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 ASSEMBLY**

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**FOURTH COMMITTEE, 1069th
 MEETING**

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Chairman: Mr. Adnan M. PACHACHI (Iraq).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Ortiz de Rozas (Argentina), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 45

Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi (A/4404, part I, chap. VI, sect. G and part II, chap. II; A/C.4/455-457) (continued)

HEARING OF PETITIONERS (continued)

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Aloys Munyangaju, representative of the Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse (APROSOMA), Mr. Jean Birihanyuna, Mr. Joseph Biroli, Mr. Pierre Burarame and Mr. Pascal Mbuziyonja, representatives of the Front commun, Mr. Anastase Makuza and Mr. Lazare Mpakaniye, representatives of the Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu (PARMEHUTU), Mr. Prosper Bwanakweri, representative of the Rassemblement démocratique ruandais (RADER), Mr. Michel Kayihura, Mr. Barnabas Nkikabahizi, Mr. Cosmos Rebero, Mr. Joseph Rutsindintwarane and Mr. Michel Rwagasana, representatives of the Union nationale ruandaise (UNAR) and Mr. Alexandre Rutera took places at the Committee table.

1. Mr. SIDI BABA (Morocco) said that one of the petitioners representing PARMEHUTU had claimed that the Mwami of Ruanda had espoused the cause of a fraction of the population. He asked the petitioners whether in taking that attitude the Mwami had based himself on consideration of race or whether he had adopted it on nationalist and anti-colonialist grounds.

2. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandaise) said that his party was not a monarchist but a nationalist party. The Mwami had not identified himself with any political party and had always said that he was above party considerations. It had been claimed that he belonged to UNAR but the truth was that, in pressing for self-government and the termination of the trusteeship, the Mwami had merely expressed views which coincided with those of UNAR.

3. Mr. MUNYANGAJU (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse) said that what mattered was what the Mwami did rather than what he said and the facts did not support the statement that the Mwami stood above party interests. The national cause was

embraced by all parties; if the Mwami was above party, it seemed strange that he should have accused APROSOMA of being in the pay of the Belgian Government. The interests with which the Mwami had identified himself, despite his oath as a constitutional monarch, were partisan rather than ethnic, for there were Tutsi and Hutu in both camps.

4. Mr. MAKUZA (Parti de mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) said that the facts made it evident that the Mwami had championed one political party, namely the party which represented his clan. He had no sooner come to the throne than he had deprived the Hutu movement of its leaders, well knowing that there were a number of different parties in the country. When the disturbances had broken out, the Mwami's actions had all favoured UNAR and that party had refused to allow any other party or indeed anyone else who was not a member of the Tutsi clan to approach him. That had been confirmed by Mr. Bwanakweri's statement before the Committee at the 1067th meeting. During the disturbances of 1959, the headquarters of UNAR had been with the Mwami and it had sent orders to strike down the opposition leaders; if the Mwami was above party, it seemed odd that only Hutu had been killed while the Tutsi had been spared.

5. After the disturbances, the Mwami had been approached by men of good will and asked to adopt a less partisan attitude, in order to avoid his being denounced by the other political parties; but he had chosen to stand up for feudalism and for his clan and party, and PARMEHUTU therefore felt that he should be removed.

6. Again, the Mwami had flatly rejected both the proposal that he should be guided by a body of four advisers chosen by the leading parties and the proposal that his actions should be endorsed by the all-party Provisional Special Council. He had vouchsafed no reply to the request that the Kalinga (royal drum), a symbol of humiliation for the Hutu, should be abolished.

7. In all circumstances his party wished to have nothing further to do with the Mwami and it would not change its views.

8. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandaise) contended that there was no proof of the statements just made. He read out a proclamation by the Mwami dated 24 October 1959—before the disturbances—in which he had stated that he was above all political parties, and further proclamations dated 14 November and 16 November 1959 in which the Mwami had appealed for peace and order and had said that he disavowed any political party claiming to be under instructions from him to organize attacks; he had added that he was not the Mwami of any particular party but of all the Ruandese.

9. Mr. MAKUZA (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) said that although he believed that the Mwami had in fact made the statements attributed

to him by the previous speaker, he could only reiterate that the Mwami's actions belied his words.

10. Mr. RUTERA said that, as a priest and a nationalist, he could not support a party which was a tool of the Belgian Government. He could see no reason why the Mwami should be criticized for opposing parties which were in the pay of Belgians. The object of the Belgians was to keep the people in subjection. The Mwami could not be above party when it was a question of a puppet party.

11. He could not be expected to agree with Mr. Makuza if the latter chose to support the Belgians, who had done the country so much harm; but if Mr. Makuza were to favour the nationalist cause, then he would support him.

12. The CHAIRMAN appealed to the petitioners to confine themselves to giving answers to the questions and to refrain from indulging in personal recriminations.

13. Mr. REBERO (Union nationale ruandaise) deplored the fact that fabricated accusations had been levelled at the Mwami and the nationalist parties. To find solutions to the problems of Ruanda-Urundi, the people had to remember that the affairs of the country were in their own hands. The Belgian authorities had their own plans and, though they now recognized that they had made a mistake, they would not go back on those plans because they attached great importance to saving face. The anti-nationalists were supporting an Administration which had ruined the country and which could, moreover, abandon it, leaving the people of Ruanda-Urundi the task of rebuilding a ravaged land. When the people had been granted independence they would be able to solve their problems.

14. Mr. SIDI BABA (Morocco) asked to what extent the local institutions in Ruanda and Urundi were compatible with or adaptable to the requirements of a Ruanda-Urundian entity, and to what extent the general policy of the Belgian Administration relating to the future of the Territory took that unity into account. The United Nations had always treated Ruanda-Urundi as a juridical and political entity and he thought that it was a national entity, too.

15. Mr. KAYIHURA (Union nationale ruandaise) said that in recent times the Belgian Administration had worked hard to erect barriers between Ruanda and Urundi which, unless the United Nations acted swiftly, it would be almost impossible to destroy. Belgium had never been in favour of a union of the two States ("pays"), each one of which had had its own institutions, though at Usumbura there were higher administrative services common to them both. The Belgian authorities had never encouraged joint meetings between the High Councils of the two States or other bodies to discuss matters of common interest. A meeting held at Kitega in 1959 by the commissions du commerce of the two States had, to the best of his knowledge, been the only joint meeting of that kind. An example of the policy of dividing two peoples who spoke the same language and were of the same ethnic stock, and of systematically destroying the few remaining links between them was to be found in the reaction of the Belgian Resident in Urundi to the request of the Chairman of UNAR for permission to open a regional branch of the party at Usumbura; the request had been refused on the grounds that UNAR was a "foreign" party in Urundi. The fact that the

conference between political parties of Ruanda and the Belgian Minister for African Affairs had been distinct from that involving the political parties of Urundi, as also the existence of different electoral laws in the two States, were further evidence of Belgium's determination to ensure maximum differentiation between Ruanda and Urundi, so that unification would become impossible.

16. UNAR stood for the setting up of a unified State of Ruanda-Urundi.

17. Mr. MUNYANGAJU (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse) said that APROSOMA advocated the closest possible union with Urundi. Much would have to be done in that direction in the near future.

18. Mr. MAKUZA (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) said that, although the petitioners represented two opposing blocs, they were agreed on the need for union between Ruanda and Urundi. The difference between them arose from the way in which each assessed the situation. Thus, although he was not opposed to union and would be the first to applaud it, he doubted that the establishment of a unified State would be a success. The United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, had itself referred in its report (T/1538) to obstacles of a historical and sentimental origin. The solution advocated by his party was one of unity in diversity, in the form of a federation: the Ruanda-Urundian community would have at its head a federal parliament and a Head of State, both elected by universal suffrage. He doubted, however, whether even such a federation would be feasible so long as the two monarchies, which were the symbols of the historical particularism of Ruanda and of Urundi, remained in existence, for it would be impossible to impose the Mwami of Ruanda upon Urundi, or *vice versa*, and neither of them would submit to the exercise of supreme authority by a non-hereditary Head of State.

19. Mr. BWANAKWERI (Rassemblement démocratique ruandais) said that, although his party advocated the closest possible union and even the setting up of a unified State, it was in favour of federation as a first step and thought that the situation should be viewed realistically and the existence of rival kingdoms borne in mind. The question of the future relations between the two States should be decided by popular spokesmen, who would come to the fore after democratic elections. He thought that a formula that respected the two monarchies and brought them closely together would be acceptable. It would be unfortunate if the United Nations were to work out a solution to the problem of Ruanda-Urundi, only to find that it was rejected by the people.

20. Mr. SIDI BABA (Morocco) asked the petitioners whether they thought that immediate independence would eliminate the causes of discord by imposing upon the people, enjoying full rights of citizenship, the moral obligation of working for reconciliation and for the reconstruction of the country.

21. Mr. BWANAKWERI (Rassemblement démocratique ruandais) said that he had documentary evidence to support his view that the divisions among the people were caused by the policies of the colonialist Power, which sought to prevent the nationalist movements in the Territory from achieving inde-

pendence. The people of Ruanda-Urundi would be able to reach understanding among themselves, after the withdrawal of the Administering Authority.

22. Mr. MAKUZA (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) said that independence would solve Ruanda-Urundi's external problems but not its domestic problems. In other countries internal conflicts had not been solved by the attainment of independence. In his party's view the only cause of the division in the country was the centuries-old discriminatory doctrine according to which the Bantus were an inferior race. If the Tutsi gained power after the attainment of independence they would finish what they had begun in November 1959, namely the annihilation of the liberators of the people; the Bantus would naturally defend themselves and the consequences could easily be foreseen. Hence if civil war was to be avoided the domestic conflict should be settled before the attainment of independence.

23. He wished to amplify the reply he had given to the representative of Guinea at the previous meeting on the subject of the target date for independence. PARMEHUTU considered that a round-table conference should be held after the elections of January 1961, when a target date for independence could be fixed. His party had not yet reached a definite decision with regard to a target date. It desired independence as soon as possible and would come to a decision on the point during the round-table conference.

24. Mr. BIROLI (Front commun) said that the principle of independence for Ruanda-Urundi had already been agreed upon and a procedure had been proposed by the United Nations which his party could accept, though it was ready to discuss the matter again if any further proposals were made. The point at issue now should not be the principle of independence but the devising of means to set up an independent Ruanda-Urundi.

25. Mr. MUNYANGAJU (Association pour la promotion sociale de la masse) said that his party desired genuine independence and not the mere absence of political subjection. It wanted Ruanda-Urundi to be free to manage its own affairs without any outside interference. It was the duty of the United Nations to ascertain whether Ruanda-Urundi had reached that stage and, if it had not, prepare it for independence.

26. Mr. RWAGASANA (Union nationale ruandaise) said that at a meeting in Ruanda, reported in the *Bulletin officiel* of 3 September 1960, Mr. Makuza had addressed seventy settlers and other agents of the Administration. He had said that a number of Europeans were planning to leave the Territory but that there was no necessity for panic; that the Hutu parties, which represented 85 per cent of the voters, were fighting against the outmoded feudal system and were pro-Western, and that the Hutu wished for independence, though not necessarily at once, and wanted self-government immediately. The Hutu, he had added, were not in favour of the Africanization of the civil service; they wished the Europeans to train indigenous personnel and to remain in the Territory and work with them on an equal footing. The Hutu, according to Mr. Makuza, were opposed to the departure of the Europeans and wanted Belgian troops to be maintained in the Territory, and even reinforced, and two Belgian

bases to be installed in Ruanda after the achievement of independence.

27. Such statements were alarming when made by responsible persons. UNAR held, as the Chairman of RADER had said, that independence would be the only way to put an end to internal dissension. UNAR was not hostile to Belgian experts and technicians but it was opposed to Belgian colonialism.

28. Mr. MAKUZA (Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu) denied having made the statement attributed to him by Mr. Rwagasana. It was not true that he was opposed to the Africanization of the civil service; he was opposed to its feudalization. He was an enemy of feudalism because it oppressed his people and because it had allied itself with colonialism.

29. He would like his country to have a national base to maintain law and order after the termination of the trusteeship, but to say that he was in favour of the installation of foreign bases was going too far.

30. The 1960 Visiting Mission had expressed the hope that Belgium would be in a position to request the General Assembly to discuss the question of the independence of Ruanda-Urundi at its 1961 session. PARMEHUTU based its programme on that presumption and would maintain that position.

31. Mr. HUSAIN (Pakistan) said that he had one or two general questions to ask of all the petitioners. Formerly he had been under the impression that if the conflict between Ruanda and Urundi and that between the Hutu and the Tutsi could be settled the problem of the Territory would be solved. It now appeared that the matter was more complicated. The people were at variance and Belgium was failing to bring about reconciliation and was suspected, at least by one party, of encouraging another party to the detriment of the rest. Some of the parties wished the Administering Authority to place the power in their hands and then to leave the Territory, hoping in that way to be able to demolish their adversaries. Other parties wished the Administering Authority to leave immediately, thinking that they would then be able to seize power themselves. Independence achieved in such circumstances could lead only to anarchy and bloodshed.

32. He therefore asked the petitioners whether it was utterly impossible for the parties to be reconciled without the intervention of Belgium, the United Nations or any other outside agency and to devise a formula to put an end to internecine warfare. The United Nations did not want another Congo. He felt the petitioners relied too much on the United Nations; they wanted not only an army, as the Congo had done, but also a prefabricated pattern for the future. He hoped it would be possible for the people of Ruanda-Urundi to solve their own problems. The trusteeship should be continued until that had been done, since the people should not be left alone to fight each other.

33. Mr. REBERO (Union nationale ruandaise) said that his party had always wished for reconciliation, but that as long as the promoters of conflict remained active it would be impossible. If the Belgian Govern-

ment were ready to change its policy there would be no problem, but it had no intention of changing. All the Ruandese desired harmony and the prosperity of their country. The problem was capable of solution but there must be good will on both sides.

34. The CHAIRMAN said that any other petitioners who wished to reply to the question would have an opportunity of doing so at the following meeting.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.