VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 9th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas)

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DISARMAMENT ITEMS

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- General debate

Statements were made by:

Mr. Marinescu (Romania)
Mr. Domokos (Hungary)
Mr. Okawa (Japan)
Mr. Korhonen (Finland)
Mr. Tabibi (Afghanistan)
The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 AND 121 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. MARTINESCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): The Romanian delegation is taking part in this debate on disarmament in the spirit of the general outlook of Romania, according to which the establishment of a world of peace, security and progress requires, in the first place, the total abolition of the policy of force and the threat of force, the elimination of all interference and pressure, and the renunciation once and for all of the use of military means in relations among States, in order to bring about the necessary conditions for the free and independent development of all peoples.

As President Nicolae Ceausescu stated recently:

"Romania is in favour of a policy of general disarmament and, in the first place, nuclear disarmament. We believe that military expenditures and the accumulation of conventional and nuclear weapons have attained proportions which seriously jeopardize the economic and social development of every country, as well as international peace and security. We therefore believe that everything possible must be done to halt the arms race, to embark upon a gradual reduction of military expenditures and to devote the funds saved in that way to the development of all nations, and particularly to meeting the social needs of and affording a greater measure of assistance to the poorly developed countries."

It is from this standpoint that we should like to examine the many subjects which appear on our agenda.

The special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament aroused hope. The broad-ranging debate in which all States took part, the large number of proposals, suggestions and ideas put forward, the efforts made to reach a generally acceptable agreement, as reflected in the Final Document, threw into relief the growing concern aroused by the arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race. The debate brought out the imperative need to spare no effort to halt
the arms race without delay and to embark upon genuine disarmament. We regret to have to say that more than a year after that session the main findings that emerged from it have remained just as relevant and immediate. Military expenditures have continued to grow, and the most highly sophisticated weapons continue to pile up in arsenals, while the political will to which the special session appealed to reverse this course of events has not been forthcoming. Certainly, international activity conducted since that session has not been inconsiderable, and the voluminous reports which we have before us are proof of that. As for the real effectiveness of international action to promote disarmament, it can only be judged in the light of the adoption of adequate measures calculated to make a genuine contribution to the halting of the arms race and the beginning of a genuine process of disarmament.

The state of affairs that we have just described constitutes a source of serious concern. We believe that it is the primary duty of all States to combine their efforts to put an end to the arms race and to proceed, without delay, to the adoption of effective measures of disarmament, and primarily of nuclear disarmament.

In this context, Romania appreciates the fact that the conclusion of the SALT II agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, including its ratification, does represent an important political event in international life. It is a positive step that could open the way to the adoption of disarmament measures with the participation of all States.

As a country of Europe, Romania attaches, as is its duty, primary importance to the strengthening of security, peace and co-operation in that continent. We note with concern that the arms race is continuing in Europe, that vast quantities of ever more devastating weapons are ceaselessly being accumulated there, that troops and military bases remain installed on the territories of many European countries, and that it is still in Europe that the two opposing and powerfully armed military blocs are facing one another.
Romania has always believed that détente and the security of Europe can only be truly durable to the extent that they are buttressed by effective acts of military disengagement. The Romanian Government has always spoken in favour of all countries which have troops and military establishments in Europe taking initiatives - even unilaterally - with a view to military disengagement and disarmament. This would facilitate the start of a broad process in this direction. As is known, Romania itself set an example in this regard when this year it took concrete measures to reduce its military expenditures, the funds thus released being used to increase allowances for children. It is in the light of these considerations that we welcomed the decision recently announced by the Soviet Union to reduce unilaterally its troops and armaments in Central Europe. Romania firmly supports these measures which, in its view, are in keeping with the requirements of peace, understanding and co-operation and which go towards meeting the aspirations and general interests of peoples.

At the same time we believe that the problems of disarmament in Europe cannot be resolved by unilateral initiatives. We therefore see in these measures an element which should intensify the efforts of all States to bring about disarmament, and to provide new momentum for negotiations, with the final aim of concrete measures in the disarmament field. It is imperative that other States take action to sustain this momentum.

We believe, in this context, that we must give all necessary consideration to the thorough preparation of the 1980 meeting in Madrid so that it might live up to the expectations of peoples by adopting measures to revitalize the process of détente, security and co-operation in Europe.

The special session defined a new and agreed concept for disarmament negotiations and created new, more democratic, machinery designed to harmonize efforts undertaken at various levels so that they might provide mutual support in pursuit of the final objective: the achievement of general disarmament.

We appreciate the organizational measures taken by the new Committee on Disarmament to translate into reality the provisions of the Final Document of the special session. This is an action in which Romania took direct part, together with other States.

The Committee's rules of procedure, which provide for participation in negotiations by all its members as sovereign and independent States, outside military alliances, and the agenda, which includes the fundamental problems of
disarmament, both provide favourable conditions for tackling disarmament in a new and more effective manner. Of course, this has made possible the intensification of work, but results remain unsatisfactory with regard to the substance of the problems and the Committee's first year of work has not seen any notable progress in negotiations.

It is therefore of immediate importance that the Committee on Disarmament, as the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, become a true forum for negotiation and that its activities should not be conditional on progress achieved in talks going on outside the Committee's framework. Since disarmament is a matter of vital interest to all States, it must be brought about with the participation of all and negotiations going on in various bodies must not conflict, but should rather be reciprocally supportive. We believe that this is the fundamental problem of the new Committee on Disarmament and that its effectiveness and its very raison d'etre depend in the last analysis on the solution it finds to this problem.

With regard to the United Nations Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body, it has certainly confirmed its usefulness by virtue of the participation of all Member States in its work. In the preparatory stages of the special session, Romania suggested the creation of a United Nations commission with universal participation designed to supplement the limited nature of the Committee on Disarmament. This explains the particular interest we have in this organ. An examination of the elements in the global disarmament programme is a task of the highest priority which, in order to be successful in terms of its mandate from the special session, has called for intense activity on the part of the Commission, and this once again confirmed how necessary it is for all States to combine their efforts to define concrete and effective disarmament measures in order to have a clear insight and approach, both of which are so necessary to the process of negotiation.

In this regard, we would like also to stress the need for all States to evince a constructive attitude and to make an effective commitment to the work of this organ, which symbolizes the role of the United Nations in the disarmament field, in fulfilling the clear-cut tasks which have been entrusted to it. From the same standpoint, we must also intensify research and study activities undertaken by the United Nations in the area of disarmament, a task which is being performed and which occupies a well-defined place in the Final Document of the special session.
When we call for full use to be made of the framework created by the special session, we are in fact calling for firm action to be taken in the disarmament field and for the implementation of the measures provided for in the Programme of Action adopted by the special session as well as for a continuation of the political momentum which existed during the preparation of the Final Document. The United Nations must participate more actively in disarmament efforts, in the drafting of recommendations and solutions and in the mobilization of all States, beginning with the major military Powers, in order to take the urgent measures required by the serious danger posed to peace, security and the progress of mankind by the ever-increasing stockpiles of nuclear armaments.

It is our view that preparing a global disarmament programme constitutes the primary task from the standpoint of organizing disarmament efforts in the immediate future.
We must have a long-term perspective in this area, the more so since the next 10 years will be marked by the fact that they have been proclaimed the Second United Nations Disarmament Decade, which is to be accompanied by a broad range of international activities with a view to the elimination of economic under-development and the bringing into being of a New International Economic Order. This throws into high relief the interdependence existing between disarmament and development.

The fact that the Disarmament Commission worked out elements for a global disarmament programme thus constitutes a step forward and an important stage on the road to the preparation and adoption of such a programme. The document produced, nevertheless, has many inadequacies and omissions. For example, it does not include a series of measures which would undoubtedly constitute significant stages on the road towards general and complete disarmament. Such measures would be aimed at prohibiting the use and the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, the total outlawing of nuclear weapons, the banning of certain conventional weapons of great destructive power, the dismantling of foreign military bases, the withdrawal of troops to within national boundaries and so on.

We believe that the opinions, suggestions and proposals put forward by States in the Commission and before that at the special session should be duly taken into account. For its part, Romania submitted to the special session a series of organically linked measures, beginning with those which would be easiest to carry out in the initial phase and relating above all to the political will of States, to be followed by measures properly so called relating to the gradual reduction and ultimately the banning of nuclear weapons and conventional weapons of mass destruction.

We wish to stress the particularly urgent nature of measures which could halt the arms race. It is only on that basis that we could then proceed to the gradual reduction of armaments and troop levels. The interests of the peace and progress of all peoples demand that equilibrium necessary to ensure the security of all States shall be brought about not by the escalation of the arms race or the increase of military expenditures and the stockpiling of armaments, but rather by the reduction of troop levels and armaments, by
disarmament measures and, above all, nuclear disarmament measures, under effective international control.

Romania believes, as do other States, that the time has come to take firm political action with a view to freezing and reducing military budgets. In declaring ourselves firmly in favour of halting the arms race and providing, in an organized and controlled way, for the reduction of budgets, armaments and troop levels, we believe that the freezing and the gradual reduction of military expenditures is a priority measure which the United Nations should promote more firmly. The funds which would be thus released could be used both to stimulate the progress of all countries and to help the developing countries. The Romanian Government, to that end, presented specific proposals to the special session, suggesting a reduction of budgets by 10 to 15 per cent in a first phase. We are convinced that the adoption of such measures, the priority nature of which is not open to doubt, would have a good effect. It would open the way to a more thorough approach to disarmament problems and would create conditions for the carrying out of a long-term disarmament programme which could ultimately lead to general disarmament, and primarily nuclear disarmament, for the benefit of international peace and security.

As was mentioned in the statement made in the General Assembly by the Foreign Minister of Romania, the Romanian delegation proposes to present at this session a draft resolution on the freezing and reduction of military budgets. We reserve the right to go into further detail on this subject at a later stage of our work.

The strengthening of confidence among States is another area where more vigorous action on our part is called for. The adoption of appropriate measures in the military field would make the beginning of international détente more effective and would contribute to the creation of the necessary conditions for the adoption of measures of broader scope in regard to disarmament.
In the view of the Romanian Government, measures for strengthening confidence should be viewed within a broader concept as an inseparable part of the process of strengthening international peace and security and achieving disarmament. Of course the concerted adoption and implementation of these measures should take into account at the same time the need to guarantee equal security for all States and should not offer unilateral advantages to any of them. Since they depend primarily on the political will of States, measures for strengthening confidence could open new avenues towards the improvement of political relations among States and the adoption of genuine disarmament measures. Of course, they could have wider applicability on the European continent, where there is the greatest concentration of troops and of armaments of the most sophisticated kind, and where the principal military blocs face one another. Nevertheless, because of their repercussions, they could have a universal value and field of application. We believe that it is the duty of the United Nations to give constant attention to and stimulate the adoption of all measures liable to strengthen mutual confidence.

Vigorous action in the field of disarmament should take into account the priority that should be accorded to nuclear disarmament measures. It was for that reason that the Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries quite rightly stressed, as is stated in the Final Declaration of Havana, the need to set in train a programme of action and, especially, the nuclear disarmament measures laid down in the Final Document of the special session.

In this context the following measures must be undertaken: the concluding of a convention whereby the nuclear-weapon States would undertake never in any circumstances to use such weapons or, generally speaking, any kind of force against non-nuclear States; the renunciation by the nuclear-weapon States of the installation of new nuclear weapons on the territories of other States; the cessation of the manufacture of fissile materials for military purposes; the halting of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the beginning of a process of the gradual reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles until their final elimination; the negotiation of a treaty on the total
banning of nuclear weapons. The granting of security guarantees to the non-nuclear States constitutes a singular political problem of extreme importance, closely linked with the security of almost all the States on earth, which have agreed to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Therefore it is necessary for the action begun by the Committee on Disarmament in this field to be continued and intensified in order to produce specific results as soon as possible.
The second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in 1980, will be an opportunity for joint verification, with the participation of all States, of the way in which the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty have actually been observed in practice. Unfortunately, the implementation of the Treaty is at precisely the same stage that it was during the first Conference. While non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have abided by the commitment not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons, the vertical proliferation of atomic weapons and the nuclear arms race have continued and have gained momentum. Because of the increased destructive capacity of new generations of nuclear weapons and the massive stockpiling of armaments, particularly nuclear weapons, mankind today finds itself in a serious state of insecurity. At the same time, in spite of the commitments provided for in the Treaty, the non-nuclear States and, in particular, the developing countries, are encountering growing difficulties in obtaining access to nuclear technology so that atomic energy, through its peaceful uses, might contribute to their economic development. The balance of obligations, in the spirit of which the Non-Proliferation Treaty was conceived, has not been brought about either with regard to security guarantees which the nuclear Powers were supposed to provide to the non-nuclear-weapon States as long as the nuclear arms race continues.

We therefore would like to stress the need for the most thorough and careful preparation of the second Conference so as to direct it towards a solution of the problems left pending in the course of negotiating the Treaty which have not subsequently been resolved.

In making these points, it was my intention to stress once again the role which to the United Nations must play as a forum for combining and harmonizing proposals and the efforts of the peoples of the world for disarmament. A new awakening at the international level and a current of opinion in favour of disarmament would be of the
greatest importance in this respect. For its part, Romania is determined to play an active role, aware as it is of its high responsibilities, in efforts aimed at the adoption and implementation of genuine disarmament measures. We are ready to give our support to any action which could speed up the process of disarmament and mobilize the forces of progress and international public opinion in favour of the establishment of a climate propitious to the attainment of this primary objective of mankind today.

Mr. DONOKOS (Hungary): More than a year has passed since the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which many of us consider an important turning-point in the disarmament efforts of the international community and an event which was to create the necessary momentum for the setting in motion of a more effective disarmament process.

And indeed, if anything was shown or proved by that session, it was the fact that not only the peoples but also governments had come to realize the danger inherent in the prevailing situation as well as the urgent need for a change.

In addition, the special session gave, in our opinion, an essentially correct assessment of what is to be done, as in fact contained in the Programme of Action of the Final Document.

Still, an examination of the present status of disarmament talks would lead to the conclusion that the Programme of Action is being implemented at a rather slow pace, and that the process of disarmament is contradictory. Negotiations on several issues are in progress in several forums and this, no doubt, is a positive feature. At the same time, it would be difficult to deny that the setting-up of numerous expert and study groups, together with an at times exaggerated emphasis on procedural and organizational matters, could
introduce unnecessarily bureaucratic elements into the treatment of disarmament questions. Nor should one overlook the danger that the newly-established forums might start a formalistic life of their own or drift far afield from the only justifiable purpose of their creation and existence - that of making a direct and tangible contribution to the disarmament process.

Thus the pace of progress is very slow, with results that are also slow in coming and not always unambiguously clear. This is a negative feature. Its main causes lie, in our opinion, in the fact that some of the militarily significant States still fail to show a sufficient measure of firm commitment to the cause of disarmament. In certain countries the opponents of disarmament, the retrograde forces, using every means to stir up tension, and advocating confrontation, possess growing influence and have recently increased their activity.

If we look back over the period since the special session, we recognize that the most outstanding event in the disarmament efforts was the signing of the SALT II treaty. This assessment is fully proved by the statements made by the heads of delegations in the general debate at the plenary meetings of the General Assembly. In fact, no other issue has received such an overwhelmingly positive response as that of the treaty, in terms of the realization of its paramount importance and the calls for its early entry into force. This is quite natural, since the treaty - in addition to its inherent significance, that is, the limiting of the strategic arms of the two strongest military powers - could contribute to the strengthening of confidence and thereby to the achievement of other important disarmament agreements and to the acceleration of the disarmament process. Among the steps in this direction, it is sufficient to refer to the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, or the starting of the SALT III negotiations, to which SALT II is a prerequisite.
It is this enormous significance and importance of the treaty which more than anything else prompts the adversaries of détente and disarmament to increase their activities in an effort to prevent the ratification of the treaty. It is alarming to note the measures that are being advocated, such as those providing for a considerable increase of military expenditures, and the pressures for the deployment of new weapons and new systems of weapons which could undermine and even reverse the results of the SALT II treaty.
It is to be hoped that the more sober-minded forces will be able to stop these dangerous developments and will remove the obstacles to the entry into force of the treaty, in accordance with the expectations of the international community.

The status of security in Europe has also been touched upon by many representatives. This is only natural, since the cause of universal peace is inseparable from that of European security. It may be stated that developments in Europe are, on the whole, positive. Most Governments, including my own, look to the immediate future with confidence and hope it will be possible to make further progress in deepening the relaxation of tension and extending it to the military field. The socialist countries continue to take fresh initiatives towards this end; may I in this connexion just refer to the Moscow Declaration adopted last November by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member States, and to the communique of last May issued after the Budapest meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, both of which contained a number of concrete proposals.

As we all know, on 6 October the Soviet Union announced that it would unilaterally reduce the number of its troops in Central Europe. Up to 20,000 Soviet servicemen, 1,000 tanks and a certain amount of other military hardware will be withdrawn from the territory of the German Democratic Republic over the next 12 months. At the same time a proposal was made to take further confidence-building measures to promote military détente.

We might rightly expect that the political will for disarmament, which the socialist countries have demonstrated and supported by concrete proposals, will be reciprocated by the other side. Unfortunately, the same forces which make the ratification of the SALT II treaty subject to increases in military expenditure are again at work, urging the planned development of medium-range nuclear weapons, and negotiations and dictation only from a position of strength by changing the existing balance of nuclear forces. The notion of "first building up arms and only then negotiating" would be extremely dangerous. As experience shows, it has hitherto been impossible to secure lasting advantages and this is even less likely
today. Attempts to follow this doctrine can achieve nothing but to delay negotiations at best, or to render them impossible at worst and to start new and even more harmful phases of arms build-up. We hold that the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly and this Committee should do all they can to arrest this tendency.

Under present-day conditions of the continuing arms race, great importance is attached even to steps which only serve indirectly to slow down the arms build-up and to exclude or lessen the possibility or the advisability of the deployment of weapons. We believe that the confidence-building measures may achieve great importance, as the interrelation between them and further possibilities for disarmament has come to be widely recognized. It is not accidental therefore that the different international forums receive a growing number of concrete proposals for consideration, designed to further the cause of disarmament in this way. We have always supported initiatives of this nature put forward by socialist countries. At the same time we are prepared to consider any other confidence-building measures which other delegations may wish to propose with the sincere desire of increasing trust and strengthening co-operation among nations.

This year our Committee has been allocated 21 agenda items altogether concerning disarmament or related to it in one way or another. Seven of them will be considered, wholly or in part, on the basis of the report of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament. This in itself reflects the broad mandate of that Committee. It is therefore our obvious and recurring task to analyse the activity of the Committee, both in its general aspects and by assessing the results achieved in the negotiation of concrete disarmament topics. This assumes particular significance in view of the fact that the Committee, after a new enlargement of its membership and certain structural changes, met for the first time in January of this year. It drew up its annual programme of work by taking due account of the Programme of Action for Disarmament adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly.
We have been able to see a number of encouraging signs in the work of the Committee in 1979. Unfortunately, however, despite the undoubtedly positive aspects, the Committee was unable to report any breakthrough or substantive progress in any of the high priority disarmament topics. It should be emphasized that the Committee itself cannot be blamed for the lack of results; it has done everything it possibly could under the circumstances. The fact must be accepted this time again that the composition, structure and working method of the Committee does not play a determining role and is not a substitute for the political will which some of the major military powers fail to summon up.

At the outset of the session the Committee started to work with renewed intensity and sustained its above average activity throughout the session. By working out its rules of procedure and drawing up its agenda, it has achieved pioneering work which may facilitate the conduct of its activities for years. The depth in which the various topics are discussed, the search for innovative methods to end the deadlock on some questions, and the increased endeavours of the Committee's members to enhance the success of negotiations are all indisputably encouraging signs on which the Committee will be able to rely in more favourable conditions. Both the activity and the will to contribute are amply demonstrated not only by the number of statements in the plenary meetings but also by the volume of working documents submitted during the year.
The socialist countries took the lead in activities and initiatives by presenting numerous concrete proposals in an effort to speed up disarmament negotiations and to produce practical results at the 1979 session. It was the group of socialist countries which submitted to the newly constituted Committee the first working document, which was also the first proposal concerning the practical implementation of the Programme of Action adopted by the special session. Working document CD/4 is concerned with nuclear disarmament as the most pressing issue, and suggests negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed.

The discussions that took various forms in the Committee helped to clarify a number of questions and to make intentions and positions known to members. However, the resistance or absence of some countries made it impossible for actual negotiations to begin in 1979.

We find it equally deplorable that the tripartite negotiations of a nuclear test ban this year failed to produce progress that could have enabled the Committee on Disarmament to start work on the text of the treaty. My delegation continues to regard the halting of the nuclear arms race and the starting of nuclear disarmament at the earliest possible date to be the most urgent and primary task. The signing and full implementation of an international convention banning nuclear tests for all States and in all environments is an essential and lasting prerequisite for achieving that goal. Therefore we expect all participants in the tripartite negotiations to contribute, by constructive efforts, to the early elaboration of this key agreement. Given the present level of technology and considering the useful activity of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Seismical Experts, as well as the international and bilateral agreements reached earlier in this field, we cannot accept any reason, as regards either verification or other matters, that would relieve anyone of the obligation to co-operate in the early elaboration of the agreement and to submit it to the Committee on Disarmament. At the same time, we should also recall the responsibility of the
nuclear Powers that remain absent from the tripartite negotiations. It is beyond any doubt that their position on nuclear disarmament has an influence on progress in the negotiations conducted without their participation.

My delegation has welcomed the submission of the agreed joint United States-USSR proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. The socialist countries, together with several other delegations, have done their utmost to ensure that the Committee make a start on the elaboration of a draft treaty without delay. The Hungarian delegation which participated in the work of the Committee on Disarmament worked out and submitted a draft preamble with the aim of helping to mould the major elements into a treaty. We hope that at its next session the Committee will find it possible, on the basis of the existing draft texts, to start the negotiations, which hold out prospects for relatively rapid progress, and to present a full draft treaty to the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

The Committee and the Ad Hoc Working Group established by it held a useful debate and exchange of views on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The draft international conventions presented by the socialist countries and Pakistan provided a good basis for stimulation and orientation of the debate. The consensus reached on the necessity and feasibility of an international convention is an encouraging development for the future. We hope that negotiations on this subject in the Committee will continue next year and produce tangible progress.

Despite the efforts of the socialist countries, the Committee was unable to make headway in negotiations on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and systems of such weapons. The continuing opposition of some countries prevents the start of substantive consideration. The General Assembly resolutions which allow dual or differing interpretations are invoked by some countries as a pretext for delaying the conclusion of an international treaty banning once and for all the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons. We believe that this Committee should take
steps designed to end that contradictory situation, thus enabling it to engage in active work leading to a relevant treaty.

The current session of the United Nations General Assembly should give fresh stimulus to the disarmament talks going on in various forums. What is needed here is the adoption of political resolutions that, by assessing the prevailing conditions and the pressing tasks, will realistically identify our responsibilities and take into account the serious efforts to be made. My delegation will welcome and support such proposals and will gladly join in similar initiatives.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, I consider it a privilege to be able to take part in the work of this Committee under your able and distinguished guidance.

At this session of the General Assembly which signals the end of the "Disarmament Decade", it might be helpful for our consideration of disarmament questions in the 1980s to review some features of the past decade.

The first point that comes to mind is the positive list of achievements of the Disarmament Decade. The 1970s, which began with the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, witnessed progress in a number of areas, including the strategic arms limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States and the conclusion of the Treaty on the sea-bed and the Convention banning biological and toxin weapons.

The special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - organized last year for the first time in the history of the United Nations - attracted world-wide attention to the importance of disarmament and delineated the kind of measures that are necessary for its promotion. As such, it was an appropriate event to mark the end of the Disarmament Decade - and it might be considered a first step towards a new disarmament era.
Especially welcome were the remarks made by the delegation of the People's Republic of China at the last session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, to the effect that the People's Republic of China was prepared to participate in the Committee on Disarmament in due time. If China's participation is indeed realized in the near future, in the 1980s - and for the first time - all of the nuclear-weapon States will have appeared at the negotiating table in the Committee on Disarmament.

The second point is that, contrary to all our hopes of establishing world peace through disarmament, there is a trend to proceed in the other direction. I am referring to the world-wide tendency to increase military expenditures. World-wide military expenditures, which in the year 1970 were calculated to total $256 billion, are now estimated to have actually exceeded the $400 billion level. Careful scrutiny of the statistics will show that, although the rate of increase in military expenditures remained low in the first half of the 1970s - when détente was strongly advocated and it seemed that the world was actually moving in that direction - the latter part of the 1970s showed a marked increase in these expenditures.

The third point that should be made is that certain important disarmament treaties which it was hoped would be concluded during the past 10 years still remain unachieved. Ever since Japan first participated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the year preceding the beginning of the Disarmament Decade, my Government has consistently, and on every occasion, appealed for progress towards the ultimate objective of disarmament: general and complete disarmament. We are therefore seriously concerned that progress has been so meagre and that, inter alia, neither the comprehensive nuclear test ban Treaty nor the chemical weapons ban Treaty has been concluded.

In considering, then, these achievements and disappointments, one must conclude that, although there are some hopeful signs for future disarmament efforts, the Disarmament Decade has not completely met the expectations of the man who originally proposed it, the late Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant - nor, for that matter, the expectations of the entire world.

My delegation believes that mutual distrust and suspicion among nations are the greatest deterrents to the progress of disarmament. The growth
of military expenditures by more than 150 per cent in the last 10 years, and our failure to conclude important disarmament treaties during those same 10 years, can be said to reflect the degree of deep-rooted mistrust existing among States. My delegation wishes to propose the following three points as a means of dispelling this mistrust.

First, political propaganda must be eliminated from the disarmament debate. The fact that a major Power, which has a special responsibility regarding disarmament, tends to make unrealistic proposals for the sole purpose of catching the fancy of the world public results not only in a waste of precious time but also does unfathomable harm to disarmament efforts. Countries which genuinely seek to grapple with the disarmament problems not only may feel distrustful and wary of the aims and intentions of such a Power, but when debates and negotiations stagnate in a succession of fruitless discussions, they can become frustrated and feel powerless about the very idea of disarmament. Therefore, my delegation wishes to stress once again that the most important requirement for furthering progress in disarmament efforts is to try to take measures that are feasible and devoid of publicity-wise rhetoric, and proceed step by step, based on a sober assessment of the existing world situation, as well as a realistic outlook into the future.

Secondly, nations must exercise military self-restraint. The conducting of military activities that provoke neighbouring countries or other countries in the region to be on the alert cannot but destroy confidence and trust among nations -- the very starting point for disarmament. Approaches by military aircraft unusually close to the territorial air space of other countries, the construction of new military bases in areas adjacent to other countries, and so forth can be cited as examples of such military activities. In the case of my own country, for example, a new deployment of military forces has recently been taking place on territories inherent to Japan - territories the reversion of which Japan has been seeking - and this new military build-up has been intensifying the suspicion and anxiety of the Japanese people. My delegation wishes to take this opportunity once again to make a fervent appeal to all countries to exercise military restraint so that trust and confidence among States can be consolidated thereby making a sizable contribution to the promotion of disarmament.
Thirdly, effective confidence-building measures must be undertaken. Among such measures proposed at the United Nations special session devoted to disarmament, as well as on many other occasions, my country is especially interested in that pertaining to the publication of military expenditures. By revealing on a continuing basis the size and objectives of its own armaments through the opening to the public of its military expenditures, each country could help dispel the suspicion and mistrust which constitutes one of the causes of the arms race. Work is in progress among experts to devise a standardized reporting system aiming at the uniform publication of military expenditures. Any country which refused to participate in such a standardized system would be regarded as lacking in enthusiasm for achieving disarmament, regardless of its flowery statements and speeches in other fields.

I should now like to turn to the way of thinking of my country regarding disarmament activities in the 1980s.

I shall begin with nuclear disarmament.

My delegation welcomes the signing of SALT II in June this year and wishes to express its appreciation of the efforts of the two countries which brought it about. My delegation trusts that the signing of the SALT II agreements will accelerate progress towards nuclear disarmament, and strongly hopes that the Soviet Union and the United States will make greater efforts in the SALT III negotiations to achieve a further reduction of their strategic nuclear weapons and a curb on their qualitative development.

The first point I wish to touch upon under nuclear disarmament is the question of a comprehensive test ban. Now that SALT II has been concluded, we must make every effort to realize a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which is of the highest priority in the field of nuclear disarmament. My country has appealed time and again to the three nuclear-weapon States -- namely, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, to complete speedily their tripartite negotiations and present the results to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
While my delegation appreciated the submission of a progress report on the negotiations to the last session of the Committee on Disarmament, we feel obliged to express our dissatisfaction with regard to its brevity and because it failed to describe the state of progress of the negotiations and the areas in which agreement is yet to be reached. Since it can be deemed that general agreement has been reached on a considerable part of the draft treaty, my delegation requests the negotiating parties to make their best efforts to present the results of the negotiations to the next session of the Committee on Disarmament. If that proves not to be possible, it would like to urge them to present at least a more detailed progress report.

Recognizing the importance of verification in the context of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, my Government has taken an active part in studies conducted by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to establish an international seismic data exchange system. My delegation welcomed the presentation of the second report of the Ad Hoc Group at the last session of the Committee on Disarmament, as well as the decision to continue the Group's mandate. Further, my delegation would like to express its thanks to the World Meteorological Organization for its co-operation in the work of the Ad Hoc Group. Needless to say, great expectations are entertained by countries with regard to verification by means of a seismic data exchange system. Recalling the fact that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group announced at the last session of the Committee on Disarmament that a further six months to one year was necessary to prepare for an experimental exercise of the data exchange system, my delegation would like to request the Ad Hoc Group to endeavour to put the experimental exercise into practice at the earliest possible date. We believe that such an experimental exercise should be carried out prior to the entry into force of the test ban treaty, and that this in itself would greatly contribute to the realization of the treaty.

The second item that I wish to take up under nuclear disarmament is the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. Although often criticized for its inherent inequality, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is becoming firmly established as the one and only legal mechanism we have for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. My delegation
entertains the conviction that in order to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation régime in the years ahead it is absolutely essential, first of all, to achieve universal participation in the Treaty. That is why my country welcomes the recent ratification of the Treaty by, inter alia, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, and requests and urges other non-participating countries to recognize fully the importance of the Treaty and become parties to it.

We are of the view that ways and means of achieving universal participation in the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be considered at the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to be held in August of next year. My delegation believes that, in order to increase incentives for the non-party States to adhere to the Treaty, it is necessary that the nuclear-weapon States take the following measures to compensate for the unequal elements in the Treaty.

First, all nuclear-weapon States should, with regard to their activities in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, which are mandatory under the Treaty for the non-nuclear weapon States.

Secondly, in the light of the Treaty's requirement that the nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty undertake nuclear disarmament measures to make up, in a way, for the renunciation by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty of their nuclear-arms option, the nuclear-weapon States should endeavour to realize a comprehensive nuclear test ban, to be followed by a cut-off of the production of nuclear fissionable material for weapons purposes, thereby stemming the arms race both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Thirdly, the right of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as stipulated in the Treaty, should be substantially guaranteed by the nuclear-weapon States. The consideration of some sort of preferential measures to be accorded to the Treaty parties with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could greatly help enhance the incentive to participate in the Treaty. At the same time, however, my delegation is fully aware of the dangers of nuclear proliferation that are inherent in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In order to avoid those dangers, my country is actively participating in the work of the International Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which is seeking the technical means of making compatible the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on the one hand, and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the other. INFCE is now in the process of concluding its work before the deadline at the end of next February. My delegation hopes that, on the basis of the findings of INFCE, international efforts will be continued in the years ahead to render mutually compatible the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the prevention of nuclear proliferation.

My third point under nuclear disarmament is the strengthening of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation believes that, when considering measures to strengthen the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States, it is necessary to pay due consideration to the political and military conditions pertaining to each State and region. Given the fact that these conditions involve such numerous and diverse elements, attempts at formulating an all-embracing treaty for strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States would be a time-consuming and futile exercise. We believe that the most realistic course for strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States without wrecking the security framework of the international community as a whole would be for the General Assembly or the Security Council to take note of the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and on other occasions regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons. In this way, such declarations would be invested with a more authoritative status than that of unilateral declarations by individual States.

In the Committee on Disarmament this year the United States submitted a proposal to the effect that the unilateral commitments of the five nuclear-weapon States regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States should be incorporated in a General Assembly resolution, thus giving them international status and enhancing their character as solemn commitments. My delegation highly appreciates and supports this proposal by the United States as a realistic measure to strengthen further the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States, and urges that the Committee on Disarmament take that proposal into full consideration in its deliberations on this problem.
I now turn to the question of chemical weapons. As is evidenced by our submission in 1974 of a draft treaty on the subject to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Japan has long been actively concerned with the problems of achieving a chemical-weapons ban. I wish to declare and affirm that there exists in Japan no factory or any other facility that is engaged in the production of chemical weapons. I also wish to express the hope that, without hampering the production of chemicals for peaceful purposes, not only will the world's existing chemical weapons be completely abolished but, in addition, a ban on the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons will be achieved at an early date.
The banning of chemical weapons is a matter of priority second only to nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, there is no denying that the delay in the submission of the long-awaited joint initiative by the Soviet Union and the United States and the question of the reorganization of the disarmament machinery resulted in a slackening of the deliberations on the matter in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. However, the concrete progress report on the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States which my country had been consistently requesting, and which was recently submitted to the Committee on Disarmament, is to be welcomed as providing a basis for accelerating our deliberations in the future. It is to be hoped that, on the basis of this progress report, discussion of the substantive questions of a chemical weapons ban will be actively pursued in the Committee on Disarmament in the coming year. My delegation strongly hopes that the Soviet Union and the United States will reach agreement at an early date on the remaining issues as outlined in the progress report and submit a joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament as soon as possible, thus enhancing the productivity of the Committee's work.

The progress report touches on the scope of the substances to be prohibited, as well as on the toxicity criteria to be used, and also indicates that the two States have agreed on the necessity of a list of prohibited substances. In this respect, my delegation believes that, even before submission of the joint initiative by the two States and without interfering in their bilateral negotiations, the early conclusion of a chemical weapons ban treaty would be facilitated if the Committee on Disarmament were to enlist the assistance of experts and begin to draw up a list of possible substances to be prohibited.

Finally, I wish to turn to the field of conventional arms control and disarmament. The pursuance of nuclear disarmament as a matter of top priority does not mean, in any way, that arms control and disarmament in the field of conventional weapons may be neglected. My delegation would like to emphasize the importance of conventional arms control and disarmament, for the following reasons particularly. First, four fifths of total global military expenditures are on conventional armaments. Secondly, it is these conventional weapons which are actually used in conflicts, and improvements in their accuracy and destructive capacity are enabling them to inflict increasingly tragic sufferings on the parties to the conflicts. Thirdly, in areas such as Europe, where conventional as well as nuclear armaments are important in maintaining the East-West balance, progress in nuclear disarmament
alone, without parallel progress in the field of conventional armaments, is deemed to have a destabilizing effect on the regional security system. However, given the fact that the security of the majority of States in the world depends on conventional armaments, it is necessary to devote realistic consideration to the security of each individual State when promoting arms control and disarmament in the field of conventional weapons.

Various objectives to be attained in the field of conventional arms control and disarmament are stated in paragraphs 81 to 88 of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. On this occasion, my delegation firmly reiterates its hope that every State will exert its utmost efforts to attain those objectives. We also look forward to future progress in the negotiations on the mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe, as well as in the consultations between the Soviet Union and the United States on restraint on the transfer of conventional weapons. The recent United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects is to be appreciated as providing an impetus for promoting conventional arms control and disarmament.

Today I have explained the thinking of my country with respect to the disarmament measures which we should bring about in the 1980s. My delegation believes that in order to achieve these objectives, and in addition to the sincere and painstaking efforts at the official level, it is imperative that public opinion be fully mobilized to urge the leaders of States to take political decisions on disarmament issues. On the eve of the second United Nations Disarmament Week, my delegation hopes that the Week will play an important role in shaping public opinion on disarmament. In concluding my statement, I wish to add that the Government of Japan will be sponsoring various activities during Disarmament Week to disseminate information among the public regarding the importance of disarmament.

Mr. KORHONEN (Finland): In the annual debate on disarmament in this Committee, my delegation has consistently emphasized the political impact of arms control and disarmament negotiations and the intrinsic link between détente and disarmament.

In this respect, the signing of the SALT II agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States is an encouraging development, although a partial and limited
measure. It should be implemented without delay. If it is succeeded by subsequent qualitative and quantitative limitations of nuclear weapons, the SALT II agreement will be a significant step towards making the world safer against the outbreak of nuclear war.

The continent of Europe seems to be on the verge of a new round in the arms race, both conventional and nuclear. The qualitative arms race has created new generations of nuclear weapons and is accompanied by new strategic doctrines which take into account the possibility of limited nuclear war.

At the same time, disarmament negotiations in Europe are at a standstill. The talks in Vienna have continued for six years without results. While new initiatives and proposals have been advanced and new ones can still be expected, these have not led to their concrete consideration, let alone to negotiations.

In his main statement at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in August 1975 at Helsinki, the President of Finland, Mr. Urho Kekkonen, dealt with the imperative need for disarmament in Europe. He said:

"We believe that the contribution made by the present Conference to the promotion of détente has brought us nearer the day when the idea of far-reaching international disarmament is not just a remote prospect but an integral part of our co-operation. This belief is not just a wishful dream of a small country not belonging to any bloc. It is based on the consciousness that, rather than any system relying on the use of force, the co-operation initiated by us is the best guarantee of security."
Now new approaches to European arms control are needed. Finland, as a country pursuing a policy of neutrality, has endeavoured and continues to endeavour to make a contribution to disarmament. In the light of the factors I have referred to, the delegation of Finland would conceive that, in approaching arms control and disarmament in Europe, the following elements should be kept in mind.

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has been a significant contribution to the realization of the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Europe, and the continuing process of that Conference has greatly enhanced stability in Europe.

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe explicitly confirmed the interest of the participating States in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament, designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security.

The implementation of confidence-building measures agreed upon in the Final Act has contributed to increasing stability and security in Europe; their scope should be extended.

The Vienna talks, which have continued for several years, are a central element of ongoing arms control efforts in Europe.

The recently signed strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) should also give a new impetus to arms control measures in Europe.

Finally, important initiatives and proposals have been made recently, designed to advance the consideration of European disarmament issues in a framework comprising the whole of Europe; they could also give a new impetus to subregional arms control and disarmament efforts in various parts of our continent.

On the basis of those considerations, the Government of Finland believes that arms control and disarmament efforts in Europe could contain the following aims. First, urgent consideration should be given to the various initiatives and proposals designed to further arms control and disarmament measures both in Europe as a whole and at the subregional level: in particular, confidence-building measures should be developed further and their scope expanded. Secondly, all concerned should exert their utmost efforts
to lessen the dangers of military confrontation and to promote détente in Europe through appropriate arms control and disarmament negotiations. Thirdly, future arms control and disarmament negotiations should be designed to cover all categories of weapons and should comprise the whole of Europe, with the full participation of all Governments concerned.

When I referred to important proposals and new initiatives I had in mind a proposal made by the President of France, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, some time ago and others made later on by the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, all designed to initiate arms control negotiations comprising the whole of Europe, in which all the countries of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe would participate. All these proposals also deal in some detail with the important field of confidence-building measures. Finland has responded positively to these initiatives.

More recently a number of important initiatives have been put forward by the President of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev, in a speech dealing with the security of Europe. We welcome the readiness of the Soviet Union, which has now been expressed in a most authoritative manner, to reduce the number of intermediate-range nuclear missiles deployed in the western part of its territory. We hope that this offer will lead to serious negotiations which can produce agreement on reductions and thus help to turn the armament development in Europe to the opposite direction. The announcement made at the same time concerning a unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops and armaments from the territory of the German Democratic Republic will, it is to be hoped, give a special impetus to the Vienna talks on force reductions in central Europe.

As far as Finland is concerned, we have endeavoured for our part to keep the Nordic countries outside any nuclear strategic speculation. To this effect, President Kekkonen suggested in May 1978 and again in May of this year a Nordic arms control arrangement. The suggestion is a further elaboration of the idea of a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone.

I have dealt at considerable length with various aspects of arms control and disarmament in Europe. I have done so because we believe that on the basis of all relevant initiatives and suggestions and through appropriate consultation and negotiation the outline for a comprehensive framework for a
European disarmament programme could be defined. Such a comprehensive programme, containing new approaches as far as both the substance and the participation are concerned, is now needed for European disarmament. The proper forum for negotiations is, of course, not here; it should be found through common efforts by the Governments concerned.

The 1978 special session on disarmament invigorated the machinery of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The Final Document of the special session and especially its Programme of Action constitute an authoritative substantive framework for the disarmament efforts of the international community. Among other challenges, nuclear disarmament is identified as a priority area.

A comprehensive prohibition of nuclear testing is a necessary measure for nuclear arms limitation. We urge the participants in the tripartite negotiations to continue their efforts towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the interest of both vertical and horizontal non-proliferation. The work related to seismic detection carried out by the Committee on Disarmament is an important contribution to the solution of problems of verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. For its part, Finland has actively participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Detection.

Because of the threat posed by nuclear weapons, further efforts to prevent their proliferation are needed. We consider the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the best instrument to this end. My delegation will return to this topic at a later stage.

We welcome the joint proposal made by the Soviet Union and the United States in the Committee on Disarmament for a convention on the elimination of radiological weapons and warfare. Such a convention would, in our view, be a further important arms limitation measure.
During the past year, a convention on chemical weapons has been a task of high priority in the Committee on Disarmament. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should present a joint initiative for a convention at the earliest possible date. My Government welcomes the efforts of the Committee on Disarmament to commence multilateral negotiations towards a chemical-weapons convention. For a number of years, the Finnish Government has taken a special interest in this question. As early as 1972, my Government launched a research project on the role of instrumental analysis on chemical-warfare agents and their verification. The goal of the project is the creation of a national chemical weapons verification capacity which could eventually be put into international use. We considered that such an instrumental, factual project would be most appropriate for a neutral country deeply concerned about the arms race.

Without going into details here, I should like to mention that the Finnish project has been conceived as a multi-purpose one, both substantively and functionally. Substantively, the planned control capacity could be used in three different verification activities: destruction of stocks, non-production of chemical weapons, and alleged use. Functionally, the capacity could be used regardless of the modalities of verification to be agreed upon. First, it could be used for national verification or any combination of national and international inspection; secondly, it could be used in connection with an investigation ordered by an appropriate international authority; and, thirdly, it could meet some of the concerns expressed by some developing countries about possible difficulties in carrying out verification by their national means only.

We should not forget that the qualitative and quantitative arms race in the field of conventional weapons is, in many cases, the most immediate threat to security. Conventional weapons also constitute the bulk of military expenditures in the world. They are also a major
Effective measures should be explored with the aim of restraining the ever-increasing build-up of conventional weapons. Therefore, a variety of approaches, including regional arrangements, could be applied, such as agreed limitations of arms transfer.

The United Nations conference on inhumane weapons recently concluded its work in Geneva. It made progress in efforts to protect civilian populations from suffering caused by certain inhumane conventional weapons. In the view of my delegation, the General Assembly should decide that a new conference should be convened - or that the same conference should be continued - in the autumn of 1980.

Mr. TABIBI (Afghanistan): I wish on behalf of the Afghan delegation to convey to you and the members of your Bureau our warmest congratulations on your unanimous election and the excellent leadership with which you have provided our Committee. Afghanistan, as an ancient country in the heart of Asia, has throughout the ages followed the policy of peace and friendship with all nations. We unfailingly supported every effort by the League of Nations in its disarmament conference, and during the United Nations era we have lent all our support to the efforts for disarmament and peace. The basis of the policy of the revolutionary Government of Afghanistan -- as stated by our President both during the tenth special session and at the meeting of the non-aligned countries in Havana last month and reaffirmed by our Foreign Minister a few days ago during the General Assembly debate -- is our great concern and anxiety with regard to the armaments race and the nuclear threat to world peace and security.

Despite some positive developments, such as the holding of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and some limited measures taken so far, the threat to world peace and security is still hanging over us as a sword of Damocles.
We believe that a realistic and positive approach towards disarmament not only creates peace and international co-operation but releases a tremendous amount of wealth for the creation of a happy and prosperous world.

The United Nations must continue and accelerate its efforts to put into practice the decisions agreed to by the international community at the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament on subjects such as the speeding-up of a second strategic arms limitation agreement, a convention prohibiting chemical weapons, a ban on radiological weapons and concluding conventions on weapons used for mass destruction and liable to cause unnecessary suffering to human beings. To this effect, the latest attempt at Geneva towards the prohibition or restriction on the use of destructive conventional weapons, and a convention to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and use of these types of weapons, seems urgent.

We hope also that progress will be achieved in the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons and the conclusion of a universal convention to this effect. A comprehensive nuclear test ban is the most important question, and we hope that a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty will be concluded, because all of mankind is waiting for it. We hope that next year the Committee on Disarmament will give priority to this question, because the basic objections in this connexion have been eliminated. We hope that an international convention will be concluded concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against States not possessing such weapons, for in the strange world in which we live unilateral declarations of intent are not sufficient.

Afghanistan is in favour of the creation of an ad hoc group to prepare for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to convene in 1982. As the Final Document of the tenth special session devoted to disarmament was a great step which gave momentum to this noble purpose, we are sure that the special session of 1982 will also bring about the further realization of mankind's ancient dream of disarmament.
We all agree that the success achieved in negotiating and signing the SALT II agreement has brought us closer to achieving SALT III as well, and we hope that the ratification of SALT II will soon take place in the interest of peace. As for the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, which for more than a quarter of a century has been debated by the General Assembly, no further delay is justified. The test-ban treaty, as a matter of urgency, should and must be concluded.

In this respect, we hope that the appeal by the Secretary-General for completion of the draft conventions on two major disarmament questions, namely, the total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the prohibition of chemical weapons, will be acted upon soon. We also welcome the report on the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons which was presented to the Committee on Disarmament by the super-Powers.

We believe that the role of the Committee on Disarmament should be strengthened and that, in the light of the latest decisions by the Sixth Summit Conference of non-aligned countries in Havana, the "Group of 21" within that Committee should also play a major role in reflecting the wishes of the great Non-Aligned Movement of our time.
While we are discussing these important items on disarmament, preparations for observing Disarmament Week are taking place. This initiative is useful, not only for the dissemination of information on disarmament and its relationship to security and peace, but in order to incite and encourage public opinion in all nations, so that their peoples may co-operate with one another as members of one family to maintain peace and international security and give present and future generations from the danger of a third world war. It is in this spirit that our delegation welcomes the proposal on "Inadmissibility of the Policy of Hegemonism in International Relations", proposed by the Soviet Union, and also extends its support to the item "Adoption of a declaration on international co-operation for disarmament" put forward by Czechoslovakia.

Indeed, a declaration laying out the fundamental principles of mutual co-operation is in accordance with the general principles of international law enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in the five principles accepted in Bandung and in various non-aligned declarations, in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in the resolution on the Definition of Aggression adopted by the General Assembly; it is also in line with documents codified by the International Law Commission, such as the Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, and the Formulation of Principles of the Charter and of the Judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal.

We agree that at a time when the world is under the threat of huge stockpiles of destructive and dangerous weapons, the acceptance of generally recognized principles of peaceful international co-operation is useful and timely. No doubt the peaceful international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, scientific, technological and humanitarian fields accepted at Helsinki helped to strengthen détente and international understanding. This declaration will also be helpful in creating an atmosphere of trust and co-operation in the field of disarmament. When it is said that war is not waged on the battlefields but primarily in the minds and hearts of people, this is true. Therefore if we create an atmosphere of
friendship, cooperation, détente and international understanding, States will refrain from destroying people and instead will follow the path of peace and love which has been advocated by all humanists, prophets and philosophers throughout the history of mankind.

Afghanistan also favours the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well as in the rest of the world, because those general steps towards nuclear-free zones will be steps towards the achievement of a nuclear-free world, a world of peace and brotherhood, on land, sea and air.

Afghanistan is also concerned about the possession of nuclear technology by South Africa and Israel and the threat that they may possess nuclear bombs. It considers this as a crime against peace and the security of mankind in a critical area of the world. For this reason an international agreement on guarantees of the security of States like Afghanistan which do not possess nuclear weapons, and the accession of all States to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty seems urgent.

My country is not only in favour of zones of peace in Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and Latin America, but it also supports the liquidation of existing military bases and the prohibition of new ones. My country has stated over and over again that it attaches great importance to the goal of disarmament, not only because it would save the world and civilization from the scourge of another holocaust, but also because a colossal sum of money - $350 billion - could be diverted to the urgent needs of billions of hungry, naked, sick, undernourished and needy people of the world, most of whom live in the ancient continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

We believe that as a result of 30 years of exhaustive discussions and consistent endeavours towards disarmament, we have now reached a critical cross-roads in history, when stockpiles of dangerous nuclear weapons are mounting; this makes it a matter of moral, political and humanitarian duty to embark on positive and practical measures to save the present generation and our planet from destruction. It is high time that we dedicated ourselves honestly to peace and global happiness and prosperity; Afghanistan, as a peaceful and non-aligned country, promises and reaffirms its support for every effort towards the noble aim of disarmament.
The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the meeting I would like to make a last reminder that this afternoon at 6 p.m. the list of speakers will be closed for the general debate on disarmament items.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.