdiction over the person concerned. Two related conclusions were drawn from this. First, immunity from criminal jurisdiction means primarily immunity only from executive (or executive and judicial) jurisdiction. Second, immunity from the criminal process or from criminal procedure measures does not imply immunity from the substantive law of the foreign State. In other words, immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction is procedural in nature, not necessarily substantive. It serves as a procedural bar to criminal liability but does not in principle preclude it on the substance. The person in question may be proceeded with substantively in another appropriate forum.

12. In making suggestions for delimiting the scope of the topic, the Special Rapporteur noted that it covered only the immunity of officials of one State from the criminal jurisdiction of another State. It did not deal with questions concerning immunity from the civil jurisdiction of another State or international criminal jurisdiction. Nor did it address the question of immunity of an official from the State of his own nationality. The Special Rapporteur also doubted the advisability of giving further consideration within the framework of the topic to the question of recognition and the question of immunity of members of the families of high-ranking officials.

13. It was suggested that the topic should cover all State officials, and in that regard, an attempt should be made to define “State official” for the topic or to define which officials were covered by the term for the purposes of the topic.

14. The scope of the immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction of serving officials differed depending on the level of the office held. All serving State officials enjoyed immunity in respect of acts performed in an official capacity. Only certain serving high-ranking officials additionally enjoyed immunity in respect of acts performed by them in a private capacity. The scope of immunity of former officials was identical irrespective of the level of the office that they held: they enjoy immunity in respect of acts performed by them in an official capacity during their term in office. It was suggested that the doctrinal distinction drawn between immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae had been useful and remained so for analytical purposes.

15. Immunity ratione personae is temporal in nature and ceases once a person leaves office. It inheres to a narrow circle of high-ranking State officials, and conceivably extends during the time it is enjoyed to illegal acts performed by such officials both in an official and in a private capacity, including prior to taking office. It is not affected by the fact that the acts concerning which jurisdiction is being exercised were performed outside the scope of the functions of an official, nor by the nature of his stay abroad, including in the territory of the State exercising jurisdiction. Noting that the high-ranking officials who enjoy immunity ratione personae by virtue of their office include primarily Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Special Rapporteur suggested that an attempt be made to determine which other high-ranking officials, beyond the “troika”, enjoyed immunity ratione personae or to define criteria for identifying such officials.

16. A State official was protected from the criminal jurisdiction of a foreign State by immunity ratione materiae for acts performed by such an official in an official capacity. Such immunity did not extend to acts that were performed by an official prior to his taking office. However, a former State official was protected by immunity ratione materiae in respect of acts performed by him during his time as an official in his capacity as an official. The classification of conduct as official conduct did not depend on the motives of the person or the substance of the conduct. Immunity ratione materiae extended to ultra vires acts of officials and to their illegal acts. The determining factor was that the official was acting in a capacity as such. The Special Rapporteur perceived the concept of “official act” to be broader and inclusive of an “act falling within official functions”. The immunity was also scarcely affected by the nature of an official’s or former official’s stay abroad, including in the territory of the State exercising jurisdiction. Irrespective of whether such person was abroad on an official visit or was staying there in a private capacity, he enjoyed immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction in respect of acts performed in his capacity as an official.

17. It was understood that such acts as performed were acts of the State for which the State official serves. In the view of the Special Rapporteur, this did not preclude the attribution of such acts also to the official who performed them. He suggested that there could scarcely be objective grounds for asserting that one and the same act of an official was, for the purposes of State responsibility, attributed to the State and considered to be its act, and, for the purposes of immunity from jurisdiction, was not attributed as such and was considered to be only the act of an official. However, the scope of the immunity of a State and the scope of the immunity of its official were not identical, despite the fact that in essence the immunity was one and the same.

18. Of logical necessity, the issue of determining the nature of the conduct of an official—official or personal—and, correspondingly, of attributing or not attributing such conduct to the State, must be considered before the issue of the immunity of the official in connection with this conduct is considered.

19. Where charges (of being an alleged criminal, suspect, etc.) have been brought by a foreign jurisdiction against a State official, only such criminal procedure measures as are restrictive in character and would prevent him from discharging his functions by imposing a legal obligation on that person, may not be taken when the person enjoys (a) immunity ratione personae or (b) immunity ratione materiae, if the measures concerned are in connection with a crime committed by that person in the performance of official acts. Such measures may not be taken in respect of a State official appearing in foreign criminal proceedings as a witness when that person enjoys (a) immunity ratione personae or (b) immunity ratione materiae, if the case concerns the summoning of such a person to give testimony in respect of official acts performed by the person himself, or in respect of acts the official became aware of as a result of discharging his official functions.

20. Criminal procedure measures by a foreign jurisdiction imposing an obligation on a State official violate the immunity that the official enjoys, irrespective of whether he is abroad or in the territory of his own State. A violation of the obligation not to take such measures against such a State official takes effect from the moment such a measure is taken by a foreign jurisdiction and not merely once the person against whom it has been taken is abroad.

21. The Special Rapporteur also considered the various interrelated rationales for possible exceptions to immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction, chiefly advanced in respect of immunity ratione materiae, namely: (a) grave criminal acts committed by an official cannot under international law be considered acts performed in an official capacity; (b) since an international crime committed by an official in an official capacity is attributed not only to the State but also to the official, the latter is not protected by immunity ratione materiae in criminal proceedings; (c) peremptory norms of international law that prohibit and criminalize certain acts prevail over the norm concerning immunity and render immunity invalid when applied to such crimes; (d) there is a link between the existence of universal jurisdiction in respect of grave crimes and the invalidity of immunity as it applies to such crimes; (e) there is an analogous link between the obligation aut dedere aut judicare and the invalidity of immunity as it applies to crimes in respect of which such an obligation exists; (f) a norm of customary international law has emerged, providing for an exception to immunity ratione materiae in a case where an official has committed grave crimes under international law. The previous Special Rapporteur did not find any of these rationales to be sufficiently convincing. While pointing out that it was possible to establish exemptions from, or exceptions to, immunity through the conclusion of an international treaty, he concluded that it was difficult to speak of exceptions to immunity as a norm of customary international law that had developed. In the same way, it could not definitively be asserted that a trend towards the establishment of such a norm existed.

22. The situation that he characterized as one of absence of immunity was one in which criminal jurisdiction was exercised by a State in whose territory an alleged crime had occurred, and that State had not consented to the performance in its territory of the activity that led to the crime, as well as to the presence in its territory of the foreign official who committed the alleged crime.

23. The previous Special Rapporteur also addressed the procedural aspects of the invocation of immunity. Given that the focus of the debate in the Commission has been on the substantive matters, for the time being, it may only be worthwhile to note his observation that the question of the immunity of a State official from foreign criminal jurisdiction must in principle be considered either at the early stage of court proceedings or even earlier at the pretrial stage, when the State that is exercising jurisdiction decides the question of taking, in respect of the official, criminal procedure measures that are precluded by immunity. Any failure to consider the issue of immunity in limes litis may be viewed as a violation by the forum State of its obligations under the norms governing immunity.

B. The debate in the Commission

24. The Commission dealt substantively with the topic of the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction at its sixtieth session, in 2008, and at its sixty-third session, in 2011. Since the previous Special Rapporteur did not include any draft articles in his reports, the debate among the members of the Commission was always held in plenary session using an open, general format. This did not, however, prevent the members from commenting on various specific issues raised in the reports of the Special Rapporteur, including by expressing significant opinions on methodological and conceptual matters and opinions relating to the inclusion of immunity in the international legal system as a whole and its relationship to other institutions, principles and values of that system.

25. The members of the Commission generally endorsed the scope of the report proposed by the previous

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10 *Yearbook ... 2008*, vol. II (Part Two), paras. 116–140 and 159–185. The Commission considered the topic at its 3086th–3088th, 3111th and 3113th–3115th meetings (see *Yearbook ... 2011*, vol. I).
Special Rapporteur, which excluded the issues of immunity from the jurisdiction of the State of nationality of the official, immunity from international criminal courts and the immunity of officials and agents of the State, who, like diplomatic and consular officials, officials on special mission and others, are governed by ad hoc treaty rules. There was also consensus on limiting the topic to immunity from criminal jurisdiction, excluding the immunity of State officials from civil jurisdiction.

26. The members of the Commission were generally in favour of viewing immunity as an institution grounded in customary international law, as the previous Special Rapporteur had proposed in his preliminary report.

27. There was an interesting debate on the basis for immunity, during which some members of the Commission noted that immunity was justified by the function performed, while others focused instead on the representational nature of State officials and, ultimately, on the “personification” of the State in those officials as the justification for immunity. Some members, supporting the essentially functional nature of immunity, stressed that a stricto sensu, restrictive interpretation of it was therefore required. It must be borne in mind that the statements made by the members of the Commission who spoke on the topic did not make a sufficient distinction between the application of the two bases (functional and representative) for immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae.

28. Some members of the Commission supported the previous Special Rapporteur’s position that immunity was grounded in the sovereign equality of States and stability in international relations. However, other members drew attention to the fact that immunity also placed a limitation on the sovereignty of the forum State insofar as it prevented the exercise of the latter’s jurisdiction.

29. Lastly, some members of the Commission expressed concern at the fact that, in establishing the basis and nature of immunity, the previous Special Rapporteur had not taken sufficient account of new aspects of international law, related to the effort to combat impunity, that reflected a tendency to limit immunity and its scope.

30. There was broad support for the idea that immunity was procedural, not substantive, in nature, as the previous Special Rapporteur had maintained in his reports. However, some members of the Commission were in favour of addressing the topic of immunity from a substantive perspective as well.

31. Generally speaking, the members of the Commission endorsed the distinction between immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae, although no explicit opinions on the implications of such a distinction were expressed.

32. Concerning the persons to whom immunity would apply, there was a short debate on the use of the terms “official”, “agent” and “representative”. However, the debate on the question of which term should be used was inconclusive. In any event, some members of the Commission agreed with the previous Special Rapporteur that all State officials enjoyed immunity by virtue of their office. Other members, however, drew attention to the need to define the term “official” and to limit it to persons involved in the exercise of governmental authority or in public service.

33. Concerning the persons who enjoyed immunity ratione personae, many of the Commission’s members expressed support for the inclusion in this category of members of the so-called troika: Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs. However, some members questioned the appropriateness of extending such immunity to include Ministers for Foreign Affairs. Other members were in favour of including in this category other high-level officials (such as ministers of defence and ministers of trade) who are quite often involved in international affairs. Attention was also drawn to the possibility of establishing criteria for determining which high-level officials of States, other than the troika, might enjoy such immunity, but other members of the Commission were of the view that only the troika enjoyed immunity.

34. With respect to the scope of immunity and the identification of any exceptions to it, some members of the Commission considered that immunity was absolute; they shared the Special Rapporteur’s view that none of the customary justifications could justify any kind of exception to immunity. Other members, however, thought that it was necessary to take into account certain circumstances under which immunity would not apply, such as accusations arising from non-official acts, competing jus cogens norms in respect of international crimes, or the commission of international crimes that are condemned by the international community as a whole. Still other members of the Commission said that competing jus cogens norms and the existence of international crimes were irrelevant for purposes of immunity. In that context, some members recalled that the definition of the scope of immunity must make provision for international crimes for two reasons: the Commission’s prior work in connection with the draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind,20 and the fact that there was no immunity from prosecution by the international criminal courts.

35. The members of the Commission also expressed their views concerning the concept of an “official act” from the point of view of its scope and of its relationship to the international responsibility of States. Some members considered that any act that had been, or appeared to have been, carried out by an “official” must be defined as an official act for which immunity was enjoyed. However, other members supported a restrictive definition of an “official act”, excluding conduct that might, for example, constitute an international crime. Some members were in favour of treating the concept of an “official act” differently depending on whether the act was attributed to the State in the context of responsibility or to individuals in the context of criminal responsibility and immunity.

36. There was less discussion of the procedural issues covered in the third report of the previous Special Rapporteur. Most of the Commission’s members endorsed the general approach taken by the Special Rapporteur in this area (invocation of immunity, timing

and form of invocation of immunity, waiver of immunity, etc.), although some members expressed reservations, arguing that agreement on the substantive issues raised in the second report of the Special Rapporteur must be reached before the procedural aspects of immunity were addressed.

37. Lastly, with respect to the approach to be taken by the Commission in its work on the topic, its members expressed various opinions during the debate as to whether the topic should be addressed solely in terms of *lex lata*, or whether an analysis of *lex ferenda* should also be included. There were also differences of opinion as to whether the topic should be viewed as an exercise in codification or whether the element of progressive development should be included. Some members of the Commission, arguing for a cautious approach, were in favour of beginning with a study of *lex lata* owing to the highly sensitive nature of the topic. Other members stressed that in any event, the Commission’s approach to the topic must be balanced in order to weigh the principle of immunity against the need to combat impunity.

C. The debate in the Sixth Committee

38. The Sixth Committee dealt substantively with the topic of the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction in 2008 and 2011. Statements by delegations also offer points of interest that clarify States’ views concerning the reports of the previous Special Rapporteur, and immunity in general.

39. States did not comment specifically on the scope of the topic proposed by the previous Special Rapporteur, although some delegations said that it would be useful to take into account certain matters related to the principle of universal jurisdiction or to the establishment of international courts. Others suggested that the question of the inviolability of State officials, which was closely linked to immunity, should also be included.

40. One delegation expressly stated that the legal basis of immunity was customary international law.

41. A number of delegations supported a functional rationale for immunity, while another group of delegations considered that its rationale was both functional and representative. Some delegations stated that sovereignty was the basis for immunity and one delegation maintained that the ultimate purpose of immunity was to preserve the dignity of the State. Some delegations also spoke of the need to preserve stability in relations between States and to protect States’ ability to perform their functions, noting that those interests must be carefully balanced with the prevention of immunity.

42. There was support for the essentially procedural nature of immunity. Some delegations noted that immunity did not relieve officials of the general responsibility to respect the laws of the foreign State or absolve them from accountability for their acts before foreign courts.

43. There was also support for distinguishing between immunity *ratione personae* and immunity *ratione materiae* in establishing the scope of the immunity of State officials. Generally speaking, there was no opposition to maintaining this distinction.

44. There was no consensus in the Sixth Committee on the question of which persons enjoyed immunity. There was general agreement as to the immunity *ratione personae* of the troika, but one delegation also asked the Commission to consider whether this type of immunity also applied to other individuals owing to the high-level offices that they occupied. In that connection, one delegation stated that immunity *ratione personae* should apply only to persons who held representative posts. Opinions on the question of whether general immunity applied to all State officials varied widely and the Commission was requested to define the term “official”.

45. There were diverging views concerning the scope of immunity. While some argued that immunity was absolute in every case and that no exceptions could be found in customary law, others maintained that immunity was a general rule to which there could be exceptions. In that connection, some were in favour of using serious international crimes as a criterion for identifying exceptions to immunity, including immunity *ratione personae*, and the Commission was asked to examine this issue from a *lex ferenda* perspective. Similarly, peremptory norms were mentioned as potential grounds for exception, as were crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of international courts and offences that are criminalized under domestic law pursuant to the Rome Statute. On the other hand, one delegation said that exceptions to immunity could undermine international relations, give rise to politically motivated indictments and even raise due process concerns. In any event, some delegations warned that caution was necessary in addressing the issue of exceptions to immunity.

46. Some delegations also said that the Commission must establish an explicit definition of an “official act” that distinguished clearly between an “act of an official” and an “act falling within official functions”.

47. The issue of the relationship between immunity and the responsibility of the State was also raised. One delegation noted that in order to address this link properly, the concept of “control” in the context of immunity *ratione materiae* would have to be clarified.

48. Lastly, with respect to the approach to the topic that the Commission should take, a wide range of views concerning the role to be played by a study *de lege lata* or *de lege ferenda* was expressed in the Committee. Some delegations recommended a step-by-step approach.


whereby the Commission would address the topic first de lege lata and then de lege ferenda. Others said that the Commission should take new approaches, since international law was evolving and the resulting changes, particularly in connection with international crimes, must be taken into account. In that regard, the Commission was requested to promote greater consistency in international law and to strike a balance between the need to preserve stability in international relations and the need to avoid impunity for serious crimes of international law.

CHAPTER II

The topic “Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction” during the present quinquennium: issues to be considered

49. The topic of the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction remains of great interest to States and to the international community as a whole, since practice, while consistent, has been controversial. States have been debating this type of immunity in both political and legal forums for several decades, and academic and scientific institutions and think tanks in various parts of the world—including, in particular, the Institute of International Law—have made important contributions to this debate and continue to do so. The debate has also been enriched by the inclusion of several categories that are essential elements of contemporary international law, such as the definition of the international criminal responsibility of individuals, the establishment of the international criminal courts and, generally speaking, the development of appropriate mechanisms for combating impunity for the most serious international crimes. Lastly, it must not be forgotten that the International Court of Justice has made an important contribution to the debate through various cases that are quite well known and have been studied by the previous Special Rapporteur, including the Court’s recent judgment of 3 February 2012 in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State.25 This judgment deserves special consideration because some of its methodological elements are of interest in the context of the immunity of States, whose potential implications for the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction the Commission should consider.

50. Furthermore, as is clear from the overview contained in chapter I of the present report, the topic of the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction is not without controversy. On the contrary, the views expressed by the previous Special Rapporteur in his three reports have given rise to an extensive and interesting debate in which different and, in many cases, opposing positions on some of the basic concepts and categories proposed in these reports can be identified.

51. Within that framework, the Commission must continue its work on this topic and must do so in a systematic, structured manner in order to ensure that the topic is addressed effectively and efficiently. This requires an additional attempt at clarification, both methodological and conceptual, with two objectives: first, to eliminate as many as possible of the “grey areas” that could cause confusion on a topic in need of rapid, adequate clarification; and second, to draw up a road map that will make it possible to comply, as reliably as possible, with the General Assembly’s request that the Commission give priority to the topic.

52. At the current stage of the work, this attempt at conceptual and methodological clarification must take the form of identification of the principal points of contention that currently exist and of those that will have an impact on the future work of the Special Rapporteur and the Commission.

53. Therefore, the following pages will address, in turn, the following issues: the distinction and the relationship between immunity ratione materiae and immunity ratione personae and the basis for both categories in order to determine whether each of them should be the subject of a separate legal regime (sect. A); the distinction and the relationship between the international responsibility of the State and the international responsibility of individuals and their implications for immunity (sect. B); immunity ratione personae (sect. C); immunity ratione materiae (sect. D); and, lastly, mention of the procedural issues related to immunity (sect. E).

A. Immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae

54. In his preliminary report, the previous Special Rapporteur addressed the distinction between immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae. In so doing, he echoed a classic distinction that is reflected in both practice and doctrine. This distinction between the two types of immunity has also been reflected in the Commission’s debates and in those of the Sixth Committee. It is unquestionably a distinction that exists in practice, and its continued existence appears to constitute one of the rare points of consensus that have emerged to date.

55. However, there appears to be consensus only on the existence of this distinction; it has been impossible to develop a uniform or essentially uniform position on two questions that are essential in mapping the Commission’s future work in this area: (a) whether the conceptual distinction between immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae requires, or should require, two separate legal regimes; and (b) whether, despite this conceptual distinction, there are basic elements that imply the existence of a certain unity regarding the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction.
56. Concerning the first of these questions, a distinction between immunity *ratione personae* and immunity *ratione materiae* may be considered the most appropriate methodological approach to the topic, since it makes it possible to give separate treatment to the intrinsic, specific circumstances in which each of these types of immunity functions. It will also help to avoid confusion and grey areas, which, in practice, are nevertheless emerging more frequently than might be wished, including in the areas of jurisprudence and doctrine. Lastly, it will make it possible to give separate treatment to the legal regimes to be applied in each case. The Commission may wish to follow this methodological proposal to make a clear distinction between the two types of immunity and, at the same time, to establish a separate legal regime for each of them. This methodological approach is made all the more necessary by the fact that the previous studies do not facilitate such a clear distinction.

57. With respect to the second question, it must be stressed that the distinction between the two types of immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction (*ratione personae* and *ratione materiae*) must be made without prejudice to one point on which there is no disagreement whatever: that the two types of immunity have the same purpose, namely, to preserve principles, values and interests of the international community as a whole; they are not granted to the beneficiary in abstract terms, independently from his or her relationship to the State or performance of representative or other functions thereof; and they are granted with a view to the continued performance of such functions and to stability in international relations. Therefore, regardless of the other specific functions of each of these types of immunity, the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, taken as a whole, has a clearly functional nature linked to preserving the principles and values of the international community, a functional nature of general scope that cannot be reduced solely to immunity from jurisdiction *ratione materiae*, even though the term “functional immunity” tends to be used only for this type of immunity.

58. This functional nature of immunity, understood broadly, is the cornerstone of immunity and, in the Special Rapporteur’s view, must therefore be a key element of the Commission’s work on the topic. Only by taking this aspect into consideration will it be possible to understand, and to help lay a firm foundation for, a system of immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction that can be incorporated seamlessly into contemporary international law, thereby ensuring that such immunity does not conflict unnecessarily with other principles and values of the international community that are also in the process of incorporation into international law. This will make it possible to take a balanced approach to the institution of immunity that is the subject of the present report, thereby facilitating the establishment of one or more legal regimes that will provide security in practice and in international relations.

B. The international responsibility of the State and the international responsibility of individuals: implications for immunity

59. A second issue that has been a subject of debate in previous sessions is the relationship between the international responsibility of the State and the international responsibility of individuals and its potential implications for the immunity of State officials from foreign jurisdiction. The debate arose, essentially, in defining the concept of an “official act” and its attribution to the State. Consequently, this is a debate that has taken place particularly with reference to immunity *ratione materiae* but that also concerns immunity *ratione personae* to the extent that the latter also covers immunity with respect to official acts.

60. It is essential to clarify this relationship in order to determine the methodological approach to immunity; moreover, it will have major consequences for the legal regime or for regimes applicable to the two types of immunity. As a result, the Commission may wish to address this issue in the early stages of its work during the present quinquennium. The norms and principles of international law that are particularly applicable to immunity and to State responsibility, as well as the other norms and principles of contemporary international law that are applicable to the international criminal responsibility of individuals and that constitute a set of norms, principles and values of the international community in the effort to combat impunity, should therefore be taken into account.

C. Immunity *ratione personae*

61. As mentioned above, the concept of immunity *ratione personae* is not a point of contention, since it is generally agreed that it refers to the immunity enjoyed by certain persons, who are identified individually owing to their specific State office, with respect both to their private acts and to official acts arising from the office that they hold. This office, as well as the functions inherent in it, would explain the recognition of immunity before the criminal courts of a foreign State. However, while the concept of immunity *ratione personae* is not, in itself, controversial, the definition of its characteristics is a matter for discussion on which it has not, as yet, been possible to reach consensus. This is reflected in the reports of the previous Special Rapporteur and, in particular, in the debate in the Commission and in the General Assembly.

62. Thus, all that can be concluded is that there is agreement on three basic points: immunity *ratione personae* is associated with the holding of extremely high State office (although there is insufficient consensus on which holders of such office are included); it covers all acts performed by the beneficiary (both private and official); and it is temporary in nature, since immunity *ratione personae* ends at the moment when the person ceases to hold the office that conferred immunity. However, there are still points of contention, particularly with regard to two key issues: the list of persons who could enjoy immunity *ratione personae*, and the question of whether immunity is absolute or restricted. These two issues should therefore be the focus of the Commission’s future work on the topic.

63. Concerning the first issue, State practice, doctrine and jurisprudence appear to point to an emerging consensus on the troika (the Head of State, the Head of Government and the Minister for Foreign Affairs), each of which invariably enjoys immunity. Some have argued that
other persons and/or offices may also enjoy immunity, but it has not been possible to reach any kind of consensus on those persons and/or offices. The Commission may therefore find it useful to study both practice and the applicable principles of international law in order to answer three separate but complementary questions: Is it possible that immunity from foreign criminal jurisdiction could cover persons other than the members of the troika? If so, which persons/offices other than the troika should enjoy immunity or, at the least, what criteria could be used to identify them? And lastly, should the list of those who enjoy immunity be closed or open?

64. With respect to the absolute or restricted nature of immunity ratione personae, two opposing positions have been expressed to date. For some, there are no exceptions to this type of immunity, which is therefore opposable to any act carried out by the persons enjoying immunity. For others, on the contrary, certain acts performed by a Head of State, Head of Government, Minister for Foreign Affairs or, where appropriate, any other person who might potentially enjoy immunity would not be covered if the act was contrary to jus cogens norms or could be characterized as an international crime. The Commission may find it useful to address this issue, taking the following elements, among others, into account: the very specific position of those who enjoy immunity in the State system and in the entire system of international relations; the interests, values and principles of international law that are at stake; the functional nature of all immunity and the particular nature of this type of immunity; and, lastly, whether a potential principle of restrictive interpretation is applicable to the institution of immunity.

D. Immunity ratione materiae

65. The concept of immunity ratione materiae is also not, in the abstract, a point of contention. In the Commission’s previous work and in practice, jurisprudence and doctrine, this term refers to the immunity enjoyed by certain persons who act as official or agents of the State and whose official acts are performed in that capacity. However, some of the integral aspects of this concept have been the subject of various and opposing interpretations that are an obstacle to potential consensus on the definition of immunity ratione materiae. At the same time, the debates in the Commission and in the Sixth Committee have raised other points of contention that must be addressed if a legal regime applicable to this type of immunity is to be established. The aforementioned contention concerns, primarily, the following issues: (a) the definition of the subjective scope of immunity ratione personae, which the previous Special Rapporteur linked to the general concept of the “official”; (b) the definition of an “official act” and its relationship to State responsibility; and (c) the absolute or restricted nature of immunity.

66. With regard to the first of these issues, it must be stressed that the terminology employed by the previous Special Rapporteur in referring to the persons who enjoy immunity has introduced an element of ambiguity that must be resolved. For example, the term “official” (“funcionario” in Spanish and “représentant de l’État” in French) does not necessarily refer to a single general category of persons in the service of the State, since national legal regimes vary widely. The Commission may therefore reconsider the possibility of using a term that better reflects the subjective reality that is the basis for immunity ratione materiae.

67. On the second point, the definition of an “official act” has also been hotly debated with regard to both the concept itself and its implications for immunity. In particular, the Commission may find it useful to distinguish between official acts and unlawful acts; between official acts and the attribution of an act to the State; and between the responsibility of the State and the criminal responsibility of individuals, both of which may arise from the same official act. In defining the term “official act”, practice, the applicable principles of international law and the current values of the international community must be taken into account. Lastly, the question of whether restrictive interpretation criteria apply to this type of immunity must also be considered.

68. Lastly, there is insufficient consensus on the question of whether there are exceptions to this type of immunity, particularly in cases involving the violation of jus cogens norms or the commission of international crimes. The same question arises as in the aforementioned case of immunity ratione personae; however, it should be noted that there appears to have been greater support for a potential exception in the case of immunity ratione materiae than in that of immunity ratione personae. In any event, the Commission should examine this issue on the basis of the same parameters that have been mentioned above in relation to immunity ratione personae, also taking into account the question of whether the differences between these two types of immunity come into play.

E. Procedural aspects of immunity

69. By its very nature, the effective exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction over State officials occurs in the context of judicial proceedings. The question of its applicability during a prior and, to some extent, essentially preparatory phase of those proceedings may also be raised. Therefore, the procedural aspects of immunity are an essential and unavoidable element of work on the topic. The previous Special Rapporteur devoted his third report to these issues. While that report was not discussed extensively by the Commission, issues relating to the form of invocation of immunity, the timing of its invocation and the potential waiver of immunity, among others, were considered less controversial than the substantive issues addressed in the present report.

70. The Special Rapporteur therefore considers that this last set of questions should ultimately be the subject of specific study in order to determine whether, among other options, it would be possible to establish a single procedural regime that would include both immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae, or whether the specific characteristics of these two categories will require the establishment of different procedural rules for each of them. This does not mean, however, that certain procedural aspects should be ignored in addressing the substantive issues mentioned above, since the essentially procedural nature of immunity makes this necessary.
Chapter III

Workplan

71. The Commission’s future work cannot and should not ignore its previous work. However, owing to the methodological considerations set out above, the Special Rapporteur is of the view that a new workplan for the next quinquennium should be established.

72. This workplan should focus on the points of contention mentioned above and should address them in a systematic, ordered and structured manner. To that end, the Special Rapporteur considers it useful to divide these issues into four groups:

1. General issues of a methodological and conceptual nature
   1.1 The distinction between immunity *ratione materiae* and immunity *ratione personae* and the implications of that distinction
   1.2 Immunity in the system of values and principles of contemporary international law
   1.3 The relationship between immunity, on the one hand, and the responsibility of States and the criminal responsibility of individuals, on the other
2. Immunity *ratione personae*
   2.1 The persons who enjoy immunity
   2.2 The material scope of immunity: private acts and official acts
   2.3 The absolute or restricted nature of immunity and, in particular, the role that international crimes play or should play
3. Immunity *ratione materiae*
   3.1 The persons who enjoy immunity: the remaining terminological controversy and the definition of an “official”
   3.2 The definition of an “official act” and its relationship to the responsibility of the State
   3.3 The absolute or restricted nature of immunity: exceptions and international crimes
4. Procedural aspects of immunity

73. The Special Rapporteur has already held one set of informal consultations with the members of the Commission, on 30 May 2012. The following list of questions was submitted to the members for consideration during those consultations and should be read jointly with the sets of questions set out above, since they refer to and elaborate on some of them:

Some methodological and general conceptual issues

– Could immunity serve as an instrument that protects and guarantees some principles and values of the international community?
– Should those principles and values be balanced with other principles and values of the international community?
– What is the place of the functional approach to immunity?
– Is it useful to approach the topic by retaining the distinction between immunity *ratione personae* and immunity *ratione materiae*?
– What should be the consequences of such an approach? Two different legal regimes?
– Should the link between State responsibility and individual responsibility be present in the approach of the topic? If yes, what should this link be?
– Is the substance/procedure distinction useful in addressing the topic?

Immunity *ratione personae*

– Persons entitled to immunity: a narrow or a broad approach? Closed list or open list?
– Scope of immunity: an equal or a different treatment of private acts and official acts?
– Could there be a place for international crimes in the approach to immunity *ratione personae*?

Immunity *ratione materiae*

– A terminological issue: are the words “official”, “représentant de l’État” and “funcionario” the most accurate with regard to the description of persons entitled to immunity?
– The concept of “official act”: a narrow or a broad approach? How is it linked to State responsibility?
– Could there be a place for exceptions, in general terms, with regard to immunity *ratione materiae*? If yes, which exceptions?
– Could there be a place for international crimes in the approach to immunity *ratione materiae*?

74. For each of these questions, and for others that will need to be addressed in connection with them, the Special Rapporteur proposes to prepare draft articles that will be submitted progressively to the Commission. It would be premature to make any proposal concerning the final form that the outcome of this work should take, although the normative aspect of the topic cannot be ignored.
75. Concerning the method of work that the Special Rapporteur proposes to follow in addressing the remaining issues, the Commission’s attention is drawn to the fact that a step-by-step approach, addressing each of the various groups of remaining questions in turn, is considered the most appropriate. The Special Rapporteur is convinced that this method—which makes it possible to isolate the issues in need of consideration—will make it easier to structure a debate that has the disadvantage of focusing on issues that are numerous and, moreover, sensitive and extremely complex. Such an approach is likely to lead to concrete results more quickly.

76. The Special Rapporteur also considers it essential to continue to make a detailed study of practice in the broad sense of the word. To that end, she will continue to use the memorandum prepared by the Secretariat in 2008\(^\text{26}\) while including subsequent practice that was not covered by the previous Special Rapporteur in his three reports.

77. Lastly, as to whether to approach the topic from the perspective of *lex lata* or *lex ferenda*, the Special Rapporteur would like to state that, in her opinion, the topic of the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction cannot be addressed through only one of these approaches. She believes that, on the contrary, both aspects must be taken into account in the Commission’s future work, although she fully realizes the usefulness of beginning with *lex lata* considerations and including an analysis *de lege ferenda* of some topics, as needed, at a later date. This approach will make it possible to address the topic in a balanced manner, and it is fully consistent with the Commission’s mandate to pursue simultaneously the codification and progressive development of international law.

Introduction

A. Inclusion of the topic in the programme of work of the Commission

1. A proposal for a new topic entitled “Formation and evidence of customary international law” was discussed in the Working Group on the long-term programme of work during the sixty-second and sixty-third sessions of the International Law Commission, in 2010 and 2011 respectively.1 The present note should be read together with the syllabus attached as annex I to the Commission’s 2011 report, which contains an extensive list of background materials. Annex I began by noting that “Questions relating to sources lie at the heart of international law. The Commission’s work in this field has been among its most important and successful, but has been largely confined to the law of treaties”2.

2. At its sixty-third session, the Commission decided to include the topic “Formation and evidence of customary international law” in its long-term programme of work, on the basis of the syllabus at annex I.3

3. Support was expressed for the topic in the Sixth Committee during the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly in 2011. It was suggested that the outcome should result in a practical guide, with commentaries, for judges, government lawyers and practitioners. While the point was made that the aim should not be to codify the topic itself, it was also observed that it would be difficult to systematize the formative process without undermining

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1 See Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), p. 19, para. 32 and p. 175, para. 365. The Working Group was reconstituted by the Planning Group of the Commission each year during the previous quinquennium, and was chaired by Mr. Enrique Candioti.

2 Ibid., annex I, p. 183, para. 1.

3 Ibid., p. 175, para. 365.
the very essence of custom, its flexibility and constant evolution. Concerning the methodology, the importance of making a differentiation between State practice and jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals on the one hand, and the practice and jurisprudence of domestic courts on the other, was stressed. The Commission was also urged to proceed with caution in considering the role of unilateral acts in identifying customary international law.\(^4\)

4. By paragraph 7 of its resolution 66/98 of 9 December 2011, the General Assembly took note of the decision of the Commission to include the topic “Formation and evidence of customary international law” in its long-term programme of work, and also of the respective comments made by Member States in the Sixth Committee.

5. At its sixty-fourth session, in 2012, the Commission decided to place the topic “Formation and evidence of customary international law” on its current programme of work and appointed Sir Michael Wood as Special Rapporteur for the topic.\(^5\)

6. The present note sets out the Special Rapporteur’s initial thoughts, particularly on the scope of the topic. It also outlines a tentative programme of work for the consideration of the topic, and if possible its conclusion, during the present quinquennium (2012–2016).

7. Chapter I of the note lists a number of preliminary points that will need to be covered. In chapter II, the Special Rapporteur discusses the scope of the topic and possible outcomes of the Commission’s work on the topic. A tentative programme of work is set out in chapter III.

B. Aim of the present note

8. The discussions that took place within the Working Group on the long-term programme of work during the previous quinquennium were of great assistance in formulating the previously mentioned syllabus for the topic.\(^6\) The syllabus sought to reflect many of the views expressed in the Working Group. But, for obvious reasons, many of the present members of the Commission did not take part in those discussions.

9. This note has been prepared in order to stimulate an initial debate and exchange of views on the topic during the second part of the Commission’s sixty-fourth session, in 2012. Rather than attempt to get into details, it is more in the nature of a series of headline points, aimed at giving a broad overview of the topic and offering a focus (or a target) for the Commission’s discussions in the second part of the 2012 session.

10. The Special Rapporteur’s principal aim during the second part of the 2012 session is to seek initial views of members of the Commission on the scope of the topic, the methodology to be employed and possible outcomes. The Special Rapporteur would benefit greatly from hearing the initial views of the members of the Commission on the topic in general, in the light of the preliminary thoughts in the following sections of this note. Those views will assist in the drafting of the first (preliminary) report in good time for the Commission’s sixty-fifth session in 2013.

Chapter I

Preliminary points

11. The following points could be covered in a first preliminary report, in 2013.

A. Previous work of the Commission related to the topic

12. Much of the Commission’s work has been concerned with the identification of customary international law, although it has often been cautious about distinguishing between the codification of international law and its progressive development. It dealt directly with the formation of customary international law, for example, in connection with what became article 38 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.\(^7\) And in its first years, the Commission had on its agenda the topic “Ways and means of making the evidence of customary international law more readily available”.\(^8\)

13. The work of the International Law Association, between 1984/85 and 2000, culminated in the adoption in 2000 of the London Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law (with commentary).\(^9\) The Association’s work, which consists of 33 principles and associated commentary, resulted in both supporting and critical reactions, which can be reviewed as well.

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\(^4\) Topical summary of the discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during its sixty-sixth session, prepared by the Secretariat (A/CN.4/650), para. 65.

\(^5\) Yearbook ... 2012, vol. I, 3132nd meeting.

\(^6\) Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part 2), annex I.


\(^8\) At its first and second sessions, in 1949 and 1950, the Commission, in accordance with the mandate in article 24 of its statute, considered the topic “Ways and means of making the evidence of customary international law more readily available”. The outcome of the report of the working session of the Committee on Formation of (General) Customary International Law, held in 2000, is at pp. 778–790. The Committee’s six interim reports contain more detailed material.
C. Customary international law as a source of public international law and its relationship to other sources

14. By way of background, it may be interesting to look at the travaux préparatoires of Article 38, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is often regarded as “badly drafted”. The relationship between customary international law and treaties is an important aspect of the topic, to be discussed in detail in a later report. Also to be covered is the relationship of “customary international law” to “general international law”, “general principles of law” and “general principles of international law”. (The term “general international law” is often found nowadays, but it seems to have a somewhat different connotation from “customary international law”.) It is important to distinguish between rules of customary international law and comity/mere usage, between customary law and “soft law”, and between lex lata and lex ferenda.

D. Terminology/definitions

15. To set the scene, there should be some discussion of the use and meaning of the term “customary international law” or “rules of customary international law”, which seem to be the expressions in most common use (others are “international customary law”, “custom” and “international custom”). The establishment of a short lexicon of relevant terms, in the six official languages of the United Nations, could be useful.

E. Importance and role of customary international law within the international legal system

16. It could be useful to discuss briefly customary international law “as law”, and the challenges that have occasionally been addressed to its role within the international legal system.

F. Theories of custom and approaches to the identification of rules of customary international law

17. A brief description of the principal theories of custom, as they emerge from writings on the subject, may assist in informing the approach to be adopted eventually by the Commission. The theoretical underpinnings of the subject are important (for example, as to the relative roles of practice and opinio juris), even though the ultimate aim will be to provide a practical aid to those called upon to investigate rules of customary international law.

G. Methodology

18. In the preliminary view of the Special Rapporteur, the most reliable guidance on the topic is likely to be found in the case law of international courts and tribunals, particularly the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of International Justice. The preliminary report could include a descriptive survey of the approach to customary international law by international judicial bodies, chiefly in the case law of the International Court of Justice. Guidance may also be found in the case law of national courts, codification efforts by non-governmental organizations and the writings of publicists.

19. It will be necessary to address general questions of methodology, such as the relative weight to be accorded to empirical research into State practice, as against deductive reasoning. The difficulties and options are well set out in the introduction to the final report of the Committee of the International Law Association. It is also the case that practical considerations may affect methodology, especially in a world of nearly 200 States, but this is not really a new problem. The practice of other international persons, in particular international organizations, may also be important.

CHAPTER II

Scope of the topic and possible outcomes of the Commission’s work

20. On a practical level, it is important to define the scope of the topic, and to consider possible outcomes, at an early stage. The purpose of this chapter of the note is to assist the Commission to do that. In the first paragraph of annex I to the Commission’s 2011 report, it is stated that the title of the topic “would not preclude the Commission from entering upon related aspects if this proved desirable, but the focus would be on formation (the process by which rules of customary international law develop) and evidence (the identification of such rules)”. The Special Rapporteur considers that this statement accurately describes the scope of the topic.

21. To avoid unnecessary overlap, the scope of the topic needs to be clearly delimited in relation to other topics that have been on the Commission’s agenda, past and present. These include “Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law” and “Treaties over time”. This should not be difficult in practice.

10 Ibid., final report of the Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, p. 716, para. 6.


16 For the outcome of the Commission’s work on that topic, see Yearbook ... 2008 to 2011, see Yearbook ... 2011, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 168–171, paras. 333–344.
the dividing lines are likely to be reasonably clear. For example, while the effect of treaties on the formation of customary international law is part of the present topic, the role of customary international law in the interpretation of treaties is not.

22. The topic will cover the whole of customary international law. It is the view of the Special Rapporteur that, given the unity of international law and the fact that “international law is a legal system”, it is neither helpful nor in accordance with principle, for the purposes of the present topic, to break the law up into separate specialist fields. The same basic approach to the formation and identification of customary international law applies regardless of the field of law under consideration. The Commission’s work on this topic will be equally relevant to all fields of international law, including, for example, “customary human rights law”, “customary international humanitarian law” and “customary international criminal law”. It is, however, for consideration whether, and if so to what degree, different techniques might be appropriate for the identification of particular rules of customary international law.

23. A particular question to consider is whether the topic should include the emergence of new peremptory norms of general international law (“jus cogens”). The Special Rapporteur’s present view is that this is a separate matter, which should not be dealt with as part of the present topic. For example, peremptory norms may be found in treaties just as much as in customary international law.

24. It should not be expected that the outcome will be a series of hard-and-fast rules for the determination of rules of customary international law. Instead, the aim is to elucidate the process of the formation and determination of rules of customary international law through guidance and practice. A starting point for discussion of the overall aim of the Commission’s consideration of the topic can be found in annex I:

The aim is not to seek to codify “rules” for the formation of customary international law. Instead, the aim is to produce authoritative guidance for those called upon to identify customary international law, including national and international judges. It will be important not to be overly prescriptive. Flexibility remains an essential feature of the formation of customary international law. In view of this, the Commission’s final output in this field could take one of a number of forms. One possibility would be a series of propositions, with commentaries.

25. The Special Rapporteur suggests that the appropriate outcome for the Commission’s work on the present topic should be a set of “conclusions” with commentaries.

Chapter III

Tentative schedule for the development of the topic

26. In its 2011 report to the General Assembly, the Commission set out, in a pithy fashion, what is expected of Special Rapporteurs. Among other things, they are expected to prepare each year a substantive report, preferably limited to no more than 50 pages. In connection with the work of the Planning Group, the Commission said that the Group should cooperate with Special Rapporteurs and coordinators of Study Groups to define, at the beginning of any new topic, a tentative schedule for the development of the topic over a number of years as may be required, and periodically review the attainment of annual targets in such schedule, updating it when appropriate.

27. In the same report, it was suggested that, for convenience, the topic should be considered in four stages: underlying issues and collection of materials; some central questions concerning the identification of State practice and opinio juris; particular topics; and conclusions.

The following tentative schedule is therefore proposed for the development of the topic “Formation and evidence of customary international law”:

2012: Preliminary note and initial discussion within the Commission. The main aim is to enable the Special Rapporteur to gather initial views from members of the Commission concerning the scope, methodology and possible outcome of the work on the topic, and to consider information to be sought from States.

2013: First report of the Special Rapporteur (on some preliminary points, including those mentioned in chap. I above), and gathering further materials.
2014: Second report of the Special Rapporteur (discussing State practice and *opinio juris*). It is suggested that the second stage could cover some central questions of the traditional approach to the identification of rules of customary international law, in particular State practice and *opinio juris*:


"(ii) Nature, function and identification of *opinio juris sive necessitatis*."

"(iii) Relationship between the two elements: State practice and *opinio juris sive necessitatis*, and their respective roles in the identification of customary international law."

"(iv) How new rules of customary international law emerge; how unilateral measures by States may lead to the development of new rules; criteria for assessing whether deviations from a customary rule have given rise to a change in customary law; potential role of silence/acquiescence."

"(v) The role of ‘specially affected States’."

"(vi) The time element, and the density of practice; ‘instant’ customary international law."

2015: Third report of the Special Rapporteur (on certain particular topics). This report too would contain further “conclusions”.

2016: Fourth report of the Special Rapporteur: consolidated and reworked full set of “conclusions”, for discussion and adoption by the Commission.

"(vii) Whether the criteria for the identification of a rule of customary law may vary depending on the nature of the rule or the field to which it belongs“ (*ibid.*, para. 8).

It is suggested that a third stage could cover particular topics such as:

"(i) The ‘persistent objector’ theory.

“(ii) Treaties and the formation of customary international law; treaties as possible evidence of customary international law; the ‘mutual influence’/interdependence between treaties and customary international law.

“(iii) Resolutions of organs of international organizations, including the General Assembly of the United Nations, and international conferences, and the formation of customary international law; their significance as possible evidence of customary international law.

“(iv) Formation and identification of rules of special customary international law between certain States (regional, subregional, local or bilateral—‘individualized’ rules of customary international law). Does consent play a special role in the formation of special rules of customary international law?” (*ibid.*, para. 9).
CASUAL VACANCIES IN THE COMMISSION

[Agenda item 13]

DOCUMENT A/CN.4/655

Note by the Secretariat

[Original: English]

[23 July 2012]

1. Following the resignation of Mr. Stephen C. Vasciannie as a member of the Commission on 22 July 2012, a seat on the International Law Commission became vacant.

2. In this case, article 11 of the statute of the Commission is applicable. It prescribes that:

   In the case of a vacancy, the Commission shall fill the vacancy, having due regard for the provisions contained in articles 2 and 8 of the statute.

Article 2 reads:

1. The Commission shall consist of thirty-four members who shall be persons of recognized competence in international law.

2. No two members of the Commission shall be nationals of the same State.

3. In case of dual nationality a candidate shall be deemed to be a national of the State in which he ordinarily exercises civil and political rights.

Article 8 reads:

At the election the electors shall bear in mind that the persons to be elected to the Commission should individually possess the qualifications required and that in the Commission as a whole representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal systems of the world should be assured.

3. The term of the member to be elected by the Commission will expire at the end of 2016.
**CHECKLIST OF DOCUMENTS OF THE SIXTY-FOURTH SESSION**

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