

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 6 March 1973, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. I. Kömives

(Hungary)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. P.N. BATISTA
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. O. MITEV
<u>Burma:</u>	U THAUNG LWIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. R.W. CLARK Mr. D.R. MACPHEE
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. J. STRUCKA Mrs. V. BASETLIKOVA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. H. KHALLAF Mr. A.E. KHAIRAT Mr. S.A. ABOU-ALI
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. M. IMRU Mr. T. GEBRU
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. I. KOMIVES Mr. F. GAJDA
<u>India:</u>	Mr. P.K. BANERJEE Mr. M.K. MANGALMURTI
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. N. DI BERNARDO Mr. E. GIUFFRIDA Mr. P. BRUNI Mr. L. RUSSIANI
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. N. NISIBORI Mr. H. MATSUMOTO Mr. Y. HAMADA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
 Mr. M. MARIN
 Mrs. M. PRIETO

Mongolia:

Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
 Mr. J. CHOINKHOR

Morocco:

Mr. M.A. KHATTABI
 Mr. M. RAHALI

Netherlands:

Mr. M.J. ROSENBERG POLAK
 Mr. E. BOS

Nigeria:

Mr. J.D.O. SOKOYA
 Mr. A.A. OLUMIDE

Pakistan:

Mr. M.J. KHAN

Poland:

Mr. W. NATORF
 Mr. S. TOPA
 Mr. A. CZERKAWSKI
 Mr. H. PAC

Romania:

Mr. C. ENE
 Mr. O. IONESCO
 Mr. M. MANEA
 Mr. A. SASU

Sweden:

Mr. L. ECKERBERG
 Mr. U. REINIUS
 Mr. J. PRAWITZ
 Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of the Soviet Socialist
 Republics

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
 Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
 Mr. V.P. ABARENKOV
 Mr. V.P. KALININ

United Kingdom:

Mr. H.C. HAINWORTH

Mr. D.F. DUNCAN

Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD

Mr. R. HOULISTON

United States of America:

Mr. J. MARTIN

Mr. R. KIRK

Mr. R.W. DREXLER

Mr. P. SEMLER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. CVORÖVIC

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. ILKKA PASTINEN

Alternate Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJORNERSTEDT

Special Consultant:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 589th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador I. Kómives, representative of Hungary.

Statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Mexico and the Netherlands.

The Delegation of Sweden submitted a "Working Paper on the concept of amplified verification in relation to the prohibition of chemical weapons" (CCD/395).

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 8 March 1973, at 10.30 a.m.

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Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Before beginning my statement, I should like to join previous speakers in welcoming our new colleagues in the Committee -- Ambassador Barton, representative of Canada and Ambassador Di Bernardo, representative of Italy. My delegation wishes them successful participation in the work of our Committee.

The Committee on Disarmament this year approaches its work under more favourable circumstances heralding better conditions for our concrete discussions on the most important questions concerning the problems of disarmament. The favourable trend towards a lessening of international tension has found its further application within the past year, and we hope that its reflexion will be felt also in the discussions on disarmament which this year should produce concrete results.

Particularly encouraging for our work on disarmament in general are such events as the start of preparatory work for the European Security and Co-operation Conference in Helsinki and the start of preparatory consultations in Vienna on the reduction of armed forces and armaments. Many favourable events in the international field occurred during the past period which are good prerequisites attesting to the fact that the lessening of tensions and positions could also be achieved in the military field as a whole and in the field of disarmament in particular. It is only logical to expect that nuclear Powers and other States making efforts for the lessening of international tension will make the necessary endeavours and show readiness to adopt such measures which would afford lesser opportunity for the outbreak of a new world military conflict, and would curb and gradually liquidate armament systems and, primarily, nuclear weapons. Discussions on disarmament at the twenty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly have shown that the overwhelming majority of States are in favour of effective measures in the field of disarmament and wish to contribute to their realization. This situation should reflect itself in real state of affairs in the world and must not be a mere declaration of intentions by some countries, which would be not followed by concrete deeds.

One of the most important principles of disarmament negotiations is the necessity that the realization of certain disarmament measures should ensure the same state of security to all countries and thus not offer unilateral advantages to some States. This means that it is necessary already during the negotiations on disarmament agreements and their formulation to bear in mind the security interests not only of countries which are directly participating in such negotiations but also the legitimate

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interests of all others. In the case of some agreements it is even necessary that all world Powers which have military significance be parties to them and, particularly, all the nuclear Powers. It would not be realistic to request two or three nuclear Powers to destroy completely all their nuclear systems while the remaining two endeavour to continue with their construction without limitation. This does not, however, mean that our Committee is to be prevented from the discussion of measures that should be adopted by all military significant Powers, even those which are not present here at the moment, if they should be really effective. On the contrary, it is greatly desirable that negotiations on some of the most pressing questions should not be postponed if this or that Power does not as yet wish to participate. Even in such a case negotiations should continue with all endeavour; an appropriate agreement should be concluded and pressure exerted in order to ensure that such an agreement, adopted by the majority of countries, is also respected and possibly also acceded to by countries which were not present at the time of its formulation. It is well known that every agreement has its revision clause, and a meeting of all parties is usually held within five years of its conclusion in order to discuss its effectiveness and to express the participants' attitude to it. We have mentioned here the fact that it would be advisable for all military significant Powers, particularly all nuclear ones, to participate in the most important agreements on disarmament, and we certainly also would wish them to participate already in the negotiations on such agreements. But, as we see the situation now, if some Powers have as yet abstained from concrete disarmament negotiations, it is only and solely their own fault. With regard to the two German States -- being likewise very important Powers from the military point of view, though not nuclear ones -- the time surely is not very far off when they will fully participate in our negotiations, and there will certainly be no lack of readiness on their part to do so.

We have said here that if two nuclear Powers are not participating in our deliberations it does not mean that the Committee cannot discuss concrete questions without their presence. The Committee's activities so far have proved that it can be done. It rests with the present delegations to show to what extent our Committee will be able to meet the expectations of the world public in the fulfilment of the tasks recommended to the Committee by the relevant General Assembly resolutions.

There are favourable conditions for the conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons which, in the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation,

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should have high priority in this year's Committee's work. We are not the only ones who are of this opinion. United Nations General Assembly resolution 2933 (XXVII) reflects the views of a majority of States that the Committee should "continue negotiations, as a matter of high priority, with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction."

To a great extent the task of the Committee has been simplified by numerous documents presented in the Committee on these problems touching practically all aspects of the problems under discussion. The most important of them is the draft convention submitted by the socialist countries in March 1972 (CCD/361) which can evidently serve as a guideline for working out of the final draft convention, which then could be submitted by the Committee to the twenty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly for further consideration.

The proposal of the socialist States proceeds from the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons and implies the elimination of whole categories of weapons from the arsenals of States. It contains a system of obligations ensuring complete liquidation of all chemical weapons without exception, termination of their production and development, their physical destruction and, wherever possible or beneficial, their use for peaceful purposes. Everything advantageous or rational that has appeared during the course of negotiations concerning these problems has been embodied in this proposal. It represents a synthesis of opinion of a number of States on how to solve in a practical way the question of prohibiting chemical weapons in its complexity. For its distinctly positive parts, the proposal of the socialist States has gained the support of many States and also of those Committee members who wish this proposal to be an opening for elaborating the final draft convention. The situation and practical procedure which the Committee should decide upon were well characterized by the words of the distinguished representative of Nigeria at the 1875th meeting of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly: "We feel that from the technical angle enough is now known on this subject and the time is therefore ripe for the Committee on Disarmament to start immediate negotiations in a concrete form and with a draft treaty on its table. My delegation is of the opinion that the socialist draft, however inadequate it may appear to be, should form the basis of immediate negotiations. Any further time spent on resolving technicalities may tend to complicate rather than clarify the positions."

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It follows that States which are really interested in the attainment of an early prohibition of chemical weapons should submit concrete proposals -- i.e. concrete formulations of individual provisions for the proposed convention. The Socialist delegations have approached the solution of the question from this very point of view, and have demonstrated it by submitting a concrete draft convention. The other side should also decide in favour of this procedure. Thus we would avoid further delays in the fulfilment of our priority task recommended by the relevant resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. At the opening of the Committee's session on 20 February 1973, the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Martin, declared that "the United States is fully committed to the goal of achieving effective controls on chemical weapons." (CCD/PV.585, p.13). With regard to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons he declared that "last year many delegations submitted working papers dealing with such topics as the toxicity of chemical substances and the identification, definition and classification of chemical agents." (*ibid.*, p.11). The delegation of the United States also submitted a number of working papers. Considering the present situation we cannot but express agreement with the opinion of the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Nisibori, who at 1877th meeting of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly last year stated that "while we appreciate the efforts of the United States to clarify technical problems by presenting a volume of working papers to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it is a matter of some regret that the United States has not as yet presented any concrete proposal, including concrete verification measures, for the prohibition of chemical weapons." (A/C.1/PV.1877, p.27 of the provisional text). More than five months have elapsed since the interruption of the Committee's work in September last year. The Czechoslovak delegation would like to express the hope that during that period the respective countries have again considered the possibilities of concrete discussions and will contribute by concrete proposals to a successful conclusion of the discussions on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The solution of the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests is the further remaining important goal. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has no nuclear

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weapons, nor any plans to possess them in the future. We have signed and ratified the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water as well as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The obligations emanating from the said Treaties, which we fully respect and observe, completely exclude any nuclear weapons tests on our part. However, we are of the opinion that nuclear tests should be stopped all over the world by all countries and in all environments. It is not necessary to point out the gravity of these problems. The past discussions have dealt with all aspects of this question in considerable detail. Figuratively speaking, the clay is wet and what remains is to shape a form -- i.e. an international legal document -- which, accepted by all nuclear Powers, would prohibit the carrying out of any nuclear weapons tests in all environments. The Czechoslovak delegation will dwell on this question in one of its future statements.

In today's statement we wish to mention another question, the question of one collateral measure which we consider now important. It is a question of military budgets. It has been noted, both at the United Nations General Assembly and in several statements so far delivered in our session, that there are indeed tendencies of positive development in the international situation. These tendencies have been confirmed also by the termination of the war in Viet-Nam and by the obvious relaxation of relations among States. There are more concrete perspectives for the achievement of permanent peaceful relations among nations regardless of their social systems. Therefore, under such circumstances, it can be said that nations could allocate much less to military expenditure and focus their attention on the real needs of increasing standards of living in their respective countries. And what is the situation in reality? At the end of January 1973, the President of the United States proposed an increase in the military budget by almost \$5 billion and, what is more, he stated at the same time that this trend was to be expected likewise for the fiscal year 1975. To justify those increases in the United States military budget at a time when that country is not engaged in any military encounter, he argued, inter alia, that "a strong military posture is necessary for maintaining peace." This is nothing new, merely a different wording of the well-known saying of the ancient Romans that "if you want peace, make ready for war" -- a saying which proved false so many times in the course of history.

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The increase in military budgets to incalculable levels does not, however, remain the domain of one country only. During the very days of the beginning of our negotiations this year, the United Kingdom announced a record increase in its military budget to £3.3 billion. The declaration of the British Government issued on that occasion again applies the ten-year old argument that "only negotiations from strength are likely to produce equitable agreements". It is not a very encouraging overture for negotiations on the reduction of military forces in Europe which, as we believe, will commence with full speed already this year in spite of all present difficulties. We think that our post-war negotiations offer enough evidence to remind us that proceeding from a position of strength leads nowhere in negotiations on disarmament. We do not wish to harm the legitimate claim of every country to safeguard its defence ability. However, we feel justified in our opinion that the present situation in armaments of individual countries has reached such a level that their basic national security interests would not be threatened at all even without further increase of their budgets. On the contrary, after the end of the war so many means were allocated to armament that with the necessary maintenance and occasional exchange of some types of weapons, it would be quite possible not only to freeze the budgets but to reduce them as well.

If we look at the course of negotiations on disarmament, we can see that the question of reduction of military budgets was discussed at a period when the international situation was far from being as promising as now. Great attention was devoted to that question during the decade of 1954-1964 and a number of proposals was submitted. The Soviet Union proposed several times a reduction of military expenditures in budgets; there was also a unilateral reduction of military budgets. The delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt proposed in April 1964, at the then Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, that an appeal should be addressed to all major Powers to reduce their military budgets on the basis of mutual examples (ENDC/PV.182, pp.15-16).

We think that an exchange of opinions on the question of the reduction of military budgets can do no harm. It would certainly be a merit to our session if we could submit this year a worked-out position on this question to the United Nations General Assembly. We should consider the problem even more thoroughly, as it undoubtedly will be discussed from the regional point of view at the European Conference on Security and Co-operation.

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At the opening session, the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Martin, mentioned the question of conventional weapons. Proceeding from the fact that numerous military conflicts in the world have been fought with those very weapons -- and that all armed conflicts have not yet ended -- the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has already for many years advocated the adoption of effective measures in the field of conventional weapons. One can only remember the approximately 70 million victims of conventional weapons in World War Two, and further millions of innocent victims in Viet-Nam, to see the problem in its whole entirety. On the other hand we are aware of the fact that some Powers would like to use the so-called controls of conventional weapons against the legitimate interest of colonial nations fighting for their national liberation. To this we would never agree. Also the Charter of the United Nations envisages such interests and makes them legal in the context of international law. In our opinion, the present period characterized by considerable lessening of tension offers realistic conditions for the settlement of this problem. In the proposal of the Soviet Union "on non-use of force, including the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in international relations for all times", we see a concrete path leading towards that end. The adoption of this proposal would also lead to the prohibition of conventional types of weapons because the proposal for non-use of force in relations among States and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons logically covers the banning of conventional weapons as well. In this respect the twenty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted the well-known declaration containing the solemn pledge of States of "their renunciation of the use or threat of force in all its forms and manifestations in international relations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons."

We consider the declared readiness of the Soviet Union "to agree upon and appropriately to formalize reciprocal commitments with any of the nuclear Powers on the non-use of force, including the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against one another" as an important step on the way to the realization of this idea.

This new Soviet initiative opens further perspectives for the solution of the prohibition of use of force both in the form of nuclear or conventional weapons, and offers new possibilities also in the field of preparations for and convening of a world disarmament conference. As one of the States members of the Special Committee, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is directly interested in the conference

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preparatory work in order that it may lead to purposeful and immediate results so that the Special Committee can thus fulfil the recommendation contained in United Nations General Assembly resolution 2930 (XXVII) "to examine all the suggestions expressed by Governments on the convening of a world disarmament conference and related problems and to present, on the basis of consensus, a report to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session." In view of the fact that a majority of the members of the Special Committee are members of the Committee on Disarmament, the working atmosphere of the Special Committee will depend to a considerable extent on the relation to that body of individual delegations here present. The importance of the proposal for convening a world disarmament conference necessitates that members of our Committee do everything possible for a successful beginning and constructive work of the Special Committee. It is a sincere wish of the Czechoslovak delegation that the positive approach of countries to this proposal will enhance their efforts for the creation of favourable conditions for the work of the Special Committee. As is evident from the replies sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/8817 and Add.1) and from the course of discussions both at the United Nations General Assembly and in our Committee, a majority of countries is clearly in favour of the earliest possible convening of a world disarmament conference. We must, therefore, stop shifting from one foot to the other, and not use procedural questions as a pretext for slowing down or even blocking the convening of the Special Committee. Members of our Committee are with one exception members of the Special Committee. They have, therefore, a special responsibility in this matter and should not take it lightly.

In that context we cannot agree with the opinion of the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Hainworth, expressed at the Committee's meeting on 27 February, that "the Special Committee should meet only when the five member States in question, i.e. the five nuclear weapon States — have signified that they were ready to take their seats at the table" (CCD/PV.587,p.7) Such a course of affairs would postpone the whole matter until the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly. It would be in direct contradiction to resolution 2930 (XXVII). This resolution was a compromise solution achieved after hard bargaining by the group of non-aligned States, standing firmly behind the idea of a world conference and trying to bring it some steps forward, even if very modest ones.

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We consider that the participation of all nuclear Powers in a world conference and in the Special Committee is important. However, the fact that some of them are not yet ready to take their places in the Special Committee should not prevent that body from starting its work. The Special Committee could undertake a very useful exchange of views and would naturally not exclude those nuclear Powers which remain absent from its work at the beginning from joining in its activities at a later date. In addition, there is always the possibility of co-operation with the Special Committee in other ways than direct participation. At the last session of the United Nations General Assembly one of the nuclear Powers, which informed us that it will remain absent from the Special Committee, assured us that it will nevertheless maintain contact with it.

The Czechoslovak Delegation sincerely hopes that, when the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly starts deliberations on the world disarmament conference -- which as you know has already been placed on its provisional agenda by resolution 2930 (XXVII) -- there will be substantial matters to be discussed and not only procedural questions concerning the Special Committee, avoiding the real crux of the matter.

In conclusion, allow me to express hopes that all disarmament negotiations, which are supposed to take place this year -- that is our Committee's work, the SALT talks, the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference and also the talks on reduction of military forces and armaments in Europe, about which preliminary consultations have recently started in Vienna -- will bring about something positive. The present extension of disarmament negotiations, which the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic sincerely welcomes, testifies to the importance and attention accorded now to disarmament by the whole international community.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is ready to contribute by its constructive share to these talks wherever it would be possible. And to the present Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, we would wish that it will achieve such results in its work this year that it may face the General Assembly of the United Nations this autumn with its visor raised.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): On 29 November 1972, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, as resolution 2932 B (XXVII), the draft which had been submitted to the First Committee two weeks previously under the sponsorship of all the members of the Group of Twelve of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

That resolution, whose brevity and simplicity match its importance, deals with the bilateral SALT talks. As can be seen from its wording, reproduced in full in one of the attachments to the letter from the Secretary-General circulated under the symbol CCD/393/Rev.1, the resolution has two principal objectives, which I shall now discuss in the reverse order to that in which they are mentioned in the resolution.

In operative paragraph 2 of the resolution, the General Assembly expressly invites the two Governments participating in the SALT negotiations to "keep the General Assembly informed" of the results of those negotiations.

This invitation reflects a need to which U Thant drew attention as early as 1971, in carefully weighed and common-sense terms, in the Introduction to the last Annual Report which he submitted to the Assembly as Secretary-General. In that Report, he stated inter alia that: "At present, the Members of the United Nations have to rely on unofficial and unconfirmed press reports about the negotiations at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. But questions concerning a possible nuclear war and human survival, as well as the economic and social burdens of the arms race, directly and intimately affect every human being on earth. Let us recall that the United Nations under the Charter has been given specific responsibility in the field of disarmament. Accordingly, in my opinion the time has come to inquire whether the United Nations should not be officially informed about the progress of the arms limitation discussions, to enable the Members to understand and consider the issues involved, even if they do not discuss the details of the day-to-day negotiations."

Similar opinions have been repeatedly expressed, both here and in New York, by various delegations. On behalf of Mexico, for example, I voiced them at the 495th meeting of this Committee on 23 February 1971. I was again the Mexican spokesman on 23 October 1972 when, at the beginning of the debate on the disarmament items, I stated to the First Committee of the General Assembly, referring to the results of the SALT I talks, that "we believe the General Assembly has a right to be officially informed by the participating States and that this report should be made at the present session".

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Precisely because our statements fell on deaf ears, we were obliged to make an official request to the Secretary-General on 3 November 1972, and to his Special Representative to this Committee on 20 February 1973, to the effect that the three bilateral instruments that emerged from the first stage of the negotiations to which I have been referring should be reproduced as documents of the General Assembly and of the Committee on Disarmament. They have now been reproduced under the symbols A/C.1/1026 and CCD/394.

We venture to hope that in the light of the outcome of those requests, and bearing in mind that the invitation specifically formulated by the General Assembly must now be added to them, the two nuclear super-Powers may in future remember the functions of the Assembly and of this Committee with regard to all matters concerning disarmament.

Notwithstanding the importance of the invitation addressed by the General Assembly to the SALT participants in paragraph 2 of the abovementioned resolution, the provisions of paragraph 1 of the resolution are undoubtedly of far greater significance. In this paragraph, the organ which is fully representative of the international community, having stated that it was convinced of "the necessity that the renewed negotiations should bring about early and positive results in the field of nuclear disarmament", made a solemn appeal to the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union "to make every effort to expedite the conclusion of further agreements including important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems".

The appeal by the General Assembly is obviously based on its conclusion that the three bilateral instruments to be found in document CCD/394, whatever political and psychological consequences they may have internationally, are very limited in scope as disarmament measures. This is because, on the one hand, the quantitative limitations provided for in these instruments are set at the far from reassuring level that existed when the instruments were signed, and in some cases at an even higher level; and, on the other hand -- as regards the qualitative, which is perhaps the more dangerous, aspect -- leaving aside a few minor limitations relating to defensive weapons, the agreements not only fail to mention any qualitative restriction but would even seem to have been construed by the super-Powers as an incentive to unbridled competition in this field.

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The appeal by the General Assembly also reflects, to our way of thinking, the conviction that the philosophy on which the SALT I negotiations appear to have been based is fundamentally wrong and will have to be radically modified in the second phase. Otherwise, the intention declared in the penultimate preambular paragraph of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems "to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament" will remain pure sarcasm.

A radical change in this philosophy, assuming that such thinking can be accepted as a necessary evil for the first phase of SALT, is imperative now that the second stage of the talks has begun. Unless it takes place, we shall be forced to agree with two experts on international affairs, one British and the other from the United States, who in separate and very recent articles made observations on this subject which I take the liberty of reproducing.

The first writer says:

"In actual fact, the 1972 SALT agreements are based entirely on a single aim: to preserve the state of mutual assured destruction (MAD) between the parties. It is strangely paradoxical that the ritual promise of achieving general and complete disarmament should appear in the very treaty which, in concentrating on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, lays down the principle that the path to security lies in the institutionalization of a system of mutual terror whereby each party can destroy a large number of the other's cities."

The second of the authors to whom I have referred writes:

"Neither the antecedents nor the immediate prospects of SALT II suggest an acceptable rate of progress towards arms limitation. Even less -- far less -- do the SALT negotiations show any sign of ridding us of nuclear terror. On the contrary, it has become the accepted practice in the field of arms control to seek to stabilize this terror, and even guarantee its indefinite continuance, in the very understandable -- and very mistaken -- belief that it is the only practical means towards peace."

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In the light of opinions such as those which I have just quoted, it is natural that we should regard the appeal by the General Assembly to the nuclear super-Powers in connection with SALT II as extremely pertinent. We believe that the only solution which can in the long run prove acceptable and effective for the achievement of those three goals -- peace, justice and progress -- which were proclaimed in 1970 as the theme for the anniversary of the United Nations is general and complete disarmament under effective international control which would, as a first immediate step, comprise the progressive reduction and eventually the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

It was for this reason that four years ago we defined the Mexican views on this problem in the following terms:

"We refuse to believe that the so-called deterrent power -- a formula that has regrettably been much abused -- of such weapons can be regarded as a positive factor justifying their existence. The fact that in the past twenty years we have had a precarious peace based on a frightening balance of terror is for us far from being a convincing argument ...

We cannot understand why today international peace and security should have to depend on weapons such as the nuclear weapons, the very existence of which entails the danger of universal suicide. Against the presumed need for the deterrent power of nuclear weapons we must set the very real need to evaluate the moral dissuasive power of all peoples of the world, who demand every day with greater urgency and less patience that an end be put to a situation which endangers nothing less than the very survival of the human species."

We do not seem to have been very far wrong in our attitude, as is clear from the many recent well-founded criticisms of the theory of nuclear deterrence, most of them made by experts of unquestionable and recognized authority in matters of strategy and national or international security.

The fact that the SALT meetings are now to be held in this very city of Geneva will perhaps make it easier for our discussions to be heard by the participants in those talks. Moreover, nuclear disarmament is something of which SALT has no monopoly, but it occupies a prominent place in our Committee's programme -- although sometimes there is a tendency to forget this. It therefore seems to me extremely relevant to outline, as I shall proceed to do presently, some of the principal points made in one of the most recent critical studies of nuclear deterrence -- studies which, as I have already said, have been appearing in ever increasing numbers.

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This is a paper which served as a basis for discussion at one of the working groups of the California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar organized by the Ford Foundation. It was published as a booklet of the Seminar and also as an article in Foreign Affairs in January 1973. The author, Dr. Fred Charles Iklé, is not only a former Professor of Political Science in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, but has since 1968 been Head of the Social Science Department of no less a body than the Rand Corporation, and it would therefore be impossible to reject his views as invalid by attaching to them the customary label of "Utopian pacifism".

His study is entitled "Can nuclear deterrence last out the century?", and the reply he gives to this question is categorically negative.

The author begins by noting that the autumn of 1972 marked half the road from the beginning of the nuclear era to the year 2000. Mankind, he says, has been spared nuclear devastation since the annihilation of two Japanese cities by the only two nuclear weapons then existing. But the destructiveness of nuclear arsenals, now increased many thousandfold, has sunk into human consciousness like man's knowledge of his mortality.

We all turn away, however, from the thought that nuclear war may be as inescapable as death, and may end our lives and our society within this generation or the next. We believe, or act as if we believed, that thanks to a certain international order the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons with their almost incomprehensible destructiveness will never be used.

Yet, this order is so constructed that it cannot move toward abolition of nuclear weapons. It demands, as the necessary condition for avoiding nuclear war, the very preservation of these arms always ready to destroy entire nations.

Dr. Iklé goes on to analyse the principal "dogmas" generally accepted in certain military and government circles of the nuclear Powers, and he summarizes in the following terms the conclusions which he has reached concerning the obvious danger of nuclear deterrence and its evident inability to ensure world peace:

"An almost exclusive emphasis on deterrence could be defended as a satisfactory long-term policy if it could be convincingly argued that successful deterrence was tantamount to prevention of nuclear war. There exists no rational basis for such an argument. No matter how cataclysmic the threatened 'assured destruction,' those calculated decisions which our

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deterrent seeks to prevent are not the sole processes that could lead to nuclear war. We simply cannot know which of the various potential causes is most probable--whether it be a coherently calculated decision to attack, or an 'irrational' decision or technical accident. Yet the approach now prevailing puts almost all effort into preventing the 'rational' decision."

The author demonstrates, with the support of various facts from the history of the twentieth century, that "irrational" decisions can by no means be regarded as an exception in international relations and, with reference to the importance of the "accident" factor, he states that:

"... Nobody can predict that the fatal accident or unauthorized act will never happen. The hazard is too elusive. It is inherent not only in the ineradicable possibility of technical defects, but also in the inevitable vulnerability to human error of all command and operational procedures -- during periods of high alert as well as during the many years of quiet waiting. So exceedingly complex are modern weapons systems, both in their internal mechanisms and in their intricate interactions, that it seems doubtful whether any group of experts could ever ferret out every unintended ramification, discover every lurking danger."

In addition to irrational decisions, the study from which I am quoting gives a number of recent examples showing the truth of the statement I have just read out concerning the inescapable danger of "accidents". The author then arrives at the following conclusions:

"Given that occasional incompetence or malfeasance is predictable in large institutions -- whether military or civilian -- the safety of nuclear armaments remains a constantly pressing uncertainty. Given the huge and far-flung missile forces, ready to be launched from land and sea on both sides, the scope for disaster by accident is immense. Given that our strategic dogmas demand the targeting of populations and denial of defensive measures, the carnage would be without restraint."

In his very thought-provoking article, Dr. Iklé has not overlooked the ethical aspect of nuclear deterrence. In order to give an idea of his well-argued opinions on this point, I will merely read out the following two paragraphs:

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"... 'assured destruction' fails to indicate what is to be destroyed; but then 'assured genocide' would reveal the truth too starkly. The common phrase 'detering a potential aggressor' conveys a false simplicity about the processes that might lead to a nuclear attack, as if we had to worry only about some ambitious despot who sits calculating whether or not to start a nuclear war. A moral perversity lies hidden behind the standard formula: in the event this 'aggressor' attacks, we must 'retaliate by knocking out his cities.' Tomas de Torquemada, who burned 10,000 heretics at the stake, could claim principles more humane than our nuclear strategy; for his tribunals found all his victims guilty of having knowingly committed mortal sin.

"The jargon of American strategic analysis works like a narcotic. It dulls our sense of moral outrage about the tragic confrontation of nuclear arsenals, primed and constantly perfected to unleash widespread genocide. It fosters the current smug complacency regarding the soundness and stability of mutual deterrence. It blinds us to the fact that our method for preventing nuclear war rests on a form of warfare universally condemned since the Dark Ages -- the mass killing of hostages."

In order to complete my comments on the study by the Head of the Social Science Department of the Rand Corporation, I must quote what in my view may be regarded as the principal conclusion which emerges from all the facts analysed in the study, and which is expressed by the author in these terms:

"... these assumed requirements of stable deterrence are to a large extent the heritage of strategic policies from prior decades, now obsolete. They are a perilous way to protect ourselves from nuclear catastrophe and harmful to the prospects of strategic disarmament. Happily, they are dispensable for deterrence. Over the decades to come, we can develop and put into effect a safer and more humane strategy to prevent nuclear war."

In the Mexican delegation's view, if this strategy is really to be "safer and more humane", it is essential that the countless appeals of the General Assembly for a cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament should be complied with.

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For this purpose it is essential that the nuclear Powers, and first and foremost the super-Powers, should take very seriously their primary responsibilities in this matter which is of vital interest for all peoples since -- as cannot be repeated often enough -- it is ultimately the very survival of mankind which is at stake. That is why the "important qualitative limitations" and the "substantial reductions" so urgently asked for by the Assembly in resolution 2232 B (XXVII) are of capital importance as measures which should progressively lead the super-Powers to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, "at an early date", as the Assembly has so often said.

The fate of the world cannot go on depending indefinitely on the macabre game of Russian-American nuclear roulette. In this connexion I venture to recall what the President of Mexico, Mr. Luis Echeverría, so rightly said at the opening meeting of the sixteenth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency held in my country's capital on 26 September 1972. After referring to the valuable contribution made by Latin America through the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Mexican Head of State said:

"But it is not enough that we should undertake to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We must destroy existing nuclear weapons. Until this is done, there will still be a danger of catastrophe".

Conclusions such as those formulated in the very authoritative study on which I have commented, and opinions such as that expressed by Arnold Toynbee as long ago as 1967 when he said that "the threat to mankind's survival has become much greater since 1945 than it ever was in the first million years of history", prove that Mexico's traditional attitude is well founded.

Mr. ROSENBERG POLAK (Netherlands): Once again we come together to "undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles and taking into account inter alia paragraph 8 of these principles, agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

The quotation is taken from resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961. That resolution contains the endorsement by the General Assembly of the agreement which at the end of 1961 had been reached by the Soviet Union and the United States on the composition of what was then called the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

(Mr. Rosenberg Polak, Netherlands)

It is worthwhile to read again the now almost 12 years old paragraph 8 of the joint statement of agreed principles to which I have just referred, and I beg your indulgence for my reading out this paragraph to you:

"States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme [of general and complete disarmament] has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement of the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme".

In meeting for a new session of the Committee on Disarmament we should not lose sight of the objectives embodied in paragraph 8 of the joint statement of agreed principles. Although efforts should continue to be made with a view to ensuring agreement on concrete measures of disarmament, we should at the same time keep in mind our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament and we should direct all our efforts to that end.

The world picture has changed considerably since the establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in 1961. Perhaps we can view the present world situation with somewhat more comfort and optimism than we were able to do some twelve years ago. It seems that countries are learning to live together in peace and harmony or, in any case, in a state of negotiation instead of confrontation. Co-operation among States in the fields of science, technology, economics and human relations is increasing. China is now represented in the United Nations and we are looking forward to the moment at which the two parts of Germany will join the world Organization. The parties to the long and bitter war in Viet-Nam have come to an agreement. SALT I has culminated in two agreements on offensive and defensive nuclear weapons systems. The second round of SALT II is going to start in this city within a few days. In Helsinki and in Vienna attempts are being made towards the convening of conferences that have as their goal the enhancement of European security and co-operation.

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How can the Committee on Disarmament fit into this global picture of a world striving for better and more enduring relations among nations? Does our Committee still have a role to play or is it doomed slowly to disappear?

I do not believe it is to fade away. During the last session of the General Assembly there was much discussion again on the convening of a world disarmament conference in which all States should participate. The Netherlands was ready to accept the idea because we hoped that it might perhaps lead to the involvement of all militarily important States in disarmament talks. Unfortunately our hopes have not materialized. It cannot be expected that the difficulties which are hampering progress toward a decision on the holding of a world disarmament conference will soon be overcome.

The duty to make progress in the field of arms control and disarmament is still ours. We must in any case respond to the challenge of the last session of the General Assembly which requested this Committee specifically to give first priority to its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, and to continue negotiations, as a matter of high priority, with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

With regard to the first problem -- a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests -- we must indeed in this session give our utmost attention to this subject.

It is clear, however, that the main responsibility lies here with the nuclear Powers concerned, and we therefore urgently appeal to them to come forward with constructive proposals aimed at an early cessation of underground nuclear tests and at the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban.

We have stated on several occasions that the only category of underground explosions that is relevant for on-site inspection consists of those explosions that can be detected and located but not identified by national means.

We have also argued that due to seismological progress the range of this particular category is shrinking rapidly.

We are, of course, highly interested in the additional information on seismic tests which the United States representative has promised us in his statement at our meeting on 20 February last.

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At this juncture I should like to refer to the statement by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union at our meeting on 20 February. Mr. Roshchin stated on that occasion that the Soviet Union is wholeheartedly in favour of the complete and immediate solution of the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests, on the assumption that nuclear tests, including tests under ground, must be stopped everywhere and by all. He also said that it is essential that all the nuclear States should participate in negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests, including underground tests, and that only under these conditions can progress be achieved in this matter. I should not like to exclude the possibility that this Soviet position is merely intended to emphasize the importance of the participation of all nuclear Powers in disarmament negotiations, including negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests. However, if this Soviet position establishes a pre-condition for the conclusion of a treaty banning underground tests, it would be fair to ask the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union if the conclusion of such a treaty would, according to the Soviet view, only be feasible if all nuclear Powers are involved as signatories. I should be most grateful if the Soviet representative could remove any doubt that might have arisen on this important question.

Allow me to make a few remarks also on the second problem entrusted to us by the General Assembly.

During our last year's session we had a fruitful and stimulating discussion on the chemical warfare issue. We all began to realize the complexity and manifold implications of the subject. We certainly gained in insight. We should now proceed to the next state -- viz. the formulation of concrete proposals and of possible treaty language. Some proposals and suggestions have already been made. Others are to follow. We hope that our common thoughts and efforts may pave the way for making at least a first step towards chemical disarmament. We should move from the stage of explorations to the stage of negotiations. Preferences for certain types of solution have been expressed, but we have been lacking so far in indicating precisely how to translate those preferences into practicable and negotiable arrangements. The problem to be tackled is an intricate one, but this should not discourage us in trying to search for the right track. This delegation hopes to be able to contribute in a constructive manner.

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Although the control and reduction of weapons of mass destruction has to be considered as the most important task in the field of disarmament, yet we ought not to overlook the necessity of achieving mutually acceptable arms control restraints affecting so-called conventional weapons. The agreements in matters of arms control and disarmament concluded since World War II, are mainly concerned with weapons of mass destruction. This emphasis on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons was justified, because they constitute the greatest threat to our civilization and to mankind. On the other hand it is a fact of life that all armed conflicts since World War II were fought with conventional weapons. As has often been said in this Committee, there is tragically enough nothing conventional about the death and the destruction conventional weapons have wrought on the human race.

The distinguished representative of the United States, Mr. Martin, included in his statement of 7 September last the invitation to address ourselves to the basic question whether we all share the objective of endeavouring to make progress in the field of conventional arms control.

In the United States working paper CCD/307 of 12 August 1970 a regional approach to conventional arms limitation is advocated. The working paper sets out some principles and guidelines which could provide the basis for regional agreements or arrangements.

The SIPRI study The Arms Trade with the Third World comes to the conclusion that the most fruitful approach to actual regulation or limitation of conventional weapons would perhaps be through regional recipient-country agreements which would cover production as well as trade. In that study the thought is, however, expressed that there is no prospect of concluding such arrangements in regions where the competing military commitments of the great Powers are important. It is supposed, therefore, that arrangements are more likely to be made in regions where the links with the major arms race are weakest.

I have referred already to the formidable undertaking in the arms control field which is now getting underway in a neighbouring country; the exploratory talks in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. The impact of

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those talks could be far-reaching. It is to be hoped that the example will induce countries in other regions of the world again to consider the regional arms limitation approach.

1973 may be becoming an important year in the history of international negotiations with the present talks in Helsinki and in Vienna, the developments in Viet-Nam and Indochina, the trade negotiations in the framework of GATT. Let us endeavour to the utmost to ensure that the results of our labours during the present session will count when the balance-sheet of 1973 will finally be drawn up.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.