VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 37TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas)

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DISARMAMENT ITEMS

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 AND 121 (continued)

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Mr. Petrovsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
Mr. de La Gorce (France)
Mr. Naik (Pakistan)
Mr. Adeniji (Nigeria)
Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico)
Mr. Ortiz de Rozas (Argentina)
The meeting was called to order at 10.40 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 AND 121 (continued)

Mr. EILAN (Israel): Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12, having circulated in this Committee for some time, and having undergone a bit of cosmetic surgery, was finally submitted on 8 November. It underwent an additional and meaningless alteration in the form of Revision 1, which has done little to lessen the harm which might be inflicted on the Centre for Disarmament by the demands made on it in operative paragraph 6 of the unrevised text of A/C.1/34/L.12.

The United Nations, various departments of its Secretariat and the specialized agencies have had their efficiency greatly impaired in the last decade by the process of politicization. Instead of pursuing the tasks for which they were created, many United Nations bodies are now forced to waste their time and budgets in complying with the demands made on them by anti-Israel resolutions of the General Assembly adopted by the automatic voting majority at the disposal of the Arab States. The newly-created Centre for Disarmament, which has already proved itself an effective arm of the United Nations in disseminating objective information to the world on the dangers of the armament race, is now similarly being threatened by draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1.
Instead of being allowed to devote itself entirely to objective studies about armament and disarmament, it might be asked to perform a task which would make it serve the political and partisan ends of Arab States in their political warfare against Israel. The phrasing of operative paragraphs 6 and 7 of A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1 in asking the Secretary-General "to prepare a study on the Israel nuclear armament," in essence makes impartial research impossible by prejudicing the issue on the assumption that such nuclear armament in fact exists. The rest — if one may say so — of the scenario is clearly discernable.

If draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1 is adopted, the Arab propaganda machine, fed by petrodollars, will see to it that suitable articles appear in various publications all over the world, giving new "facts" about "Israel's nuclear armament." These articles will have to be collected, analysed and quoted by the Secretariat of the United Nations and reported to the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly. This report will then be quoted as so-called authoritative proof of Arab allegations against Israel. The pattern is both transparent and familiar.

The postponement of the submission of the findings by one year in draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1 does little, as I said, to lessen the intrinsic harm that might be inflicted by the original version of the draft resolution to the credibility and standing of the Centre for Disarmament as an impartial body of objective research.

I should like to discuss draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1 in its entirety.

I had occasion in my intervention on 5 November to describe in detail the political circumstances, in terms of inter-Arab rivalry, which prompted Iraq to submit the substance of agenda item 121, first to the special session, and later as a draft resolution to the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly. Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1, though dressed in sheep's clothing, is a continuation of that same Iraqi initiative which was criticized by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and adopted with evident reluctance by the thirty-third session.
At this point, it may be useful to look at the Iraqi resolution of last year, and especially at subjects that were omitted from this year's follow-up draft resolution. They are principally paragraphs that dealt with conventional weapons, and which expressed concern for a "rapid Israeli build-up" or "escalation of Israel armament" and a request to the Security Council to "refrain from any supply of arms, ammunition, military equipment or vehicles, or spare parts thereof, to Israel, without any exception".

The omission of all mention of conventional armament in A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1 was no doubt due to the realization on the part of the rulers of Baghdad that a country like Iraq, which today is acknowledged as the biggest importer of military hardware in the third world, is ill suited to point a finger at anyone in the matter of acquisition of arms. Even in Baghdad they must have realized that in a body such as this, committed to the cause of world disarmament, a repetition of Iraq's demand that Israel, and only Israel, be disarmed, will meet with opposition or lack of support of all Member States who still cast their vote on merit, and not blindly in response to bloc allegiance.

The Iraqi draft also refrains from telling the Security Council in quite such blunt language as a year ago how best to go about its business.

Nevertheless, last year's Iraqi resolution, though discreetly tucked away in the preamble of A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1, is still recalled and still remains a mainstay of this year's Iraqi initiative. As the permanent representative of Israel had occasion to state in this Committee last year:

"Given the automatic voting majority at the disposal of the Arab States, the presence of an accusation against Israel in a resolution of the General Assembly also ensures its almost automatic adoption, although, of course, it is in itself no proof of its veracity.

"The circle thus created is truly vicious. First, an accusation — however unfounded and however untrue — is railroaded through the General Assembly; later, the authors of the slander need only quote a United Nations resolution to substantiate, as it were, their originally false allegations". (A/C.1/33/PV.51, p. 23-25)
This year's Iraqi resolution, if passed, will no doubt be recalled in an Iraqi resolution next year, and thus the tangled web of lies will be weaved until nobody remembers any more that it all originated in a momentary need of Iraq in 1978 to display its one-upmanship against political rivals in the Arab world.

By abandoning the mention of conventional weapons and by accusing Israel of trying either to acquire or of possessing nuclear capability, Iraq has shifted into a far safer area of slander, where hearsay, rumour and speculation can be served up as irrefutable evidence. Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1 is doing just this in the first preambular paragraph. No "increasing information and evidence" whatsoever has been made public to substantiate the Iraqi allegation that Israel is "aiming at the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons". Therefore, the condemnation of Israel in operative paragraph 4 is based on an allegation which has not been proved to anyone's satisfaction, except to that of Iraq and its allies.

In my statement of 5 November, I enumerated a list of countries that have either signed and not ratified or not signed at all the Non-Proliferation Treaty: the total number of which was 49. I should like now to read out a list of non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which by 31 December 1978 had not yet complied with article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty stipulating the deadline for the entry into force of the relevant safeguard agreements to be concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and I am quoting the report of the Agency, A/34/497: Bahamas, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Malta, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, United Republic of Cameroon, Upper Volta and Venezuela.
If one reads both lists, the one I submitted the other day and the list I have just read out, operative paragraph 3 in A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1 is clearly discriminatory in singling out Israel for censure on a matter in which, in one manner or another, 87 Member-States find themselves in the same position as Israel. In fact, operative paragraph 3 is hypocritical, unless it addresses itself to the majority of Member-States of this Organization.

However, the height of hypocrisy is reached if one reads the list of co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1 - that is to say, of Member-States which, in operative paragraph 3, call upon Israel to submit all its nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency and, in operative paragraph 4, accuse Israel of trying to acquire nuclear capability. Out of the 33 co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1, 20 States have, in one way or another, not done what Israel is asked to do. Three States signed but did not ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Democratic Yemen, Yemen and Kuwait. Eleven States - 11 co-sponsors of this draft resolution - did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty at all: Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Cuba, Djibouti, Mauritania, Mozambique, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, six of the co-sponsors did not comply with the safeguard regulations: Benin, Libya, Mali, Tunisia, Somalia and Syria. If this draft resolution is adopted, the delegation of Israel will be delighted to give the widest possible publicity to it, including the list of co-sponsors and the attitude of most of them to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Finally, the submission of the Iraqi draft resolution, and especially the first preambular paragraph, is nothing but a very transparent attempt to divert the world's attention from the frantic efforts on the part of three countries, Iraq, Libya and Pakistan, to establish a new nuclear axis. If one is to express oneself in the language of the first preambular paragraph, there is indeed cause for alarm in the increasing information and evidence regarding the activities aimed at the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons by the three States I have just mentioned.
The same goes for the third preambular paragraph. If one speaks of nuclear collaboration which is to be condemned, it is that of Pakistan, Libya and Iraq. As for South Africa, my Government has repeatedly, and as recently as 2 November of this year, categorically denied the existence of nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa which, as I said in my statement of 5 November, exists only in the minds of people who wish to associate Israel with South Africa for transparent political reasons. If I wished to follow the example of the Iraqi representative, I could quote as many publications as he did - and they are of recent vintage - to present a very detailed account describing the very serious measures that are now under way to substantiate my charges regarding Pakistan, Libya and Iraq.

I shall, however, content myself with mentioning the Iraqi Ambassador to Brazil, who, according to an Associated Press dispatch of 29 September this year, openly expressed Iraq's intention to develop the atom bomb. The President of Iraq, Sadam Hussein, according to an Iraqi news agency, made a reference to nuclear weapons as recently as 25 October and added that Iraq will have to look for appropriate measures to achieve a victory over the Zionist enemy.

In other words, draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1, the Iraqi statements in this Committee, the words of the Iraqi Ambassador to Brazil and the speech of the President of Iraq are nothing else but attempts to justify and pave the way for the acquisition by Iraq of nuclear capability. This is the real purpose of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1, now before this Committee.

Mr. VELISSARPOULOS (Greece) (interpretation from French): Very briefly, I should like to express the views of my delegation on the draft resolution contained in document A/34/29 concerning the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. My country is a member of the Ad Hoc Committee and very soon we will be called upon to approve the draft resolution submitted to us.
(Mr. Velissaropoulos, Greece)

In the light of the difficulties of the problem, it might be said that the results of the work of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, as well as those of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, have been generally satisfactory, and I believe that they give just cause for gratification. We should like, nevertheless, to recall some of the comments we made in the Ad Hoc Committee at the July meeting, because in our view it is essential that our actions be directed towards achieving tangible results without becoming involved in a situation where good intentions are swallowed up in the quicksand of obstacles which, since they are foreseeable, are avoidable if we follow the right method.
In fact, one of the main concerns of my delegation - and, I note, of a number of other delegations - arises from the doubts about the effectiveness of the Ad Hoc Committee's work if it were deprived of the participation of countries that are permanent members of the Security Council and of countries that are the principal maritime users of the Indian Ocean. Therefore it is to be hoped that there will be an appropriate expansion of the membership of the Ad Hoc Committee, because that alone could assure the establishment of the conditions necessary for the solution of the problems, and in particular of those presented by paragraphs 14, 15 and 19 of the Final Document of the July Meeting (A/34/45). Therefore, we hope that the talks between the Soviet Union and the United States will be resumed and that, very soon, those two countries will take their places in the Ad Hoc Committee. Having said that, we would add that we maintain the position that the implementation and interpretation of resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 1971 are above all the responsibility of the countries of the Indian Ocean region.

A second comment is related to the enormous variety of geopolitical conditions existing in the different maritime regions of the world. Greece views a future agreement on the Indian Ocean as affecting that ocean alone, and one whose clauses cannot constitute a precedent for a similar agreement elsewhere.

A third observation concerns the consensus. We believe that for an agreement to be effective it must be the result of a consensus, because only then can we expect that it will be respected by all. In keeping with that line of reasoning, it would be advisable to re-examine certain of the results of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States when, as we hope, the countries invited to do so take an effective part in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and, consequently, in the work of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference.

I shall not dwell on other views held by my delegation, so as not to take up more of the Committee's time. They have been expressed already in the past, either at meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee or, more particularly, in a statement made in July by the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations. I shall merely recall the affirmation that our country, as one of the principal maritime users of the Indian Ocean, ardently hopes that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and, in due course, that of the conference on the Indian Ocean will come to a successful conclusion as speedily as possible, since that will contribute to the
strengthening of the principle of freedom of international navigation, in accordance with international law and with customs, to which Greece is firmly attached. We therefore trust that progress can be made in the preparatory work of the conference, but there again we have to stress the fundamental importance that we attach to an enlarged participation such as we have described in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Accordingly, we shall vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/34/29. Despite a few uncertainties that some of its paragraphs leave pending, it does constitute a forward step and provides a vigorous impetus towards fresh efforts.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Soviet Union has asked to be allowed to speak in order to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/34/L.23 concerning the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, a draft resolution whose sponsors, along with the Soviet Union, are the delegations of Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Viet Nam.

In that draft resolution there is a proposal on the need to examine possibilities for an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, and for this purpose the Secretary-General is requested to call upon all States to transmit to him their opinions and suggestions regarding the possibility of concluding the aforementioned agreement and to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

As is known, at its session last year the General Assembly, by an overwhelming majority of 105 votes, adopted resolution 33/91 F, which calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, and also calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territories to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories.
It was pointed out in the resolution how positive was the significance of the territorial limitation of the stationing of nuclear weapons in the interests of the maintenance of peace and security and the prevention of a nuclear war, and also in the interest of achieving the larger objective of the subsequent complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other States.

The Soviet Union, as is known, indicated its readiness to accept the obligation not to station nuclear weapons on the territories of those States where there are no such weapons at present and has called on other nuclear-Powers to do likewise. The adoption by the thirty-third session of the General Assembly of resolution 33/91 F on this question has demonstrated the agreement of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations to take practical steps to prevent the further stationing of nuclear weapons.

In the light of this clearly stated intention, it is apparently necessary now to consider further concrete action concerning the realization of this purpose. In our opinion, one of the possible ways of implementing the decision of the General Assembly to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present could be, for instance, the conclusion of an international agreement that would be couched in the form of a treaty and would place obligations, on the one hand, on nuclear-weapon States not to station nuclear weapons on the territories where there are no such weapons at present and, on the other hand, on non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any measures which might result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories.

This is the view of the Soviet Union concerning the subsequent steps involved in the implementation of resolution 33/91 F of the General Assembly of the United Nations. In our opinion, it would be useful to know now how the other States Members of the United Nations visualize further action on this question and what they think of the possibilities of the international agreement that I have just referred to. This is precisely the purpose of the draft resolution that is now being introduced.
The delegation of the Soviet Union considers that the study of the views of the various States concerning the possibilities for an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would greatly help in determining the concrete action that could be taken to attain this objective. In this connexion, we express the hope that such opinions and considerations of States as may be submitted to the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly might aid in achieving the most optimal means of implementing the goals outlined in the resolutions of previous sessions of the General Assembly on the subject under consideration.

In conclusion, the delegation of the Soviet Union wishes to express the hope the proposed draft resolution will command the widest possible support.

Mr. de LA GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): The French delegation, in its statement to the First Committee on 29 October, announced that, with regard to agenda item 42 (i), we intended to submit a draft resolution on a study of the technical, legal and financial implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency. This draft resolution has now been circulated as document A/C.1/34/L.21 and, on behalf of its 38 sponsors, I have the honour to submit it for consideration. The sponsors are as follows: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, the Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Italy, Liberia, Mauritius, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, Yugoslavia and Zaire.
The French delegation is gratified at the support that was given by so many delegations to a proposal to continue the study undertaken by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, pursuant to resolution 33/71 J adopted last year by the General Assembly. May I here express my warmest thanks to those delegations.

I do not intend here to analyse the progress report of the Group of Governmental Experts submitted to the General Assembly as an Annex to the Secretary-General's report and circulated on 18 September as document A/34/540. Suffice it to recall its conclusions, to which the French delegation already referred in its statement of 29 October:

"The Group fully recognized the valuable contribution which monitoring by satellites could make to the verification of certain parts or types of arms-control and disarmament agreements. This contribution from satellites to the verification process must not in general be seen as excluding other means of verification. The Group also appreciated the positive role that satellite monitoring could play in preventing or settling crises in various parts of the world and thus contributing to confidence-building among nations. The Group considered the gradual approach to the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency technically feasible and saw in it a way to limit and control the financial commitments required from the international community. With respect to the legal nature of the agency, it appeared that action would have to be taken to ensure its independence, which would constitute an essential guarantee for the objectivity of its analyses." (A/34/540 Annex, para. 23)

These conclusions, which were adopted unanimously by the group of experts, as well as the report itself are only of a preliminary nature. The experts - and I wish here to pay a tribute to the high quality of their work - in the course of the two sessions which they held this year,
examined the numerous and complex questions posed by the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency and found that many of them required further in-depth study. That is why they recommended:

"...that a comprehensive report...should be completed in time for consideration at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament." (Ibid., para. 24)

That report should be ready, therefore, early in 1981 so that the Preparatory Committee for that session can study it in the course of its work.

is the purport of the draft resolution which we are submitting today. The Secretary-General's report does carry in its Appendix I a list of subjects which should be studied in depth in the comprehensive report proposed by the group of experts. That list gives a fairly clear idea of questions to be dealt with in the future. We do not wish in any way to prejudge the conclusions that may be presented. What is important is for the General Assembly, in the course of its special session and before that its Preparatory Committee, to have before them as complete a record as possible. While Governments can obviously make their contribution to that record, the study undertaken by the group of experts under the authority of the Secretary-General and at the request of the General Assembly is a particularly important component. That is why we feel that the study should be carried out under the most propitious conditions in the course of 1980, that it be concluded in the first months of 1981 and, finally, that the appropriate financial and administrative provisions may be adopted.

The idea of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency appears to many Governments to be an initiative susceptible of making a very useful contribution to the cause of disarmament within the very difficult and very important area of monitoring. Disarmament and security being matters which
concern us, we consider that all the international community should have access, under suitable conditions, to this modern and indispensable means of verification and observation presented by satellite monitoring systems. As we recalled in the course of the general debate, this solution is all the more necessary since in the next few years the number of States possessing observation satellites will have increased considerably. It would therefore be abnormal for the international community to be deprived any longer of the data that these satellites may provide to verify compliance with disarmament agreements and possibly to contribute to the control and prevention of the outbreak of crises.
However, at this stage it is not a question of the Commission or the General Assembly taking a stand on the principle of such a project. It is merely a question of carrying through the task that has been undertaken of preparing for the consideration of the matter by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That is why the objections and the doubts that certain Governments may have with regard to the principle of an international satellite monitoring agency should not, in our view, lead them to disassociate themselves from the consensus which we trust will emerge on the continuation of the study begun by the group of governmental experts under the authority of the Secretary-General.

Mr. NAIK (Pakistan): The Pakistan delegation has asked to be allowed to speak in order to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/34/L.3 on the conclusion of an international convention to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

I should like briefly to recall the rationale of the proposal for the elaboration of the international convention. As we all acknowledge, the existence of nuclear weapons, especially the awesome nuclear arsenals of the major nuclear Powers, constitutes a serious threat to the security of all States. The non-nuclear-weapon States are most vulnerable to this threat since they have no means by which to resist or counter nuclear attack or blackmail.

As stated in the preambular part of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3, the most credible and effective way in which the threat from nuclear weapons can be averted is through nuclear disarmament, the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and strict adherence to the principle of non-use of force in international relations. We hope that these objectives will soon be achieved. Pakistan has welcomed and supported all proposals and initiatives to this end. Yet, until the realization of these objectives, the international community must build other immediate barriers against the nuclear threat to which the non-nuclear-weapon States are exposed. Pakistan drew the international community's attention to this question in 1974 in order to take such a first step towards credible and real security for the non-nuclear-weapon States.
The major justification advanced by each of the nuclear Powers for the acquisition and retention of nuclear weapons in their military arsenals is that the State concerned is threatened by the possession of nuclear weapons by other Powers. Clearly, non-nuclear-weapon States have played no part in the decisions of the nuclear-weapon States to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. It is therefore entirely invidious that those States should continue to be exposed to the threat posed by nuclear weapons. As I have stated earlier, until nuclear weapons are entirely banned and eliminated the nuclear Powers are under an obligation to assure non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened by these weapons.

Besides contributing to international peace and security, the extension of effective assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States will have a salutary impact on the prospects of nuclear non-proliferation. However, it would be self-defeating to construe the entire issue in the context of non-proliferation or merely as a means of encouraging the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It is not the non-nuclear-weapon States which are under an obligation to give further assurances about their non-nuclear status; it is, rather, the nuclear Powers which must assure them in a credible way that their nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear countries.

It is a matter of satisfaction to the Pakistan delegation that, in response to the recommendations of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, and of resolution 33/72, adopted at the last regular session, the Committee on Disarmament found it possible to include on its agenda the item on "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". We are also gratified that in-depth negotiations were held on the subject in the Ad Hoc Working Group set up in the Committee on Disarmament leading to the identification of the main elements involved in the subject and agreement on certain broad issues.

As stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group - in appendix II of the report of the Committee on Disarmament - there are two broad elements on which agreement is to be evolved: the nature of the assurances to non-nuclear countries and the form in which they are extended.
The positions of various States with regard to the nature and the scope of the assurances to be provided are outlined in paragraph 10 of the Working Group's report. Pakistan's position on the issue, which, I believe, also reflects the general thinking of most non-nuclear States outside the major military blocs, is quite clear. We feel that the nuclear Powers must assure all the non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the latter. Most of the nuclear-weapon States, however, have not found it possible to give such a categorical assurance. The declarations which were made by the nuclear-weapon States at the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament were a welcome indication that they recognized the legitimacy of the concern of the non-nuclear Powers. However, with one exception those declarations were not only qualified in scope and limited in application but also capable of subjective and varying interpretations which further reduce their value and contribution to promoting a sense of security among the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The major nuclear Powers encounter difficulties in providing unqualified and categorical assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States because of their strategic doctrines and their commitments in the context of their nuclear security alliances, primarily the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty. But, surely, those non-nuclear-weapon States which are outside those alliances should not continue to be exposed to the nuclear threat merely because of the "strategic" considerations and military alliances of the super-Powers.
Pakistan has therefore submitted a formulation to circumvent these difficulties by calling for assurances from the nuclear Powers to the non-nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of the nuclear Powers, that is, mainly the non-aligned countries. This formulation was endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly in resolution 31/189 C as recalled in the preamble of our draft resolution. It is contained in article I of the draft convention submitted by my delegation in the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation believes that this formulation provides the most feasible basis for an agreement on a common and uniform obligation by the nuclear Powers to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Ad Hoc Working Group's deliberations on the form in which assurances should be extended to non-nuclear States were more substantive. As noted in paragraph 11 of the Group's report:

"the question of an international convention was widely discussed" (A/34/27, appendix II, para. 11)

as the report adds:

"There was no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention." (Ibid.)

This is a very circumspect reflection of the fact that the modality of a convention is generally favoured in the Committee on Disarmament. There are, as the report mentions, "difficulties" and these will need to be overcome. But this is not surprising; nor is it sufficient reason for the General Assembly to hesitate in endorsing the objective of concluding an international convention on this subject.

This is all the more so since the elaboration of a convention on this subject has been endorsed by the non-aligned countries at their recent Summit in Havana, by the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers and by the overwhelming majority of members who have addressed the subject at the current session of the General Assembly.

The preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3 reflect the background and developments which I have just outlined. These considerations lead inexorably to the conclusions which are drawn in the operative part of the draft resolution.
Operative paragraph 1 would ask the General Assembly to affirm the conclusion of the Committee on Disarmament about the urgency of reaching agreement on effective international arrangements on this subject.

Operative paragraph 2 notes with satisfaction that there is no objection in principle in the Committee on Disarmament to an international convention to assure the non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is my delegation's belief that if the momentum generated in the work of the Committee on this subject is maintained, there is every possibility that an agreement can be reached on the conclusion of an international convention during the session of the Committee in 1980. It is for this reason that operative paragraph 3 endorses the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations on the subject at the beginning of its 1980 session, and operative paragraph 4 recommends that the Committee conclude the international convention on the subject during the course of the next year. From what I have said previously, it is clear that this reflects the sentiment and position of the wide membership of the United Nations, and particularly the non-aligned countries.

The Pakistan delegation has conducted extensive consultations on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3. We are very grateful to several delegations which have submitted very constructive and positive suggestions and observations to us. In the light of these consultations, my delegation has made certain modifications in the text of the draft resolution. We have already submitted to the Secretariat the revised version, which we hope will soon be circulated to members of this Committee, but I shall take this opportunity to indicate the changes that have been made in draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3.

First, the words "with satisfaction" in the sixteenth preambular paragraph have been deleted. In the eighteenth preambular paragraph the words "to conclude" have been replaced by the words "to elaborate". After the eighteenth preambular paragraph, two additional preambular paragraphs have been added. The first reads:

"Also noting similar recommendations made in the relevant resolutions of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers;".

The second new preambular paragraph would read:
"Further noting the general support expressed during its thirty-fourth session for the elaboration of an international convention to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;".

Then there are some changes in the operative paragraphs as well. Operative paragraph 1 has been reworded as follows:

"Affirms the conclusion of the Committee on Disarmament that there is wide recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;".

It will be self evident that we have decided to delete operative paragraph 5 in response to the views of a number of delegations. Finally, in the revised version we have added a last operative paragraph which, like the draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.9, would have the General Assembly place the item on:

"the conclusion of an international convention to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" on the agenda of its next regular session. I am hopeful that once the revised version of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.3 is circulated to members of the First Committee, they will find that most of the observations and comments made to us in the informal consultations have been fully reflected in our revised version.

It is also the hope of the Pakistan delegation that, in the forthcoming negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, the major nuclear Powers will respond positively to the recommendations of this draft resolution which reflect the views of the vast majority of States represented here. Such a response would enable the Committee on Disarmament to conclude an international convention during the course of the next year. This would be a signal contribution to international peace and security in the nuclear era and to the goal of nuclear disarmament.
Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): I should like to indicate to the Committee the results of the negotiations which have taken place on draft resolution A/C.1/34/PV.37. It will be recalled that during the consideration of this draft resolution it was suggested that some deletion should be made in operative paragraph 3. That was the reason for further consultation. The sponsors have been in touch with some delegations that expressed very strong views on operative paragraph 3. We arrived at two sets of possibilities. It would seem that the alternative that meets the preoccupation of most of the sponsors would be the deletion of the word "dates" from operative paragraph 3 and the change of the word "target" to "targets", so that the paragraph would read:

"Determines that the draft resolution should embody, inter alia, an indication of targets during the Disarmament Decade for accomplishing the major objectives and goals of disarmament, as well as ways and means of mobilizing world public opinion in this regard;".

It would also be fair to indicate that another possible formulation was suggested on Friday which seemed to meet the concerns and views of two delegations in particular that had very strong views on this paragraph. Unfortunately, that formulation was not acceptable to the large majority of the sponsors of the draft resolution. I am therefore not in a position to accept it on behalf of the sponsors.

Finally, I should like to state that the name of India has been omitted from this draft resolution. India is a sponsor and its name should be included.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those members who wish to explain their vote before the vote.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): Last week I made a statement in which I explained the reason why the United States would abstain in the vote on this draft resolution. Our experience has been that target dates are a little bit misleading in this context.
It is one thing to vote for target dates, but it is a little harder to meet them. I appreciate the sense of compromise with which the representative of Nigeria has eliminated the word "dates", but I can only observe that in this context the elimination of the word "dates" does not really change the substance. The word "targets" in this context means target dates. There is no other reason to mention it, particularly since we are dealing with a decade.

For that reason, we maintain the position that I stated last week.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): The delegation of Japan appreciates the efforts of the sponsors of the draft resolution before us to amend operative paragraph 3. We note that the word "specific" was dropped from the original text and we also note that the word "dates" has now been dropped. It now reads "... an indication of targets during the Disarmament Decade". I should like to say that the Government of Japan does not consider it realistic to set target dates for accomplishing major objectives and goals of disarmament. However, my Government has no objection to the General Assembly's declaring the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade and to Member States' continuing even greater efforts towards achieving effective disarmament measures. Therefore, my delegation will vote in favour of this draft resolution.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): I should like to express our appreciation for the work done by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.18/Rev.1 and to state that we find our points met for the most part by the changes proposed. We shall therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution. I should like to add that the word "targets" does not mean in any way the fixing of specific dates. Our understanding is that the word "targets" refers to a good objective.

Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to express my thanks to the representative of Nigeria for his explanation of the changes to operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution.
For my part, understanding full well the spirit of negotiation that motivated the change, I nevertheless must say that I regret the dropping of the word "dates", because that is precisely the word that gave content to the draft resolution. The First Disarmament Decade has now elapsed without a single disarmament step or gesture being made. Now we are going to begin the Second Disarmament Decade, which will probably be followed by a third and perhaps a fourth, and the same thing will probably occur unless the United Nations decides to set target dates and to exert pressure so that disarmament will in fact take place.

I feel that it would have been more realistic to leave operative paragraph 3 as it stood. I understand the spirit of negotiation that has led to the deletion, but in the light of certain statements that have been made to the effect that some votes will not be cast in favour of the draft despite the change, I wonder whether it was really necessary to drop the word.

However, understanding the spirit shown by the sponsors, the Argentine delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Members will recall that last week I asked for a separate vote on operative paragraph 3 in order to register our misgivings with regard to the mention of target dates. In view of the statement of the representative of Nigeria, for which we are very grateful, I withdraw that request.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I should like to explain the reasons for our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.18/Rev.1.

Our delegation also shares the views of those delegations which feel that the establishment of target dates is not realistic, inasmuch as it would not contribute to the natural course of negotiations on disarmament and would merely give rise to unjustified illusions. However, the removal of the word "dates" makes it possible for us to vote in favour of the draft resolution.
Mr. de LA GORCE (France) (interpretation from French): The French delegation will have no hesitation over voting in favour of the draft resolution submitted to us. We did feel that paragraph 3 in the original text was somewhat over-ambitious and was, to a certain extent, unrealistic. As now drafted, it is acceptable to us. However, I should like to point out that the French text of paragraph 3 contains a very serious mistake in meaning because it implies that the main objective of disarmament must be achieved in the course of the Disarmament Decade. That is an obvious contradiction in terms and we should like the Secretariat to take note of it and to ensure that such important differences of substance in the English and French texts are corrected. Moreover, we would like this sort of error not to recur in the documents that are circulated in the official languages of the General Assembly.

Mr. MORENO (Italy): My delegation appreciates the efforts that have been made to reword paragraph 3 of the resolution in question. However, we still have some misgivings regarding the present formulation of this paragraph. We should like to point out that the word "targets" cannot, in our view, imply the fixing of specific dates for the goals of disarmament. We are, however, in agreement with the general purpose and objectives of this resolution and with the declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. We will therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I did not request a separate vote on paragraph 3, because the representative of the Netherlands had done so. He has since withdrawn that request and I would therefore now like to request such a vote.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now take action on agenda item 34, "Consideration of the Declaration of the 1980s as a Disarmament Decade", contained in draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.18/Rev.1. The representative of the United States has asked for a separate vote on operative paragraph 3, which now reads:
"Determines that the draft resolution should embody, inter alia, an indication of targets during the Disarmament Decade for accomplishing the major objectives and goals of disarmament, as well as ways and means of mobilizing world public opinion in this regard;".

The Committee will therefore take a decision first on operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution.

Operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.18/Rev.1, as revised, was adopted by 120 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.

Mr. MARSHALL (United Kingdom): I wish to speak on a point of order connected with our consideration of this item. In the light of the vote on paragraph 3 that we have just taken, my delegation would be quite prepared for you, Mr. Chairman, to ask this meeting whether there is a consensus on the resolution as it now stands.

The CHAIRMAN: May I then take it that the Committee agrees to adopting draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.18/Rev.1 without a vote?

The draft resolution was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes at this stage.

Mr. MARSHALL (United Kingdom): My delegation voted in favour of the original resolution on the subject of the Disarmament Decade in 1969. We saw and continue to see the concept of a Disarmament Decade and its proclamation by the General Assembly as a useful spur to the greater effort in disarmament generally.

For the same reason, we would have liked to support this resolution as a whole and we took an active part in the discussions at the end of last week on the amendment to paragraph 3. However, we have just abstained in the vote on paragraph 3 and I should like to explain why. The reason is that the rather modest revision to the wording of that paragraph does not meet our concern about the direction in which this subject is going, namely, that even without the reference to dates, this paragraph still contains a request to the Disarmament Commission that it, in effect, established a further negotiating framework which would be superimposed upon other arrangements which, it is already requested, should be formulated in the Committee on Disarmament during the next three years.
Mr. RAJAKOSKY (Finland): The delegation of Finland supported draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.18/Rev.1, which has just been adopted without a vote, and we also voted in favour of operative paragraph 3.

I should like to state briefly that my delegation is very grateful to Ambassador Adeniji of Nigeria for his efforts to improve the operative paragraph 3, from which the word "dates" was deleted.

In our view, attaching dates or deadlines for the accomplishment of objectives and goals of disarmament does not in general enhance the chances of the successful completion of disarmament negotiations. We therefore interpret the targets as including no time element.

The CHAIRMAN: Before we turn to the next phase of our work, I think it appropriate to call attention to a request from the President of the General Assembly with regard to the voting procedure followed at the plenary meeting last Friday. Rather than attempt to paraphrase what he said, I shall read it to the Committee:

"Given the difficulties in concluding our voting expeditiously today, in that several delegations were late for the voting, I should like all delegations to be aware of the manner in which I intend to conduct the business of the plenary meetings. This is particularly important since, during the remainder of the session, we shall be receiving a large number of Committee reports and shall be required to take a large number of votes.

"I should like to restate that it is my intention to begin plenary meetings punctually. Secondly, it is my intention to proceed to the vote when such is required whenever - and I repeat 'whenever' - the necessary quorum exists.

"For those who arrive late or wish to change any inaccurately recorded vote, a system exists whereby representatives may proceed to the voting table on the floor of the hall to my left and fill in a special form designed for this purpose.

"I appeal for the co-operation of all delegations in expediting the business of the plenary meetings since, as I have indicated previously, we have an especially large number of items this year requiring consideration by the plenary body." (A/34/PV.69, pp. 77, 78)
(The Chairman)

Delegations will recall that in the early stages of our discussions in this Committee I mentioned a similar procedure, which the First Committee will continue to follow where late-comers are concerned when draft resolutions are being voted upon. I am always appreciative of members' co-operation, and I am sure they will continue to give it.

The next phase of our work deals with a request by the Ambassador of Mexico, supported by the Ambassador of Argentina, concerning a report by the Secretary-General in document A/34/588. It was decided that this matter would be dealt with this morning following consultations.

It is my understanding that the former of the two proposals that were made, namely, that a draft resolution be submitted, is not practicable, and I should therefore like to suggest that the Committee agree, without a vote, to send to the General Assembly for consideration a draft decision on this point in the Secretary-General's report. Paragraph 17 of the report states:

"The Secretary-General points out that these costs cannot be met from the regular budget of the United Nations and that, if the General Assembly were to share the view that it is desirable that such a study be made, it would have to take a decision to that effect, including the administrative and financial implications thereof". (A/34/588)

I should like to suggest that the Committee agree to a draft decision being sent to the General Assembly for consideration, and that this be done without a vote.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I think that this comes rather promptly, and I believe that more than one representative wishes to speak on this subject. I saw two hands in addition to my own going into the air, and it is not wholly coincidental that they were the hands of representatives of delegations involved in tripartite negotiations on this subject.

I think we should point out that this study is a study not by Government representatives, but by nationals of States who are not representing their Governments in this context. Frankly, I believe that sending this on to the General Assembly with a recommendation to the Assembly is making a distinction without a difference. I think a decision to do so would be premature.
Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): I should like to explain that in the event of a vote on the Chairman's proposal concerning document A/34/588, our delegation would be obliged to vote against that proposal. This is because in that document there is a recommendation to conduct a study on the prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests. In its approach to the solution of the question of conducting any kinds of studies in the sphere of disarmament, the Soviet delegation proceeds from the premise that at present the principal task should be to strive to elaborate and conclude practical agreements on limiting the arms race and on disarmament.

It is precisely on this that the efforts of States should be focused, within the United Nations as well as in the Committee on Disarmament and other forums. A very large number of statements have been made in favour of disarmament. There is no lack of studies on the various aspects of this problem, studies that have been carried out at the national as well as the international level. The time has long since come when it is necessary to proceed from words and theoretical studies to action.

In this connexion, we must express our concern at the growing number of various kinds of studies on problems of disarmament being conducted under United Nations sponsorship which, as a matter of fact, present not inconsiderable financial implications without actually yielding palpable results for genuine disarmament. In our opinion, independent studies should be carried out only in very definitely justified cases. Otherwise, the United Nations will be diverted from the discussion and solution of disarmament items in practical terms.

If we consider the proposal to conduct a study on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, it can be stated very clearly that this is precisely a case where there is no need for a new, independent study. The point is that this is a concrete subject, and one that has been studied in considerable detail over a number of years, in political as well as in scientific and technical terms.
We do not now need, by means of additional studies, to demonstrate the harm that may be caused by nuclear tests and the need for their total and general prohibition. On the other hand, the scientists of various countries have rather fully studied the problem of control of such prohibitions. As the Committee knows, various separate parts of the question of control are being discussed in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. But on the whole, it may be said that the scientific foundation for ensuring a reliable verification of the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests by all States does exist.

The question of a full and general nuclear test ban in practical terms is now being discussed in negotiations between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom. We can observe today that there has been progress there, and we expect that our partners will not introduce any complicating factors into these negotiations.

No studies, especially the kind that are unnecessary by their very nature, are likely to alter the existing realities. Therefore, we consider such studies as are recommended in document A/34/588 to be superfluous. Moreover, we cannot overlook the fact that the above-mentioned study is related also to definite, additional financial expenditures which extend beyond the sphere of the United Nations budget.

Therefore, in our statement today, we wish once again to express and to record our disagreement with the carrying out of a study on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, and to have this position of ours reflected during the adoption of a decision on this question.
The CHAIRMAN: Before giving the floor to the next speaker on this matter, I should like to say that it seems to me that we have gone just a little beyond the proposal from the Chair, but probably we will not now have to deal with this again if we should come to it later on.

My suggestion was merely that a draft decision be sent without a vote to the General Assembly, and if that were not the desire of the members of the First Committee, then we would take another position. But now that we have had statements from the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, I think that another decision will probably have to be made.

But the Chair does not intend to open a debate on this item, which was more than sufficiently discussed at our last session, so I hope that we will not get involved in a debate on this matter.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I fully share the Chairman's view that it would be inappropriate and redundant for us now to undertake a discussion of the somewhat prolonged and, I must admit, somewhat fruitless negotiations taking place among three nuclear Powers.

But the issue here is something very different, something very concrete and very precise. Considering that it would be helpful for the Secretary-General to count on the advice of a group of "eminent persons", the General Assembly felt that the Secretary-General might be able to call upon these eminent persons to assist him in the preparation of a study on disarmament and therefore, by consensus, the General Assembly decided that the Advisory Board could help him.

The General Assembly may have felt that this was because, apart from their knowledge and expertise in the subject concerned, the members of the Board would also enjoy the necessary independence in advising him, since they would be acting on a personal basis. As I said, perhaps the General Assembly felt that a Board of this nature would be highly useful to him.
It might also be very helpful because it would avoid a proliferation of studies, and it could be very useful in so far as the Board might seek out other persons to assist them in the preparation of their report. Those who may have read the basic document on this matter, which is one that I referred to in my last statement on this subject last Friday, document A/34/588 of 7 November, will have noted that it contains a report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Advisory Board, and will also recall that in paragraph 13 it says that the Board discussed a number of proposals. There were a number; I would even say that there were many proposals for the carrying out of studies, and it was only a single study which the Board recommended should be continued. It recommended this because it felt that in the light of many circumstances that bear upon the matter, that study would be extremely helpful.

In paragraph 13 itself it is said:

"This study was proposed in light of the fact that the cessation of nuclear weapon testing by all States was considered to be an item of the highest priority for the negotiating body ..." (A/34/588, para. 13)

that is, the Committee on Disarmament, not the three Powers which, we know, will not be able to derive much benefit or profit from it. Furthermore the Board felt that the study "could be of great assistance in the multilateral discussions in the Committee on Disarmament" (Ibid.). That was why the Board recommended a study on that subject, and the Secretary-General himself in paragraph 16 concludes by saying:

"As he has stated on previous occasions, the Secretary-General considers that the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban as an indispensable step to halt the qualitative nuclear arms race."

(Ibid., para. 16)

The Secretary-General goes on to say, and I am not quoting myself, I am quoting him:

"Although this matte: has been the subject of much study in the past, the Secretary-General feels that any measures which may contribute to the conclusion of an agreement are welcome" (Ibid., para. 16)
And then he mentions the cost and how the study would be prepared. Therefore, on the basis of that, and on the basis of the decision the Chairman adopted previously, my delegation has taken the liberty of preparing a very short draft that I would now beg your leave to submit for consideration in this Committee, in order to prepare that decision that we would refer to the General Assembly. I shall read it very slowly, and I have already given a copy to the Secretariat and I believe that it is at present being processed. This decision would read as follows:
"The First Committee recommends that the General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to prepare the study on the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban recommended by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and by the Secretary-General himself. The study should include the chapters or sections described in paragraph 14 of the relevant report of the Secretary-General (A/34/588), and should be completed in time to be transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament in the spring of 1980, as indicated in the same paragraph. It should be carried out in accordance with the procedure described in paragraph 16 of the Secretary-General's report."

That is the brief text that my delegation would submit for decision to the First Committee.

Mr. Ortiz de Rozas (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish):

Pursuant to my last statement, I should like now formally to support the text, just submitted orally by the representative of Mexico, of a draft decision for approval by this Committee and referral to the General Assembly. I shall not dwell on the reasons already adduced by the representative of Mexico, but I should like to make some additional comments.

It is not my intention to start a debate on this subject, in which I am ready to heed the Chairman's appeal, and I recognize the right of any delegation to reserve its position on initiatives or ideas of this nature or any decision that may be adopted by the General Assembly or the First Committee. However, I cannot omit mention of some of the comments made by the representative of the Soviet Union.

I must say that I am 95 per cent in agreement with what he said about concentrating disarmament efforts on practical measures and agreements. To a large extent I also agree that over the years many studies have in fact been made on disarmament subjects. Those studies have at times proved to be extremely useful, while at other times they have merely gathered dust through lack of readership appeal, but they have nevertheless contributed to the jurisprudence of disarmament. I agree with him that in many cases there is no need to start new studies. Where I disagree, however, is when he speaks at the
end of his statement about another study being superfluous and too costly. I do not think that a study on nuclear test-ban treaties would be superfluous because other studies have already been made. As the representative of Mexico reminded us just a few moments ago, the Secretary-General notes in his own report that other studies and surveys have been made, but he goes on to advocate this study being made now. When we speak of something being superfluous with regard to the question of disarmament, we must be wary; and when we speak about it being costly, we must be equally wary. Let me cite an example to show how everything is relative.

The Soviet Union this year submitted an agenda item, "Inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations". I think that in the work that has been done by the First Committee in that connexion more than the $51,000 we are trying to allocate to the study on the test ban urged has already been spent. But if we are going to speak of things being superfluous, perhaps we should refer to the Charter itself. The Charter is the most important document in our Organization, but it is the smallest in format. But if we read the Charter carefully and if we read the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, we may come to the conclusion that the Soviet proposal for the condemnation of the policy of hegemonism is also superfluous, since the Charter forbids that type of political activity and, beyond the Charter itself, the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security does so also. And yet, there would appear to be an atmosphere that is most receptive to the Soviet proposal, an atmosphere in which it is not considered to be superfluous, and why not? The reason is that, as we say in Spanish, "If there is too much of a thing, it can do us no harm". In other words, the strengthening of the condemnation of hegemonism may not be amiss today, and if we adopt a condemnation of that nature, using terms the same as those adduced by the representative of the Soviet Union, once it is adopted we will go from words to deeds, which is what we all are seeking. That is why I say that in matters of disarmament we cannot truly talk of what is superfluous.

Some may feel that this survey on nuclear-weapons testing is superfluous, and others may feel it to be very useful because it may encourage the three countries that have been discussing the matter for a long time to decide to take the final
step and submit a draft text. Even if the study served no other purpose, that would be justification enough.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): In connexion with the statement of the representative of Argentina, Mr. de Rozas, I should like to add some clarifications and to shed further light on the matter referred to by him.

First of all, we are discussing not the question of the inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations, but a more concrete question, namely, that of the carrying out of a study in regard to nuclear tests. But since we have now started speaking of the other subject, I merely wish to explain to the representative of Argentina that in advancing our proposal concerning the inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations we do not at all intend to plunge the United Nations into the task of carrying out additional studies. There we are referring to a rather clear political phenomenon of our day that constitutes a very serious obstacle in the way of the efforts of our Organization to restructure international relations on the basis of its essential principles. It involves the adoption of a simple political decision on this item that would make it possible to raise the inadmissibility of hegemonism to a universal principle of international relations. There is no question of any special study, and I wish to make that quite clear. Perhaps some misunderstanding has crept into the interpretation of that matter. On the other hand, in the present instance, when studies on nuclear tests are referred to, we are pointing out that what is involved is the conducting of studies that, instead of directing the efforts of States Members of the United Nations towards achieving concrete and speedy results at talks now being held on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, are on the contrary diverting them from that question. What is proposed is that a study be carried out on a question that has already been quite adequately studied in the past, at both the national and international levels, and, moreover, that further expenditures be incurred by the Organization. I therefore deemed it necessary to introduce some clarity into this matter.
The CHAIRMAN: I should like at this time to say that we all realize that this question, even though it deals with disarmament, was not a part of our agenda. Based on this and in the light of the statements made by the representatives of Mexico and Argentina, may the Chair, rather than retract the proposal which it made earlier that the Committee adopt a draft decision without a vote, recommend now that the Committee adopt a draft decision along the lines of the text read by the representative of Mexico. In this light I should like to appeal to the representatives of the United States and of the Soviet Union that they accept this proposal without the a vote but have their reservations, concerns or objections included in the summary report. If this is so, we might be able to deal with it rather than putting forward another proposal.

Mr. YANG (Philippines): My delegation should like to associate itself with and to support the statements made by the representatives of Mexico and of Argentina.

My delegation agrees with the arguments put forward by these two representatives with respect to a draft decision that may be adopted by the First Committee, the main thrust of which is the recommendation of a study regarding a comprehensive test ban.

I should like to make only three points. First, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies made only one recommendation this year, and this is the only recommendation which they made. It is the only subject which they believe should be the subject of a study. The Advisory Board unanimously adopted this decision in the belief that this is a priority issue with respect to nuclear disarmament.

Fifteen years have elapsed since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty. It has always been the wish of the international community to have a comprehensive test ban. We are aware of the negotiations which are in progress, but we are also understandably concerned over the lack of progress in those negotiations. We thought that the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban was already at hand, but nothing has yet resulted.
Secondly, with respect to this recommendation of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, this study will help with respect to ongoing negotiations. As a matter of fact, one of the criteria adopted by the Advisory Board for recommending studies was that they would help ongoing negotiations. For this reason it is urgent that this study be carried out. The representative of Mexico, in fact, stated that the report of its results should be made available in time for the spring session of the Committee on Disarmament.

Thirdly, there are many studies that have been made with respect to disarmament in the United Nations, but these studies are being updated. We have, in fact, agreed that the studies, such as those for example, on disarmament and development, should be continued. We have had previous studies on these subjects, and yet we have approved subsequent studies on subjects similar to those that have been studied in the past.

I would not adduce further arguments on the importance of this study. Suffice it to consider the fact that such a study was the only recommendation of the Advisory Board and that the Secretary-General agreed with this recommendation, as he stated in his report. This is my delegation's submission in support of the position taken by the representatives of Mexico and Argentina.

Mr. MARSHALL (United Kingdom): My intervention is really procedural. I think the Chairman put his finger on the point just now, Sir, when he said, if I heard him correctly, that this item was not on our agenda for today. My request is therefore simply whether we could return to this matter at a time when it was on the agenda and when the proposal which has been read out to us by the representative of Mexico could be circulated in writing in the normal way and when we would have had an opportunity to consider its substance, its financial implications and the normal matters relevant to it.
My delegation, for one, was entirely unprepared for this discussion this morning. I have the sense that we were not alone. I say this without prejudice at all to the substance of the matter upon which we would reserve our position to comment later.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to make one correction. Of course, the item - if I may call it an item - was not inscribed, so to speak, for discussion today, but when I said that it was not on our agenda I meant that this was not part of the allocation of items from the General Assembly at the beginning of our session for us to deal with.

I certainly agree with the representative of the United Kingdom's view, as I myself am unable to reread the text presented by the representative of Mexico. I would certainly agree to postponing this until tomorrow but would emphasize that there will be no discussion on the substance. It will merely be on a decision to be taken for submission to the General Assembly. This is what we will be dealing with, and not a discussion or a debate on the proposal contained in the report of the Secretary-General.

The representative of the United Kingdom has said what I was going to propose to the Committee, that we deal again with this at our next meeting tomorrow morning, but since we have as yet no speakers for tomorrow our meeting would be on Wednesday, which means that we would have a long list of resolutions to deal with on Wednesday morning. Frankly, I should not like to prolong this situation, so I hope that it can be dealt with at our next meeting, be it tomorrow or Wednesday.

Mr. MARSHALL (United Kingdom): Since the Chairman has left open the possibility that he might consider taking this tomorrow, I wonder if I could suggest that we do not do that. I think it is implicit in what I said before that there are things which, certainly, my delegation should wish to think about. So could we say that we would not take this before Wednesday? It seemed to me that it would fit quite well on Wednesday in any case.
The CHAIRMAN: This matter will be dealt with at our next meeting on Wednesday. I am not certain whether it will be in the morning or the afternoon, but we shall take up the draft resolutions first and deal with this matter towards the end of our work. At that time, the text that has been read out by the representative of Mexico should have been circulated by the Secretariat and all representatives will have had a chance to acquaint themselves with it.


On Wednesday draft resolutions A/C.1/34/L.12/Rev.1, A/C.1/34/L.20 and A/C.1/34/L.21, which were included among the list of draft resolutions to be considered, will not be taken up for consideration because the Committee requires information as to the financial implications. On that day we shall therefore take up draft resolutions A/C.1/34/L.2, A/C.1/34/L.4, A/C.1/34/L.13, A/C.1/34/L.14, A/C.1/34/L.15, A/C.1/34/L.16, A/C.1/34/L.17, A/C.1/34/L.19 and A/C.1/34/L.24.

Mr. NOLAN (Australia): A revision to draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.14 will be coming out tomorrow. I wonder, therefore, whether we could delay consideration of that draft resolution from Wednesday to the next meeting at which we shall be considering draft resolutions.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure that that is possible.
Mr. IWAM (Kuwait): I just want to ask for some clarification. I did not intervene in the debate earlier simply because I wanted to address myself to the Assistant Secretary-General.

As we know, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies has only recently been set up, and I believe that its function is to advise the Secretary-General on disarmament studies. My understanding is that normally it is the Secretary-General who makes the recommendation for a study to be undertaken, since the Board normally advises the Secretary-General. For that reason, I should like to know - not only in this case but as a general rule - what will be the procedure in future when the Advisory Board adopts a recommendation for a study to be undertaken and, if that study is to see the light of day, what would be the proper procedure for that study to be approved in the General Assembly?

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the Assistant Secretary-General.

Mr. MARTINSSON (Assistant Secretary-General, Centre for Disarmament): I should like to reply to that question at our next meeting, in view of the various complications.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Since the Chairman has indicated that there might not be a meeting tomorrow, and since draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.19 is on the list of those on which decisions will be taken on Wednesday, I thought it advisable to indicate that there is a likelihood of a revision being introduced to that draft resolution. I do not believe that that revision should necessitate postponing a decision on the draft resolution on Wednesday, provided delegations are made aware of it by being able tomorrow to obtain copies of the revised text.

It might also be useful to indicate that the revision is merely a suggestion by one delegation to complete the original text. That suggestion has been discussed with some delegations, which have expressed their views. As a result, the original suggestion has been modified.
The suggestion consists in adding a paragraph to the original text, and, as I said, I shall hand it over to the Secretariat for the purpose of having a revised text of this draft resolution issued.

However, I should like to indicate the area in which the revision would apply, so that delegations can reflect on it and perhaps on the basis of their reflection indicate on Wednesday whether or not they will be prepared to take a decision on the draft resolution. My own view is that this revision should not really cause the postponement of a decision on it on Wednesday.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/34/L.19, to which I am referring, deals with the United Conference on prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons. After operative paragraph 3, there would be added a new operative paragraph 4, which would read as follows:

"4. Takes note of the progress made by the Conference Working Group on the General Treaty entrusted with the preparation of the text of a convention to which optional protocols or clauses embodying prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects would be attached."

The following operative paragraphs would be renumbered accordingly.

I should like to say that it was the view of some delegations that, since the various issues discussed at the Conference had been mentioned in each of the operative paragraphs in draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.19, there should be some reference to the work done on the general treaty. The suggested wording which I have just read out has been taken almost verbatim from the report of the Conference, so that it should not cause too much inconvenience to any delegation. For that reason, it was suggested to the delegation which originally proposed the addition of that paragraph that we should stick very closely to the wording of the report of the Conference.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall keep draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.19 on the list of those to be dealt with and see what happens at our meeting Wednesday morning.
Two representatives have asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of the right of reply. Before calling on them I should like to recall that the time-limit for the exercise of the right of reply is 10 minutes in the first instance and five minutes in the second.

Mr. AL-ALI (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): Each time the Zionist representative speaks or exercises his right of reply in connexion with statements made by the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12 dealing with Israeli nuclear armament, he avoids discussing the primary question and speaks of conventional weapons. He quotes figures in an attempt to persuade representatives that the countries neighbouring Israel have military capacities which go well beyond that of Israel, as if it were other countries which are occupying by force of arms the territory of Palestine and of other Arab countries.

I am therefore compelled to reiterate what we have already stated on this subject. I shall ask the representative of Israel to read what was published yesterday by The New York Times where it stated that information received by the United States Pentagon confirms that Israel has conventional weapons which assure its superiority over all of the Arab countries up to 1984.

I might add that draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12 submitted to this Committee refers to Israel’s nuclear weapons. It would have been preferable for the representative of the Zionist entity to be able to refute the information supplied by my delegation in previous statements, or to answer the specific questions we have put and which have to do with the acquisition by Israel of nuclear weapons.

The representative of the Zionist entity spoke of draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12 as an Iraqi proposal. He laid stress on that in his intervention. Draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12 has been sponsored and supported by 37 countries. It has the support of the majority of States, and in particular of the non-aligned member States. I should like to recall to the representative of the Zionist entity that a resolution on the nuclear arms and conventional arms of Israel was adopted by the General Assembly last year with a majority of 72 votes in favour, in other words, twice the number of those voting against and abstaining. The condemnation in the draft resolution referred to by the representative of the Zionist entity is due to the policy of discrimination and aggression.
practised by his country. There are a score of resolutions adopted every year which condemn the Zionist entity precisely because of its colonialist essence. Would the Zionist entity wish to condemn all the States in conformity with the principles of justice as he visualizes it? The representative of the Zionist entity has referred to certain States which support the draft resolution and which have not adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The States mentioned by the representative of the Zionist entity have no nuclear capacity, even in the peaceful sphere. The majority of those States have no nuclear reactors, and those which do have them have only small ones designed for medical purposes. As for the nuclear capacity of my country, my delegation would wish to remind the members of this Committee that the reactor in Iraq's possession is a small one, used exclusively for medical purposes and for research. Its capacity is only half a megawatt, and it is subject to the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

As for the Zionist entity, it has two reactors, that of Nahal Sourek near Tel Aviv, with a capacity of 5 megawatts, and the reactor of Daimona, whose capacity is as high as 24 megawatts. That reactor alone is sufficient to produce fissionable material, plutonium 239, which is used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons and atomic bombs. It makes it possible to produce three nuclear bombs of the type dropped on Hiroshima. In spite of that, Israel refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, its two nuclear reactors are subject to no international control whatsoever.

Now, what does all this mean? As far as concerns the States which have subscribed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty but have not yet ratified it, they are only awaiting the accession of the Zionist entity to that Treaty.

As for the allegations of the representative of the Zionist entity according to which draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12 is supported only by Iraq and its allies, my answer is that this means that the Zionist entity does not recognize the truth, because 37 countries are sponsors of that draft resolution, among them Iraq. Moreover, this draft resolution is supported by a large number of countries, and the representative of the Zionist entity will
find when the time comes that the countries voting in favour of this draft resolution will not be only those he has labelled the allies of Iraq or States which support it. They will be, on the contrary, countries which are anxious to see international peace and security established and strengthened. Moreover, the countries which will be aligning themselves on the side of the Zionist entity are those which take into account only their own interests and seek to sow destruction and arouse conflicts throughout the world.

The representative of Israel in his intervention said that to charge United Nations bodies with studies on disarmament only blocks United Nations efforts. We denounce the sources of tension and we feel that all these aspects whose study we are calling for fall within the competence of the United Nations, because we are all seeking to ensure international peace and security.
Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (interpretation from Arabic):

I apologize for speaking because I know that the Committee has important work to do. But I must do so in the light of the statement made by the representative of the Zionist entity, in which he mentioned my country a number of times and also in the light of his manoeuvres and attempts to divert our attention from the subject before us, namely Israel's nuclear armament and the threat it represents to the Middle East and to the world at large. He already resorted to this tactic when he spoke, not of disarmament, but of oil. That is why it is necessary for me to reply to him.

First, draft resolution A/C.1/34/L.12 was submitted on behalf of a number of countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America as well as Europe.

Secondly, a number of resolutions have stressed the co-operation that exists between Israel and South Africa in the nuclear field - at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and at the Islamic Conference. That is why I do not believe that the Governments and peoples of the countries represented in the OAU are acting in a vacuum nor do they base themselves on propaganda or lies as claimed by the representative of the Zionist entity. If he is sure that Israel has no nuclear arms programme, why does he fear operative paragraphs 3 and 6 of this draft resolution which call on Israel to submit all its nuclear activities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency and provide for the preparation of a study on Israeli nuclear armament? Why is he afraid of this inspection and study and why does he not say that his country will co-operate with the international organizations?

We have become accustomed to the Zionist entity violating international resolutions and avoiding the truth.

Thirdly, with respect to co-operation between Pakistan and Libya, it has been stated on several occasions that Pakistan's nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes only. Israel does not want to see any country use atomic energy for peaceful purposes, as Libya and some other countries are doing.

The Zionist representative also spoke of conventional weapons. He has forgotten that the Zionist entity is second on the list of those countries of the world that import weapons, coming immediately after Iran during the time of the Shah. The Zionist entity is at the head of the list in terms of the percentage of armed forces in relation to population. It is the first country in the world to have
compulsory conscription for women. It is also the country with the largest number of foreign experts, not only military experts but in other fields as well because the population of the Zionist entity comes from Europe and from North and South America. Many of its citizens studied at universities and institutes in those countries. The difference between the Zionist entity and the countries of the third world with respect to the supply of weapons is that the Zionist entity acquires weapons in the form of aid from the United States, one of the super-Powers and a permanent member of the Security Council. The countries of the third world, on the other hand, pay for their weapons, at the cost of their development, in order to safeguard their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

*The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.*