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Chairman: Mr. Ali. (Malaysia)
*Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative
and Budgetary Questions:* Mr. Saha

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in Darfur

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Agenda item 161: Financing of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
(A/62/379, A/62/380 and A/62/540)

1. **The Chairman** drew attention to the letter dated 2 October 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly, contained in document A/62/379.

2. **Mr. Yeo** (Officer-in-Charge, Peacekeeping Financing Division), introducing the Secretary-General's report on the financing of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008 (A/62/380), said that the proposed budget currently before the Committee was based on the phased deployment of the Operation's military personnel. The full authorized strength of 19,555 military personnel was not expected to be achieved by the end of the current budget period.

3. The budget presentation for UNAMID differed from the presentation of other peacekeeping budgets in three respects. First, owing to the unique operating nature of the Mission, section II of the report ("Structure and resource planning") provided information on the African Union-United Nations command and control structure. Second, pursuant to section II, paragraph 2, of General Assembly resolution 61/276, the report also included information on the resource planning assumptions. Third, the report gave only a summary description of the five components of the results-based budgeting frameworks. The complete frameworks, reflecting the expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and outputs, would be presented in the budget for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009.

4. The proposed budget for UNAMID for the period 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008 amounted to \$1,477,766,300. Operational costs in respect of, inter alia, facilities and infrastructure, air transportation, ground transportation and communications accounted for 72 per cent of the total resources requested.

5. As for human resources, it was envisaged that a total of 18,663 military personnel, 2,627 United Nations police, 1,770 formed police units and 3,617 civilian personnel, including positions under general temporary assistance, would have been deployed by 30 June 2008. The Secretary-General's resource estimates

for military and civilian personnel took full account of the phased deployment strategy and also reflected the application of delayed deployment factors of 45 per cent, 15 per cent and 25 per cent for military contingents, military observers and United Nations police and formed police units, respectively, and delayed recruitment factors of 5 per cent for international staff and 40 per cent for United Nations Volunteers.

6. In view of the timing of the establishment of UNAMID, the support account for peacekeeping operations for 2007/08 had not included resources for backstopping. Accordingly, the proposed budget included 13 posts for the Integrated Operational Team, which would be incorporated into the proposed budget for the support account for 2008/09. The proposals currently before the Committee also included funding for the Special Envoys of the African Union and the United Nations and their immediate office under general temporary assistance until 31 December 2007. Should the mandate of the Special Envoys be extended beyond that date, funding of the immediate office would revert to the regular budget with substantive, administrative and technical support to be provided by UNAMID. A trust fund had recently been established to support the activities of the Joint Mediation Support Team.

7. The actions to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of UNAMID were set out in paragraph 286 of the report.

8. In paragraph 13 of General Assembly resolution 61/289, the Secretary-General had been requested to submit a revised budget for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to reflect the financial resource requirements for the heavy support package to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) at the main part of the sixty-second session. However, as the proposed budget for UNAMID already included resource requirements for the heavy support package, it would not be necessary to submit the revised budget. The Secretary-General would respond to the request pertaining to the review of the Mission's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities contained in paragraph 14 of the same resolution when he submitted the proposed budget for UNMIS for 2008/09.

9. The extraordinary measures set out in document A/62/379 included the continued provision of substantial support to AMIS under the heavy support package through the temporary use of the resources

approved for UNMIS for 2007/08. UNMIS would later be reimbursed by UNAMID upon approval of the latter's budget for 2007/08. After setting aside a three-month operating reserve of \$160 million, the projected cash position for UNMIS amounted to \$87 million. As at 31 October 2007, the total amount assessed for UNMIS since its establishment had amounted to \$2,579.1 million, of which \$200 million was currently outstanding. Troop-contributing countries had been reimbursed for troop costs up to 31 August 2007 and for contingent-owned equipment and self-sustainment up to 30 June 2007.

10. In closing, he said that the approval of the budget for UNAMID and the prompt receipt of the associated assessed contributions would be vital, not only to meet immediate cash requirements but also to allow for the prompt reimbursement of the Special Account for UNMIS and the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund.

11. **Mr. Saha** (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions), introducing the related report of the Advisory Committee (A/62/540), said that the Advisory Committee was recommending that the proposed budget for UNAMID for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008 should be reduced by approximately \$151 million to \$1.3 billion. That recommendation was based on the Advisory Committee's experience in observing the pace of deployment of other large missions and on its conviction that the level of the proposed budget was very likely to exceed requirements. It also took account of reductions arising from the specific recommendations on civilian posts contained in paragraphs 36 to 74 of its report.

12. The civilian personnel costs included in the budget proposed by the Secretary-General were based on the planned deployment schedule, which projected a civilian staffing component of 3,550 by 30 June 2008, rather than on the total of 5,497 posts proposed. Since not all functions would be required simultaneously at the start-up of the mission, the deployment of staff should be phased in order to meet the operational needs of the mission as it evolved. The Advisory Committee also recommended that the structure of the mission, the final allocation of posts and their grade levels should remain under review as the mission was deployed. It expected the budget for UNAMID for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009 to include a further review of and justification for all staffing proposals on the basis of experience gained and actual workload.

13. Given the prevailing circumstances, the Advisory Committee requested the Secretary-General to provide up-to-date information to the General Assembly, at the time of its deliberations, on the status of force generation and preparations for deployment, as those aspects could have a further impact on the pace of deployment and affect non-post resources. If the planned deployment schedule did not materialize, the related underexpenditure would have to be reported in the performance report and an explanation given as to the reasons for the variance from the original assumptions.

14. With the presence of two missions in the same country, it was essential to maximize synergies and exploit all opportunities for efficiencies. However, the Secretary-General's proposal did not provide a detailed analysis of such opportunities. The Advisory Committee therefore recommended that the proposed budget for 2008/09 should present an analysis of the scope for joint services and that the plan for the balance of 2007/08 should be re-examined accordingly. Moreover, the use of resources under operational costs should be strictly monitored and comprehensive information should be provided in the performance report. Requests under operational costs in the 2008/09 budget should reflect refinements on the basis of experience gained and further review.

15. The Advisory Committee had taken note of the letter contained in document A/62/379. Most of the extraordinary measures described therein related to the support component, in particular the deployment of personnel and procurement. The Advisory Committee underlined the importance of adequate advance planning to obviate the need to resort to exceptional measures and cautioned against the recurrent application of such measures. Paragraphs 31, 78 to 82 and 85 of the report contained further relevant comments. Since UNAMID presented greater than usual management challenges and risks because of prevailing circumstances and the high level of procurement and infrastructure development required, the Secretary-General must ensure that those risks were managed prudently.

16. **Mr. Ramos** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union; the candidate countries Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey; the stabilization and association process countries Albania and Serbia; and, in addition, Armenia, Iceland and Moldova, said that the European Union would

approach its consideration of the proposed budget for UNAMID in its usual manner, namely with a view to ensuring that the Mission had the necessary resources to carry out its mandate effectively and efficiently. The European Union was committed to working constructively with other delegations in order to conclude the relevant deliberations in a timely fashion.

17. However, the groundbreaking hybrid nature of UNAMID, as well as its size, the enormous logistical challenges it faced and the significant financial implications of its establishment, meant that proper budget scrutiny was essential. More details were therefore required about the proposed shape of the Mission, its relationships with other actors on the ground and the assumptions on which the budget proposals were based. In addition, supplementary information should be provided on the Secretary-General's use of extraordinary measures, since the relevance of that issue extended beyond UNAMID.

18. **Mr. Hussain** (Pakistan), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, expressed concern about the late issuance of the Advisory Committee's report, which had not been available on the Official Documents System until earlier that morning, and about the lack of detailed logical frameworks in the Secretary-General's report. Such situations should be avoided in future.

19. With regard to quick-impact projects, the Group of 77 and China advocated increasing the current provision of \$1 million and hoped that future budgets would reflect the critical importance of such projects. On the issue of human resources, the Group trusted that the relevant General Assembly resolutions would be taken into account when recruiting staff to fill the many new posts.

20. Lastly, while the Group of 77 and China understood the logistical difficulties facing UNAMID, extraordinary measures such as those set out in document A/62/379 should be avoided at all costs, particularly since they had implications for other United Nations activities. Indeed, in the case at issue, more careful planning and the provision of adequate information might have obviated the need for such measures.

21. **Mr. Gaspar Martins** (Angola), speaking on behalf of the African Group, expressed his full support for the rapid deployment of UNAMID and welcomed the budget proposed by the Secretary-General. Given

the scope, size and hybrid nature of the Operation, he endorsed the proposed structure and resource requirements, stressing that the provision of adequate resources would be crucial to the Mission's success. Approval of the proposed budget for UNAMID should bring an end to the flexible use of the resources already approved for UNMIS.

22. Referring to the "single-bid" contract awarded on an exceptional basis by the Secretary-General, he said that the bidding process should have been open and competitive and conducted in such a way as to guarantee the timely deployment of the mission. Qualified bidders from different regions, including those from developing countries and, in particular, those from Africa, should have had equal access to the process.

23. Under the Addis Ababa Agreement, UNAMID should have a predominantly African character and its troops should, as far as possible, be sourced from African countries. He was therefore encouraged that many African countries, as well as other Member States, had pledged to send peacekeepers and equipment to support the mission. Steps should be taken to expedite the process of personnel recruitment and force deployment, and adequate resources should be provided to begin deployment of the command and control structures and systems necessary to ensure a seamless transfer of authority from AMIS to UNAMID. The proposed structure of the Operation was appropriate for its mandate, and any restructuring at the present stage could be detrimental to the effective implementation of that mandate.

24. He stressed the importance of the ongoing close coordination and cooperation between the African Union, the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan with a view to reaching a lasting solution to the situation in Darfur. The role of international partners and donors would also remain essential for the successful implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and for post-conflict reconstruction. In that connection, the African Union had developed a comprehensive African strategy for post-conflict reconstruction in the Sudan, which set out clear and time-bound actions and would be implemented in coordination with donor-funded efforts. UNAMID had a critical role to play in coordinating the provision of international support to the Sudan, and, as such, must be provided with the means necessary to fulfil its mandate.

25. **Mr. Poulin** (Canada), speaking also on behalf of Australia and New Zealand, said that the three delegations strongly supported the Darfur peace process and the work of AMIS, to which Canada had provided aircraft and armoured personnel carriers. The three delegations welcomed the establishment of UNAMID and trusted that, as the Mission carried many risks, the Secretariat, in partnership with the African Union, would ensure that it was successful and soundly managed.

26. While thanking the Secretary-General for his effort in preparing the complex budget proposal for the mission in such a brief time and for providing additional information on resource-planning assumptions, in line with the request made by the General Assembly in its resolution 61/276, the delegations were concerned at the lack of information and justification for the 72 per cent of the proposed UNAMID budget taken up by operational costs. It was incongruous for more detail to be given in connection with a single junior staff post than in connection with operational items valued at several hundred million dollars. In future peacekeeping budget proposals, and in keeping with General Assembly resolution 61/276, the Secretariat should address that imbalance.

27. Noting the same over-emphasis on posts, at the expense of operational expenditure, in the report of the Advisory Committee (A/62/540), the delegations believed that the oversight role of the Advisory Committee and the Fifth Committee would be enhanced if more attention was focused on the dominant items of expenditure in the peacekeeping budget, which included transport, infrastructure and communication, in contrast to the dominant item of expenditure in the regular budget, which was staffing.

28. The three delegations shared the doubts — expressed by the Advisory Committee in justification of its recommended budget reduction — that UNAMID would require the full amount of resources sought, because of its likely pace of deployment. They looked forward to hearing the Secretariat's views on that recommendation and to receiving updated assumptions regarding operational costs and the results of the Darfur mission start-up risk assessment. They would also like further information on the prioritization strategy for staff recruitment and deployment to ensure that the right personnel were deployed first, bearing in mind the scarcity of accommodation and other

subsistence resources in the initial stages of the mission.

29. Adequate backstopping capacity must be in place at Headquarters, within established budgetary procedures, as UNAMID was the largest operation managed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support. As the Advisory Committee had indicated, there were a number of opportunities for UNAMID and UNMIS to share support assets, thus improving efficiency and synergy. The two missions should be encouraged to cooperate in that regard.

30. Turning to the letter dated 2 October 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly (A/62/379), he said that, while the three delegations wholeheartedly supported the fastest possible deployment of UNAMID and understood that it was a challenge for the Secretariat to meet the deadlines for implementing Security Council resolution 1769 (2007), circumventing established administrative policies and procedures intended to ensure proper controls and accountability was an imperfect solution. They urged the Secretary-General to preserve transparency, accountability and fairness in using the exceptional measures described, especially in procurement, which involved large sums of money.

31. Noting the Advisory Committee's observation that the Secretary-General had resorted to similar exceptional measures in the recent past, they looked forward to discussing with the Secretariat the reasons for that recurring practice. As peacekeeping required rapid deployment in difficult circumstances, the Organization should be able to deliver results without regular use of exceptional measures. The delegations would work with other Member States and the Secretariat to find a long-term solution to the special demands of modern peace operations and avoid the kind of ad hoc solution used in the current instance. They would also take part in efforts to bring about a meaningful and overdue reform of procurement processes.

32. **Mr. Tawana** (South Africa) said that his delegation advocated the deployment of a robust peacekeeping force in support of the Darfur Peace Agreement. As UNAMID was mandated to undertake a wide range of activities, there should be no attempt to alter its proposed structure, post levels or resources, as they were appropriate to ensuring coordination and

cooperation between the African Union, the United Nations and the host Government. The Mission was a significant milestone in creating synergy between the African Union and the United Nations and gave practical expression to that partnership. A sufficient budget should therefore be approved promptly.

33. **Mr. Abdelaziz** (Egypt) said that Egypt had an unquestionable interest in peace and stability in the Sudan and therefore supported the current peace process in Darfur, remaining committed to bringing it to a successful end. His delegation believed that the budget proposal for the mission reflected the financial and human resources needed to implement its complex and multidimensional mandate successfully. As the Security Council, in its resolution 1769 (2007), had tasked UNAMID with overseeing a wide array of activities in Darfur, the Committee should take a decision which provided a solid foundation for the Mission's work and contributed to lasting peace in the region. His delegation would consider the recommendations of the Advisory Committee, and it hoped that the Secretariat would provide a detailed explanation of the potential impact of budget reductions.

34. Although the estimated cost of military, police and civilian personnel was over 25 per cent of the total proposed budget, the Secretariat had performed poorly in the areas of deployment and recruitment when measured against the deadlines set in resolution 1769 (2007) and the requirement to maintain the African character of the mission. His delegation would like an update from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the current situation. The necessary coordination between UNMIS and UNAMID should not affect the ability of either Mission to assume its responsibilities effectively. His delegation was concerned at the Secretariat's failure to respond to the request made by the General Assembly in its resolution 61/289 for a revised UNMIS budget that reflected the resource requirements for the heavy support package to the African Union Mission in the Sudan. It also concurred with the Advisory Committee's view that, as the establishment of UNAMID had been on the horizon for some time, there should have been no need to resort to the exceptional measure of using resources already approved for UNMIS.

35. The single-source contract accounting for about 25 per cent of the Mission's operational costs and a further 17 exceptional measures indicated in the

Secretary-General's letter to the President of the General Assembly (A/62/379) were a matter of great concern to the Egyptian delegation, which looked forward to discussing the justification for such measures, taking into account the actual rate of deployment and the time needed to put out to tender a construction and support package. Finally, there must be close coordination and cooperation between the African Union, the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan to ensure a lasting solution to the situation in Darfur, which was in the interest of Egypt and all the Sudan's neighbours.

36. **Mr. Traystman** (United States of America) said that the situation in the Sudan was, and would continue to be, a top priority for the United States of America, which welcomed the establishment of a large, robust peacekeeping force to protect civilians and humanitarian workers and ensure peace and security. All actors must take all possible measures to ensure that UNAMID became fully operational as soon as possible, so that it could fulfil its vital mandate.

37. The United States delegation commended the Secretariat for its preparation of the proposed budget for the mission and for the measures taken to ensure an orderly and timely transition from AMIS to UNAMID, and it welcomed the analysis and recommendations received from the Advisory Committee to facilitate the Fifth Committee's consideration of the matter. At a time when the multiple and varied activities of the Organization were generating rapidly escalating expenses, the Secretariat should maximize the effective use of available resources through strong leadership and management, more efficient implementation of mandates and greater accountability for action. His delegation hoped that the Fifth Committee would proceed without delay to complete its examination and adoption of the proposed budget in order to ensure that UNAMID had the funds it needed.

38. **Ms. Musunga** (Zambia) said that the view, dating back to the era of pan-Africanism and the foundation of the Organization of African Unity, that Africa could not be truly independent without economic independence, still held true. Economic independence required a conducive environment, particularly peace, security and well-being across the continent. The humanitarian crisis in Darfur cast a shadow on peace and development. The economic potential and well-being of the people of the Sudan depended on the conflict in that country coming to an end.

39. Since the conflict had taken root in 2003, more than 400,000 had been killed and more than 2.5 million had been displaced. Unless drastic measures were taken, those figures would rise. In the wake of the various efforts made to resolve the conflict since 2004, the establishment of UNAMID, through resolution 1769 (2007), was a welcome step. Her delegation was confident that full and timely implementation of the Mission would promote peace in Darfur. It supported the proposed operational and administrative structures and the proposed budget and it was concerned that any alteration to them would adversely affect the desired results.

40. Having noted the information in the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly (A/62/379), it supported continuation of the rapid deployment envisaged in the report of the Secretary-General (A/62/380) but took the view that the processes involved should be normalized to conform to the Organization's procedures and regulations. The African participation in UNMIS and UNAMID was right and proper.

41. Her delegation looked forward to sustainable post-conflict solutions in the Sudan and urged implementation of General Assembly resolution 61/230 on implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa.

42. **Mr. Muhith** (Bangladesh) said that his delegation was fully aware that UNAMID was a complex mission with a challenging mandate in a difficult environment and that, owing to the time factor, a number of extraordinary measures had been put in place to implement Security Council resolution 1769 (2007). In connection with the award of a non-competitive, single-source contract, it agreed with the Advisory Committee that steps must be taken to ensure international competition on a wide geographical basis and looked forward to discussing procurement arrangements in detail, particularly in the light of financial rules 105.16 (a) (vii) and 105.16 (b). Because of the unusual circumstances, his delegation saw merit in the Secretary-General's budget proposal and believed that, given the foreseen and unforeseen challenges ahead, the mission should be adequately resourced. However, it shared the concern of the Advisory Committee that the UNAMID budget for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008 had not been

submitted in results-based form. It expected the budget for the following period to be submitted in full compliance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions.

43. **Mr. Mohamad** (Sudan) said that he welcomed the efforts of the African Union and United Nations Special Envoys to persuade the non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement to join the peace process. He hoped for transparency concerning the figures and data pertaining to the resources contributed by Member States for the consolidation of peace in the Sudan and affirmed his country's full commitment to the discharge of its obligations to that end, as well as its readiness to provide all necessary assistance. Its cooperation was evident in the successes thus far achieved, particularly with regard to the UNAMID operational centres, administrative and personnel requirements, the status-of-forces agreement and his Government's provision of the land and various logistical and other services needed to set up camps.

44. He appreciated the efforts to abide by the terms of reference for UNAMID set forth in Security Council resolution 1769 (2007), which reaffirmed the strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Sudan, as well as full respect for that sovereignty. It was important, however, to prevent any impression of disregard for the work of Sudanese national and local authorities.

45. His Government looked forward to ongoing channels of cooperation with the proposed UNAMID structures, the scope for which was far-reaching and included such vital areas as quick-impact projects, health, education and the Darfur-Darfur dialogue and consultation. Indeed, it was willing to cooperate to the utmost in the interest of the Mission's objectives. Such cooperation would have been desirable at the planning stage with a view to avoiding the paradoxes that had arisen. The proposed establishment of a sub-office in Zalingei, for instance, was incongruous, failing as it did to take into account the division of Darfur into three states. Zalingei was moreover located in southern Darfur, which was not only the most secure of those states but would also, in common with the other two Darfur states, have a regional office located in its administrative capital. A sub-office in Zalingei was therefore superfluous to requirements, which would be adequately covered by those three regional offices. A further paradox concerned the proposed numbers of 455 international and 4 national United Nations

Volunteers. A country with a population of 40 million was in a position to provide a much larger number of national United Nations Volunteers, thereby also sparing UNAMID resources for deployment elsewhere.

46. His delegation remained troubled by some of the extraordinary action that had been taken in establishing UNAMID, not least the award of a contract worth \$250 million to Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), without competition. He therefore requested the promised replies to its previous questions on that subject, together with an explanation of the circumstances leading to that particular course of action, which was in breach of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, and details of the contract, including its period of validity and the possibilities for renewal. He also requested an explanation with regard to an information sheet, circulated at an informal meeting of the Committee, which had stated that the action in question was the only available means of ensuring the fulfilment of requirements under Security Council resolution 1769 (2007), while also subsequently stating that PAE had been asked to submit its tender on 16 July 2007, which predated the resolution by some two weeks. Furthermore, it had later been stated that negotiations with PAE dated back to 26 April 2007. On the matter of such operational costs, he concurred with the view expressed in paragraph 81 of the ACABQ report (A/62/540) and with the recommendation contained in its paragraph 82.

47. The sole-source contract referred to in paragraph 81 had been the subject of questions and reservations by the Headquarters Committee on Contracts (HCC), as stated in the record of its meeting of 31 August 2007, which was available on the Internet. Constituting as it did an important document, that record should be circulated to all Member States in order to apprise them of the details relating to the contract, which was financed with their contributions. Issues raised by HCC included the question of why procedures to complete the contract had been pursued, despite the lack of any evidence to show that the conditions set by the Controller had been met. Secondly, why had PAE been given an undertaking when it did not own the requisite equipment? According to the Department of Field Support, PAE used equipment owned by the United States Government, which did not necessarily comply with United Nations standards and requirements. Thirdly, PAE had been provided with information on

the heavy support package and the situation in Darfur at a meeting with the Department of Field Support and the Procurement Division on 26 April 2007. There had thus been sufficient delay before the adoption of Security Council resolution 1769 (2007) for tenders to be openly declared. Fourthly, the Tender Committee was on record as having been asked to approve the contract at a time when it was still being negotiated, which was not in line with usual practice.

48. Notwithstanding paragraph 13 of General Assembly resolution 61/289, the explicit request for the Secretary-General to submit a revised budget for the Mission had been disregarded and appeals had instead been made for financing of the heavy support package in ways other than those provided for in the resolution. He requested an official explanation for that failure to comply with the resolution, given the need to avoid setting any precedent for the selective implementation of General Assembly resolutions. In contrast, the Advisory Committee had made a commendable effort to gather and report the information needed to enable Member States to take enlightened decisions on the subject. As for paragraph 14 of the resolution, it too had been entirely disregarded, and he would appreciate an explanation as to why.

49. UNAMID was distinct from other United Nations missions, yet the complementarity of the United Nations and the African Union was not reflected in the distribution of leadership positions. He therefore looked forward to the circulation of a list to Member States comprising full details of the assignment of such positions to both United Nations and African Union personnel. The African character of the Mission should be clearly visible in all key areas, including recruitment.

50. Humanitarian activities were part of the mandate of peacekeeping missions, including UNAMID, as recognized in Security Council resolution 1769 (2007). In the case of Darfur, any confusion of mandates should be avoided by ensuring that such activities were directly supervised by UNAMID, rather than by the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), which had its own specific objectives and responsibilities. Another issue was that the proposed budget resources for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and for quick-impact projects were not commensurate with the size, mandate and responsibilities of UNAMID. He therefore hoped that plans based on experiences in the field would be developed and funding proposals made with a view to remedying that situation. He further

hoped that the key area of reconstruction and development would be given the maximum focus which it deserved and that United Nations activities in the Sudan would be strengthened to that end, in accordance with the joint statement made in Khartoum following the Secretary-General's visit to the Sudan in September 2007. Lastly, he hoped that standards for accountability and the United Nations code of conduct for the Sudan would be tightened in order to preclude any repetition of the immoral behaviour of UNMIS personnel in Juba.

51. **Mr. Davide** (Philippines) said that, as a regular contributor of military and police personnel to various United Nations missions, the Philippines believed that the success of peacekeeping operations was contingent on a clear and robust mandate and the provision of adequate resources to fulfil that mandate. Personnel on the ground must be given all the knowledge and tools they needed to accomplish their mission. His delegation joined others in supporting the budget proposed by the Secretary-General.

52. UNAMID was a tangible manifestation of cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, and reflected the spirit of the November 2006 declaration on enhancing UN-AU cooperation and the ten-year capacity-building programme for the African Union. Approval of the Secretary-General's budget proposal would not only recognize the African Union's efforts in Darfur but also further strengthen cooperation and partnership in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

53. **Mr. Mukai** (Japan) said that, as a joint operation, UNAMID would require close coordination between the Organization and the African Union as well as within the Organization itself. The relevant United Nations departments, in particular the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Field Support (DFS) and Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and the country team must work together and learn to speak with one voice. It was also the largest humanitarian operation ever undertaken and should reinforce the work of United Nations and other humanitarian organizations on the ground. He requested the Secretary-General to provide information on efforts by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and United Nations funds, programmes and agencies to promote cooperation. Furthermore, the slow progress in the peace process and the uncertain political climate made

a phased approach to deployment the most practical option.

54. Peacekeeping operations must be effective but must also aim for budgetary discipline, accountability and transparency. His delegation agreed with many of the observations and recommendations in the ACABQ report (A/62/540). While his delegation supported the appointment of a Deputy Joint Special Representative at the Assistant Secretary-General level to head the peace process component, many of the political affairs posts had still to be justified. It was to be expected that DPA would coordinate its work with the Joint Mediation Support Team but as much support as possible should be mobilized from within the mission and from DPKO, DFS and DPA. It was also essential that UNAMID and UNMIS should collaborate fully, in particular in the areas of liaison, support services and logistics. He expressed concern that the resources authorized for the integrated operational teams by General Assembly resolution 61/279 still had not been utilized; the 26 posts approved should be allocated to priority activities, such as UNAMID.

55. His delegation shared the concerns expressed by ACABQ with regard to collaboration between UNAMID and the United Nations country team. There were around 11,000 humanitarian personnel in Darfur, as well as more than 1,200 personnel from United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. Maximum use should be made of those United Nations resources in the context of UNAMID's liaison and coordination functions.

56. Not all staff had to be on the ground from the beginning; deployment should take place in phases based on a realistic assessment of the evolving operational needs of the mission. The structure of the mission, the allocation of posts and the grade levels should be finalized as personnel were deployed. Phased deployment of staff should be based on progress in the peace process and needs on the ground in such areas as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, rule of law, governance and human rights.

57. His delegation concurred fully with the ACABQ recommendation for a reduction of \$151 million in the Mission's 2007/08 budget based on updated information on the deployment of military and police personnel. Changes in the deployment of civilian personnel and operational costs could likewise result in lower expenditures. He suggested that a 20 per cent

reduction of the proposed budget would be realistic for a phased deployment and requested the Secretary-General to provide the General Assembly with up-to-date information on the status of force generation and preparations for deployment in the context of Security Council resolution 1769 (2007).

58. Given the enormous operational costs for UNAMID, about \$1 billion, or 72 per cent of its total budget, including nearly \$730 million for facilities and infrastructure, he said that Member States must act as watchdogs to ensure the efficient use of those funds, in particular with regard to procurement. He therefore requested the Secretary-General to provide the General Assembly with a more detailed breakdown and justification of resource and equipment requirements, including unit prices for each component of the operational costs as well as of the large single-source contract. His delegation was of the view that the proposed resources must be adjusted in the light of the most recent deployment schedule. Since air operations would be the principal means of transport, maximum use should be made of the resources of UNMIS and the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy (UNLB), and he encouraged the Secretary-General to continue to ask for contributions of military helicopters.

59. **Mr. Tарisse da Fountoura** (Brazil) stressed the importance of providing UNAMID with adequate resources for the effective implementation of its complex and unique mandate and expressed support for the budget presented by the Secretary-General. The international community's willingness to commit resources to the Mission must, however, be accompanied by the readiness of the parties to the conflict to support full deployment of the Mission and commit themselves to a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

60. The procurement process in peacekeeping operations must be handled in an open, transparent and competitive manner and in full compliance with the Financial Regulations and Rules and relevant resolutions. Companies and vendors from all regions, in particular developing countries, must likewise be active participants in the bidding process. Although the budget for peacekeeping operations had increased greatly in recent years, his delegation fully supported the crucial role those operations played in assisting countries to emerge from conflicts and achieve economic development and sustained peace. All missions should be given equal treatment and receive the resources needed to fulfil their mandates.

61. **Mr. Andanje** (Kenya) said that the authorization of a hybrid African Union-United Nations force to address the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur was an important step for peace and stability in the Sudan as well as the region, and Member States should act quickly to provide that force with adequate resources. The complex and multidimensional nature of the Mission posed great operational and logistical challenges and would require unprecedented cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union. Ambiguity over authority, command and control could exacerbate those difficulties but the challenges were not insurmountable.

62. Everything possible must be done to ensure rapid deployment with a view to protecting civilians and humanitarian operations. Humanitarian assistance could not be provided without protection. Adequate provision must be made for the security of United Nations staff, humanitarian workers, civilians and installations, and incidents such as the fatal attack on African Union soldiers must not be allowed to reoccur.

63. He commended the African Union and the regional economic communities for contributing peacekeeping troops and urged countries that had not yet specified their actual contribution to do so. The African Union was not yet equipped for peacekeeping missions and needed logistical and technical support from the rest of the international community.

64. He expressed concern at the recommendation by ACABQ that the budget for UNAMID should be reduced by \$151,143,400. The Mission's success hinged on the provision of adequate resources, and a reduced budget would undermine UNAMID before it even deployed. He suggested that the rationale for the original budget request should be re-examined and that the Secretariat should express its views on the potential impact of the budget cut on the Mission, especially its structure.

65. He also expressed concern at the ambiguity with regard to authority, command and control. He understood that backstopping and command and control structures and systems would be provided by the Organization, but, bearing in mind that the mission was supposed to have a predominantly African character, he asked whether contingents contributed by non-African Union countries would be placed under United Nations or African Union command. He wondered how the arrangement provided for in

Security Council resolution 1769 (2007) whereby the United Nations had command and control authority and the African Union would presumably take responsibility for routine operations would work in practice. Serious questions likewise remained with regard to backstopping by the Organization. Such issues must be resolved prior to deployment.

66. He agreed with ACABQ that the grade level of posts should be similar to those in other large missions but nevertheless believed that the posts of Senior Economic Adviser and head of the liaison office in Khartoum should be at the D-2 level, as requested by the Secretary-General, so that the individuals in question would be able to interact with the representatives of all stakeholders in the political process.

67. His delegation remained committed to UNAMID. The Mission should be provided with increased resources in order to ensure security for civilians and humanitarian workers and oversee the implementation of a future peace agreement. The international community must cooperate to ensure the deployment of fully resourced peacekeepers and support personnel without delay.

68. **Mr. Reddy** (India) said that his delegation supported the deployment of UNAMID with full resources. Deployment of a mission of such magnitude and complexity without adequate resources would be counterproductive and would doom it to failure. The Secretary-General's proposed budget for UNAMID provided the correct administrative and budgetary framework for the operation. He welcomed the close cooperation between the Organization and the African Union required by the Mission and called for expedited recruitment of the civilian staff, to be deployed as needed and with due regard to the security situation.

69. He took note of the letter dated 2 October 2007 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly (A/62/379) and concurred with ACABQ that the Secretariat should understand the need for adequate advance planning in order to obviate the necessity of resorting to exceptional measures. Repeated use of exceptional measures undermined the budgetary and administrative discipline required for good governance and increased the risk of bypassing internal controls. He was concerned in particular about the award of a single-source contract amounting to \$250 million on the pretext that urgent action was

necessary. His delegation strongly opposed such waivers of procurement rules and regulations except under extraordinary circumstances, which did not seem justified in the current case. He agreed with ACABQ that there must be effective, fair, transparent and rule-based international competition from all suppliers on a wide geographical basis for the provision of goods and services, including for UNAMID.

70. He likewise agreed with ACABQ that it was imperative to maximize synergies between UNAMID and UNMIS without however compromising their ability to fulfil their respective mandates. The management challenges associated with UNAMID, caused by the prevailing circumstances and the high level of procurement and infrastructure development required, had led ACABQ to advise the Secretary-General to ensure that those risks were managed prudently. Member States must also closely monitor the Mission.

71. He called on the international community to fully support the deployment of UNAMID and help alleviate the humanitarian situation in Darfur, and he urged the parties to the conflict to abandon violence and participate in the peace talks.

72. **Mr. Rosales Díaz** (Nicaragua) expressed regret at the late issuance of the report of ACABQ. It likewise expressed regret that the relevant letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly (A/62/379) had not become available until 2 October 2007.

73. His delegation supported the Secretary-General's proposed budget for UNAMID but was concerned at the awarding of a single-source contract in the amount of \$250 million without a public tender, on an exceptional basis, in violation of the rules and regulations relating to procurement, and it intended to seek an explanation from the Secretariat during informals. He stressed that when the exception became the norm, the Secretariat must be held accountable for its actions.

74. **Mr. Yeo** (Officer-in-Charge, Peacekeeping Financing Division), referring to the request from ACABQ that updated information on the deployment of military and police personnel should be furnished to the General Assembly, said that updated information relating to the proposed budget for UNAMID was available in the conference room. He and his colleagues from the Secretariat looked forward to

addressing the concerns expressed by various delegations during the informal consultations.

75. With regard to the non-submission of a revised budget for UNMIS reflecting the financial resource requirements for the heavy support package for AMIS, he said that that information had been included in the resource requirements for UNAMID but not explicitly identified as such. Updated information identifying those amounts had been provided to ACABQ and had been included in the documentation available to the Committee for the upcoming informals.

76. **Mr. Saha** (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions), with regard to the late issuance of documents, suggested that the Secretariat might be able to indicate when information, including updated information, had been provided to the Advisory Committee and when documents had been issued. The Advisory Committee had conducted its review of the report of the Secretary-General expeditiously and was not responsible for any delays.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.