

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

EEEC/PV.315
20 July 1967
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 20 July 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. R. CARACCIOLO (Italy)

GE.67-13861

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil: Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA
Mr. C. A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. T. DAMIANOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma: U KYAW MUN

Canada: Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
Mr. J. R. MORDEN

Czechoslovakia: Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia: Mr. A. ZELLEKE

India: Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy: Mr. R. CARACCILO
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
Mr. E. FRANCO
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico: Mr. J. CASTANEDA
Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria: Alhaji SULE KOLO

Poland: Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO

Mr. O. IONESCO

Mr. C. GEORGESCO

Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM

Mr. R. BOMAN

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. V. P. SUSLOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. O. SIRRY

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY

Mr. I. F. PORTER

Mr. R. I. T. CROMARTIE

Mr. M. R. MORLAND

United States of America:

Mr. G. BUNN

Mr. G. BREAM

Mr. C. GLEYSTEN

Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the three hundred and fifteenth meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Before calling on the representative of Sweden, who is the only speaker for this morning, I should like to tell the Committee the reason for the change in the rotation of the chairmanship at the last meeting. On that day Italy was due to take the Chair, but, as the occasion coincided with the arrival of the new head of the Italian delegation, the representative of Mexico kindly agreed to change places with him. I should like to thank the representative of Mexico, and to assure the Committee that the normal rotation will now be resumed.
3. Mr. EDELSTAM (Sweden): In a statement made before the Committee on 29 June the head of the Swedish delegation, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, dealt with the subject of a treaty banning underground nuclear tests (ENDC/PV.309). She put forward inter alia some findings and suggestions of a technical nature intended as a contribution to end if possible the present deadlock on the question of control methods to be employed to monitor such a treaty. With that statement the Swedish delegation wanted to start a new discussion in the Committee on this subject in order to find out if the time was not now ripe to bring the matter of a comprehensive test-ban treaty to a successful end.
4. We have since been gratified to note that other delegations are similarly preoccupied with this subject. I have in mind, of course, the important statements made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, at the meeting of 11 July (ENDC/PV.312), and by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, at the meeting of 13 July (ENDC/PV.313).
5. Mr. Foster put a number of questions to this delegation asking for further information which, he said, the United States Government needed for its study of some of the points made in Mrs. Myrdal's speech. We hope that satisfactory answers to Mr. Foster's questions will be found in the Swedish delegation's document entitled "Memorandum on the control of an underground test ban treaty" (ENDC/191), which was distributed yesterday and is available to representatives here today. The remarks which I am about to make with specific reference to these questions should be studied together with that document to become meaningful.

(Mr. Edelstam, Sweden)

6. I have to add, however, that some of the questions put to us by the United States delegation cannot be satisfactorily answered by words alone. The answers would have to be put into mathematical language to be complete. We have not attempted to do this in our memorandum; it would have made the paper inaccessible to most of us around this table. Some of the mathematical descriptions are, however, already available to specialists in the technical document referred to in footnote 1 of the memorandum. With this important reservation, I will now treat Mr. Foster's questions one by one.

7. The first one deals with our statement that only one earthquake will be mistaken for an explosion in fifteen years. The method of calculation used to obtain these numbers is described in general terms in our memorandum (pages 1, 2). The data that were used are also defined in the text.

8. The second question deals with the sufficiency of deterrence afforded by particular verification methods. Here I wish to emphasize that the purpose of the control system, as we see it, should be to deter from violations of the treaty. Its purpose would not be to provide intelligence facts. We hope that our document contains a satisfactory description of how we came to consider the particular deterrence level of 10 per cent to be sufficient. I wish to refer to page 4, outlining our evaluation on this point. I may add that, to our knowledge, the same percentage figure has been used in the past in corresponding calculations by United States scientists.

9. The third question deals with the inspection case. Mr. Foster questioned our statement that the British "complexity" method of identification from long distance could reduce the need for inspections to one in two years. Once again, this was the result of the calculations made by using the method that we have tried to describe in general terms in our memorandum.

10. We have also in our document explained how we arrived at the particular level of on-site inspection efficiency used in our calculations (page 5). In this connexion we look forward to the further technical information of the event location problems connected with this issue which was promised by Mr. Foster in his statement.

11. Finally, in answer to the question on the magnitude of seismic events considered, we hope that it has been made clear in our document how this particular point was treated (page 3).

(Mr. Edelstam, Sweden)

12. Let me add as a further explanation to readers of our memorandum that our assessment of the control capabilities depends, of course, on the data used and on the political requirements we put into our calculations. Other investigators might well want to use another set of political requirements on deterrence against violations and assurance against mistakes about earthquakes. These would in turn lead to other results.

13. Mr. Foster, in his statement, also dealt with the relationship between national security and arms control measures. "The appeal of arms control measures must rest on whether they enhance the security of the nations agreeing to them", he said (ENDC/PV.312, para. 9). He went on to say:

"To be consonant with security, a comprehensive test-ban treaty must afford a means for verifying that each party is fulfilling its obligations. That is to say, one of two parties cannot be expected to cease an activity in which both are engaged and which is an important factor in their strategic relationship unless it is convinced that the other party also is ending that activity."

(ibid., para. 10).

14. We should not wish to dispute this thesis. But we are confident that by using a deterring system of control in conformity with the ideas which we have put forward, a treaty banning all nuclear tests would serve the purpose of national security.

15. Mr. Roshchin pointed out that the non-proliferation treaty should be considered - "... as a first step towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race, towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. In our opinion the conclusion of such a treaty, by bringing about a higher degree of confidence in relations between States, would open up more favourable possibilities for achieving agreement on other disarmament questions and in the first place on questions of nuclear disarmament". (ENDC/PV.313, para. 15)

He went on to say:

"One of the most important steps towards nuclear disarmament would be the discontinuation by the nuclear Powers of all tests of nuclear weapons, including underground nuclear explosions". (ibid., para. 17)

(Mr. Edelstam, Sweden)

16. It is indeed the opinion of the whole world that a treaty to this effect would constitute a real proof of the good will of the nuclear-weapon Powers to put an end to the constant refinement of their enormous nuclear stockpiles. I will not reiterate once again what was said in our earlier statement on this score. I only wish to remind the Committee of the general framework in which we have placed the ideas of a technical nature which we advanced in our earlier statement and which we are bringing forward again today.

17. Finally, let me say that we have noted with appreciation the statements by both the United States and the Soviet representatives that their Governments do desire to seek an effective comprehensive test-ban treaty. We view the discussion which the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has now engaged upon as a further proof of this political will. This spirit should make it possible for the Committee to work out during its current session a draft text of a treaty banning all nuclear tests.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 315th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Roberto Caracciolo, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy and Sweden.

"The delegation of Sweden tabled a Memorandum on the control of an underground test ban treaty.^{1/}

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 25 July 1967, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.