VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas)

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DISARMAMENT ITEMS

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Statements were made by:

Mr. Wyzner (Poland)
Mr. Klestil (Austria)
Mr. Komatina (Yugoslavia)
Mr. Canales (Chile)
The meeting was called to order at 10:30 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 AND 121 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. WYZNER (Poland): Last year's special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament confirmed beyond any doubt that the question of halting the arms race and opening the avenues towards genuine disarmament remains the most crucial and burning issue of the contemporary world. Without any exaggeration it can be stated that the future of mankind, the irreversibility of the process of détente, the possibility of resolving such pressing issues as the shortage of food and energy depend largely on the ability of States to achieve a breakthrough in the field of disarmament. For, as Poland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, E. Wojtaszek, stated in this session's general debate:

"The danger of the arms race is that it engulfs more and more States, that it is turning into a technological race, that it involves more and more people and absorbs growing material resources and, consequently, instead of strengthening international security, it undermines it." (A/34/PV.11, p. 47)

The events of the last few months have proved once again that, given the political will of the parties concerned, efforts to check the arms race can bring fruitful and meaningful results. The most significant of those events has been the signing by the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America of the long-awaited Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The Treaty and other documents signed in Vienna represent a step of historic importance for the whole of mankind. They will reduce the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war, positively influence the consolidation of the process of détente and restrain the arms race in its most dangerous manifestation.
Poland has welcomed with great satisfaction the SALT II Treaty as a major landmark on the road towards building a more secure world. We sincerely hope that it will enter into force without delay, thus paving the way to SALT III negotiations on measures for further limitation and reduction of strategic arms as well as the stimulation of more substantial and rapid progress on other forums of disarmament negotiations.

Earlier this year my country celebrated the thirty-fifth anniversary of its re-emergence as the People's Republic. The year 1979 also marked another anniversary - the fortieth anniversary of Nazi Germany's aggression against Poland, as a result of which six millions of our citizens lost their lives.

In the course of the 35 years of its existence, People's Poland has been making relentless efforts to avert the danger of a new war and to build foundations of a lasting peace in Europe and in the world at large. Particularly intensive activities of Polish diplomacy have been directed at the elimination of material means of waging wars, with special emphasis on the weapons of mass destruction.

I should like to recall that as early as 33 years ago, during the very first session of the United Nations General Assembly, on 24 January 1946, the Polish delegation asked the General Assembly to recommend the national representatives to the United Nations to accept a solemn undertaking envisaging inter alia that

"the Members of the United Nations shall exclude from their national armaments atomic weapons and all armaments for mass destruction".
For quite comprehensible reasons, the main efforts of my country have been focussed on promoting political and military détente in Europe — an area of the highest concentration of armed forces and sophisticated weapons.

Some early and well-known examples of Poland's active involvement in this direction can be found in our proposals for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe or for freezing nuclear armaments in the same area. And although the ideas put forward by Poland at that time did not materialize in Europe, they originated a wide discussion on the subject followed by a number of concrete initiatives regarding the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, Latin America being the foremost example.

At present, the particular attention of my Government is concentrated on the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Our constructive approach to these talks has been manifested inter alia by our submitting, together with other socialist States, a number of proposals aimed at reaching an equitable agreement in accordance with the principle of undiminished security of all parties involved. We sincerely hope that these proposals, which represent a considerable accommodation of the views of our Western partners, will meet with a positive response from these last.

This applies also to a series of other initiatives which the socialist countries put forward with the view of fostering military détente in Europe, particularly the initiatives contained in the Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the States-Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, adopted in November 1973, and in the Communiqué of the meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of those States, held in May 1979. All measures proposed in those documents, including the proposal to convene a Conference of all Signatories of the Final Act at Helsinki for the purpose of easing military confrontation in Europe, aim at halting the arms race and opening up avenues towards real disarmament.

Special attention is due, in our view, to the important and timely proposals submitted in his Berlin address of 6 October by President Leonid Brezhnev. The proposals are clearly aimed at the reduction of tensions as well as the strengthening of mutual confidence and détente at a much lower level of military involvement in the crucial area of deployment of both Warsaw Treaty and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces.
We do hope that, in seriously examining those essential issues, some Western Governments will put aside short-sighted or purely domestic considerations and find it possible to adopt a positive attitude, at a time when it is still relatively easy and does not require the undoing of decisions adopted previously at a political or military level.

As was emphasized in the reply of my Government to the Secretary-General's note regarding the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the special session devoted to disarmament,

"In the entirety of its efforts towards disarmament, Poland is guided by the letter and spirit of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session ..."

"Consonant as they are with the priorities approved by the tenth special session, the joint initiatives by Poland and other socialist States reflect special emphasis on nuclear disarmament and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction." (A/34/495, p. 8, paras. 4, 5)

I should like to turn therefore to some of the substantive questions raised both in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly and in the factual report which the Committee on Disarmament has submitted to the current session of the General Assembly in document A/34/27.

With its expanded membership, and with only one nuclear-weapon Power conspicuous for its continued absence from the negotiating table, that organ for multilateral disarmament negotiations has become more representative than ever. As my delegation sees it, an important factor sustaining the Committee's role has been its resolve to seek the attainment of its objectives on the basis of consensus -- the only practicable basis for reaching decisions with clear implications for the security interests of States.

It is, however, regrettable that despite its busy session the Committee has not been able to report to the General Assembly any significant progress on the major issues it discussed. It is especially disappointing in view of the fact that both the discussions and the proposals submitted in the Committee have provided a sufficiently good basis for reaching more substantive results on several key issues.
Perhaps the most important and urgent one has been the question of nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear arms race, which, as we know, corresponds to the priorities set forth in the Final Document of the special session. It is also an area where Poland has always attached great importance to early and meaningful progress that would eventually result in lessening and ultimately the eliminating once and for all of the menace of nuclear conflict.

Seeking to contribute to the attainment of that objective, the socialist countries, Poland included, came forward in the Committee with a proposal to undertake negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing stockpiles of them until they have been completely destroyed.

The underlying premise of the initiative taken by the socialist countries has been their conviction that the only workable alternative to the unrestrained build-up of nuclear arsenals is a determined search by the international community for security based on a lower level of nuclear arms. In our considered view, such a lower level can and should be reached through gradual and balanced steps, with due respect for the principle of undiminished security of all parties.
It has been suggested now and again, with some justification though, that endeavours deployed so far to advance the cause of disarmament through various measures of arms limitation have had only a limited success in slowing down the arms race and preventing an increase in arsenals world-wide. My delegation firmly believes that the initiative of the socialist States to commence early consultations, with a view to preparing for substantive negotiations within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, amounts in fact to a major departure from the concept of mere arms control and a step towards tangible disarmament.

While the Committee has missed the opportunity of going into the substance of the proposal at its 1979 session, it has had, nevertheless, a useful exchange of views on the elements of and the prerequisites for comprehensive negotiations on nuclear disarmament. It has, in fact, begun to chart a promising course of action it could follow in that regard in 1980. My delegation is confident that the General Assembly will not fail to urge the Committee to proceed with all dispatch and determination to discharge its mandate in the field of nuclear disarmament at its forthcoming session.

Poland has always supported the relevant General Assembly resolutions addressing themselves to legitimate security concerns of States. That is also why we joined with other socialist States in submitting a draft international convention on the strengthening of security of non-nuclear-weapon States - originally the initiative of the USSR.

The security preoccupations of non-nuclear-weapon States, first recognized in Security Council resolution 255 (1968), are among the most fundamental common concerns of nations under any geographical latitude.

The consideration which the Committee on Disarmament has so far given to that issue, even though not conclusive, holds an optimistic promise. In fact, a unique situation obtains in which the desires of non-nuclear-weapon States are matched by a corresponding readiness of the nuclear-weapon Powers to work out a solution acceptable to both. Such a solution, in our view, should reinforce the régime of non-proliferation, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, generate renewed and sound
confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States that they would never be the targets of nuclear weapons or of the threat of their use.

In the view of my delegation, this requirement would be fully met by the formula sponsored by the socialist States covering all countries which resolve not to acquire nuclear weapons and not to allow them to be stationed on their territory. Intrinsically linked to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), such a solution would be based on easily identifiable criteria as to which States qualify to obtain such assurances. Agreement in this regard could be reached between each and any nuclear-weapon Power and any individual non-nuclear-weapon State. Alternatively, and preferably, agreement on universally binding juridical guarantees could be reached through an international convention embracing nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States.

The question of the prohibition of the development, production and deployment of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, initiated by the Soviet Union, has for some years now commanded the attention of the international community, both in the General Assembly and in Geneva, as an important and imaginative proposal. All along, its overriding objective has been to erect effective barriers to halt the technological arms race in the most sinister area - that of weapons of mass annihilation.

It is with real satisfaction that my delegation welcomes the agreed joint proposal of the USSR and the United States on major elements of a treaty to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons which, following long and arduous bilateral negotiations, were submitted to the Committee on Disarmament. We deem that document to be a suitable basis for specific negotiations with a view to elaborating the final language of yet another multilateral arms prevention agreement. We are confident that after due study of the Soviet-American document in State capitals, the Committee will be able, as of the beginning of its next session, to proceed expeditiously to constructive work to develop the major elements of a treaty into a formal document for its submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.
(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

While the preliminary agreement to outlaw radiological weapons constitutes an important step in the endeavour to ban the development of specific types of new weapons of mass destruction, we cannot relinquish our aspiration to elaborate a universal and comprehensive treaty that would decree once and for all that no scientific or technological breakthrough can ever be used for purposes of mass destruction. Such a treaty remains an important objective for my country.

One way to promote that goal, in our view, is to turn to competent experts for their objective opinion as to when and where we ought to be on the alert against the possibility of emergence of a new weapon of mass destruction or a new system of such weapons. The case of the nuclear neutron weapons, the prohibition of which the Committee on Disarmament should consider with renewed vigour, proves that a little prevention might be better than a lot of cure.

In my general statement today, I should also like to make some observations on the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, an issue whose pressing urgency is unquestioned.

Clearly, it will be recognized that in this area the primary responsibility must rest with the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves. No multilateral body can legitimately be expected to contribute significantly to the solution of complex technical and military issues which only States possessing nuclear weapons are competent to resolve. The international community is therefore fully entitled to urge the Powers involved in the trilateral negotiations to accelerate the pace of their talks and to bring before the Committee on Disarmament as soon as possible the results of their efforts. Unless that happens, little progress can realistically be expected from the Committee, despite the useful assistance it has been receiving from the group of scientific experts studying international co-operative measures with respect to detection and identification of seismic events.
Of course, my delegation has welcomed with satisfaction the joint report on the progress made in the trilateral negotiations concerned with a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in all environments and on a protocol covering explosions for peaceful purposes. We are confident that the three parties will be able, it is hoped before long, to report more substantial progress, thus making it possible for the Committee to proceed with its negotiations, with a view to elaborating the text of a multilateral agreement in that regard. Of course, it is generally recognized that for such an agreement to become an enduring and effective juridical instrument it will be indispensable for all nuclear-weapon Powers to become parties.

I must admit that I have quite deliberately reserved the final part of my remarks concerning the work of the Committee on Disarmament to chemical disarmament – an area of traditional interest to Poland which for years has spared no effort to advance the cause of the complete elimination of chemical weapons.

My delegation notes with particular gratification the fact that, responding to General Assembly resolution 33/59 A, in whose preparation we had the privilege of co-operating at the thirty-third session with a number of other delegations, the question of the total elimination of chemical weapons has been actively pursued both in the Committee on Disarmament and within the context of the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. This is encouraging news for the prospects of early agreement on the prohibition of all chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles.

Poland considers, as in fact do all the socialist States and many others, that the effective elimination of chemical weapons from the arsenals of States is a question of primary importance which deserves priority consideration and solution. No other course of action would be acceptable for those indiscriminate weapons of mass annihilation which – if ever used – would take a devastating toll in the first place of unprepared and innocent civilians. Indeed, some recent industrial and other accidents with toxic chemical agents confirm that ultimate solution in this area brooks no further delay.
Mr. Wyzner, Poland

It has always been the firm view of the Polish Government that an appropriate treaty on chemical weapons would have to gain universal acceptance and support, in the first place of the permanent members of the Security Council, to endure as an effective disarmament measure. That is why Poland has attached critical importance to the bilateral talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the joint initiative for subsequent presentation to, and finalization in treaty form by, the Committee on Disarmament. The latest report which the negotiators submitted on the progress which they had reached so far signals, in our view, some new positive developments in the cause of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

I need hardly add that, as in the past, the Polish delegation is prepared to take an active part in the preparation and presentation of an appropriate draft resolution calling for the realization of our common objective: the effective, early elimination of all chemical weapons.

One of the main problems which remains a constant centre of attention for Poland is the strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, with the parallel promotion of international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy and nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It is with that end in view that Poland participates in the preparations for the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Our activities in the International Atomic Energy Agency and in what is called London Club are also in line with the same goals.

A question has been formulated as to the most suitable ways for practical implementation of the wide range of ideas and recommendations contained in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

In the opinion of the Polish delegation, two parallel courses of action seem to be necessary: first, a more effective utilization of existing forums of disarmament negotiations and deliberations. In that respect we are encouraged to note that last June the United Nations Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus recommendations relating to the elements
of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We support the Commission's view that, following their examination by the General Assembly, those recommendations should be transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament for further action.

Among the new organs which were called into being by the tenth special session was the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies. We are happy to observe that during the brief year of its existence and work, the Board has been able to offer the Secretary-General and, through him, the General Assembly valuable and helpful advice on such questions as suitable topics for comprehensive programmes of disarmament studies, or establishing an international institute for disarmament research. My delegation hopes that in the future as well the collective wisdom of the Board will assist this Committee in solving the intricate issues of disarmament studies and that, following the example of the most recent session, we shall not hesitate to call for the Board's expertise in the matters within its terms of reference.

The second course of action is the undertaking of concrete preparations for convening, as soon as possible after the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, a world disarmament conference with universal participation and with such terms of reference as would allow it to proceed to more radical solutions to the problems of disarmament.

It is also evident that, in order to overcome existing obstacles on the road to real disarmament, there is a pressing need for closer, constructive co-operation among all States, irrespective of their socio-political systems. For that reason Poland welcomes the innovative initiative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic that a declaration on international co-operation for disarmament be adopted and fully supports such a draft of that declaration as was eloquently introduced to the First Committee by Vice-Minister Vejvoda.

The road leading to genuine disarmament is complex, at times requiring meticulous work and littered with obstacles; it can be travelled only through closer international co-operation leading to effective negotiations, mutual understanding and confidence. In our view the Czechoslovak proposal fully
meets that purpose. Were it approved, it would stimulate the political will of States and at the same time create an appropriate framework for the realization of its goals, with its formulation of basic requirements and principles that should determine the conduct of States in disarmament negotiations. Thus the draft declaration urges all States to strive to achieve concrete measures of disarmament through the implementation of those requirements and principles, as enumerated under various chapters of the draft.

In order for those plans to materialize one must, as the draft declaration logically assumes, create the necessary climate based on repudiation of the concepts of seeking military superiority or intimidation, as well as the propaganda of war. The climate should be based rather on the ideals of peace, trust and friendly relations between peoples. But on the other hand international détente and all the positive political processes that are related to it can be genuinely lasting only if they are backed up by effective steps to bring about military détente as well.

We believe that perhaps the most sound and convincing asset of the draft declaration is the presentation and, subsequently, the logical realization of that idea of the interrelation between political and military détente. We do hope that the important initiative by Czechoslovakia will draw the support it certainly deserves of all States committed to détente and disarmament.

In order to come closer to the attainment of the final goal of all our efforts, which remains general and complete disarmament, we need to act with perseverance and dedication both in the field of actual disarmament negotiations and in the broader perspective of bringing about conditions which would facilitate making a decisive breakthrough in that area.
One of the most significant categories of measures which in the long run can decisively influence the course and pace of disarmament negotiations are steps directed at the elimination of distrust and prejudice among nations, at shaping in the minds of peoples and, first of all, of young generations, the attitudes that will encourage efforts in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. That is why Poland attaches such great importance to the translation into reality of the provisions of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace (General Assembly resolution 33/73), adopted at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly on our initiative.

As members of the Committee are aware, the day after tomorrow we shall mark the beginning of Disarmament Week 1979. I am very pleased to inform you of the modest contribution of my country to the observance of that week in the form of assistance in the production of an official United Nations poster issued on that occasion designed by a well-known Polish artist, Karol Sliwka. The theme of the Disarmament Week poster, which at present is being distributed throughout the world, is "Mankind must choose: halt the arms race or face annihilation".

In this spirit, I shall conclude by quoting from the message of the people of Poland to the peoples and parliaments of the world made last September on the fortieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War:

"Let us make a collective effort to ensure mankind a secure future. May lasting and universal peace unite peoples, States and continents".

Mr. KLESTIL (Austria): Mr. Chairman, the United Nations and, in particular, this Committee, which is meeting this year under your most able and experienced chairmanship, has over the past years been a constant and at times a bitter critic of the snail's pace of the disarmament process. The frustrations and more than justified anxieties of peoples all round the world who are threatened with annihilation and seemingly unable to diminish this threat have been clearly reflected in many statements delivered in this Committee year after year and in scores of often repetitive resolutions of the Assembly which urge, implore, command and demand action towards disarmament. To be sure, this year's debate on disarmament will follow the same path; and it could hardly be otherwise.
At this very minute $1 million are being added to world military expenditures, which now run at an annual rate of about $410,000 million. This constitutes an increase, in constant prices, of about 50 per cent over the past two decades.

This arms race in the nuclear and conventional fields, which was accurately described by one of the leading statesmen of the second part of this century as a "marathon of irrationalism", has long since reached such proportions and developed such a dynamic of its own that each and every step towards a mere limitation of armaments is by far offset by much greater advances in arms technology. However, the fact remains that this process of madness has to be stopped, because in the words of the Final Document of the tenth special session, "Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation". (Resolution S-10/2, para. 18)

The longer that concrete and militarily significant measures of genuine disarmament that would effectively halt and then reverse the arms race remain delayed, the harder it will become to control these developments. Therein, ultimately, lies the justification of our annual disarmament debate, as frustrating as it might appear, and therein lies also the justification of my country's participation in the relevant efforts of this Assembly.

In our view, a small country like Austria, with a relatively low level of armaments, which certainly does not threaten the security of any other country but which, like many other countries, is threatened by the enormous danger of the arms race, can best make its contribution to this annual debate by stating its views on the issues before this Committee in as clear and unambiguous terms as possible. This I should like to undertake in my statement.

By far the most important and most urgent issue on our agenda is the question of nuclear disarmament, and I intend to devote my statement primarily to a discussion of disarmament measures in the nuclear field. For Austria, as for many, if not all, other countries the existence of vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons is the chief cause for concern. Not even the most extensive interpretation of a country's subjective needs for security can furnish adequate justification for the maintenance of stockpiles of nuclear weapons sufficient to kill all mankind several times over. In this connexion, I should like to recall that the primary responsibility for disarmament rests with those States that have the largest military arsenals - and first and foremost with the two leading nuclear-weapon States.
We certainly welcome the signing of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union on 18 June of this year. This was a very important step in the process of the reduction of tensions between East and West. An impetus to that process is indeed urgently needed. Therefore, the political importance of that Treaty cannot be overrated. This positive evaluation of SALT II, however, cannot make us forget that the Treaty represents only a step on the way towards nuclear disarmament. Our satisfaction with the signing of SALT II is combined with the earnest hope that the Treaty will soon be ratified and that it will be followed by further negotiations leading towards the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and fissionable material for weapons purposes, as well as towards a progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document. We should like to reiterate our hope that such negotiations, to which the two leading nuclear Powers are committed by the clear terms of the Final Document, will be carried out in good faith and with the necessary political will in order to produce significant progress in the near future. Such progress should then enable the other nuclear-weapon States to join in the negotiating process, thus bringing us closer to global nuclear disarmament.

May I also express, at this stage, my delegation's concern about the arms race in the field of medium and intermediate-range missiles and tactical nuclear weapons on the European continent. We should like to urge all Powers concerned to show maximum restraint and to start as soon as possible appropriate negotiations to put an end to this very alarming aspect of the nuclear-arms race. Of course, in this respect more than anywhere else the close interrelationship between nuclear and conventional armaments is most apparent. Disarmament efforts must therefore address both fields in a parallel way in order to have any chance of success.

In talking about the awesome problems posed by the ever-increasing build-up of nuclear-weapon arsenals, the Austrian delegation would also like to refer to the proposal concerning "negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed", which has been presented to the Committee on Disarmament
by the Soviet Union and a number of other countries in document CD/4. We consider that document to be a very timely and serious proposal, which must first of all be judged in the light of the ongoing process of strategic arms limitation negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as on the basis of paragraphs 50 and 29 of the Final Document adopted at the special session. The utmost importance that the Austrian Government attaches to an undisturbed and speedy continuation of the SALT negotiations is well known and hardly needs to be reiterated. At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that the SALT process, at least as perceived until now, concerns only the strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons that are in the possession of the two negotiating partners.
Therefore, in order to implement the far-reaching goals contained in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, a broader concept of nuclear disarmament negotiations will have to be envisaged. We see the proposal contained in document CD/4 as one possible step in this direction. A careful study of this proposal reveals that it contains a great number of interesting ideas; these, however, seem to require further clarification and elaboration.

I should like to mention two points that are of fundamental importance in this context. First, it is the considered view of the Austrian Government that disarmament negotiations must not jeopardize the existing, over-all balance of power, precarious as that may be. Certainly, document CD/4 addresses itself to this problem and states that:

"the degree of participation of individual nuclear States in measures at each stage should be determined taking into account the quantitative and qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and of other States concerned." (CD/4, p. 2)

In this connexion, our position is clear. The degree of participation of individual nuclear-weapon States, and indeed the measure of obligations they would have to assume, must depend on the size of their total military strength, including nuclear arsenals as well as conventional weapons. In our view, it is not enough to state that "the existing balance in the field of nuclear strength" should remain undisturbed. Disarmament efforts must take into account the interrelations of all different armament systems. Therefore, throughout its various stages, disarmament must be considered in relation to the existing balance of power, as manifested both through nuclear and through conventional forces.

Secondly, adequate verification is an indispensable element for all disarmament efforts. In the context of the negotiations for the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), the two participants agreed not to interfere with their "national means of verification," that is, primarily, their satellite reconnaissance
capabilities. These instruments will certainly not suffice to monitor the eventual far-reaching disarmament measures that are contemplated in document CD/4.

Further clarifications, therefore, going beyond the principle contained in that document that "agreement should also be reached on the necessary verification measures," appear to be essential before we can fully assess the proposal before us. In this context, the Austrian delegation maintains that international verification measures would have to be given an importance place among the various monitoring methods envisaged. We should not forget that the international community already has a very valuable instrument at hand for the verification of nuclear non-armsament. I am referring to the control mechanisms of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The experiences and verification procedures of the Agency should play a major role in any effort leading to real nuclear disarmament. In this connexion, let me express the hope that, as an important step in this direction, those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so might soon find it possible to place their non-military nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards.

These are the comments we wished to make on this important proposal at this stage. As I indicated earlier, we believe that the proposal made by the Soviet Union deserves in-depth study on the part of all Governments and especially, of course, those immediately concerned.

It would appear obvious that we would not expect the negotiations on this proposal to begin immediately. Indeed, given the delicate and very complex nature of the proposal, considerable time might elapse before concrete talks get under way. It is all the more important, therefore, that negotiations on individual aspects of nuclear disarmament be continued or taken up as soon as possible. I have already referred to the need for further speedy pursuance of the SALT talks.

At the same time, we would sincerely hope that negotiations on an "adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissible material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices" (General Assembly resolution 33/91 H) as called for by the General Assembly might begin as soon as possible. The Austrian
delegation continues to support this approach, and we should like to encourage the Canadian and Australian delegations to proceed with their efforts in this field.

Within the larger framework of arms control measures in the nuclear field, there is of course one particular measure which, in the opinion of the vast majority of States, is long overdue. Sixteen years have now passed since the conclusion of the partial test ban Treaty in 1963. Despite long-standing commitments contained in the preamble of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and various other international instruments, despite the vast number of General Assembly resolutions passed on this subject, and despite the most obvious significance of a comprehensive test-ban treaty — both for efforts to put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons — we must once again register our deep-felt disappointment that the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty have not been concluded. Furthermore, reliable sources indicate that the nuclear Powers are currently increasing their testing activities. At the same time, it appears certain — not least on the basis of the findings of the ad hoc Group of Seismic Experts established by the Committee on Disarmament, in which Austria is actively participating — that adequate answers to the relevant verification problems that are generally presented as the major unresolved issues can be found. We are therefore forced to draw the conclusion that the urgently awaited breakthrough in the negotiations is primarily a matter of political decision making. We therefore urge the three negotiating partners to take the necessary decisions so as to enable the Committee on Disarmament to embark on multilateral negotiations leading towards a widely acceptable draft treaty. In this connexion, I should like to express my concern about the lack of substance in the report on the ongoing negotiations that was presented to the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament. Even were the bilateral negotiations still not concluded by the beginning of next year — much to our disappointment — we would at least hope for a much more substantial report, on the basis of which the Committee could finally start its work.
It is our opinion that, in order to be acceptable to the international community at large, a comprehensive test ban must be of a truly comprehensive nature without loopholes as far as the scope of the agreement is concerned. Furthermore, the treaty should be of indefinite duration or, if the three nuclear-weapon States which are currently negotiating on a comprehensive test ban should only be prepared to accept a treaty with a certain time-limit, it should provide for its automatic prolongation unless the contracting partners are for reasons of vital interests forced to withdraw from the treaty. Finally, if the treaty is to become truly multilateral, it would have to contain adequate measures to ensure that all States parties have the necessary possibilities to participate in a meaningful way in the verification process, as has been called for in paragraph 31 of the Final Document.

The Austrian delegation has over the past years underlined the fact that the question of horizontal nuclear proliferation is, in the first instance, a political one and therefore needs first and foremost a political answer.

In the last years nuclear technology has become globally accessible. Today fissionable material for atomic weapon purposes could be produced by many countries. Hence it is ultimately the political will not to proliferate that counts more than technical barriers to nuclear proliferation. The decision of any country to create an independent nuclear arms capacity would introduce additional dangers for regional and international security. Austria is convinced that effective prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is in the interest of all States. It should therefore be pursued with great determination. We are equally convinced that a country's decision not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons constitutes renunciation of a sovereign right in the interest of the international community and that today's nuclear-weapon States would have to provide an adequate response in the form of similar self-restraint. Hence early and concrete steps for nuclear disarmament are of the greatest importance and urgency.

In this connexion, and in view of the forthcoming second Non-Proliferation-Treaty Review Conference, I should like once again to recall that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is based on mutual rights and obligations of all
contracting Parties. Only if the nuclear Powers recognize the interrelations between their own obligations and those of the non-nuclear-weapon States will the Treaty have a chance of survival. Only under these conditions will it be possible to persuade those countries that have so far preferred to remain aloof to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Austria was one of the first States to sign and ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty and subsequently to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Agency's activities in the field of safeguards are of great importance. We have always given it our full support and we shall continue to do so in the future.

Nevertheless, I should like to repeat that a political consensus will have to be found to solve the problem of nuclear proliferation. The following must be the main elements of such a consensus: general agreement on the dangers of any form of proliferation both vertical and horizontal; the elaboration of generally acceptable non-discriminatory safeguards; an unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to engage in nuclear disarmament; and recognition of the legitimate interest of many industrialized and developing countries to take advantage, if they so wish, of the various possibilities offered by the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

I should like to conclude with a brief discussion of one additional important issue which has a bearing on non-proliferation efforts: arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have been the subject of intensive discussions in the Committee on Disarmament in the course of this year. This in-depth consideration has certainly contributed to a further clarification of the extremely complex political and legal problems involved. As the Austrian delegation has already pointed out during last year's discussion of this issue Austria, a country which already 24 years ago formally renounced the acquisition or production of nuclear weapons and which, because of its status of permanent neutrality, does not take part in military alliances, takes a particular interest in this question.
We consider that non-nuclear-weapon States have every right to obtain such assurances on the part of the nuclear-weapon States and we are convinced that such measures, which, however, must not be seen as a substitute for nuclear disarmament, can strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

We have therefore welcomed the relevant unilateral declarations which have been issued by the Governments of nuclear-weapon States, and we consider these declarations to be binding upon the respective Powers under international law. Furthermore, we consider that these declarations do not create any further obligations on the part of Austria, in addition to those into which Austria has already entered.

There can be no doubt that the unilateral declarations, important as they are, would gain in effectiveness if it should prove possible to co-ordinate those pledges and mould them into a common formula. We fully realize, however, that this might be a formidable task, because the existing declarations in their diversity reflect the different strategic doctrines and distinct security perceptions of the nuclear-weapon States, which are not likely to change in the foreseeable future. In any case, the responsibility to find a common formula for security assurances will primarily rest upon the nuclear-weapon States themselves, although further participation in such efforts by non-nuclear-weapon States would certainly be fruitful. It will be necessary to follow a flexible approach in this matter and, in the view of my delegation, it is certainly too early to give any clear-cut preference to any specific form in which these assurances might find their final expression. For a country like Austria, which has committed itself to a policy of neutrality, the idea of an international convention raises a number of questions that have to be studied very closely. As a matter of principle, it is not acceptable to such a country to confer upon an outside Power the responsibility for the maintenance of its own security. It was for those reasons that already last year we put on record our reservations concerning the so-called positive security guarantees. I wish to restate here that it is and must be up to the country which is a victim of an act of aggression or threat of such an act to decide by itself whether and to what extent any assistance offered in this regard will be accepted. Furthermore, we also have reservations on the use of the word "guarantees" as such, which in any case carries with it the implication of a certain outside responsibility for the security of a sovereign State.
I have presented Austria's views on some of the most urgent issues on our disarmament agenda. I hope my delegation will be allowed to refer at a somewhat later stage of our debate to a number of other items which we consider to be of equal importance. I should like at this stage to summarize the three fundamental reasons which make disarmament - in spite of its tremendous difficulties and formidable obstacles - essential in this interdependent world.

Disarmament must lead us towards a safer world, which will no longer be characterized by a more than precarious balance of terror, and thus ultimately ensure human survival. Disarmament must lend credibility to the principle of renunciation of force, pledged by all Members of this Organization, and thus increase mutual confidence. Disarmament must release the resources necessary for a more rapid economic development and thus pave the way towards a more equitable international order and a better world for all.

Disarmament must, therefore, be seen as part and parcel of an over-all policy of peace and security based on the principle of the renunciation of force, mutual confidence and economic development.

Mr. KOMATINA (Yugoslavia): The debate on disarmament this year - happily taking place, Sir, under your experienced chairmanship - should in our view, in the first place enable the General Assembly to ascertain the results that have been achieved in implementing the decisions of the tenth special session and to draw appropriate conclusions for the forthcoming period. With this purpose in mind, the General Assembly should examine the reports that the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission have submitted to it on the basis of their respective mandates. In order to draw up a balance sheet of what has been achieved since the special session, it is also indispensable to examine briefly the global picture in the field of the arms race and of disarmament, taking into account regional and bilateral negotiations.
The special session has laid down the principles, determined the responsibilities and obligations of countries and indicated the ways of solving priority tasks. The special session has, without any doubt, greatly stimulated the involvement of all countries and set in motion a number of new initiatives. Some initial results have been achieved, primarily in the field of the active involvement of the United Nations. However, on the whole, no genuine results have yet been achieved in implementing the priority tasks which were unanimously adopted at the special session.

The causes for this should be sought, in the view of my delegation, in inveterate policies that rely on the use of force and tend towards domination, as well as in the ingrained belief that more weapons mean greater security. The maintenance of an illusory balance of forces is the first and last postulate of the policy of great Powers and antagonistic blocs which tend to impose themselves as the basic structure of international relations. All this is inevitably accompanied by stepped-up rivalry in establishing spheres of interests and the use of various forms of intervention and interference in the internal affairs of independent countries. In this context, persistent attempts to legalize the practice of interventionism are cause for special concern.

The arms race has not been halted. On the contrary, we are witnesses to its intensification, which directly threatens the independence and security of an ever larger number of countries and the right of peoples to free and unhampered development. Unless urgent measures are taken to halt and reverse such a course of development, the arms race will assume new and even more dangerous aspects. At the same time, this state of affairs threatens to obliterate the results achieved with regard to the democratization of international relations and to jeopardize the process of détente, which - owing to its bloc constraints - is in a state of stagnation, while containing certain elements of crisis as well.
My Government has welcomed the signing of SALT II. The significance and scope of this treaty will depend on the steps that follow, that is, on an early start of the next phase of negotiations, which should lead to the adoption of genuine measures of disarmament in general, and of nuclear disarmament in particular.

Yugoslavia supports every constructive step leading to a relaxation of tensions, the halting of the arms race and the taking of measures of genuine disarmament. We appreciate every proposal conducive to the lessening of the danger of armed confrontation, especially in Europe, where we are faced with the biggest concentration of military forces and modern weaponry. It is within this context that we view the initiative of the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Leonid Brezhnev, concerning the readiness of the Soviet Union to withdraw 20,000 soldiers and 1,000 tanks from the territory of the German Democratic Republic. We feel that this proposal deserves to be studied with the greatest attention.

In addition to SALT II, we believe that it is indispensable to intensify the negotiations on the reduction of armaments and armed forces in Central Europe and to overcome the state of stagnation which has characterized these negotiations for a number of years. We also consider that conditions in Europe have become ripe to take up more resolutely the consideration of all forms of disarmament, both nuclear and conventional.

The study of problems of conventional armaments should be tackled more boldly, in accordance with the priorities laid down by the special session. In this connexion, we have in mind particularly the responsibilities of the countries possessing the largest military arsenals, as well as the need to effect a reduction of conventional armaments. We believe that the United Nations Disarmament Commission could, in addition to performing the priority tasks that have been agreed upon, work out principles and elements relevant to a comprehensive consideration of this problem.
The elaboration of confidence-building measures is, in our opinion, also significant. The implementation of these measures could foster the creation of a favourable climate for the taking of measures of regional disarmament. The experience of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is encouraging, and we consider that favourable conditions exist for further progress in this respect.

At their Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government, the non-aligned countries - which have always been in the forefront of efforts and initiatives aimed at general and complete disarmament - devoted due attention to the problem of disarmament in all its complexity. They reiterated their readiness to strive for the implementation of the decisions of the tenth special session and indicated the ways and means for achieving this. Within this context, they laid special stress on the central role that the United Nations has to play in this regard.

As for the first session of the new Committee on disarmament, established by the special session, I should like to set forth some of our views concerning the work of that body, and its place and role in the system of negotiations on disarmament problems.

It would, of course, be premature to draw definitive conclusions and make final appraisals now. However, the Committee's activity over a period of five months enables us to make some specific comments and to note certain tendencies.

Two distinct impressions are embodied in our appraisal: first, satisfaction over the fact that the Committee has succeeded, on the whole in solving questions relating to procedure and the organization of its work; and, secondly, concern that the Committee has not been able to make progress with respect to the consideration and solving of substantive disarmament issues. Unfortunately, the report submitted by the Committee to the General Assembly does not allow us to draw any other conclusion.
Particularly disquieting is the fact that negotiations on disarmament, viewed as a whole, are constantly lagging behind the real needs of the international community. They are not following the rhythm and direction dictated by the ever more rapid progress of science and technology, particularly in the field of armaments. No less alarming is the fact that precisely those countries which have been leading the arms race are reluctant to assign to multilateral negotiations the importance that they really deserve. Such a position of leading military Powers and blocs has had the effect of limiting the scope of multilateral negotiating bodies on disarmament problems and, in certain cases, of impeding their work. Regrettably, the first experiences indicate that no positive changes can be noted in this respect.
As a result of the decision of the tenth special session, the Committee on Disarmament has become the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament problems. By stressing this, I do not want to imply that the Committee has acquired the exclusive right to negotiate on disarmament problems. On the other hand, however, this does not at all mean that there exist disarmament problems with which the Committee should not and cannot be concerned merely because some of its individual members are engaged in separate negotiations on such problems.

The separate negotiations that are going on, for instance, on the prohibition of chemical weapons or on a comprehensive test ban should be included in the negotiations of the Committee, since they have to reflect the interests of, and ensure compliance by, all countries. If the participants in these separate negotiations make the work of the Committee conditional on their prior agreements, then we should rightly ask ourselves whether these separate negotiations actually promote the solving of disarmament issues and whether such agreements can obtain international consensus.

We are confident that it is possible to achieve a useful and constructive concurrence between multilateral negotiations in the Committee and separate negotiations that are under way outside its framework. The submission of a comprehensive report on the state of separate negotiations would enable the Committee to start substantive negotiations designed to elaborate treaties on a chemical test ban and the prohibition of chemical weapons. At the same time, that would be a sign of a positive attitude towards multilateral negotiations conducted within the framework of the Committee and towards the Committee as a whole.

The Committee should not be understood as being a body whose role will be reduced to the endorsement and forwarding to the General Assembly of texts of international agreements. By reason of its character and place in the system of negotiations, the Committee should, taking into account the priorities embodied in the Programme of Action of the special session and recommendations of the General Assembly, initiate and conduct its negotiations independently, and exercise a direct and active influence on all negotiating processes and their outcome. It goes without saying that it is necessary for the Committee to enjoy the full support and co-operation of all its members. Only in that case will the Committee be able to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it.
A report has been submitted on the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and my delegation will comment on it later. How I should like to express our satisfaction over the successful start of the Commission's activity and the first results achieved by it.

The priority task of the Commission, concerned with the consideration of elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, has already been fulfilled. All the Member States have taken part in the work of the Commission and a large number of countries have made, individually or jointly, concrete contributions. The atmosphere which prevailed during the Commission's work, the way in which the positions were co-ordinated and, finally, the adoption of decisions have confirmed the political justification for reviving the work of the Commission. This has confirmed our belief and that of a great number of other - especially non-aligned - countries, that the United Nations is able to solve very complex and difficult tasks, if and when there is a common political will of Member States.

In our opinion, the first session of the Commission has completely justified our expectations. We hope that, on the basis of its mandate, the Commission will continue to contribute to the solving of various problems in the field of disarmament and, thereby, to the implementation of the decisions of the special session.

The special session has clearly determined the priorities and courses of action in the field of disarmament, which, of course, are valid today. The situation with which we are confronted one-year-and-a-half after the special session gives rise to anxiety owing to the absence of concrete results in implementing the Programme of Action. We must note, with regret, that the conclusions of the programme concerning the initiation of new negotiations on disarmament problems, with the accent on the special responsibility of leading nuclear Powers, have not been implemented. In the same way, no results have been achieved in negotiations on some specific questions of disarmament which have been taking place for a long time.
There is no need to emphasize the significance of the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty for halting the nuclear arms race and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The tripartite negotiations which have been going on for a number of years are continuing, unfortunately, at a pace and along a course determined exclusively by their participants. In the meantime, the nuclear-weapon States continue their tests and exert constant efforts to improve their systems of nuclear weapons.

The failure to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty is endangering some of the results achieved so far in the field of prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. We have in mind, of course, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Without a comprehensive test ban, without taking resolute measures to halt the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is unrealistic to expect that the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be able to play, lastingly and effectively, the role which was assigned to it. Confidence in the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the universally acceptable basis for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons depends primarily on the readiness of leading nuclear-weapon States to embark on the road of limitation and reduction of their nuclear potentials. The second Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which will be held next year, will undoubtedly provide an opportunity to examine these questions in greater detail and to draw appropriate conclusions.

In earlier years my delegation has already had the opportunity to oppose resolutely attempts aimed at denying or at limiting — under the guise of prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons — the sovereign right of all States to have access to nuclear technology and to use it for peaceful purposes. We have underlined our firm belief that any restriction in this respect, resulting from discriminatory acts or the monopoly of some countries, would be at variance with the right of every State to unhampered social and economic development. We continue to believe that it is necessary to achieve, on the broader international plane, solutions guaranteeing the free transfer of nuclear technology and its use in the interest of accelerated development of non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly developing ones, with an appropriate system of international control to be applied without discrimination.
I have dealt only with a certain number of issues on the agenda of the First Committee. In the course of our work, we shall have the opportunity to state our views on some other problems as well.

In conclusion, I wish to point out that the complex character of the problem of disarmament should not be used as an excuse to justify the slowness of negotiations and the inadequate results achieved in this field. Readiness to search for solutions and determination to achieve them are a decisive factor in all negotiations. Such readiness, persistence and determination have not always been manifested in the negotiations so far, precisely by those participants who bear the greatest responsibility for the final outcome. Therein lies also one of the main reasons for the present unsatisfactory state of negotiations on disarmament and the failure to achieve genuine results over a number of years. Such a situation makes it incumbent on every one of us, and on the United Nations as a whole, to exert constant efforts with a view to implementing the decisions we have adopted and the obligations we have assumed in common. Because, as we must be aware, without tangible success in halting the arms race and adopting genuine disarmament measures, all efforts to create a new system of international political and economic relations will remain vain and the results achieved will remain fragile.

Mr. CANALES (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation will begin its participation in the work on the agenda at the present session by tendering to you, Mr. Chairman, our warm congratulations on your election to preside over the work of the First Committee, and through you to congratulate the members of the Bureau. I trust that we shall make effective progress in our deliberations that will lead to our making a fruitful contribution to the work of disarmament.

Disarmament, or, at least, at the present stage, control over armaments in their different fields, is without any doubt the greatest contribution towards the strengthening of international peace, which is the primary responsibility and objective of our Organization.
This is a clear proof of the fact that we must lay down basic foundations through the elaboration of a programme for true disarmament, that will allow us in turn to formulate treaties, agreements or conventions acceptable to all States, and thus lead us progressively to general and complete disarmament under strict international control. This is the ultimate objective that we have been seeking in vain for more than three decades.

Every day and every second that passes without new effective progress being made in stemming the arms race means the construction or perfection of thousands and thousands of weapons intended to eliminate countless human lives in the event of a war which might break out in any part of the world as a result of the atmosphere of tension surrounding international relations.

Perpetual peace, the aspiration of all mankind, has thus far been only a Utopian concept, impossible to achieve. It has been only a glorious pipe-dream, a deep-felt hope, as has been proved in universal history over the course of centuries.

Governments and peoples tend to forget the experiences of the past, the horrors of conflict are only a sad memory which time itself manages to erase. And so, countries return to resort to violence to resolve their disputes.

Using national security as their yardstick, they prepare instruments for aggression to back and support their international policies. They take this course instead of seeking peace, and basing themselves on a position of complete compliance with the terms of international law, obedience to the principles of the Charter of our Organization, to the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, and to disarmament, which can be obtained only in an atmosphere of trust that must be widened, expanded and strengthened.

War still is and will continue to be the irrational and absurd resort to which countries will turn in the last instance for a solution of their international disputes. The great Powers and those countries that possess powerful military industrial complexes are the ones that must play a decisive role in the maintenance of peace, since it is they that possess the greatest dissuasive powers or the greatest possibilities of controlling the military balance in the different regions of the world.
With the extraordinary progress achieved by science and technology, war is becoming increasingly cruel and destructive since the introduction of nuclear weapons. Weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated conventional weapons that cause death, damage and destruction never before achieved, especially among the civilian population, are also stockpiled.

Of these weapons, those that we are called upon with the greatest priority to limit, reduce and eliminate are nuclear weapons, regardless of their system of delivery or military use, whether strategic or tactical, according to their potential.

It is for this reason that this first statement on behalf of my Government at the present session of the General Assembly will deal with all those agenda items that have some bearing on the military or peaceful uses of nuclear energy, its proliferation, nuclear tests, denuclearized zones, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States, and other related subjects.

My delegation is convinced that everything that could be said on disarmament has already been said in our debates, particularly in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly and in the contributions of institutions devoted to the study of peace and disarmament.

Yet we believe nevertheless that to reaffirm our policies in these matters would be helpful in order to be more fully aware of disarmament and to stress the urgency called for by these measures if we wish in fact to avoid the horizontal proliferation which daily appears as a real threat in different regions of the world.

The super-Powers in their bilateral talks must assure us that there is in fact a living political will to achieve prompt and timely commitments on the limitation of offensive nuclear weapons and then go on to new agreements that will mean more than a mere balancing of powers, which will only create a nuclear balance that will act as a deterrent factor.
Such guarantees would create the confidence that is necessary for other nuclear Powers, or those about to become nuclear-weapon States, to renounce their desire to possess arsenals of nuclear weapons which would then make them military Powers within the framework of their respective regions.

The present arms race would be very different if, after the harsh experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United Nations had been able to adopt preventive and effective measures to avoid their proliferation.

But today we are confronted with a grave problem created by our weakness and indecisiveness to act at that time, when the great Powers submitted drafts aimed at arriving at general and complete disarmament under strict international control, agreement on which was postponed year after year, after sterile deliberations and negotiations.

The truth is that between the theory which we all believe and the translation of the theory into treaties leading to true disarmament there is an unbridgeable gulf.

International mistrust and antagonistic ideological blocs, the exaggerated attitudes and ambitions for domination of some States, the lack of effective disarmament verification measures, and the lack of authority of international organizations to control this type of activity, militate against the achievement of greater results in matters of disarmament, which are indispensable if we are to strengthen international security.

The SALT II talks now in their last stages of approval were welcomed with optimism by the whole world, since they do in fact lead to effective measures for the limitation and control of strategic nuclear weapons.

Hence, we take the liberty of congratulating the super-Powers on their political decision to take further decisive steps leading to effective nuclear control.

Nevertheless, we feel that the delay in achieving those agreements favours horizontal proliferation, as I have said. This time factor should be taken into account in forthcoming SALT conversations.
The levels of limitation of offensive weapons are too high, but this is because of the weapons already stockpiled. There is still a sufficient number of them capable of destroying much of mankind.

Thus there must be agreements to reduce and ultimately to eliminate those stockpiles. This in turn would encourage multilateral agreements on other decisive steps contained in the comprehensive disarmament plan to make it the very basic document that it should be, once the Committee on Disarmament has finished its work.

Meanwhile, we feel that until research and development of nuclear material by the great Powers continues, and until total and general prohibition of nuclear tests has been arrived at covering underground tests, we still run the risk of a qualitative proliferation taking place. That would make it very difficult to find the required balance and also to reach bilateral agreements.

Horizontal proliferation is another concern to which my delegation wishes to draw attention. In the very near future there will be many States which, through their own development of peaceful nuclear capacity, will be able to put that nuclear capacity to military use, thus shattering the conventional military balance in many parts of the world. Hence all measures to control this aspect of proliferation must obviously be supported.

When speaking of nuclear material in the hands of nuclear Powers, we do not consider tactical nuclear weapons, incalculable stocks of which are scattered in alarming profusion over the heart of Europe by the forces of the military alliances in that part of the world.

We therefore hope that political détente will also cover military aspects, particularly in so far as weapons of mass destruction are concerned. Measures have recently been adopted on reduction of military forces, but these are very difficult to prove, since the quantitative reduction can well be replaced by a greater qualitative capacity, and therefore the quantitative reduction becomes a purely nominal step.

As long as countries carry out nuclear tests, it is impossible for us to avoid nuclear proliferation. The partial test ban Treaty has opened the door to qualitative proliferation, and the lesser nuclear Powers are being allowed to continue to perfect their quantitative vertical proliferation.
Thus, high priority should be given by the Committee on Disarmament to establishing a general and complete treaty, totally prohibiting nuclear-weapons tests.

Not all States agree with the establishment of an immediate moratorium on all types of nuclear tests, until the total preparation of a general and complete test-ban treaty has been arrived at.

The super-Powers have made great progress in the military use of nuclear energy, whereas other States are reluctant to delay their nuclear research until they have achieved a greater level of nuclear preparedness.

Furthermore, those treaties should in no way hinder the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

I wish to speak now of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We believe that it is the inalienable right of non-nuclear States to make a peaceful use of nuclear energy. No country should oppose this progress on the pretext that it might subsequently lead to military use.

The use of nuclear energy in agriculture, food, health, energy and industrialization is growing daily, and all States aspire to develop their own technology in these areas. This is a fact, and we therefore believe that only international co-operation will allow us to have adequate equipment, fissionable material and technological support from the more developed countries, thus enabling us to develop this type of technology which will contribute to our social and economic development, and therefore ensure the better welfare of our peoples.

To oppose this growth is neither just nor equitable, particularly if the non-nuclear States accept the safeguards offered them by the International Atomic Energy Agency whose co-operation daily appears to us to become more valuable, and whose terms of reference in so far as control is concerned should be widened.

The United Nations also plays an important role in disarmament, but it too should be widened until a world body is created that will plan, control and assume responsibility for the achievement of the final objective, namely, the elimination of all types of weapons, and leaving only ways and means to ensure the domestic security of States and an international force for peace-keeping operations.
If the yearly expenditure on the development of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States, which amounts to 20 per cent of the total military expenditures of $90 billion a year, were to be invested in co-operation with other States in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, that would in turn lead to considerable development programmes in the countries of the third world.

Nuclear security is a very important question which must take into account a plan of action for disarmament in the nuclear field. In other words, what are the aspirations of the non-nuclear States that are not responsible for the development of these weapons, and which therefore hope that their devastating effects will not reach their territories to the same extent as they afflict other areas of the world? They aspire to a commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; to the conversion of regions of the world into denuclearized zones; to the avoidance of the effects of atomic radiation; to ensuring that international terrorism cannot lay its hands on nuclear explosives; to the institution of adequate means of verification of weapons control, and so on.

With regard to denuclearized zones, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty on Outer Space and the Treaty on the Sea-bed are all international instruments which have contributed to protecting certain areas of the planet from the use of nuclear bombs — although unfortunately no immediate repercussions have been felt from those treaties since those regions are not inhabited by human beings. That was not the case with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which represents an example of which Latin America can well be proud in that it is a ground-breaking treaty of great importance. A timely initiative in a region of peace, that Treaty gained the consent of the countries of the region to avoiding horizontal nuclear proliferation and to ensuring that the nuclear Powers would not use their nuclear weapons against targets on this continent. Surely that example should be followed in other regions of the world, where the same security is aspired to, as is the case in Africa, the Middle East and the countries of southern Asia. These agreements must be sought persistently and stubbornly, until all States voluntarily join them, after having overcome the obstacles that still arise and after the support of the nuclear Powers for these treaties has been obtained.
Regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear weapon States seek a commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States not to use that type of weapon against their territories, while the former adhere to their commitment not to manufacture, acquire or allow the establishment or transit of that type of weapon in their territories. A firm commitment of that nature will, in itself, be an obstacle to horizontal proliferation.

Adequate and secure procedures of verification of armament control, in accordance with disarmament agreements and any other measures that may be brought to bear will create sufficient confidence to allow us to continue to study the possibility of new disarmament treaties. If we do not muster the use of all technical means at our disposal - namely satellites, radar, aerial photographic and electronic inspection, and even on-site inspection - we shall not be able to create an atmosphere conducive to the adoption of disarmament measures, particularly in the nuclear field. As experience has shown, a promise is not sufficient.

Impartial organs such as the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must be given greater power in order to co-operate in the establishment of this system without thereby implying any interference in the domestic affairs of States.

Verification measures can be used by nations individually, through international agreements.

Different types of disarmament call for different types of verification. If we truly aspire to general and complete disarmament, we must begin to accustom ourselves to accepting different means of verification, whether they be international, regional or bilateral. For the moment, the transfer of nuclear technology must be clearly registered with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Finally, we believe that greater speed is required in our work. The final disarmament programme must be given priority in the Committee on Disarmament so that it may be approved by the General Assembly as quickly as possible. In the meantime, there are many matters that could be dealt with prior to its adoption, especially those which for so many years have been the subject of negotiations.
By delegation attaches the greatest priority to matters dealing with nuclear disarmament, within the context of the plan of action on disarmament, and I would conclude my intervention today by listing the sequence of measures which we believe is called for by nuclear disarmament. The final objective of the process would be the elimination of all types of nuclear weapons or machinery, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Following a logical order for the remaining measures that should be adopted, I would list them as follows: first, an end to scientific and technical research so as to prevent the perfecting of these weapons; second, a moratorium on nuclear tests, pending the adoption of a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear tests; third, continuation of the SALT talks between the super-Powers until nuclear weapons are reduced and eliminated; fourth, the setting of maximum levels for quantitative proliferation of further nuclear capability, in the search for a nuclear balance which will ultimately lead to the elimination of those weapons without prejudice to the security of the nations concerned; fifth, the adoption of adequate measures of verification as an integral part of the general process of nuclear disarmament; sixth, adequate control over the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in non-nuclear-weapon States that will include equipment, fissionable material and technology transferred to those countries, along with the acceptance of IAEA safeguards; seventh, speeding up of the process of creating new demilitarized zones; eighth, control over atomic radiation produced by any nuclear activities which may be carried out; ninth, maximum dissemination to technical organs and world public opinion of information on these subjects, which could make a valuable contribution both to the adoption by countries of their own security measures in case of conflict and to the mobilization of the will to promote political decisions in support of nuclear disarmament.

This is our great task in what is only one aspect of disarmament, although it is the most important, since to fail to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons would spell the final holocaust of mankind.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.