



C O N T E N T S

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Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/1881, A/2187, A/C.1/L.1 and A/C.1/L.2) (continued)	11

Chairman: Mr. João Carlos MUNIZ (Brazil).

Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (A/1881, A/2187, A/C.1/L.1 and A/C.1/L.2) (continued)

[Item 16 a]*

1. The CHAIRMAN recalled that, by General Assembly resolution 507 (VI), the sixth session of the Assembly postponed the consideration of the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. There were consequently two reports under this item (documents A/1881 and A/2187).

2. Mr. PUNYARATABHAN (Thailand), speaking on a point of order, observed that Thailand was a member of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, the reports of which dealt at length with the political developments and the economic and financial situation of the Republic of Korea. His delegation was of the opinion that it would be only just that a representative of the Republic of Korea, an independent sovereign State, be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in a discussion of that item on the agenda. He thereupon submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.1) to that effect.

3. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said there was no need to stress the extent to which the Koreans themselves were interested in the discussions of this question on the agenda and he quoted from a cablegram (A/C.1/L.2) dated 17 October 1952 addressed to the President of the General Assembly from the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea requesting permission to be heard. The USSR delegation regarded the demand of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea as just and introduced a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.2) to invite its representatives to participate in the consideration of the question. The USSR representative also said that his delegation had no objection to the Thailand draft resolution.

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

4. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-CAKARTOVA (Czechoslovakia) stated that it was the task of the United Nations not merely to discuss the question but also to make a contribution to the immediate restoration of peace in Korea, to the cessation of bloodshed and the horrors of the Korean war, to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and to the securing of Korea's independence. Bearing these tasks in mind, it was essential that representatives of the people of Korea be present. Therefore the Czechoslovak delegation supported the USSR draft resolution.

5. Mr. ACHESON (United States of America), in supporting the Thailand draft resolution, recalled that the Republic of Korea was the innocent victim of the aggression which the United Nations found had taken place and had been a partner in the struggle to resist it. The Republic of Korea had participated in the discussions in the past and it was only proper it should be there now. The United States representative added that the North Koreans, who had been found by the United Nations to be the aggressors, had no place at the General Assembly. The proper place for the aggressor, if any place were proper for him, was in the tent at Panmunjom. He earnestly solicited the votes of his colleagues to reject the USSR draft resolution.

6. Mr. POLITIS (Greece) stated that his delegation supported the Thailand draft resolution. With regard to the USSR draft resolution, he said it was inadmissible not only for reasons of law but also for those of elementary morality. It was inadmissible for reasons of law because, in the present case, it was not simply a distinction between the United Nations, on the one hand, and a non-Member State on the other, but of the United Nations and an aggressor. The Charter imposed preliminary conditions for the admission of a third party when it was to be heard by the Organization. Therefore, the aggression must cease before any direct contact could be considered between the United Nations and the adversary.

7. The United Nations had never concealed its desire to achieve an honourable cessation of hostilities, which depended on the final success of the armistice negotia-

tions. Those negotiations should continue on a military level, without the intervention of the General Assembly. When they had been completed, consideration could be given to inviting the adversary to express his views.

8. Reasons of morality militated against having the aggressor present. The blood of United Nations soldiers was being shed in Korea, and the Members could not admit to the Assembly those who were causing bloodshed. Public opinion could not permit such a flagrant moral abdication. The Greek delegation also believed the hour was too serious for the Committee to allow further propaganda speeches.

9. For these reasons, he concluded, his delegation would oppose the USSR draft proposal.

10. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), in supporting the USSR draft resolution, said that the People's Democratic Republic of Korea should be given an opportunity to tell the true facts about Korea, the unheard of brutalities of the aggressor, the destruction of peaceful cities and towns, the mass annihilation of the peace-loving people by barbarous bombing, and chemical and bacterial warfare. His delegation did not believe the United Nations, in whose name the United States was waging war against the Korean people, could consider and, much less, decide questions relating to the unification and reconstruction of Korea without granting a hearing to the representatives of the Korean people.

11. Mr. SARPEN (Turkey) said his delegation would support the Thailand draft resolution and oppose the USSR draft proposal to invite participation by representatives of a party then fighting against the United Nations. The North Koreans and Chinese Communists should first stop killing United Nations soldiers. The Turkish delegation reserved its position on the USSR motion once fighting had ceased.

12. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that the representative of the United States had again displayed his inconsistency in protesting against inviting representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea to participate in the discussion of the Korean question on the grounds that they had been determined to be the aggressor. The USSR representative said he would let pass the obvious fact that the accusation was unjust and totally unfounded. Evidence had been repeatedly produced at past Assembly sessions by the USSR delegation proving the accusation to be spurious and false.

13. On the other hand, the representative of the United States did not object to United States generals and diplomats conducting negotiations with those same representatives of North Korea at Panmunjom. Why was it permissible to enter into negotiations there but inadmissible for those same representatives to be present at the United Nations, especially since they were the representatives of the whole Korean people? There were two yardsticks of truth, one for oneself and the other for others. That indicated from the outset that consideration of the Korean question would not materialize into a concrete solution capable of bringing about peace in Korea or of settling the numerous difficulties complicating international relations.

14. In referring to the statement of the Greek representative, Mr. Vyshinsky observed that the consideration of the Korean question would be transferred into a hollow comedy if the Greek representative spoke of public opinion which had many times been suppressed by his Government.

15. In maintaining his delegation's proposal, he asked the representatives of other delegations to espouse a more just position, one which would be in keeping with the principles of the United Nations as an instrument of peace, and to put an end to a war which the American interventionists had unleashed and had been prosecuting in Korea for two years.

16. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland) said that statements made in the general debate and in the First Committee indicated that a number of delegations were fully aware of the significance of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question for the development of the United Nations and for its maintenance as a proper instrument for the solution of international disputes. His delegation expected these delegations to persevere in their endeavours to create a judicious atmosphere for the consideration and solution of the question. Mr. Skrzyszewski pointed out that while the members of the Committee were sitting in the meeting room, people were dying on the battlefields in Korea. American bombs were raining on cities, towns and villages, destroying human lives and property.

17. An appropriate solution by the General Assembly would make it possible to end hostilities and eliminate one of the neuralgic pains aggravating the international situation.

18. The proceedings of the Committee, in his opinion, should be so organized as to enable it to consider the question comprehensively and be acquainted with and apprised of all the arguments, particularly those which might be brought up by the parties. All that was essential for any objective and fair consideration of the Korean question. Consequently, the Polish delegation wholeheartedly supported the USSR draft proposal.

19. Mr. Skrzyszewski recalled that the United States delegation had had the question of North Korean representation moved from the General Committee to the plenary meeting of the General Assembly and to the First Committee. Then it had introduced, as a pretext for voting against the USSR draft motion, the idea that North Korea was the aggressor. As the USSR representative had pointed out, that view was incorrect and unjust. All the peoples of the world knew that the United States was the aggressor. The North Korean representatives would be highly unpleasant witnesses the United States Government would not want the Committee to hear. But such a situation would be unfair. It would be immoral not to invite the victim of aggression, and that victim was North Korea, to participate in the objective consideration of the problem.

20. Mr. Zafrulla KHAN (Pakistan) said that his delegation would support the Thailand draft resolution.

21. North Korea had been and continued to be guilty of aggression. On account of that aggression, the United Nations had embarked on a certain course to abate it. After it had been abated, the General Assembly resolutions with respect to Korea could become effective. The military action, although it involved all the

fighting, suffering and consequent distress, was not an ordinary military conflict between two Powers. The United Nations forces would not embark upon any military action except in support of a moral cause. That was happening in Korea. Of the rightness of that cause, the Pakistan delegation entertained no doubt whatsoever. Secret military measures to be taken in support of that cause would not be discussed and therefore no information would be divulged which ought to be kept secret. Considerations of a different character would apply to these discussions than would normally apply between two belligerents which had entered upon a military conquest in support of their own particular interests.

22. The aggressor had requested to be heard while the United Nations was deliberating the measures needed to put an end to the aggression and the course to be followed after it had been abated in order to give effect to the resolutions of the United Nations with regard to the unification and rehabilitation of Korea. If the representatives of North Korea were present, they would not be able to dislodge the Committee from the position it had adopted. If they were heard, one of two results would follow. One, they would be as unreasonable as they had been to begin with, still bent upon the course that the United Nations had condemned and pledged to stop and abate. In that case the United Nations would occupy a stronger position than ever before. Or, there was the possibility that what they said might reflect on factors which had not been fully considered previously and which might enable the United Nations to achieve its objective more speedily.

23. Mr. Khan remarked that it might be said to be a vain hope and that, if they were invited, they would abuse the invitation, and that it would only be a propaganda effort. However, all the propaganda they might make was already being made or would be made here on their behalf. The propaganda, therefore, was not frightening. Korea was not the disease, it was a symptom. It behooved the representatives not to let slip any opportunity, however dim the hope, to lead mankind towards peace. It was because of that consideration that the Pakistani delegation would support the USSR draft proposal.

24. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) observed that as the question was procedural, he would not respond to some of the provocative statements which had been made. He agreed with the representative of Pakistan that the representatives of South Korea should be present at the deliberations and that North Korea had been the aggressor. However, he did not believe the North Koreans should be invited to come to the United Nations, although the fact that they were the aggressors should not be the decisive reason. The United Kingdom delegation applied one simple test: would their presence assist in stopping, as quickly as possible on honourable terms, the Korean conflict? He did not believe it would.

25. The representative of the United Kingdom did not believe, as had been suggested by the USSR representative, that the fact that discussions were going on in Panmunjom between the representatives of the United Nations Command and the North Koreans was a reason for inviting the North Koreans here. It had

been seen over many months what came of those negotiations and, looking at them as an attempt to secure a military armistice, it was much better that they should continue. Although there was no reason to fear any propaganda speeches made by the representatives of North Korea, the Committee would have to listen hour after hour to a discussion, a tirade of abuse of the other side. That was not the atmosphere in which to begin the discussions upon Korea. He asked if it were not possible to take the matter off the platform of propaganda and, as reasonable people, to pool their ideas as to how to find a solution to the question. He thought that most of the delegations believed it was possible to find a solution.

26. Mr. POLITIS (Greece) wished to state that he was rather surprised to hear Mr. Vyshinsky, of all people, speaking about hangmen.

27. Mrs. SEKANINOVA-ČAKRTOVA (Czechoslovakia) observed that in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the requirements of justice, whenever a question was discussed which concerned any party, that party should be invited to participate in the discussion. Since no one would deny that the people of Korea, who had become the victims of United States aggression were affected by this discussion, it was only fair to invite their representatives to participate. She recalled the cases of the former Italian colonies and of Palestine, during discussion of which the parties concerned had participated, and pointed out that recently, especially since the beginning of aggressive action in Korea, the United States, with the help of groups of countries supporting its policy, had introduced a new practice consisting of arbitrary and unilateral consideration of problems without the participation of the parties concerned. She called upon delegations to put an end to those illegal methods which would only lessen the prestige and authority of the United Nations and threaten the outcome of the discussion. The representative of Czechoslovakia said that the United States delegation would like to force the General Assembly to consider the Korean question on the basis of a one-sided American version of events and that its opposition to the participation of representatives of North Korea in the discussions was based on fear.

28. If the Committee wished to maintain its self-respect and not undermine the authority of the United Nations, it must oppose all attempts by the United States delegation to prevent participation by representatives of North Korea and accept the USSR draft proposal.

29. Mr. LUNS (Netherlands) supported the Thailand draft resolution but opposed the USSR draft resolution in the belief that, as long as North Korea continued to flout the United Nations by persisting in its aggression against the Republic of Korea, its representatives should not be invited to take part in the debate. Not until a cease-fire was arrived at by military negotiations at Panmunjom could valid reasons be advanced for inviting political representatives to take part in discussions for the political solution.

30. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) observed that the representative of the United States had objected to the USSR draft proposal

because North Korea had attacked South Korea and was the aggressor. He pointed out that that assertion had been repeatedly refuted by documents seized in the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Korea at Seoul, testimony from former members of Syngman Rhee's Government, geographical maps and other evidence. The whole world was aware of and protested against the bloodshed now going on in Korea, the bloodthirsty bombing of towns and villages, the brutal treatment of prisoners of war, the germ warfare carried on by the United States, and, finally, the Pharisaiical talks that had been conducted in Korea for almost fifteen months and which were being wrecked on account of the attitude of the United States participants.

31. The representative of the Byelorussian SSR asked why it was that the United States, which had been talking to North Korean authorities at Panmunjom for fifteen months, was unwilling to allow these representatives to be heard in a Committee of sixty Members who were anxious to ascertain the truth? The only answer was that the United States was afraid of the truth. The Committee should invite both parties in order to ascertain the truth concerning the events occurring in Korea. For that reason his delegation supported the USSR draft resolution.

32. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) said that it was an established fact that the United Nations was carrying on negotiations with North Korea and by so doing had recognized North Korea as a party to a military conflict. That conflict was one of the most important aspects of the Korean question that the Committee had to consider. Without expressing any judgment as to the merits of the conflict, the representative of Indonesia considered that representatives of both North and South Korea should be allowed to participate in the debate without vote. He therefore expressed his delegation's support of both draft resolutions.

33. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) said that he had been impressed by the argument put forward by the representative of Pakistan but considered its premise faulty in the sense that the question to be answered was what purpose would be served by accepting the USSR draft proposal. He considered that it was one thing to treat with a representative on the field of battle and altogether a different matter to ask the perpetrator of an aggression to sit, even without vote, and discuss matters which should be discussed on the field of battle. Since there seemingly remained only one outstanding issue between the parties to the present conflict, he questioned whether such an issue should be considered in such a deliberative body as the Committee.

34. He agreed with the representative of the United Kingdom that the propaganda protestation and vituperation that he believed would result from participation by the North Koreans would not produce a climate calculated to bring about a settlement of the disastrous situation of which the United Nations was not the author.

35. The representative of Canada observed that, if the representatives of North Korea were invited to participate in the discussions, the Committee would have to listen to vituperation like that practised by the North Koreans at a meeting of the International Red Cross in Canada during the summer.

36. He then quoted Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Charter and observed that the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the Charter had not been observed by North Korea.

37. For those reasons, the Canadian delegation opposed the USSR draft resolution, supported the Thailand draft resolution and reserved its position in regard to North Korean representation if and when an armistice were concluded.

38. Mr. SKRZESZEWSKI (Poland) said that in the course of previous debates, the representative of the United States had repeatedly charged the representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea with making the negotiations more difficult and preventing the conclusion of a rapid cease-fire. The representative of the United States had now stated that the North Korean representatives should go back to the tent at Panmunjom. The course of those negotiations and the fact that they had been suspended constituted a most urgent problem which would probably occupy a substantial part of the Committee's discussions.

39. It was well known, he added, that available information on the course of the negotiations was lopsided, originating exclusively from the United States which had proved to be interested in delaying negotiations and in extending the scope of the conflict and had even barred the door to those negotiations to its allies. The United States was attempting to hide the truth about the negotiations and to conceal the true nature of the North Korean proposals. For those reasons, among others, representatives of North Korea should be invited to the Assembly. World public opinion could then have an opportunity to learn the truth and to find out for what reason the negotiations had been protracted for 15 months. It was the unedifying privilege of the United States to have been linked in the records of history with the longest armistice negotiations ever to have occurred.

40. The Polish representative observed that the whole world wanted to see the Korean war, which was foisted on the North Koreans by the United States, end. The whole truth must be learned; this was one argument which militated in favour of inviting the representatives of North Korea, so that all evidence and all materials might be seen by the competent organs of the United Nations.

41. The only reason that the United States opposed that invitation to hear representatives of North Korea was that it feared their testimony since, far from being interested in the cessation of hostilities in Korea, it sought to distort and conceal the truth from the peoples of the world and of the United States. Since it was the United States which did not want an armistice and the North Koreans who were anxious to bring negotiations at Panmunjom to a conclusion as expeditiously as possible, he considered it all the more reason to hear the North Koreans in the General Assembly so that the United States might return as rapidly as possible to the tent at Panmunjom in order that the talks might be concluded as quickly as feasible.

42. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that the objections of the representative of the United Kingdom to the USSR draft resolution could be reduced to one sentence to the effect that no good would come of such a step. The repre-

representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and other States had objected to an invitation being extended to the North Korean authorities because they believed participation by representatives of the North Korean Government would not be helpful. A brief analysis of their argument showed how totally fallacious it was and that it had been devised to conceal their true motives.

43. It was an elementary rule that if an attempt were not made to hear both sides of the question, one could not hope to resolve the problem. When the USSR delegation pressed for a comprehensive study of the question the previous year, it was told that any intervention on the part of the United Nations would only harm the progress of negotiations in Panmunjom, hamper an agreement and perhaps impair the chances of such agreement. It would have appeared that intervention by the United Nations, which claimed to be an objective international organization, should have facilitated the solution of the dispute. The USSR delegation was told: no, not at all.

44. Almost a year had now lapsed; the armistice negotiations had been suspended; and the United States was obviously trying to confuse the issue in the United Nations. Until 18 October nothing was said of the new proposals made by the North Korean-Chinese Commands at Panmunjom.

45. Mr. Vyshinsky recalled that on 18 October 1952 the United States delegation had submitted a report to the General Assembly stating that on 25 September the United Nations Command had presented proposals, which on 8 October had been rejected by the Korean-Chinese party, who had suspended the negotiations.

46. The representative of the USSR observed that the events were actually quite different from those represented by the United States and he had told the General Assembly about them when he spoke on 18 October. On 8 October the Korean-Chinese Command had submitted proposals to the United States party and subsequently they were sent to General Clark and published in the *New York Times*. Those proposals opened the way for a peaceful settlement. Yet the Committee was now told that the North Koreans should go back to the tent at Panmunjom after the United States representatives had left the tent without answering Kim Il Sung's letter to General Clark.

47. Mr. Vyshinsky asked the representative of the United Kingdom how he could say that it would do no good to invite the representatives of North Korea to participate, on the grounds that nothing had been accomplished during the fifteen months of negotiation at Panmunjom since he had conceded that only the prisoner-of-war exchange remained unsolved. The United Kingdom representative had failed also to mention that agreement on all other questions had been reached because of the peace-loving concessions of the North Korean Government and the Chinese volunteers and not because of the bellicose and war-like attitude of the adverse party inspired by Syngman Rhee and his creatures.

48. The Soviet Union delegation was not suggesting that the armistice negotiations should be shifted from Panmunjom to New York or that germ warfare should be discussed. It only proposed that representatives of North Korea should be invited to the discussions of the

item on the agenda entitled "Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea." It was impossible to discuss unification fairly and comprehensively unless both parties participated in the discussions.

49. It was obvious that the crucial issue relating to the rehabilitation and unification of Korea was the question of the cessation of military operations and the withdrawal of all foreign troops and all volunteer detachments from Korean soil. Until those questions were solved, it would be impossible to reach agreement on its actual unification and rehabilitation. The Polish delegation had introduced a remarkable proposal in the General Assembly calling for the cessation of all military action on land, at sea and in the air; the return of all prisoners of war to their homeland in accordance with the standards of international law; and the withdrawal of all foreign troops, including Chinese detachments, from Korea. That should all be accomplished within two or three months. A peaceful settlement should be attained in Korea in the spirit of its unification, to be carried out by the Koreans themselves, under the supervision of a commission, with the participation of parties directly interested and other States, including States which did not take part in the hostilities. However, how could any of those questions be solved without entering into negotiations with the representatives of North Korea?

50. The unwillingness of certain delegations to enter into such negotiations was accounted for by their desire not take one step forward towards the cessation of hostilities and towards peace. Some people found it beneficial to go on fighting, but the United Nations should not be used as a shield to cover up that criminality which was being engaged in to enrich the American billionaires who were raking in profits on the Korean war. The conscience of mankind recoiled in revulsion against that attitude. If the United States, the United Kingdom, France and some other Powers supporting the policy of the United States really wanted to put an end to the Korean war, they would not consistently revert to the attitude which they had held for two and a half years. They could not keep saying who was the aggressor and who the victim. That had been solved in the annals of history. Practical measures for the cessation of hostilities must be discussed. If Members did not wish to have anything to do with North Korea, how could they say they were anxious to attain a peaceful settlement of a dispute to which Korea was one of the parties and not the weakest one either. Was it that they wished to talk only when a State was powerful? Once the North Koreans showed their strength, they sat down at the same table with them. But now they hoped that they had accumulated enough forces to enter battle again and therefore they no longer wished to talk.

51. Morally speaking, to say nothing of the legal point of view, there was no justification for saying that it was improper to have the representatives of the North Korean people come to state their views, with a view to settling the Korean situation. It was said that no good would come of it. Why not try? Had not the negotiations at Panmunjom been begun as a result of the initiative of the Soviet Union? Was it not responsible for the conditional and qualified cessation of hostilities which attended some of the negotiations?

52. The USSR representative concluded that he realized how the voting would run, but a number of representatives would agree that in voting against the USSR draft proposal they were demonstrating their dread of meeting the representatives of the Korean people face to face and their unwillingness to move one step forward to the solution of the Korean question.

53. Mr. DE SOUZA GOMES (Brazil) said that he had followed with close attention the statement of the representative of Pakistan; he regretted that his delegation could not agree with the conclusions arrived at by the representative of Pakistan. He added that his delegation would have had no objection to the calling of two parties engaged in a war and having equal rights and prerogatives, but at present the Committee was concerned on the one hand with forces in the service of justice and law and on the other hand with the representatives of an aggressive group. His delegation therefore could not support the view of inviting North Koreans who had been declared to be aggressor.

54. Mr. Souza Gomes also pointed out that the contradictions stressed by the USSR representative did not exist since at Panmunjom negotiations were being undertaken for an armistice while the Committee was trying to achieve a political settlement. He concluded by stating that his delegation would oppose the USSR proposal.

55. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) supported the invitation of South Korea as proposed by the representative of Thailand. He added that while he was not opposed in principle to inviting the North Koreans, he thought that the time was not yet ripe for sending such an invitation. At a later stage, however, when a cease-fire had taken place, there would be an opportunity for the North Korean authorities to take part in a final settlement of the Korean question. Mr. Jamali hoped that a cease-fire would be brought about immediately and recalled that his delegation along with the other Asian-Arab delegates had made an attempt to that end two years ago. In conclusion, he made an appeal for an immediate high-level discussion and an immediate cease-fire, after which the North Koreans could be invited there.

56. Mr. LÓPEZ (Philippines) said that his delegation had been much impressed by the statement of the representative of Pakistan, particularly by the view that by inviting the North Koreans the United Nations would not be leaving any stone unturned to restore peace in Korea. He thought that argument deserved serious consideration. After examining it his delegation had reached the conclusion that the North Korean authorities had available to them all normal avenues at Panmunjom or through appropriate communications to the United Nations for making known any proposals that they might have for the cessation of hostilities. He added that he could not accept the view that the North Koreans would put forward their proposals only if they were invited to appear before the United Nations. He did not believe that the North Korean authorities would stake the issue of war and peace on such a flimsy excuse. It appeared from the statements of some of the advocates of the North Koreans that the underlying idea in inviting the North Koreans was to enable them to tell the truth and not to help in finding a settlement. Mr. López added no imagination was required to un-

derstand what brand of truth the North Koreans would inflict upon the Committee. For these reasons his delegation would vote for the proposal submitted by the representative of Thailand and would vote against the USSR proposal.

57. Mr. ZEINEDDINE (Syria) observed that both the proposals before the Committee had the same objective, that of helping the Committee to be better informed. While both the South and North Koreans had excellent advocates on the Committee, he believed that the information would be more complete if given by the parties themselves. An invitation to North Korea did not imply any recognition beyond that which now existed and was merely a procedural matter. His delegation did not believe that hearing both sides would not assist the Assembly, and would wish at all times to meet the representatives of North Korea if they had constructive proposals to offer.

58. But while they agreed on the principle of inviting the North Koreans for purposes of seeking more information, they had to take also in view the situation that existed in Korea and the negotiations that were being held there. If the North Koreans were invited at this stage, it might create the impression that the United Nations had changed its attitude which would not only be contrary to fact but would also be misleading. For this reason the Syrian delegation would like to reserve its position and would abstain on the USSR proposal.

59. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) said that his delegation would support the proposal of the representative of Thailand because it believed that South Korea was a victim of aggression. As regards the USSR proposal his delegation intended to take a realistic view. There was no doubt that North Korea was an aggressor and was continuing the struggle against the United Nations forces; but that very fact made it a party to the war in Korea and to the armistice negotiations. It was possible that an invitation to the North Koreans might not serve any useful purpose but it was also possible that their presence might bring the solution a little nearer. An invitation to the North Koreans would not mean the cleansing of the aggressor of his guilt. Judgment had been pronounced. In this case, it was not a question of deciding who were the guilty parties. It was a question of exploring exhaustively all the possibilities for a settlement of the Korean question. He considered that the price of not attempting that effort might turn out to be too high. Mr. Santa Cruz concluded that he would not assume such a responsibility and for that reason would abstain from voting on the USSR proposal.

60. Mr. CASEY (Australia) pointed out that the simple fact was that following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and after an exhaustive examination of the evidence, the United Nations had branded North Korea as the aggressor. Thereafter many countries, including his own, sent troops to Korea and suffered heavy casualties. These were the simple reasons why the North Koreans should not be invited. Moreover, the United Nations was the deliberative assembly of the world and was not a court. If it were a police court it would have a dock and presumably North Korea would be in that dock. For that reason, Mr. Casey concluded, his delegation would support the proposal of the representative of Thailand.

61. Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma) regarded the two proposals before the Committee as a possible means of breaking the deadlock which had set in at Panmunjom. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of both the proposals. He added that his support of the USSR proposal did not change the attitude of his delegation which had joined other nations in condemning the North Korean aggression two years before.

62. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) said that his delegation would vote in favour of the proposal submitted by the representative of Thailand and would vote against the USSR proposal. His delegation was of the opinion that the presence of North Korean representatives would not at the moment lead to any practical result but would only subject the Committee to some more propaganda speeches. Mr. Hoppenot added that his delegation would however reserve the right to modify its present position if at a later stage of the discussion it should be thought that it would facilitate an early armistice to give the North Korean point of view a hearing.

63. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the Thailand draft resolution (A/C.1/L.1) which read as follows:

"The First Committee

"Decides that a representative of the Republic of Korea be invited to participate, without the right of vote, in the debates of the Committee on the agenda item, 'Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea'."

The draft resolution was adopted by 54 votes to 5, with 1 abstention.

64. The CHAIRMAN then put to the vote the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.2) which read as follows:

"The First Committee,

"Decides, in connexion with the consideration of the Korean question, to invite representatives of the Korean People's Democratic Republic to be present at the meetings of the Committee for the purpose of taking part in the discussion of this question."

The draft resolution was rejected by 38 votes to 11, with 8 abstentions.

65. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), in explaining his vote, stated that although the USSR delegation believed that both the North and South Korean representatives should be invited, it found itself unable to vote in favour of an invitation to South Korean representatives alone knowing in advance that the Thailand delegation itself, as well as many others, objected to the invitation being extended likewise to the representatives of North Korea.

66. Mr. VLAHOVIC (Yugoslavia), in explanation of his vote, stated that his delegation had abstained on both the proposals because his delegation did not see any useful purpose in inviting the two parties as their presence would not be of any help to the Committee in its work.

At the invitation of the Chairman, Mr. Pyun, representative of South Korea, took a seat at the Committee table.

67. Mr. ACHESON (United States of America) proposed adjournment of the meeting.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.