REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION ALONG THE CEASE-FIRE LINE IN KASHMIR

1. In view of the request submitted by nine members of the Security Council for an urgent meeting of the Council "to consider the recent deteriorating situation which has led to armed clashes between India and Pakistan" (S/10411), the Secretary-General considers it appropriate to make available to the members of the Council the following information regarding the situation along the cease-fire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This information is based on reports from Lieutenant-General Luis Tassara Gonzalez, the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which is charged with the supervision of the cease-fire agreement entered into by the parties at Karachi on 27 July 1949.\(^1\) The United Nations has no military observation machinery in any other part of the sub-continent.

2. The Chief Military Observer reported that the situation as of 29 November 1971 was as follows:

(a) Forces of both sides were deployed in battle positions for the stated purpose of meeting a threat from the opposite side. All formation (i.e. divisional) headquarters had also moved into tactical positions in the field.

(b) Both parties had contravened the Karachi Agreement by strengthening their forward defended localities, by the laying of minefields, constructing new unauthorized positions and constructing additional defences in authorized

\(^1\) For information concerning the functioning of UNMOGIP, see S/6651, para. 3, and S/6888, paras. 2-5. For the text of the Karachi Agreement, see S/1430, Annex 25.
positions. The Indian military authorities stated that they had authorized commanders to prepare or construct any defences considered necessary for the security of their areas. The Pakistan military authorities asserted that they were taking defensive measures only as a reaction to a threat from India and would continue to do so as necessary, irrespective of the provisions of the Karachi Agreement.

(c) The Indian military authorities had admitted that, since 20 October 1971, they had strengthened their forces in Jammu and Kashmir by a considerable number, thus exceeding the authorized level of troops in Jammu and Kashmir under the Karachi Agreement, and that they would continue to do so as considered necessary for the security of Indian territory.

(d) The Chief Military Observer found that Pakistan had also introduced additional forces on its side of the cease-fire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, without (as of 27 November) exceeding the permissible level. This finding was not denied by the Pakistan military authorities.

(e) As from 21 October 1971 (see sub-para. 2 (a) and 2 (b) above), the Chief Military Observer had awarded "over-all" violations to both India and Pakistan for their breaches of the Karachi Agreement under the following categories, in respect of which one or both of the parties had in effect admitted systematic non-observance of the Agreement:

(i) Laying of new minesfields;
(ii) Reinforcing or existing defended localities with men and warlike stores;
(iii) Strengthening of defences;
(iv) The forward movement from outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir of personnel other than for reliefs and maintenance.

Complaints of individual violations under these categories were being kept on record but, in view of the positions of the parties as indicated in sub-para. 2 (a) and 2 (b) above, they would not as a rule be investigated until the parties resumed full observance of the Karachi Agreement.

(f) Complaints of individual breaches were still being investigated as usual, and violations awarded as appropriate, under the following categories:
(i) Overflights;
(ii) Entering the 500-yard zone;
(iii) Crossing the cease-fire line;
(iv) Firing and use of explosives within five miles of the cease-fire line;
(v) Construction of new positions in the 500-yard zone or increase of defences in existing positions in that zone.

(g) Both India and Pakistan were continuing to use the machinery of UNMOGIP for lodging complaints of alleged cease-fire violations, and both were affording facilities and permitting the movement of United Nations Military Observers to carry out investigations. Apart from complaints alleging the strengthening of defences, complaints had been lodged since 21 October 1971 as follows:

(i) Complaints by India alleging firing by Pakistan forces, 49; entering 500-yard zone, five; crossing cease-fire line, 10.
(ii) Complaints by Pakistan alleging firing by Indian forces, 28; entering 500-yard zone, six; crossing cease-fire line, two.

Violations have been awarded as appropriate.

(h) Current developments in East Pakistan had naturally affected the climate along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and have caused tension to run high, resulting in a tendency by both sides to exchange fire at the slightest provocation. However, such firing had in the main been confined to small patrol clashes or firing from a post at a patrol moving into the 500-yard zone. Apart from one instance on 12 November 1971 where 81 mm mortars were used, firing had been confined to small arms and some 2-inch mortars.

(i) Both parties admitted that breaches of the Karachi Agreement were being committed by them for reasons which were said to be outside their military control, but they continued for the time being to use the machinery of UNMOGIP to prevent further escalation of the tense situation existing on the cease-fire line or a direct open confrontation between the two armies.

3. At 13.00 hours WPT on 3 December 1971, United Nations Military Observers reported movements of tanks and infantry in the Banihal sector of the cease-fire line. Shortly thereafter, the Pakistan Liaison Officer informed UNMOGIP that Indian forces had launched attacks along the cease-fire line and along the border.

1/ West Pakistan Time.
4. On 5 December 1971, the Chief Military Observer, on the basis of reports from United Nations Military Observers, reported as follows (all time indications WIT):

(a) Srinagar airfield bombed at 1745 hours on 3 December.

(b) United Nations Military Observers at Field Station Punch reported at 2020 hours that Pakistan troops had crossed the cease-fire line at the Punch crossing point (NR 0567) at 1910 hours. At 2140 hours, the station reported that shelling had commenced from the India side of the line toward the Pakistan side, and at 2256 hours it reported that the area of Punch was under fire from Pakistan artillery.

(c) Field station Kotli reported at 2145 hours that small-arms fire from Pakistan pickets towards Indian pickets had commenced at 1930 hours and was continuing.

(d) Field Station Jammu reported at 2245 hours that heavy artillery fire from both sides had commenced at 2215 hours and was continuing.

(e) Field Station Sialkot reported at 2250 hours that rounds of artillery were landing in their vicinity.

(f) Field Station Rajouri reported at 2250 hours that they had been informed by the local military authority that fighting was taking place along the cease-fire line from Punch to Neushera.

(g) The Chief Military Observer considers that hostilities along the cease-fire line have commenced, and he will instruct the Military Observers to remain at their stations.

5. At 1315 hours WIT on 4 December 1971, the following communication from the Chief of Army Staff India was received by the Chief Military Observer:

"Pakistan without any provocation attacked from 1630 IST {3 December} all the night our airfields Srinagar, Amritsar, Ambala (Punjab) Agra, Faridkot, Jodhpur (Rajasthan), Alwar (Rajasthan) and others, plus Pathankot.

After these air attacks, Pakistani troops crossed CFL in many locations and crossed border West Fazilka, West Ferozepore, West Dera Baba Nanak along the road Amritsar-Lahore. Pakistanis are still on India side. Indians have not yet crossed CFL and the border, but Indian planes went for air attacks in Pakistan side. Emergency is in effect in India from night 3/4 December."

1/ India Standard Time.
6. On 4 December 1971, the Chief Military Observer reported at 1100 hours WPT that during the past six hours ground activity along the cease-fire line had been relatively quiet, with no major incidents reported. There had been considerable isolated air activity on both sides. Reports from United Nations Military Observers were received as follows (all time indications WPT):

(a) Field Station Jammu reported at 0850 hours that Pakistan aircraft were over the city and being engaged by anti-aircraft artillery.

(b) Field Station Kotli reported at 0900 hours that two Indian jets were over the town, heading south west.

(c) Field Station Jammu reported at 0905 hours an air fight approximately 10 miles north west of Jammu.

(d) Field Station Bhimber reported at 0950 hours that two Indian jets had bombed the town. One bomb fell 200 yards from the Field Station, which is now operating from an underground shelter.

(e) Field Station Jammu again reported at 1020 hours Pakistan aircraft over-flying the city.

(f) UNMOGIP Headquarters Rawalpindi reported that at 1030 hours two Indian aircraft attacked Chaklala Airport, Rawalpindi, with rockets and cannon.

(g) Field Station Kotli reported at 1045 hours Indian aircraft attacking the airfield. Field Station Sialkot also reported Indian aircraft strafing the city.